Shira Perlmutter v. Todd Blanche

                United States Court of Appeals
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                    ____________
No. 25-5285                                               September Term, 2025
                                                                      1:25-cv-01659-TJK
                                                      Filed On: September 10, 2025
Shira Perlmutter, Register of Copyrights and
Director of the U.S. Copyright Office,

             Appellant
      v.

Todd Blanche, in his capacity as the person
claiming to be acting Librarian of Congress,
et al.,

             Appellees

      BEFORE:       Walker*, Childs, and Pan, Circuit Judges

                                       ORDER

      Upon consideration of the emergency motion for injunction pending appeal, the
opposition thereto, the reply, and the letter regarding case status, it is

        ORDERED that the motion for injunction be granted to the extent that appellees
Todd Blanche, Paul Perkins, Sergio Gor, Trent Morse, and the Executive Office of the
President, and their subordinates and agents, are hereby enjoined from interfering with
appellant’s service as Register of Copyrights and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office
pending further order of the court. To that extent, appellant has satisfied the stringent
requirements for an injunction pending appeal. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 20

 (2008); D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal
Procedures 33 (2025); see also Severino v. Biden, 

71 F.4th 1038, 1042

 (D.C. Cir. 2023)
(explaining that a “court generally may not ‘enjoin the President in the performance of
his official duties’” (quoting Franklin v. Massachusetts, 

505 U.S. 788, 802-03

 (1992)
(plurality opinion))). A concurring statement of Circuit Judge Pan, joined by Circuit
Judge Childs, and a dissenting statement of Circuit Judge Walker are attached.

                                      Per Curiam

                                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                                        Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk

                                                BY:     /s/
                                                        Lynda M. Flippin
                                                        Deputy Clerk

* Circuit Judge Walker would deny the motion for injunction pending appeal.
PAN, Circuit Judge, joined by CHILDS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:

     The Register of Copyrights (the “Register”) is a unique
position within the Legislative Branch, housed within the
Library of Congress. The Register serves as the Director of the
U.S. Copyright Office and is the primary advisor to Congress
on copyright issues. 

17 U.S.C. § 701

(b)(1). The Librarian of
Congress appoints and supervises the Register. 

Id.

 § 701(a).
And only the Librarian of Congress has authority to remove the
Register. That much is undisputed.

      Shira Perlmutter has served as the Register since October
2020, when she was duly appointed by the Librarian of
Congress.      On May 9, 2025, Perlmutter released a
prepublication version of a report analyzing the use of
copyrighted materials to train generative artificial-intelligence
models (the “AI Report”). Perlmutter prepared the report in
fulfillment of her statutory duty to “[c]onduct studies” and
“[a]dvise Congress on national and international issues relating
to copyright.” 

17 U.S.C. § 701

(b)(1), (4). As Register, she
supports Congress’s enumerated constitutional power to enact
copyright laws that “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

     When Perlmutter’s AI Report was released, the President
allegedly disagreed with its recommendations. And the next
day — a Saturday — the White House Presidential Personnel
Office notified Perlmutter by email that she had been
terminated from her position “effective immediately.”

     Perlmutter sued to block her removal, seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. The district court denied Perlmutter’s
request for a preliminary injunction that would have allowed
her to remain in her post until the litigation concluded. The
district court based its ruling solely on its determination that
Perlmutter had failed to show that she would suffer irreparable
                                2

harm from her immediate removal. It relied on precedents
which hold that the President’s desire to remove an official who
exercises executive power generally outweighs the official’s
interest in performing her duties. But the district court abused
its discretion by failing to consider “unusual actions relating to
the discharge itself” and a “genuinely extraordinary situation”
— factors that inform the irreparable-harm analysis and
distinguish this case from other removal cases. Sampson v.
Murray, 

415 U.S. 61

, 92 n.68 (1974).

     The “unusual” and “extraordinary” features of this case
include the following: (1) Perlmutter alleges an unprecedented
violation of the separation of powers — she contends that the
President removed the Register, an official in the Legislative
Branch, based on his disagreement with advice that the
Register provided to Congress in support of its constitutional
power to formulate laws and policies concerning copyrights;
(2) the President’s removal of Perlmutter was likely unlawful;
and (3) Perlmutter likely does not exercise substantial
executive power, making this case markedly different from
most precedents addressing the removal of government
officials. Under the circumstances, the district court should
have weighed all the preliminary-injunction factors. Those
factors all favor granting Perlmutter’s requested preliminary
injunction.

                                I.

     Congress established the Library of Congress in 1800 as a
part of the Legislative Branch. See 

2 U.S.C. § 171

(1); Compl.,
ECF No. 1 ¶ 10 n.1 (citing Library of Congress Information
Bulletin (1984)). The Library “serves as the research arm of
Congress and is recognized as the national library of the United
States.”     Frequently Asked Questions, Libr. of Cong.,
https://perma.cc/6Z77-ZRE4. Congress provided the President
                               3

with authority to appoint the Librarian of Congress, who heads
the Library, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
See 

2 U.S.C. § 136-1

(a). The Librarian is appointed for a term
of ten years. 

Id.

 § 136-1(b).

     Housed within the Library of Congress is the U.S.
Copyright Office. The Constitution vests Congress with the
power to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Relying on that
constitutional authority, Congress has protected copyrights in
some form under federal law since 1790. See Act of May 31,
1790, ch. 15, 

1 Stat. 124

. And in 1897, Congress established
the Copyright Office within the Library of Congress. History
of U.S. Copyright Office, U.S. Copyright Off.,
https://perma.cc/BJ9R-2KTS.

      The Register of Copyrights oversees the Copyright Office
and administers the nation’s copyright system. The Register is
appointed by the Librarian of Congress and acts under the
Librarian’s general direction and supervision. See 

17 U.S.C. § 701

(a); Med. Imaging & Tech. All. v. Libr. of Cong., 

103 F.4th 830, 833

 (D.C. Cir. 2024). She “is the principal advisor to
Congress on national and international copyright matters,
testifying upon request and providing ongoing leadership and
impartial expertise on copyright law and policy.” Overview,
U.S. Copyright Off., https://perma.cc/6BQN-J5Z5; see also 

17 U.S.C. § 701

(b) (listing statutory functions of the Register).
The Office also “registers copyright claims, records
information about copyright ownership, provides information
to the public, and assists Congress and other parts of the
government on a wide range of copyright issues.” Overview,
U.S. Copyright Off., supra.
                               4

     By statute, the Librarian of Congress bears sole
responsibility for appointing the Register. The Librarian also
has sole authority to remove the Register. See Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Reagan, 

663 F.2d 239

, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(“Absent relevant legislation” “the power to remove is held by
the appointing authority, and only by the appointing
authority.”).

    In October 2020, the Librarian of Congress, Dr. Carla D.
Hayden, appointed Shira Perlmutter to serve as the Register.
On May 8, 2025, the President fired Hayden. Under the
regulations promulgated pursuant to 

2 U.S.C. § 136

 and
longstanding practice, the interim Principal Deputy Librarian,
Robert R. Newlen, replaced Hayden as Acting Librarian of
Congress. Newlen has been an employee of the Library of
Congress for more than forty years.

     On May 9, 2025, Perlmutter released the AI Report — a
prepublication version of a report analyzing the fair use
doctrine’s application to the use of copyrighted materials in the
training of generative AI models. She prepared the report
pursuant to the Register’s statutory responsibility to “[c]onduct
studies” and “[a]dvise Congress on national and international
issues relating to copyright,” 

17 U.S.C. § 701

(b)(1), (4). See
U.S. Copyright Off., Copyright and Artificial Intelligence Part
3: Generative AI Training (May 2025), https://perma.cc/3J9F-
7SQN. The AI Report concluded that some uses of copyrighted
works in generative AI training were likely to qualify as “fair
use,” but some uses were likely to require licensing. Compl. ¶
19. The Copyright Office is reportedly in the process of
finalizing a separate aspect of the report to Congress, which
will address the topic of potential liability for infringing AI
outputs.
                                5

     Perlmutter alleges that the President disagreed with her on
the substance of the AI Report, as evidenced by his subsequent
statements. On the day after the AI Report was released, May
10, 2025, Trent Morse, Deputy Assistant to the President and
Deputy Director of the White House Presidential Personnel
Office, sent an email to Perlmutter on behalf of the President,
stating that her “position as the Register of Copyrights and
Director at the U.S. Copyright Office is terminated effective
immediately.” Compl. ¶ 20.

     The President subsequently invoked the Federal Vacancies
Reform Act (“FVRA”), 

5 U.S.C. § 3345

(a), to purportedly
appoint Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche as Acting
Librarian of Congress. Blanche then purportedly appointed
Justice Department official Paul Perkins as Acting Register.

     Perlmutter sued the President and other officials in the
district court, arguing that her termination was unlawful. First,
she argued that only the Librarian of Congress — and not the
President — has the authority to fire her. Second, she argued
that Blanche was unlawfully appointed as Acting Librarian and
therefore lacks authority to ratify the President’s actions, i.e.,
to effectuate her termination.

     The district court denied Perlmutter’s requests for a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.
Perlmutter v. Blanche, No. 25-1659, 

2025 WL 2159197

, at *1
(D.D.C. July 30, 2025). The district court did not consider
whether Perlmutter was likely to succeed on the merits of her
claims; rather, the court denied Perlmutter’s motion solely by
evaluating irreparable harm. See 

id.

 at *2–8. Specifically, the
district court reasoned that Perlmutter’s asserted loss of her
“statutory right to function” was not a “genuinely extraordinary
situation such that her temporary removal is irreparable harm
— or at least, harm that outweighs any corresponding risk of
                               6

harm to the Government.” 

Id. at *7

. The district court relied
on the Supreme Court’s recent order in Trump v. Wilcox, which
states that the harm to the government “from an order allowing
a removed officer to continue exercising the executive power”
is generally greater than the harm to a government official who
is wrongfully removed. 

Id.

 at *5 (quoting 

145 S. Ct. 1415

,
1415 (2025)).

     Perlmutter filed an appeal and asked the district court for
a stay of its order pending appeal. The district court denied her
request. Perlmutter v. Blanche, No. 25-1659, 

2025 WL 2409755

, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2025).

    Perlmutter then filed the instant motion for an injunction
pending appeal, asking this court to “act swiftly to enjoin
Defendants from interfering with Perlmutter’s service as
Register during the pendency of this appeal.” Mot. at 3.

      Notwithstanding Perlmutter’s purported removal, and the
purported appointment of Blanche as Acting Librarian, it
appears that Perlmutter is still serving in her role as Register.
In support of her motion for a preliminary injunction in the
district court, Perlmutter asserted that, to her knowledge, “no
official at the Library of Congress has recognized Mr. Blanche
as the acting Librarian of Congress,” and that she “[remains]
Register of Copyrights and therefore [is] required by law to
fulfill [her] above-described statutory obligations.” ECF No.
24-3 at 4–5.

                               II.

     An injunction pending appeal is an “exceptional remedy,”
and the party seeking one on appeal from the denial of a
preliminary injunction faces the “difficult task” of showing that
the district court likely abused its discretion in denying
                                7

preliminary relief. John Doe Co. v. CFPB, 

849 F.3d 1129, 1131

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam). To obtain either a preliminary
injunction or an injunction pending appeal, the movant must
demonstrate (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a
likelihood of irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, (3) that
the balance of equities favors an injunction, and (4) that an
injunction is in the public interest. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 20

 (2008). “The first two factors of
the traditional standard are the most critical,” Nken v. Holder,

556 U.S. 418, 434

 (2009), and the showing of likelihood of
success must be “substantial,” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in
Wash. v. FEC, 

904 F.3d 1014, 1018

 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Where
the federal government is the opposing party — as is the case
here — the balance of equities and public interest factors
merge. Nken, 

556 U.S. at 435

.

     Winter “can be read to require movants to establish each
preliminary injunction factor independently.” Clevinger v.
Advoc. Holdings, Inc., 

134 F.4th 1230, 1235

 (D.C. Cir. 2025).
But in general, a “movant’s failure to show any irreparable
harm is grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction,
even if the other three factors merit such relief.” 

Id. at 1236

(cleaned up). In the context of the Executive’s removal of a
government employee, courts may consider “unusual actions
relating to the discharge itself” and “genuinely extraordinary
situation[s]” to support a finding of irreparable harm.
Sampson, 

415 U.S. at 92

 n.68. At bottom, an injunction is an
exercise of judicial discretion that turns on the circumstances
of the case. Winter, 

555 U.S. at 24

.

     In determining whether an injunction pending appeal is
warranted, we must evaluate whether the district court abused
its discretion, and that analysis necessarily overlaps with the
issues that will be raised in Perlmutter’s appeal of the
preliminary-injunction order. See John Doe, 

849 F.3d at 1131

.
                               8

We review the district court’s “legal conclusions as to each of
the four [preliminary-injunction] factors de novo, and its
weighing of them for abuse of discretion.” League of Women
Voters of U.S. v. Newby, 

838 F.3d 1, 6

 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

                              III.

     As previously noted, the district court’s order denying
injunctive relief rested solely on its determination that
Perlmutter had failed to show that she would suffer irreparable
harm if removed during the pendency of further proceedings.
The district court therefore performed no weighing of the other
preliminary-injunction factors. Although courts may generally
rely solely on a movant’s failure to show irreparable harm to
deny injunctive relief, the district court nonetheless erred in
this instance. The district court’s order leaned heavily on the
Supreme Court’s statement in Wilcox that “the Government
faces greater risk of harm from an order allowing a removed
officer to continue exercising the executive power than a
wrongfully removed officer faces from being unable to
perform her statutory duty” — but Wilcox addressed
circumstances that were different in important respects.
Perlmutter, 

2025 WL 2159197

, at *5 (quoting 145 S. Ct. at
1415). The district court also failed to appropriately follow the
Supreme Court’s guidance in Sampson that “unusual actions
relating to the discharge itself” and “genuinely extraordinary
situation[s]” can support a finding of irreparable harm. 

415 U.S. at 92

 n.68. In our view, the district court abused its
discretion by neglecting to adequately consider the specific
circumstances of this case.

     Perlmutter is employed by the Legislative Branch as
Register, a role that requires her to provide advice to Congress
about copyright issues. She alleges that the President sought
to remove her from her job because he disapproved of the
                                 9

advice that she gave to Congress in the AI Report. The
Executive’s alleged blatant interference with the work of a
Legislative Branch official, as she performs statutorily
authorized duties to advise Congress, strikes us as a violation
of the separation of powers that is significantly different in kind
and in degree from the cases that have come before. This case
is also distinguishable from Wilcox because of the diminished
amount of executive power that is at stake: The Register likely
does not exercise substantial executive power because the
position is housed within the Legislative Branch; its primary
responsibility is advising Congress on matters of copyright
law; and the President has no statutory removal authority over
the Register at all. And finally, it is significant that Perlmutter’s
removal was likely unlawful because the President has no
direct authority to fire her, and his installment of an Acting
Librarian of Congress was likely ineffective.

     On de novo review of the district court’s finding of no
irreparable harm, we reach the opposite conclusion: Based on
“unusual actions relating to the discharge itself” and
“genuinely extraordinary” circumstances, Sampson, 

415 U.S. at 92

 n.68, Perlmutter has demonstrated irreparable harm. The
other preliminary-injunction factors — Perlmutter’s likelihood
of success on the merits, the balance of equities, and the public
interest — also favor issuing an injunction pending appeal.

           A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

     Perlmutter’s purported removal was likely unlawful. The
Librarian of Congress — not the President — is authorized by
statute to appoint the Register. 

17 U.S.C. § 701

(a). And
because the governing statute is silent regarding the question
of removal, the Librarian — not the President — has the power
to remove Perlmutter. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 663
F.2d at 247 (“Absent relevant legislation” “the power to
                                 10

remove is held by the appointing authority, and only by the
appointing authority.”); see also Aviel v. Gor, No. 25-5105,

2025 WL 1600446

, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 2025) (Katsas, J.,
concurring) (citing Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 

561 U.S. 477

,
493, 509 (2010)). The government does not argue otherwise in
its opposition. Thus, the dispute on the merits focuses on the
appointment of the Acting Librarian of Congress. 1

    Blanche’s purported appointment to serve as Acting
Librarian of Congress was likely unlawful because any
Librarian appointee must be confirmed by the Senate, 

2 U.S.C. § 136-1

(a), but here, Senate approval is lacking. As a result,
Blanche’s purported appointment of Perkins to serve as Acting
Register also was likely unlawful. See 

17 U.S.C. § 701

(a).

     The FVRA is likely an unavailing workaround for the
government. That statute gives the President authority to
appoint another Senate-confirmed official as the acting
principal officer of an “Executive agency,” subject to certain
limitations. See 

5 U.S.C. § 3345

. The FVRA states that it is
“the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting
[principal] official.” 

Id.

 § 3347(a). And an action taken by any

1
      The government also argues that the President’s Article II duty
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. Const. art.
II, § 3, grants him unrestricted authority to designate an Acting
Librarian. We disagree. “The Appointments Clause prohibits the
appointment of principal officers without the advice and consent of
the Senate. Such consent ‘is a critical structural safeguard’ against
presidential overreach — a feature of our constitutional system, not
a bug.” Aviel, 

2025 WL 1600446

, at *2 (Katsas, J., concurring)
(quoting NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 

580 U.S. 288, 293

 (2017)). It “is
unlikely that the Take Care Clause gives the President unfettered
discretion to designate acting principal officers with neither Senate
confirmation nor a Senate recess nor even statutory authorization
through the FVRA.” 

Id.

                               11

person who was not properly appointed “shall have no force or
effect.” 

Id.

 § 3348(d)(1). For purposes of the FVRA, the
phrase “Executive agency” means (1) “an Executive
department,” (2) “a Government corporation,” or (3) “an
independent establishment.” Id. § 105.

      The plain language of the statute indicates that the Library
of Congress is not an “Executive agency” for purposes of the
FVRA. First, Title 5 specifically enumerates the “Executive
departments” and does not include the Library. See 

5 U.S.C. § 101

. Second, the Library is not a corporation owned by the
government, so it does not fit the statutory definition of
“Government corporation.” See 

id.

 § 103. Third, the Library
is likely not an “independent establishment” because it is not
“an establishment in the executive branch.” Id. § 104. In
determining whether an entity qualifies as an “independent
establishment,” we have previously looked to statutes where
Congress has treated the term “independent establishment” as
distinct from the entity in question. See Haddon v. Walters, 

43 F.3d 1488, 1490

 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (determining that the
“Executive residence” is not an “independent establishment”
by considering Congress’s separate use of both terms in the
U.S. Code). Such is the case here, where the U.S. Code refers
to the “Library of Congress” and “independent establishment”
as distinct entities. 5 U.S.C § 4101 (defining “independent
establishment” and the “Library of Congress” as separate
agencies).

    We also note that throughout Title 5, in which the FVRA
is codified, Congress commonly refers to the “Library of
Congress” as separate and distinct from an “Executive agency.”
See 

5 U.S.C. §§ 3102

(a)(1) (listing “the Library of Congress”
separately from the term “Executive agency”), 3401(1) (same),
4501(1) (same), 5102(a)(1) (same), 5521(1) (same), 5541(1)
(same), 5584(g) (same), 5595(a)(1) (same), 5921(2) (same),
                              12

5948(g)(2) (same), 6121(1) (same), 7103(a)(3) (same), 13101
(defining the “Library Congress” as a component of the
“legislative branch,” distinct from the “executive branch” and
“Executive agency”), 4101(1) (listing the “Library of
Congress” separately from “Executive department”); see also

2 U.S.C. § 181

(b)(1) (defining “offices and agencies of the
legislative branch” as including the Library of Congress);
Davis v. Billington, 

681 F.3d 377, 386

 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(analyzing the Civil Service Reform Act and concluding that
the statute’s use of the term “‘Executive agency’ . . . plainly
does not contain the Library of Congress within the meaning
of the statute” (citing 

5 U.S.C. § 7103

(a)(3))); Haddon, 

43 F.3d at 1490

 (similar). That lends further support to our conclusion.

                    B. Irreparable Harm

     We next turn to whether Perlmutter has shown that she is
likely to suffer irreparable harm if removed during the
pendency of her lawsuit. We hold that she has.

      The mere loss of government employment is normally not
enough to show irreparable harm during the pendency of
litigation about the employee’s removal because the plaintiff
usually can be made whole through the issuance of back pay.
See Sampson, 

415 U.S. at 91

 (Congress contemplated that the
Back Pay Act would be “the usual, if not the exclusive, remedy
for wrongful discharge.”). In Sampson, the Supreme Court
held that a probationary employee, who was terminated from
her job with the General Services Administration, failed to
make a showing of irreparable injury based on her claims of
lost income and reputational damage. 

Id. at 89

. The Court
observed that the administrative scheme governing civil
servants would be disrupted by temporary relief; that “the
Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude
in the dispatch of its own internal affairs”; and that courts of
                               13

equity generally are “unwilling” to enforce contracts for
personal service. 

Id. at 83

 (cleaned up). Under the
circumstances, the Court determined that a discharged
government employee must make a showing of irreparable
injury “sufficient in kind and degree to override these factors,”
which cut “against the general availability of preliminary
injunctions in Government personnel cases.” 

Id. at 84

.
Notably, however, the Court recognized that “cases may arise
in which the circumstances surrounding an employee’s
discharge, together with the resultant effect on the employee,
may so far depart from the normal situation that irreparable
injury might be found.” 

Id.

 at 92 n.68. Indeed, “genuinely
extraordinary situation[s],” such as those involving “any
unusual actions relating to the discharge itself,” might support
a finding of irreparable harm in cases that are not “routine.” 

Id.

     Perlmutter’s appointment as Register of Copyrights is
very different from the government employment at issue in
Sampson. The plaintiff in Sampson was a probationary
employee in her first year on the job. 415 U.S. at 63–64. By
contrast, Perlmutter is a government official engaged in
“lead[ing] and direct[ing] the important work of the Copyright
Office at a critical juncture.” Mot. at 19. In the unique role of
Register of Copyrights, Perlmutter has the opportunity to
influence Congress on copyright matters of national
importance, such as the development of generative AI. She
administers the Copyright Act, which requires the examination
of copyright applications, the issuance of copyright
registrations, the maintenance of copyright deposits, and the
recordation of transfers of copyright ownership. 

17 U.S.C. §§ 205

, 410–11, 705. She has rulemaking authority that is subject
to review by the Librarian of Congress. See 

id.

 § 702. And she
may set copyright fees, under the supervision of Congress. See
id. § 708(b)(5) (The Register must “prepare a proposed fee
schedule and submit the schedule with the accompanying
                               14

economic analysis to the Congress.”). Her statutory right to
function as the Register of Copyrights is thus far weightier than
the mere loss of income implicated in Sampson. See Wilcox,
145 S. Ct. at 1415 (recognizing that a “wrongfully removed
officer” faces “risk of harm” from “being unable to perform her
statutory duty”). The uniqueness of her role and the
opportunities it gives her “transcend[] the loss of income or
embarrassment involved in the typical employment action.”
Mot. at 19.

     To be sure, Perlmutter’s inability to perform her statutory
functions likely does not, in itself, constitute irreparable harm,
even if the harm is very significant. See Dellinger v. Bessent,
No. 25-5052, 

2025 WL 887518

, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 10, 2025)
(per curiam) (recognizing that the alleged deprivation of “the
statutory right to function” is not necessarily irreparable). But
here, there is more.

      Certain “unusual actions relating to the discharge itself”
and “genuinely extraordinary” circumstances also support a
finding of irreparable harm. Sampson, 

415 U.S. at 92

 n.68.
Unlike the plaintiff in Sampson, who claimed that her employer
had violated civil-service regulations, Perlmutter alleges that
the President of the United States unlawfully removed her in a
manner that violates the separation of powers. Perlmutter has
a statutory mandate to serve as the principal advisor to
Congress on issues of copyright, 

17 U.S.C. §§ 701

, 702, and
she plays a critical supporting role in Congress’s constitutional
mission to establish a system of copyright laws, U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The President purported to remove Perlmutter
because he allegedly disagreed with her conclusions in the AI
Report, which was prepared to assist Congress in the exercise
of its constitutional authority to make law and policy related to
copyrights. The President then purported to install Executive
Branch officials — Blanche and Perkins — as Acting Librarian
                                15

of Congress and Acting Register of Copyrights. If those facts
are proven true, that would be a grave intrusion by the
President into the constitutional powers of a coordinate branch
of government. Moreover, as already explained, Perlmutter’s
removal was likely illegal because only a lawfully appointed
and Senate-confirmed Librarian can remove the Register. The
President’s attempt to reach into the Legislative Branch to fire
an official that he has no statutory authority to either appoint or
remove, and to impede Congress’s ability to carry out an
enumerated constitutional duty, presents a “genuinely
extraordinary situation,” Sampson, 

415 U.S. at 92

 n.68, that
threatens irreparable harm to the constitutional structure of our
government. The President’s purported removal of the
Legislative Branch’s chief advisor on copyright matters, based
on the advice that she provided to Congress, is akin to the
President trying to fire a federal judge’s law clerk.

     The district court failed to recognize the “extraordinary
situation” presented by this case and erred in mechanically
applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wilcox. Wilcox
involved the constitutionality of for-cause removal protections
for members of the National Labor Relations Board and the
Merit Systems Protection Board, agencies that are housed
within the Executive Branch. See 145 S. Ct. at 1415. That case
and others like it implicate the President’s Article II authority
as the head of the Executive Branch, and his statutory power to
exercise at least some control over the involved officials, such
as by appointing them (with the advice and consent of the
Senate) and removing them (for cause). See id.; see also Trump
v. Boyle, 

145 S. Ct. 2653

, 2654 (2025); Dellinger, 

2025 WL 887518

, at *3. In Wilcox, where the Supreme Court held that
the government was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim
that the President was entitled to exercise at-will removal
authority, it was more difficult for the ousted officials to
demonstrate irreparable injury. There, under the Court’s
                              16

analysis, the “actions relating to the discharge[s]” suggested
that the officials had no entitlement to keep their jobs, and so
their removals were not “extraordinary.” Sampson, 

415 U.S. at 92

 n.68; see also Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at 1415 (The “Government
faces greater risk of harm from an order allowing a removed
officer to continue exercising the executive power” at an
agency that likely exercises “considerable executive power,”
than does a “wrongfully removed officer.”); Boyle, 145 S. Ct.
at 2654 (same).

     The case most similar to the one before us is Aviel v. Gor,
where we ruled in favor of the removed official. See 

2025 WL 1600446

, at *1 (Katsas, J., concurring). There, we declined to
stay the district court’s preliminary injunction enjoining
various government officials from removing Aviel from her
position as Chief Executive Officer of the Inter-American
Foundation, a government grant-making corporation. See 

id.

at *1–2. In explaining the court’s ruling, Judge Katsas (joined
by Judge Pillard) noted that the government, which had moved
for the stay, did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits of its claim that Aviel had been lawfully removed. 

Id. at *1

. He explained that, similar to this case, the President
likely had no statutory authority to appoint or remove Aviel,
and his appointment of a Board member who purported to
ratify her removal also was likely unlawful under governing
statutes. 

Id.

 at *1–2. Regarding irreparable harm, the district
court had determined that Aviel would be irreparably harmed
by the loss of her “right to function” and because “the very
survival of her organization [was] at stake.” Aviel v. Gor, 

780 F. Supp. 3d 1

, 14 (D.D.C. 2025). By declining to stay the
preliminary injunction, we implicitly agreed with the district
court that Aviel would be irreparably harmed absent the
preliminary injunction. See Aviel, 

2025 WL 1600446

, at *1–2
(Katsas, J., concurring); see also Nken, 

556 U.S. at 426

(requiring courts to examine whether a stay will substantially
                               17

injure the other party); Clevinger, 

134 F.4th at 1236

 (“Even
under the sliding-scale approach, a movant’s failure to show
any irreparable harm is grounds for refusing to issue a
preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors merit
such relief.” (cleaned up)). Aviel supports our conclusion that
Perlmutter has made the requisite showing of irreparable harm
where she, like Aviel, has alleged a loss of her “right to
function” plus “genuinely extraordinary” circumstances.

     In sum, “unusual actions relating to the discharge itself”
support a finding of irreparable harm to Perlmutter absent an
injunction. Perlmutter can likely establish that she was
unlawfully removed from her post as Register of Copyrights,
and that her removal was motivated by the President’s
disapproval of her work in service of Congress — work that
was related to legislative, not executive, functions. Moreover,
she was purportedly replaced by an Executive Branch official.
That alleged violation of the separation of powers is irreparably
harmful to both Perlmutter and to our system of government.
In a system of checked and balanced power, the Executive has
no authority to punish a Legislative Branch official for the
advice that she provides to Congress. Moreover, if Perlmutter
is temporarily barred from “[c]onduct[ing] studies” and
“[a]dvis[ing] Congress on national and international issues
relating to copyright,” 

17 U.S.C. § 701

(b)(1), (4), no amount
of back pay will compensate her or Congress for her interim
inability to support Congress’s consideration of copyright law
and policy during a critical time. This presents a “genuinely
extraordinary situation,” such that she has made the requisite
showing of irreparable harm.

      C. Balance of Equities and the Public Interest

    Because the “first two factors of the traditional standard
are the most critical,” Nken, 

556 U.S. at 434

, Perlmutter
                               18

advances to this final, combined factor, in a strong position. In
our view, the balance of equities and the public interest also
weigh in favor of Perlmutter remaining in her job.

      In cases involving the removal of government officials,
the Supreme Court has balanced the parties’ competing
assertions of harm and ruled in the government’s favor where
the government was likely to show that the agencies in question
“exercise considerable executive power,” and that the removed
executive official sought to “continue exercising the executive
power.” Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at 1415 (emphases added); see also
Boyle, 145 S. Ct. at 2654 (“[T]he Consumer Product Safety
Commission exercises executive power in a similar manner as
the National Labor Relations Board.” (emphasis added)).
Reinstating an already-ousted official under such
circumstances would be “obviously disruptive” and would
likely inflict irreparable injury on the government because it
would interfere with the President’s constitutional power to
supervise the Executive Branch. Sampson, 

415 U.S. at 83

; see
also Dellinger, 

2025 WL 887518

, at *3. By contrast, the
injunction requested by Perlmutter would not require the
President to work with a removed principal officer at an
Executive Branch agency; and it would not interfere with the
President’s constitutional prerogative to supervise the
Executive Branch. Because Perlmutter leads an agency that is
housed in the Legislative Branch and her primary role is to
advise Congress, Perlmutter’s situation differs significantly
from the Executive Branch officials whose removals have been
repeatedly upheld. And because she continues to serve as
Register at the present time, ruling in her favor would not
disrupt the work of the U.S. Copyright Office. To the contrary,
it is her removal that would be disruptive.
                                  19

     Notably, the Register likely does not exercise considerable
or substantial executive power. 2 The Register serves Congress,
executive agencies, and the Judiciary by providing advice,
information, and assistance on national and international issues
relating to copyright. 

17 U.S.C. § 701

(b)(1)–(3). She conducts
“studies and programs regarding copyright,” and performs
“other functions as Congress may direct.” 

Id.

 § 701(b)(4), (5).
In so doing, the Register primarily works for Congress, similar
to the Congressional Research Service, the powers of which
“are exercised primarily for legislative purposes.”
Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 684 F.3d at 1341; see also Bowsher
v. Synar, 

478 U.S. 714

, 746 n.11 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the Library’s Congressional
Research Service is a “congressional agent” for purposes of the
nondelegation doctrine). To the extent that any of the
Register’s duties might be characterized as “executive” in
nature, they likely do not involve the exercise of “substantial”
executive power. Indeed, Congress chose to house the
Copyright Office in the Legislative Branch, to subject the
Register to close supervision by both the Librarian of Congress

2
      That is not true of all offices within the Library of Congress,
which “perform[] a range of different functions.” Intercollegiate
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 

684 F.3d 1332, 1341

 (D.C.
Cir. 2012). For example, the Copyright Royalty Board — which is
not part of the Copyright Office — has the power “to promulgate
copyright regulations, to apply the statute to affected parties, and to
set rates and terms case by case,” which are functions “generally
associated in modern times with executive agencies rather than
legislators.” 

Id. at 1342

. That category of Library offices is
“undoubtedly a ‘component of the Executive Branch.’” 

Id.

 (quoting
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 511). Although the Register has some
oversight responsibilities regarding Copyright Royalty Judges, any
control leaves those judges with “vast discretion,” is “likely to be
quite faint,” and is “short of the kind that would render the
[Copyright Royalty Judges] inferior officers.” Id. at 1339.
                               20

and Congress itself, and to assign prominent Congress-facing
duties to the Register. Those factors set the Register apart from
traditional Executive Branch officials and suggest that the
Register likely does not wield “substantial” executive power.

     The public interest also favors granting Perlmutter’s
requested relief. There is no public interest in implementing
Perlmutter’s likely illegal removal. See League of Women
Voters of U.S., 

838 F.3d at 13

 (“There is a substantial public
interest in having” the government “abide by the federal laws.”
(cleaned up)). Moreover, requiring that Perlmutter be removed
while this litigation proceeds would deprive Congress of her
valuable services as Register while it considers important
issues such as the intersection of copyright law and the
development of generative AI. The public has a profound
interest in the Register’s continued work.

      Our dissenting colleague does not dispute that Perlmutter
is likely to succeed on the merits of her lawsuit, that Perlmutter
would suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction pending
appeal, or that those two factors are the most critical in
deciding whether to grant the requested injunction. Instead,
our colleague would deny the requested relief based solely on
his assessment of the balance of equities. In his view, the
equities in this case are identical to those that were considered
in Wilcox and Boyle. But, as we have explained, this case is
different.

     On one side of the scale, Perlmutter asserts her interest in
performing her statutory functions at a critical time, as well as
the structural harm to our government from an unprecedented
violation of the separation of powers. The constitutional
violation alleged here is different in kind and in degree from
that discussed in Wilcox and Boyle because Perlmutter is a
Legislative Branch official whom the President purportedly
                              21

fired in retaliation for advice that she gave Congress; and the
President has no statutory authority to appoint or remove the
Register of Copyrights. On the other side of the scale, the
President asserts an interest in removing Perlmutter that is far
weaker than in Wilcox and Boyle because Perlmutter is closely
supervised by the Librarian and by Congress and therefore does
not exercise “considerable” or “substantial” executive power.
See supra at 13–14, 18–20, 19 n.2. Because our dissenting
colleague does not engage with the particular facts of the case
before us, his analysis is flawed.

                          *    *   *

      In sum, all of the preliminary-injunction factors weigh in
favor of granting an injunction pending appeal. Perlmutter has
shown a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that
the President’s attempt to remove her from her post was
unlawful because she may be discharged only by a Senate-
confirmed Librarian of Congress. She also has made the
requisite showing of irreparable harm based on the President’s
alleged violation of the separation of powers, which deprives
the Legislative Branch and Perlmutter of the opportunity for
Perlmutter to provide valuable advice to Congress during a
critical time. And Perlmutter has shown that the balance of
equities and the public interest weigh in her favor because she
primarily serves Congress and likely does not wield substantial
executive power, which greatly diminish the President’s
interest in her removal. For the foregoing reasons, we grant
Perlmutter’s requested injunction pending appeal.
WALKER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

    The Register of Copyrights exercises “executive” power.1
And “the Government faces greater risk of harm from an order
allowing a removed officer to continue exercising the executive
power than a wrongfully removed officer faces from being
unable to perform her statutory duty.”2 So the district court did
not permit the Register of Copyrights to remain in her post
while she challenges the legality of her removal, and neither
should we.

                            *   *    *

     The Register of Copyrights exercises executive power in a
host of ways. From within the Library of Congress, she
“administers the Copyright Act, which requires the
examination of copyright applications, the issuance of
copyright registrations, the maintenance of copyright deposits,
and the recordation of transfers of copyright ownership.”3 In
addition, she “has rulemaking authority that is subject to review
by the Librarian of Congress.”4 And she “has some oversight
responsibilities regarding Copyright Royalty Judges,” who
have “the power ‘to promulgate copyright regulations, to apply
the statute to affected parties, and to set rates and terms case by
case,’ which are functions ‘generally associated in modern

1
  Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance v. Library of Congress,

103 F.4th 830

, 840 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
2
  Trump v. Wilcox, 

145 S. Ct. 1415

, 1415 (2025); see also Trump v.
Boyle, 

145 S. Ct. 2653

, 2654 (2025) (same); cf. Slaughter v. Trump,
No. 25-5261, slip op. 7 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 2025) (“the Supreme
Court’s stay orders in Wilcox and Boyle teach that the balance of
equities in removal cases not governed by on-point Supreme Court
precedent generally favors the government”); but see 

id.

 (“the
equitable calculus in this case differs”).
3
  Concurring Op. 13 (citing 

17 U.S.C. §§ 205

, 410-11, 705).
4
  

Id.

 (citing 

17 U.S.C. § 702

).
                                 2
times with executive agencies rather than legislators.’”5 These
are among the reasons we have “recently recognized the
important executive power exercised by the Library,
suggesting that whatever the Library’s historical association
with Congress, it is squarely a component of the Executive
Branch in its role as a copyright regulator.”6

     Recently, repeatedly, and unequivocally, the Supreme
Court has stayed lower-court injunctions that barred the
President from removing officers exercising executive power.
Trump v. Wilcox reasoned that “the Government faces greater
risk of harm from an order allowing a removed officer to
continue exercising the executive power than a wrongfully
removed officer faces from being unable to perform her
statutory duty.”7 And Trump v. Boyle applied the same
reasoning with the same language to reach the same result.8

     Applying those precedents, the district court denied a
request for a preliminary injunction to reinstate Register of
Copyrights Shira Perlmutter after President Donald Trump
fired her. Perlmutter then asked this court for an injunction
pending appeal.


5
  

Id.

 at 19 n.2 (quoting Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Copyright Royalty Board, 

684 F.3d 1332, 1342

 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
6
  Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance, 

103 F.4th at 840

 n.4
(citing Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc., 

684 F.3d at 1341

-
42) (emphasis added).
7
  See 145 S. Ct. at 1415.
8
  See 145 S. Ct. at 2654 (same) (quoting Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at 1415);
see also id. (“The application is squarely controlled by Trump v.
Wilcox. Although our interim orders are not conclusive as to the
merits, they inform how a court should exercise its equitable
discretion in like cases.” (cleaned up)).
                                3
     My colleagues grant the injunction, holding that the
district court likely “abused its discretion”9 by “mechanically
applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wilcox.”10 Instead,
they say the district court should have considered the “specific
circumstances of this case.”11           In their view, those
circumstances are (1) the relationship between Congress and
the Register of Copyrights; (2) the amount of executive power
at stake; and (3) the suit’s merits.12

     I respectfully dissent.

    First, whether or not the Register of Copyrights is best
labeled “a Legislative Branch official,”13 the Register of
Copyrights is housed within the Library of Congress, which “is
squarely a component of the Executive Branch in its role as a
copyright regulator.”14

     Second, whether or not the Register of Copyrights
exercises less executive power than do some other executive
officers,15 Wilcox and Boyle cover any officer “exercising the
executive power.”16



9
  Concurring Op. 2, 8.
10
   Id. at 15.
11
   Id. at 8.
12
   Id. at 8-9.
13
   Id. at 9.
14
   Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance, 

103 F.4th at 840

 n.4.
15
   See Concurring Op. 9 (arguing that it is a “diminished amount of
executive power that is at stake” — which appears to mean some
“executive power” but less than “substantial executive power”).
16
   Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at 1415; Boyle, 145 S. Ct. at 2654.
                                  4
     And third, whether or not “Perlmutter’s removal was likely
unlawful,”17 Wilcox and Boyle referred to “a wrongfully
removed officer” when they said that “the Government faces
greater risk of harm from an order allowing a removed officer
to continue exercising the executive power than a wrongfully
removed officer faces from being unable to perform her
statutory duty.”18

                             *    *    *

     I do not doubt that my colleagues are attempting in good
faith to interpret and apply Wilcox and Boyle.19 But today they
repeat the mistake that Wilcox and Boyle twice corrected.20 We
must apply those precedents even if “Perlmutter alleges that the
President of the United States unlawfully removed her in a
manner that violates the separation of powers.”21

    Gwynne Wilcox alleged the same thing.22 So did Cathy
Harris.23 And so did Mary Boyle.24




17
   Concurring Op. 9.
18
   Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at 1415; Boyle, 145 S. Ct. at 2654.
19
   See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial
Decision Making, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 1639 (2003).
20
   Cf. R. Reagan, 1980 Presidential Debate (“There you go again.”).
21
   Concurring Op. 14; cf. Trevor N. McFadden & Vetan Kapoor,
The Precedential Effects of The Supreme Court’s Emergency Stays,
44 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 827 (2021).
22
   Cf. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at 1415 (staying Wilcox’s injunction).
23
   Cf. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at 1415 (staying Harris’s injunction).
24
   Cf. Boyle, 145 S. Ct. at 2654 (staying Boyle’s injunction); see also
Order, Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25A264, S. Ct. (Sept. 8, 2025).