Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
United States v. James A. Bohn
United States v. James A. Bohn, 956 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1992)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1992-02-06
- Topic
- litigation
holding that defendant's guilty plea waived his pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel claim | noting that courts “ordinarily decline to consider arguments raised for the first time 24 in a reply brief” | noting that courts generally decline to consider arguments raised for the first time 17 in a reply brief | holding that pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel claims are waived | holding that pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel claims are waived | noting that courts typically decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief | holding that pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel claims are waived | noting that courts “ordinarily decline to consider arguments raised for the first 22 time in a reply brief” | noting that 22 courts generally decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief | noting courts ordinarily decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief | noting that courts generally 1 Defendant argues that the Entrustment Exclusion unambiguously states that losses 2 or damages resulting from dishonest or criminal acts by Plaintiff or anyone to whom 3 Plaintiff entrusted the Property are not covered. (Doc. No. 7 at 6–7. | “we ordinarily decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief” | “we ordinarily decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief” | “we ordinarily decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief’ | “[W]e ordinarily decline to consider 28 arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” | courts generally decline to consider 22 arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief | "A defendant's guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defect claims. The right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act is non-jurisdictional" | “Although we ordinarily decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief, we may consider them if, as here, the appellee raised the issue in its brief.” | alleged Speedy Trial Act and right to counsel violations | pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel claims are waived | guilty plea waives speedy trial claim | guilty plea waives Speedy Trial claim
Citator
- Cited by
- 40 opinions
James A. Bohn appeals pro se his conviction, following a guilty plea, to three counts of willful failure to pay income tax, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. Bohn challenges his conviction based upon a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e), and denial of assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Bohn was initially charged with three counts of attempted income tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. A jury trial resulted in conviction on all three counts. Bohn appealed his conviction to this court and we reversed and remanded. United States v. Bohn, 890 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.1989). On remand, Bohn pled guilty to three counts of willful failure to pay income tax and was sentenced. Bohn appealed.
By pleading guilty, Bohn waived his right to assert a violation of the Speedy Trial Act. See United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262 n. 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 859, 100 S.Ct. 123, 62 L.Ed.2d 80 (1979). A defendant’s guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defect claims. See id. The right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act is nonjurisdic-tional. See United States v. Yunis, 723 F.2d 795, 796 (11th Cir.1984); Lebowitz v. United States, 877 F.2d 207, 209 (2d Cir.1989).
Next, Bohn contends that he was denied the right to assistance of counsel at an in camera hearing to determine the validity of his claim raised in connection with his income tax violations. Bohn’s guilty plea waived any such alleged constitutional claim. See United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir.1991) (a guilty plea generally waives all claims of a constitutional nature occurring before the plea).
In his reply brief, Bohn argues for the first time that he was also denied assistance of counsel at the change of plea hearing. Although we ordinarily decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief, we may consider them if, as here, the appellee raised the issue in its brief. See Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir.1990).
“Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(2) a district court is not to accept a guilty plea until it is satisfied that the defendant understands that [he] has a right to counsel at every stage of the proceeding.” United States v. Fuller, 941 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir.1991). We are satisfied that the district court discharged its duty in this regard. The record shows that Bohn waived his right to assistance of counsel by voluntarily choosing to represent himself at the change of plea hearing after the court warned him about the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se. See id. Thus, this claim is also meritless.
AFFIRMED.