Newdow v. Roberts

finding that “injunctive or declaratory relief against all possible President-elects and the President himself” is “unavailable” | explaining that suits against unknown defendants are allowed "only in situations where the otherwise unavailable identity of the defendant will eventually be made known through discovery" | explaining that suits against unknown defendants are allowed “only in situations where the otherwise unavailable identity of the defendant will eventually be made known through discovery” | explaining that courts may proceed to merits so long as at least “one plaintiff has standing” (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 682 (1977)) | noting that when an injury is caused by a third party not before the Court, courts cannot “redress injury . . . that results from [such] independent action.” | finding challenge to religious elements in the 2009 inauguration ceremony moot after the inauguration occurred and the prayers and oath were already spoken | expressing in dictum that “a court—whether via injunctive or declaratory relief—does not sit in judgment of a President’s executive decisions” | identifying a redressability problem because “[i]t is impossible for this court to grant such relief” | refusing to entertain suit where plaintiff named “all persons the future President could possibly invite to administer an oath, lead a prayer, or help in the planning of these events” because “[n]o amount of discovery will uncover the identities of the unnamed defendants” | the plaintiffs’ “second redressability problem is' that declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants ... would not prevent the claimed injury” | plaintiffs could not establish redressability because “[i]t [was] impossible for th[e] court to grant [their requested] relief’ | the plaintiffs’ “second redressability problem is that declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants . . . would not prevent the claimed injury” | the plaintiffs’ “second re-dressability problem is that declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants ... would not prevent the claimed injury” | "With regard to the President, courts do not have jurisdiction to enjoin him, and have never submitted the President to declaratory relief" | “With regard to the President, courts do not have jurisdiction to enjoin him, and have never submitted the President to declaratory relief” | “With regard to the President, courts do not have jurisdiction to enjoin him.” (cleaned up) | “With regard to the President, courts do not have jurisdiction to enjoin him.” (cleaned up) | the plaintiffs’ “second redressability problem is that declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants ... would not prevent the claimed injury” | the plaintiffs’ “second redressability problem is that declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants . . . would not prevent the claimed injury” | plaintiffs could not establish redressability because “[i]t [was] impossible for th[e] court to grant [their requested] relief’ | plaintiffs could not establish redressability because “[i]t [was] impossible for th[e] court to grant [their requested] relief” | plaintiffs could not establish redressability because “[i]t [was] impossible for th[e] court to grant [their requested] relief” | plaintiffs could not establish redressability because “[i]t [was] impossible for th[e] court to grant [their requested] relief” | first citing Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 501 (1866), then citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 827–28 (1992) | “The absence of any one of these three elements[— injury-in-fact, causation, or redressability—]defeats standing.” | “The absence of any one of these three elements[—injury-in-fact, causation, or 13 redressability—]defeats standing.” | “With regard to the President, courts do not have jurisdiction to enjoin him” | “With regard to the President, courts do not have jurisdiction to enjoin him[.]” | “It is clear the principle of Armstrong requ