Opinion · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Frye v. United States
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 1923)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1923-12-03
- Topic
- general
holding that in order for expert scientific testimony to be admissible, it must be “generally accepted” as reliable in the relevant scientific community | holding that in order for expert scientific testimony to be admissible, it must be "generally accepted" as reliable in the relevant scientific community | concluding that evidence did not establish testimony of Dr. Kassin on general police environment and susceptibility to false confessions was scientifically reliable | ruling that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is "generally accept[ed]” as reliable in the relevant scientific community | holding that veterinarian's opinion as to cause of death of horses was not scientific evidence subject to the admissibility requirement of Frye | ruling that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is "generally accepted]” as reliable in the relevant scientific community | holding that scientific evidence is admissible only if the scientific principle is "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs" | holding that expert testimony must be based on scientific methods that are sufficiently established and accepted | holding that scientific evidence will be admissible only if it has ―gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs‖ | holding that expert opinions are admissible if the question involved does not lie in the range of common experience or common knowledge | holding that, to be admissible in a court, scientific, expert evidence requires “general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” | holding that novel scientific evidence based on a particular scientific technique is only admissible if the technique has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community | holding that before scientific expert testimony may be admitted, the science “must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs” | providing that scientific evidence will only be admitted if the procedure and results are generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community | holding that admission of an expert’s opinion requires that the opinion is based on a principle or method that is “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs” | holding that "the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition ... as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made." | holding, novel scientific evidence is admissible if the methodology underlying the evidence has general acceptance in the relevant scientific community | holding novel scientific evidence admissible if methodology underlying evidence has general acceptance in relevant scientific community | explaining that the trial court considers whether a novel scientific principle has been generally accepted by the scientific community (the Frye standard) | holding courts should not admit scientific evidence at trial unless the underlying methodology has gained general acceptance in the scientific community | holding admissibility of proposed expert testimony is conditioned on whether the scientific basis for the opinion has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs" | holding admissibility of proposed expert testimony is conditioned on whether the scientific basis for the opinion has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs" | stating that the admissibility of novel scientific expert evidence should be assessed by whether that specific science and methodology had gained "general acceptance" in the particular scientific field | noting that Frye test has lost much of its force | setting forth an exclusionary rule of evidence that
Citator
- Cited by
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Appellant, defendant below, was convicted of the crime of murder in the second degree, and from the judgment prosecutes this appeal.
A single assignment of error is presented for our consideration. In the course of the trial counsel for defendant offered an expert witness to testify to the result of a deception test made upon defendant. The test is described as the systolic blood pressm-e deception test. It is asserted that blood pressure is influenced by change in the emotions of the witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises are brought about by nervous impulses sent to the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system. Scientific experiments, it is claimed, have demonstrated that fear, rage, and pain always produce a rise of systolic blood pressure, and that conscious deception or falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt of crime, accompanied by fear of detection when the person is under examination, raises the systolic blood pressure in a curve, which corresponds exactly to the struggle going on in the subject’s mind, between fear and attempted control of that fear, as the exam
In other words, the theory seems to be that truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood re-citares a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood pressure. The rise thus produced is easily detected and distinguished from the rise produced by mere fear of the examination itself. In the former instance, the pressure rises higher than in the latter, and is more pronounced as the examination proceeds, while in the latter case, if the subject is telling the truth, the pressure registers highest at the beginning of the examination, and gradually diminishes as the examination proceeds.
Prior to the trial defendant was subjected to this deception test, and counsel offered the scientist who conducted the test as an expert to testify to the results obtained. The offer was objected to by counsel for the government, and the court sustained the objection. Counsel for defendant then offered to have the proffered witness conduct a test in the presence of the jury. This also was denied.
Counsel for defendant, in their able presentation of the novel question involved, correctly state in their brief that no cases directly in point have been found. The broad ground, however, upon which they plant their case, is succinctly stated in their brief as follows:
“The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled witnesses are admissible in evidence in those cases in which the matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, for the reason that the subject-matter so far partakes of a science, art, or trade as to require a previous habit or experience or study in it, in order to acquire a knowledge of it. When the question involved does not lie within the range of common experience or common knowledge, but requires special experience or special knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or trade to which the question relates are admissible in evidence.”
Numerous cases are cited in support of this rule. Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.
The judgment is affirmed.