Quintara Biosciences, Inc. v. Ruifeng Biztech, Inc.

                FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

         FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC.,              No. 23-16093

             Plaintiff-Appellant,           D.C. No.
                                         3:20-cv-04808-
 v.                                          WHA

RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.;
GANGYOU WANG; ALAN LI; RF                  OPINION
BIOTECH LLC,

             Defendants-Appellees,

and

ALEX WONG; RUI SHAO,

             Defendants.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
        for the Northern District of California
       William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding

       Argued and Submitted February 12, 2025
              San Francisco, California

                 Filed August 12, 2025
2         QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.


     Before: Lawrence VanDyke and Anthony D. Johnstone,
     Circuit Judges, and Dana L. Christensen, * District Judge.

                    Opinion by Judge Johnstone


                           SUMMARY **


              Defend Trade Secrets Act/Discovery

    Affirming in part and reversing in part the district court’s
judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought under
the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) by Quintara
Biosciences, Inc., and remanding, the panel held that the
district court abused its discretion in striking some of
Quintara’s trade secrets at the discovery stage.
    The DTSA requires a plaintiff to prove, as a matter of
fact, that its claimed trade secret has “sufficient
particularity” to separate it from matters of general
knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of persons
skilled in the trade. The district court ordered Quintara to
disclose with “reasonable particularity” each of its allegedly
misappropriated trade secrets at the outset of discovery, a
rule borrowed from the California Uniform Trade Secret Act
(“CUTSA”). Unlike CUTSA, however, the DTSA does not
require a plaintiff to identify with particularity its alleged
trade secrets from the start. The district court concluded that

*
  The Honorable Dana L. Christensen, United States District Judge for
the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
      QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.     3


only two of Quintara’s trade secrets satisfied its “reasonable
particularity” order, and it granted defendant Ruifeng
Biztech, Inc.’s motion to strike the other trade secrets
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f),
effectively dismissing Quintara’s misappropriation claim for
those trade secrets.
    The panel held that the district court abused its discretion
by striking Quintara’s trade secrets. The district court had
broad pretrial management powers under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 16 to address the “delicate problem” of
discovery in a trade-secret case, as well as more specific
authority to order that trade secrets “be revealed only in a
specified way” under Rule 26(c)(1)(G). The panel held that
Quintara’s trade secrets were not strikable under Rule 12(f),
which authorizes a district court to “strike from a pleading
an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.” The district court also
did not properly strike the trade secrets as a discovery
sanction under Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(iii) for failure to comply
with the “sufficient particularity” order. The panel held that
a DTSA trade-secret claim will rarely be dismissible as a
discovery sanction in a situation like the one here because
the fact question of “reasonable particularity” should be
resolved on summary judgment or at trial.


                         COUNSEL

J. James Li (argued), LiLaw Inc., San Jose, California, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Niceforo L. Avila Jr. (argued), Niceforo Avila Law,
Oakland, California, for Defendants-Appellees.
4     QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.


                          OPINION

JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judge:

    The Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) provides a
federal cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets.
This appeal asks at what point in the case, and with how
much particularity, a DTSA plaintiff must specify its
purported trade secrets. By definition, trade secrets derive
their value from nondisclosure. Both plaintiffs and
defendants want to protect their trade-secret information
from the opposing party—often a competitor. So trade-secret
cases present what we have called a “delicate problem.”
Hartley Pen Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 

287 F.2d 324, 328

 (9th Cir.
1961). How can plaintiffs plead, discover, and prove
whether a trade secret has been misappropriated without
giving away the trade secret? On the other hand, how can
defendants respond to discovery without giving away their
own trade secrets? Requiring too much disclosure too early
could encourage fishing expeditions. Requiring too little
disclosure too late could prevent the parties from proving or
defending their claims. All civil discovery presents these
concerns, but they are especially acute in trade-secret cases.
    The district court attempted to solve this problem by
ordering plaintiff Quintara Biosciences to disclose with
“reasonable particularity” each of its allegedly
misappropriated trade secrets at the outset of discovery, a
rule borrowed from the California Uniform Trade Secret Act
(“CUTSA”). Dissatisfied with the particularity of Quintara’s
trade-secret disclosures, and at the district court’s invitation,
defendant Ruifeng Biztech moved to strike Quintara’s trade
secrets under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). The
district court concluded that only two of Quintara’s trade-
       QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.      5


secrets satisfied its “reasonable particularity” order. Citing
its “wide discretion in controlling discovery” and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16, the court struck the other trade
secrets, effectively dismissing Quintara’s misappropriation
claim for those trade secrets.
    By its terms and unlike CUTSA, the federal DTSA does
not require a plaintiff to identify with particularity its alleged
trade secrets from the start. CUTSA’s “reasonable
particularity” disclosure rule is similar to the “sufficient
particularity” showing we require to establish ownership of
a trade secret under DTSA. But whether a DTSA plaintiff
has identified information that is sufficiently particular to
constitute a trade secret—information that is kept secret and
derives value from not being generally known—is a question
of fact. So whether a plaintiff has sufficiently particularized
a trade secret under DTSA is usually a matter for summary
judgment or trial. While a district court has broad discretion
to manage pleadings and discovery, and to impose sanctions
on a noncompliant party, the district court exceeded that
authority here. Even if Quintara’s disclosures did not satisfy
the district court’s “reasonable particularity” order as to
some trade secrets, without more, this is not an extreme
circumstance that warrants dismissal of Quintara’s claim as
to those trade-secrets under Rules 26 and 16. Nor did Rule
12(f) provide a basis to strike any of Quintara’s trade secrets.
Because the order striking Quintara’s trade secrets was an
abuse of discretion, we reverse.
    I. Quintara sues under the federal DTSA.
    Quintara Biosciences, Inc., and Ruifeng Biztech, Inc.,
are DNA-sequencing-analysis companies based in
California. While the parties contest the exact nature of their
relationship, they agree that they engaged in a business
6     QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.


arrangement from 2013 to 2019. The relationship soured in
2019, when Quintara alleges that Ruifeng locked Quintara
out of its office, took possession of Quintara’s equipment,
and hired Quintara employees. Quintara sued Ruifeng in
response.
    Quintara’s First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”)
included one count under DTSA for misappropriation of
trade secrets, but no CUTSA claims. Under DTSA, Quintara
alleged that Ruifeng misappropriated nine trade secrets:
Quintara’s (1) “customer database;” (2) “customer profile
database;” (3) “marketing plan;” (4) design of potential new
products; (5) vendor database; (6) computer software code;
(7) “[c]ustomized reagents and protocols;” (8) design of new
products; and (9) “DNA Donor technology.”
    At the Rule 26(f) discovery-planning conference, the
parties debated whether Quintara must specify its trade
secrets with “reasonable particularity” under CUTSA
section 2019.210. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2019.210

. That
rule requires that “before commencing discovery relating to
the trade secret, the party alleging the misappropriation shall
identify the trade secret with reasonable particularity.” 

Id.

After a back-and-forth with Ruifeng, Quintara disclosed its
trade secrets with nearly the same specificity as it did in the
Complaint. The parties then filed a joint case-management
plan, which did not raise any issues pertaining to disclosure
or the need for protective orders concerning Quintara’s
trade-secret claim.
    Ruifeng soon moved for a protective order to halt
discovery until Quintara further specified its trade secrets
under section 2019.210 and Rule 26. Ruifeng argued that
Quintara failed to specify its trade secrets “with sufficient
particularity so they can be distinguishable from the prior art
      QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.   7


and information not already generally known by those
skilled in the industry,” which “hamper[s] the Court’s ability
to . . . determine the applicable scope of discovery.” The
district court, citing section 2019.210, ordered Quintara to
provide (1) a summary of each specific trade secret; (2) how
it has derived independent economic value by not being
generally known; (3) how Quintara has maintained its
secrecy; and (4) “each of the precise claimed trade secrets,
numbered, with a list of the specific elements for each, as
claims would appear at the end of a patent.” Quintara
responded by filing an amended trade-secret disclosure
(“Disclosure”) under seal. In the Disclosure, it expanded the
description of each trade secret from a few sentences to one
or more paragraphs, including new technical details. It also
subdivided two of the trade secrets claimed in the Complaint
into four separate trade secrets.
    Ruifeng still found the Disclosure lacking. Again, it
moved to halt discovery. To end the discovery standoff, the
district court gave Ruifeng a choice: “accept the disclosure
and comply with discovery; or move to strike the disclosure,
withhold discovery, and accept the consequences if wrong.”
Choosing the latter, Ruifeng moved to strike Quintara’s trade
secrets in the Disclosure, citing Rule 12(f).
    The district court granted Ruifeng’s motion to strike.
Drawing on CUTSA section 2019.210, it reviewed the
alleged trade secrets in Quintara’s Disclosure. The court
acknowledged that the “state procedure does not govern
here,” yet it applied that “reasonable particularity” rule “to
nail down [Quintara’s] asserted trade secrets . . . [and]
permit [the court] to discern the reasonable bounds of
discovery.” It held that Quintara failed, in part, to meet
section 2019.210’s requirements, and it struck nine of the
eleven trade secrets from the Disclosure. It further
8      QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.


determined that Quintara had sufficiently described two
remaining trade secrets: the customer profile database and
vendor database. And it ordered “[t]he parties [to] proceed
to summary judgment on the surviving asserted trade
secrets.” The parties then conducted discovery on the DTSA
customer-profile-database and vendor-database trade
secrets. After Quintara chose to forego the vendor-database
trade secret claim, a jury returned a verdict for Ruifeng on
the single trade secret still at issue.
    We review de novo the district court’s order to strike
under Rule 12(f). Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 

618 F.3d 970, 973

 (9th Cir. 2010). We review for abuse of
discretion a district court’s dismissal for violating a pretrial
order. Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 

833 F.2d 128, 130

 (9th
Cir. 1987).
    II. The district court abused its discretion by striking
        Quintara’s trade secrets and thereby effectively
        dismissing Quintara’s claim as to those trade
        secrets.
    Under DTSA, “[a]n owner of a trade secret that is
misappropriated may bring a civil action.” 

18 U.S.C. § 1836

(b)(1). To succeed on a DTSA claim, “a plaintiff must
prove: (1) that the plaintiff possessed a trade secret[;] (2) that
the defendant misappropriated the trade secret; and (3) that
the misappropriation caused or threatened damage to the
plaintiff.” InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Glob. Holdings, Inc., 

978 F.3d 653

, 657–58 (9th Cir. 2020); see also 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1836

(b)(1), 1839(3)–(5). Trade-secret cases “start from
the important premise that the definition of what may be
considered a ‘trade secret’ is broad.” InteliClear, 

978 F.3d at 657

 (citing Forro Precision, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machines
Corp., 

673 F.2d 1045, 1057

 (9th Cir. 1982)). DTSA’s
      QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.   9


definition of a trade secret includes “all forms and types of
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information” that “the owner thereof has taken
reasonable measures to keep . . . secret” and that “derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to . . . another person.” 

18 U.S.C. § 1839

(3). So to successfully prove possession of a trade
secret—the first element of any DTSA claim—plaintiffs
must prove that they possess information that (A) they have
tried to keep secret and (B) “is valuable because it is
unknown to others.” InteliClear, 978 F.3d at 657–58; see 

18 U.S.C. § 1839

(3).
    Despite the breadth of potential trade-secret protection,
not all proprietary information qualifies for protection as a
property interest under DTSA. To show that information is
a trade secret, a plaintiff “may not simply rely upon
‘catchall’ phrases or identify categories of trade secrets.”
InteliClear, 

978 F.3d at 658

. Instead, a plaintiff must prove
that the claimed trade secret has “sufficient particularity to
separate it from matters of general knowledge in the trade or
of special knowledge of those persons . . . skilled in the
trade.” 

Id.

 (quoting Imax Corp. v. Cinema Techs., Inc., 

152 F.3d 1161, 1164

 (9th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis in original).
     Whether a trade secret is identified with “sufficient
particularity” is a question of fact. In InteliClear, LLC v.
ETC Global Holdings, Inc., we reversed a grant of summary
judgment where there was a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the plaintiff “identified its trade secrets with
sufficient[] particularity.” Id. at 659. Defendants in
InteliClear argued that even after plaintiffs “expanded upon
the initial definition” of the claimed trade secrets, and
“described [their] specific features,” the plaintiffs “still
fail[ed] to separate trade secrets from information known in
10    QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.


the industry.” Id. at 658–59. But we explained that at an early
stage of litigation, “particularly where no discovery
whatsoever had occurred, it is not fatal to [the plaintiff’s]
claim that its hedging language left open the possibility of
expanding its identifications later.” Id. at 659. We therefore
held that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment, id. at 664, and abused its discretion in denying a
Rule 56(d) request to allow the plaintiff “to refine its
identifications through discovery,” id. at 662. So the
identification of a trade secret is a question of fact, and a
district court may grant summary judgment only if there is
no genuine dispute that a plaintiff could identify a trade
secret with “sufficient particularity.” Id. at 657–59, 663–64;
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Double Eagle Alloys, Inc. v.
Hooper, 

134 F.4th 1078

, 1088–89 (10th Cir. 2025).
     Because trade secrets derive their value from
nondisclosure, discovery involving trade secrets presents a
“delicate problem.” Hartley Pen Co., 

287 F.2d at 328

. That
is, how can a court “secure the right of one litigant to get
relevant and necessary evidence and to protect the other
litigant from disclosing secrets which are not relevant and
necessary[?]” 

Id.

 When discovery begins, “plaintiffs in trade
secret actions may have commercially valid reasons to avoid
being overly specific at the outset in defining their
intellectual property.” InteliClear, 

978 F.3d at 662

. This is
because “the more precise the claim, the more a party does
to tip off a business rival to where the real secrets lie.” See
IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 

285 F.3d 581, 583

 (7th
Cir. 2002). As we recognized in Hartley Pen, defendants
share similar concerns about turning over trade secrets or
other proprietary information in response to plaintiffs’
discovery requests. 287 F.2d at 327–28. So for both sides,
the conventional order of pleadings, initial disclosures, and
      QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.    11


first-round discovery may not be enough to set the stage for
future factual development of a trade-secret claim.
Discovery in a trade-secret case, then, requires an “iterative
process where requests between parties lead to a refined and
sufficiently particularized trade secret identification.”
InteliClear, 

978 F.3d at 662

. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure equip a district court to manage this “delicate
problem” with broad Rule 16 pretrial management powers,
and more specific authority to order that trade secrets “be
revealed only in a specified way.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(c)(1)(G).
     Plaintiffs often bring parallel state and federal trade-
secret-misappropriation claims. See 

18 U.S.C. § 1838

(providing that DTSA “shall not be construed to preempt or
displace” state remedies). State law in California, where this
case arises, takes a different approach under CUTSA’s rule
that a plaintiff “shall identify a trade secret with ‘reasonable
particularity’” before discovery commences. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2019.210

. We have noted that a plaintiff who has
satisfied DTSA’s “sufficient particularity” standard may
also satisfy CUTSA’s “reasonable particularity” rule.
InteliClear, 

978 F.3d at 658

 n.1. This makes sense because,
like CUTSA’s “reasonable particularity” rule, DTSA’s
“sufficient particularity” standard can channel discovery and
trial preparation toward the alleged trade secret at issue, and
away from other proprietary information that is not relevant
to the claim. See 

id. at 658

. Indeed, some federal district
courts have applied CUTSA’s “reasonable particularity”
rule to CUTSA claims, at times in combination with DTSA
claims. See, e.g., Chung v. Intellectsoft Grp. Corp., No. 21-
CV-03074-JST, 

2024 WL 813445

, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12,
2024); Pinkerton Tobacco v. Kretek Int’l, No. CV 20-8729
12     QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.


SB (MRWX), 

2021 WL 4928024

, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. July
14, 2021). 1
    Still, DTSA requires a plaintiff to identify a trade secret
with “sufficient particularity” as a matter of fact, unlike
CUTSA’s “reasonable particularity” rule. InteliClear, 

978 F.3d at 659

. And unlike CUTSA, DTSA does not set out
requirements for the specific timing or scope for identifying
trade secrets. Instead, the conventional procedures under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Here, Ruifeng cited
Rule 12(f) and the district court cited Rule 16 in managing
the “delicate problem” of trade-secret discovery. But in
moving to strike and striking Quintara’s trade secrets,
Ruifeng and the court ultimately relied on a California rule
that does not control a federal trade-secret claim. And based
on the facts and procedural posture of this case, neither Rule
12(f) nor Rule 16 authorized the district court to strike—and
functionally dismiss—Quintara’s claim to nine of its trade
secrets.
        A. Quintara’s trade secrets were not strikable
           under Rule 12(f).
    Ruifeng filed a Rule 12(f) motion to strike Quintara’s
trade-secret Disclosure. Under Rule 12(f), “[t]he court may
strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The district court granted Ruifeng’s
motion to strike Quintara’s trade-secret Disclosure on all but
two of the trade secrets.


1
  Because this case presents only a DTSA claim, we do not address
whether CUTSA’s disclosure rule is binding on federal courts
considering CUTSA claims. See Hamilton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

39 F.4th 575, 584

 (9th Cir. 2022).
      QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.   13


    Even if Quintara’s Disclosure could be construed as a
pleading, neither Ruifeng nor the district court identified any
strikable matter under Rule 12(f). Quintara’s trade secrets
are not an “insufficient defense,” and the parties have not
argued otherwise. Nor are the trade secrets “redundant” as
they “do[] not appear anywhere else in the complaint.” See
Whittlestone, 

618 F.3d at 974

. The trade secrets are not
“immaterial” as each directly relates to Quintara’s requested
relief. See Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 

984 F.2d 1524, 1527

 (9th
Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 

510 U.S. 517

 (1994)
(“‘Immaterial’ matter is that which has no essential or
important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses
being pleaded.” (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1382, at 706–07 (1990))). And
the trade secrets are not “impertinent” because whether
Quintara can recover and protect these trade secrets is
directly related to the harm being alleged. See id.
(“‘Impertinent’ matter consists of statements that do not
pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.
Superfluous historical allegations are a proper subject of a
motion to strike.” (quoting Wright & Miller, supra, § 1382,
at 711)). Finally, the trade secrets are not “scandalous.” See
Whittlestone, 

618 F.3d at 974

. So any authority to strike the
trade secrets at issue cannot lie in Rule 12(f).
       B. The discovery sanction dismissing Quintara’s
          claim to the nine trade secrets was an abuse of
          discretion.
    We now turn to whether the district court properly struck
Quintara’s trade secrets as a discovery sanction. When it
held that Quintara failed to disclose nine of its trade secrets
with “reasonable particularity,” the district court ordered the
parties to proceed on the claim only as to the two remaining
trade secrets. In doing so, the district court effectively
14    QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.


dismissed Quintara’s claim to the other nine. That was an
abuse of discretion.
    Rule 26 vests district courts “with broad discretion to
tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of
discovery.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 

523 U.S. 574, 598

(1998); see, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(3). Under Rule 16, a
district court may issue orders, including those authorized by
Rule 37, if a party “fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial
order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f), (f)(1)(C). Under Rule 37, a
court may sanction a party by “striking pleadings in whole
or in part.” Fed R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(iii). Because the
district court dismissed Quintara’s trade secrets as a
discovery sanction but did not make specific findings
supporting such a sanction, we “review the record
independently to determine whether the dismissal was an
abuse of discretion.” Toth v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 

862 F.2d 1381, 1385

 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Malone, 

833 F.2d at 130

). A dismissal based on a failure to comply with a pretrial
order is a harsh penalty that, given its severity, should be
dispensed only in a limited set of “extreme circumstances.”
Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A., 

782 F.2d 829, 831

(9th Cir. 1986). Quintara’s failure to specify its trade secrets
at the outset of discovery as required by the district court’s
order was not such a circumstance.
    We weigh five factors in considering whether a dismissal
is an appropriate sanction: “(1) the public’s interest in
expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to
manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants;
(4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their
merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.”
Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 

191 F.3d 983

, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 

138 F.3d 393, 399

(9th Cir. 1998)).
      QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.    15


     The first and second factors, the public’s interest in
expeditious resolution of litigation and the court’s interest in
managing its docket, usually rise and fall together in this
balancing. Henderson v. Duncan, 

779 F.2d 1421, 1423

 (9th
Cir. 1986) (“[W]e give deference to the district court because
it is in the best position to determine what period of delay
can be endured before its docket becomes unmanageable.”).
Here, although Quintara’s failure to disclose was neither
“dilatory” or “evasive,” we do not doubt the court’s concern
with moving the case along. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 

291 F.3d 639, 642

 (9th Cir. 2002); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (explaining
that the public has an interest in “the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action”). Yet a five-
month delay of discovery—half of which is attributable to
the motion for the decision under review—does not justify
the functional dismissal of Quintara’s claim as to the nine
trade secrets. Two months of discovery remained, and at the
time of dismissal the trial date stood six months away. The
delay therefore “did not consume ‘large amounts of the
court’s valuable time,’ or cause any ‘serious disruptions’ of
the district court’s schedule.” Hernandez, 

138 F.3d at 399

(first quoting Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1261

 (9th
Cir. 1992); and then quoting U.S. for Use and Benefit of
Wiltec Guam, Inc. v. Kahaluu Const. Co., Inc., 

857 F.2d 600, 603

 (9th Cir. 1988)). The resolution of the motion to strike,
while expeditious, was premature.
     As to any prejudice to the defendants, the third factor,
both parties chose to litigate whether and how to disclose the
trade-secret claim, and the record does not suggest that any
delay attributable to Quintara prejudiced Ruifeng’s defense.
Quintara, after all, attempted to comply with the district
court’s order to describe its trade secrets in more detail even
if it did not, as the court concluded, meet every element of
16    QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.


its order. Cf. Hester v. Vision Airlines, Inc., 

687 F.3d 1162

,
1169–70 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding default judgment
sanction where party “willfully and in bad faith” “violated
the court’s discovery order”).
    The fourth factor, the public interest in resolving cases
on the merits, also cuts against dismissal. The district court
dismissed Quintara’s claim to nine of its trade secrets
because Quintara failed to prove just one element of its
DTSA claim—that it owned sufficiently particularized trade
secrets. Because it invited and granted the motion to strike
before discovery had progressed, the district court’s order
“did not fairly permit development of the issues for
resolution.” InteliClear, 

978 F.3d at 663

. Therefore, the
functional dismissal of the trade secrets could not completely
resolve Quintara’s claim on the merits, and this factor
weighs against dismissal. See Yourish, 191 F.3d at 992
(noting that public policy generally “strongly favors
disposition of actions on the merits”).
    Finally, the fifth factor, consideration of less drastic
sanctions, also cuts against dismissal. The district court’s
order did not discuss granting, modifying, or denying
Ruifeng’s second motion for a protective order. Instead, it
invited Ruifeng to proceed with discovery or move to strike
Quintara’s trade secrets. It also did not consider alternatives
before striking Quintara’s trade secrets. See Ferdik, 

963 F.2d at 1262

. For example, the district court could have granted a
protective order limiting discovery to whether Quintara had
identified its trade secrets with “sufficient particularity”
before permitting additional discovery. See InteliClear, 

978 F.3d at 662

 (“Refining trade secret identifications through
discovery makes good sense[.]”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G)
(protective orders for trade secrets). After an opportunity for
discovery on the identification of the trade secrets, the court
      QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.    17


could have invited a motion for summary judgment, and
absent a genuine fact dispute as to whether trade secrets were
sufficiently particularized, it could have granted summary
judgment as to those trade secrets. See InteliClear, 978 F.3d
at 663–64; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Or if, after discovery and
an opportunity to clarify the level of particularity required
for its claim to move forward, Quintara still refused to
supplement its trade-secret identification, the district court
could have excluded evidence of any added specifications
from consideration on summary judgment or at trial. See
Imax, 152 F.3d at 1164–66–64; Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)
(exclusion of evidence for failure to supplement); see also
InteliClear, 

978 F.3d at 663

 (explaining that after a plaintiff
has “gone through the dialectic discovery process, [it] should
not have been confused ‘as to the level of specificity
required’” (quoting Imax, 

152 F.3d at 1167

)). Lastly, the
court premised its Disclosure order on sequencing discovery
and did not suggest it was on pain of dismissal. So Quintara
was not on notice that its first disclosure to the court was its
final opportunity to amend its trade-secret Disclosure. See
Malone, 

833 F.2d at 132

 (concluding that a warning can be
sufficient to meet the “consideration of alternatives”
requirement).
    Although our five-factor test for dismissal sanctions
invites case-specific analysis, a DTSA trade-secret claim
will rarely be dismissible as a discovery sanction in a
situation like this. The district court’s dismissal of these
trade secrets came early in the litigation and before an
opportunity for discovery that would allow the parties to
refine and clarify the identification of the alleged trade
secrets at issue. And the reason for striking the trade secrets
went to their merits: a fact question of “reasonable
particularity” that should be resolved on summary judgment
18     QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC.


or at trial. InteliClear, 978 F.3d at 658–59. While district
courts have broad discretion and ample alternatives under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to manage the
disclosure of trade secrets in discovery, here the district court
abused its discretion in granting Ruifeng’s motion to strike
and dismissing Quintara’s claim to the nine trade secrets at
issue.
   AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and
REMANDED. 2 The parties shall bear their own costs on
appeal.




2
  The district court did not err by denying Quintara’s motion for a
mistrial. See United States v. Lemus, 

847 F.3d 1016, 1024

 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“A decision to not declare a mistrial will be reversed only if the
improper comment, viewed in the context of the entire trial, more likely
than not materially affected the verdict.”).