Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
United States v. Portland General Electric Company, an Oregon Corporation
United States v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., an Or. Corp., 310 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1962)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1962-11-28
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- depreciation allowed on the costs of acquiring and clearing rights-of-way for electriet transmission lines
Citator
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- Cited by
- 14 opinions
UNITED STATES v. PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.,310 F.2d 877(9th Cir. 1962)
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
an Oregon Corporation, Appellee.
No. 17693.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
November 28, 1962.
Phillips, Coughlin, Buell Phillips, Clarence D. Phillips, and Alfred H. Stoloff, Portland, Or., for appellee.
Before HAMLIN, MAGRUDER and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges.
The case turns on the depreciation allowable on a utility power plant. All the statute says is that, in computing net income, there shall be allowed as a deduction "[a] reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) — (1) of property used in the trade or business. * * *" Int.Rev.Code of 1939, § 23, as amended. The district court made the factual finding, which we cannot conclude to be "clearly erroneous," that the "Annual Accrual of allowable depreciation, as computed by PGE [the taxpayer] under its straight-line unit summation method of depreciation using the useful lives of its depreciable property as established by the Utilities Commissioner's order and subsequent usage and experience thereunder, is factual, realistic and administratively practical, and therefore reasonable and in compliance with tax law and regulation. Further, that the Annual Accrual of depreciation as developed by the Commissioner on his straight-line average life method is unreasonable in light of PGE's knowledge and experience as to the useful lives of its depreciable properties, and to require PGE to substitute his method for its, is arbitrary." 189 F. Supp. at 303-304.Page 878
We are content to rely upon the careful findings of fact and conclusions of law of District Judge East on the points at issue, with which we are in entire agreement.
A judgment will be entered affirming the judgment of the District Court.