Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Murakami v. Burnett

Murakami v. Burnett, 63 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1933)

Type: Opinion
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1933-02-20
Topic: general

PER CURIAM. 1. In exclusion, as distinguished from deportation proceedings, the law is settled that there is no absolute right to a judicial determination of a claim to citizenship. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 S.

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UpLaw has not yet analyzed Murakami v. Burnett. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by: 2 opinions

TSUTAKO MURAKAMI v. BURNETT,63 F.2d 641(9th Cir. 1933)

TSUTAKO MURAKAMI v. BURNETT, District Immigration Director.

No. 6963.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

February 20, 1933.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District ofPage 642California, Central Division; Geo. Cosgrave, Judge.

Habeas corpus proceeding by Tsutako Murakami against A.E. Burnett, District Director, United States Immigration Service, District No. 31. From a judgment dismissing the writ, petitioner appeals.

Affirmed.

J. Edward Keating and Theodore E. Bowen, both of Los Angeles, for appellant.

Samuel W. McNabb, U.S. Atty., and Frank M. Chichester, Asst. U.S. Atty., both of Los Angeles, Cal. (Trent Doser, of Los Angeles, Cal., U.S. Immigration Service, on the brief), for appellee.

Before WILBUR, SAWTELLE, and MACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

1. In exclusion, as distinguished from deportation proceedings, the law is settled that there is no absolute right to a judicial determination of a claim to citizenship. United States v. Ju Toy,198 U.S. 253, 25 S.Ct. 644, 49 L.Ed. 1040; United States ex rel. Scimeca v. Husband (C.C.A. 2, 1925)6 F.2d 957.

2. The question for determination was not whether Tsutako Murakami is a citizen of the United States, but whether the applicant for admission was in fact Tsutako Murakami. It is unnecessary to enumerate the discrepancies between the testimony of appellant and that of her alleged father before the Board of Special Inquiry; it suffices to say that in our judgment they were as to material matters bearing on the family. Appellant, age 17 years at the time of her arrival, claims American citizenship by birth in this country. She came as a steerage passenger; her alleged father as a second-class passenger on the same vessel. Their testimony differed materially, among other things, as to the name and age of her alleged younger sister; there was some difference even after the alleged father had passed her a note, which she destroyed and which the Board could well believe was intended to cause her to change her testimony.

The Board was justified on the record in believing that both she and the alleged father had testified falsely, and that she was not his daughter.

Judgment dismissing the writ of habeas corpus affirmed.