Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
McNabb v. Yates
576 F.3d 1028
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 2009-08-11
- Topic
- general
holding that dismissal of habeas petition for failure to comply with statute of limitations renders subsequent petitions second or successive | holding that even when first petition was dismissed as 18 untimely, subsequent petition is second or successive and 19 requires prior authorization to file | holding that a dismissal due 6 to a procedural default and failure to show cause and prejudice overcoming that default is 7 a disposition on the merits | holding that a 14 dismissal of a § 2254 habeas petition on grounds of untimeliness “renders subsequent 15 petitions second or successive for purposes of AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).” | holding that a “habeas petition is second or successive . . . if it raises claims that were or could have been adjudicated on the merits” in an earlier federal petition | holding that “dismissal of a section 2254 habeas petition for failure to 24 comply with the statute of limitations renders subsequent petitions second or successive for 25 purposes of the AEDPA” | holding that “the dismissal of a habeas petition as untimely constitutes 2 a disposition on the merits and that a further petition challenging the same conviction would be 3 ‘second or successive’” | holding that dismissal of a habeas 23 petition as untimely constitutes a disposition on the merits and renders a subsequent petition 1 challenging the same conviction or sentence “second or successive” for purposes of § 2244(b) | holding that dismissal of a habeas petition as time barred under 28 11 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) constitutes a disposition on the merits and renders a subsequent 12 petition second or successive for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) | holding that dismissal of a habeas petition as time barred 19 under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) constitutes a disposition on the merits and renders a 20 subsequent petition second or successive for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) | holding that dismissal of 10 a habeas petition as time barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) constitutes a 11 disposition on the merits and renders a subsequent petition second or successive for 12 purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) | holding dismissal of habeas petition 11 for untimeliness constitutes a decision on the merits and renders subsequent 12 petitions second or successive | explaining that dismissal of a habeas petition for failure to comply with the statute of limitations is a decision “on the merits” | concluding dismissal for failure to comply with one-year statute of limitations 12 renders subsequent petitions challenging the same conviction or sentence “second or 13 successive” | holding dismissal of habeas petition 11 for untimeliness constitutes a decision on the merits and renders subsequent 12 petitions second or successive | explaining that the 24 dismissal of a habeas petition for failure to comply with AEDPA’s statute of limitations renders 25 subsequent petitions challenging the same conviction successive | holding “that dismissal 14 of a section 2254 habeas petition for failure to comply with the statute of limitations 15 renders subsequent petitions second or successive for purposes of” Section 2244(b) | holding “dismissal of a 20 first habeas petition for untimeliness presents a ‘permanent and incurable’ bar to federal review 21 of the underlying claims,” and thus renders subsequent petitions “second or successive” | holding “dismissal of a first habeas petition for untimeliness presents a ‘permanent and 5 incurable’ bar to federal review of the underlying claims,” and thus renders subsequent petitions 6 “second or successive” | holding “dismissal of a first habeas 24 petition for untimeliness presents a ‘permanent and incurable’ bar to federal review of the underlying 25 claims,” and thus renders subsequent petitions “second or successive” | holding “dismissal of a 24 first habeas petition for untimeliness presents a ‘permanent and incurable’ bar to federal review 25 of the underlying claims,” and thus renders subsequent petitions “second or success
Citator
- Cited by
- 142 opinions
Petitioner Ronnie McNabb seeks authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition in the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). The district court dismissed McNabb’s first section 2254 habeas corpus petition as time-barred under § 2244(d)(1) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). We hold that the dismissal of a habeas petition as untimely constitutes a disposition on the merits and that a further petition challenging the same conviction would be “second or successive” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
A habeas petition is second or successive only if it raises claims that were or could have been adjudicated on the merits. See Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir.2008). A disposition is “on the merits” if the district court either considers and rejects the claims or determines that the underlying claim will not be considered by a federal court. See Howard v. Lewis, 905 F.2d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir.1990).
A prior petition that has been dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies leaves open the possibility for future litigation and has not, therefore, been adjudicated on the merits. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485-86, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). In contrast, the dismissal of a first petition with prejudice because of a procedural default (and a failure to show cause and prejudice) forecloses the possibility that the underlying claims will be addressed by a federal court. See Henderson v. Lampert, 396 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir.2005). Such a dismissal therefore constitutes a disposition on the merits and renders a subsequent petition second or successive for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Id.
*1030 Similarly, dismissal of a first habeas petition for untimeliness presents a “permanent and incurable” bar to federal review of the underlying claims. See, e.g., Murray v. Greiner, 394 F.3d 78, 81 (2d Cir.2005). We therefore hold that dismissal of a section 2254 habeas petition for failure to comply with the statute of limitations renders subsequent petitions second or successive for purposes of the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 1
We deny McNabb’s application for authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition in the district court. 2 McNabb has not made a prima facie showing under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) that:
(A) the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the underlying offense.
No petition for rehearing or motion for reconsideration of the denial of the application to file a second or successive § 2254 petition shall be filed or entertained in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).
DENIED.
. But cf. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535-36, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005) (a "Rule 60(b) motion [that] challenges only [a] District Court's previous ruling on the AEDPA statute of limitations ... is not the equivalent of a successive habeas petition''); Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir.2009) (Rule 60(b)(6) motions in habeas petitions are reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the motion should be construed as a second or successive habeas petition).
. McNabb’s motions for leave to file a belated brief in support of his application and for judicial notice are granted.