Mark Munoz v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County

                FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARK MUNOZ; JAHLEELE                  No. 22-55941
STANLEY; TREVOR SHIVERS;
JOSE CABRERA; SAMUEL CANO;               D.C. No.
VICTOR LOPEZ; ERIBERTO                2:22-cv-03436-
GUZMAN,                                 MWF-JEM

             Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                                        OPINION
 v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY; ERIC
TAYLOR, Presiding Judge;
UNKNOWN PARTIES, Ten
Unknown, Name Defendants; 1-10,

             Defendants-Appellees.


MARK MUNOZ; JAHLEELE                  No. 23-55302
STANLEY; JOSE CABRERA;
SAMUEL CANO; VICTOR LOPEZ;               D.C. No.
VANAZAE BANKS; ALEJANDRO              2:22-cv-08682-
BANUELOS; TRAVON BROOKS;                MWF-JEM
RICHARD CASEY; ANTHONY
COLLINS; ROBERT DARBINIAN;
JESUS FARIAS; CESAR
2          MUNOZ V. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES CNTY.


JAUREGYUI; ANTHONY LOPEZ;
JOHNNY MARROQUIN; JOSHUA
MCDANIEL; PATRICK REA
MOUNT; GERBER RAMIREZ;
RAFAEL SANCHEZ; EDDIE F.
URRIETA; MICHAEL ZINKOWITZ,
Jr.,

                  Plaintiffs-Appellants,

    v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY; ERIC
TAYLOR, Presiding Judge; DOES,
Ten Unknown Named Defendants 1-
10,

                  Defendants-Appellees.

          Appeal from the United States District Court
              for the Central District of California
         Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

            Argued and Submitted November 7, 2023
                     Pasadena, California

                      Filed January 9, 2024

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, William A. Fletcher, and Ryan
                 D. Nelson, Circuit Judges.

                  Opinion by Judge R. Nelson
         MUNOZ V. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES CNTY.              3


                          SUMMARY*


              Eleventh Amendment Immunity

    The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of two
putative class actions brought pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983

against the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and Judge
Eric C. Taylor, alleging that defendants set cash bail that
plaintiffs could not afford and therefore unlawfully detained
them pretrial.
   The panel held that actions against state courts and state
court judges in their judicial capacity are barred by Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
    The Superior Court of the State of California had
sovereign immunity as an arm of the state. The exception in
Ex parte Young, 

209 U.S. 123

 (1908), did not apply because
the Superior Court cannot be sued in an individual capacity.
    Judge Taylor had Eleventh Amendment immunity
because state court judges cannot be sued in federal court in
their judicial capacity under the Eleventh Amendment. To
the extent that Wolfe v. Strankman, 

392 F.3d 358

 (9th Cir.
2004), can be read to hold that the Ex parte Young exception
allows injunctions against judges acting in their judicial
capacity, that conclusion is clearly irreconcilable with Whole
Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 

595 U.S. 30

 (2021), and thus
overruled.




*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4       MUNOZ V. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES CNTY.


                        COUNSEL

Michael J. Libman (argued), Law Offices of Michael J.
Libman, Tarzana, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Michael L. Fox (argued), Daniel D. Wall, and Bridget Cho,
Duane Morris LLP, San Francisco, California, for
Defendants-Appellees.



                         OPINION

R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

    Plaintiffs bring two putative class actions raising claims
under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983

 against the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and Judge Eric C. Taylor. We lack
jurisdiction over these claims because actions against state
courts and state court judges in their judicial capacity are
barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. We therefore
affirm the district court’s orders of dismissal.
                              I
    Plaintiffs allege that Defendants set cash bail that
Plaintiffs could not afford and therefore unlawfully detained
them pretrial. Plaintiffs allege violations of their Fourth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and seek
declaratory and injunctive relief. They request certification
of two classes: (1) a state-wide plaintiff class of about
14,000 to 17,000 similarly situated persons, and (2) a
defendant class of other California Superior Courts.
  The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Munoz v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., No. CV 22-3436-MWF,
        MUNOZ V. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES CNTY.           5

2022 WL 7150155

, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2022). It held
that it lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County because the
California Superior Courts enjoy Eleventh Amendment
immunity as arms of the state. 

Id.

 It also held that Judge
Taylor had immunity for judicial actions. 

Id.

 Plaintiffs
timely appealed.
    Plaintiffs then filed a substantively identical action a
month later. The same district judge dismissed this second
action for a lack of jurisdiction on similar grounds as the first
action. Munoz v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., No. CV 22-8682-
MWF, 

2023 WL 2780368

, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2023).
Plaintiffs timely appealed this second order.                We
consolidated the appeals for argument and now affirm both
of the district court’s orders of dismissal.
                               II
    We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291

. We
review the district court’s holdings that Defendants are
immune from suit de novo. Eason v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist.,

303 F.3d 1137

, 1140 (9th Cir. 2022).
                               III
   “[A] federal court generally may not hear a suit brought
by any person against a nonconsenting State.” Allen v.
Cooper, 

140 S. Ct. 994, 1000

 (2020). This prohibition
applies when the “state or the ‘arm of a state’ is a defendant.”
Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 

950 F.2d 1419, 1422

 (9th Cir.
1991) (citations omitted).
    Even so, the Supreme Court recognized in Ex parte
Young, 

209 U.S. 123

 (1908), that plaintiffs can sometimes
sue state officials for prospective injunctive relief to prevent
future statutory or constitutional harms. But Ex parte Young
6       MUNOZ V. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES CNTY.


applies only in narrow circumstances, such as when a
defendant can be “subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct.” 

Id.

 at 159–60.
                               A
   Applying those principles here, we conclude—as we
have before—that the Superior Court of the State of
California has sovereign immunity as an arm of the state.
See Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 

812 F.2d 1103

, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). In Zolin, we explained:

       The official name of the court is the Superior
       Court of the State of California; its
       geographical location within any particular
       county cannot change the fact that the court
       derives its power from the State and is
       ultimately regulated by the State. Judges are
       appointed by California’s governor, and their
       salaries are established and paid by the State.

Id. Further, “state case law and constitutional provisions
make clear that the Court is a State agency.” Id. Given the
considerable control that California exerts, “a suit against the
Superior Court is a suit against the State, barred by the
eleventh amendment.” Id.
    No exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity
changes this conclusion. Ex parte Young does not apply
because the Superior Court cannot be sued in an individual
capacity. See Wolfe v. Strankman, 

392 F.3d 358

, 364–65
(9th Cir. 2004).
    Because the Superior Court is an arm of the state—and
no exception applies to the rule prohibiting suits against the
state—it has Eleventh Amendment immunity.
        MUNOZ V. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES CNTY.         7


                              B
    Judge Taylor also has Eleventh Amendment immunity
as a state judge. The Ex parte Young exception “does not
normally permit federal courts to issue injunctions against
state-court judges.” Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 

595 U.S. 30

, 39 (2021). Judges “do not enforce state laws as
executive officials might; instead, they work to resolve
disputes between parties.” Id. And any errors made by state-
court judges can be remedied through “some form of
appeal.” Id.
                              C
    Our decision today differs from our reasoning in Wolfe,
which involved a constitutional challenge to California’s
Vexatious Litigant Statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 391–
391.7. 392 F.3d at 360–61. The defendants included two
California state entities and several California judges,
including Justices of the Supreme Court of California and
the California Court of Appeal. Id. at 360.
    We held that the Eleventh Amendment barred suit
against the state entities. Id. at 364. But for the individual
state-court justices, we held that the Ex parte Young
exception applied—meaning that the Eleventh Amendment
did not bar claims for prospective and injunctive declaratory
relief against them in their official capacities. Id. at 365.
    Despite that conclusion, we held that claims against the
judicial defendants were improper for different reasons. See
id. First, a judge should not be named a defendant if “there
is no relief-related basis for including” them. Id. at 366
(citation omitted). Put differently, if “complete relief” could
be afforded by “enjoining other parties,” then we “ordinarily
presume[] that judges will comply with a declaration of a
8        MUNOZ V. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES CNTY.


statute’s unconstitutionality without further compulsion.”
Id. (citation omitted). Second, § 1983’s plain text provides
“judicial immunity from suit for injunctive relief for acts
taken in a judicial capacity.” Id. We accordingly affirmed
dismissal of all the judicial defendants to the extent they
were sued in a judicial capacity. Id.
    We need not discuss Wolfe’s alternative reasons for
declining to exercise jurisdiction. In Jackson, the Supreme
Court reemphasized Ex parte Young’s conclusion that “‘an
injunction against a state court’ or its ‘machinery’ ‘would be
a violation of the whole scheme of our Government.’” 595
U.S. at 39 (quoting Ex parte Young, 

209 U.S. at 163

). As
such, state court judges cannot be sued in federal court in
their judicial capacity under the Eleventh Amendment.1 To
the extent Wolfe can be read to hold that the Ex parte Young
exception allows injunctions against judges acting in their
judicial capacity, that conclusion is “clearly irreconcilable”
with Jackson and thus overruled. See Fellowship of
Christian Athletes v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 

82 F.4th 664, 686

 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (citation
omitted). Consistent with Jackson, Eleventh Amendment
immunity is a threshold jurisdictional issue, and we have no
power to resolve claims brought against state courts or state
court judges acting in a judicial capacity.




1
  In Wolfe, we allowed some claims against judicial defendants to go
forward when sued in their administrative, as opposed to judicial,
capacity. 

392 F.3d at 366

. Because this issue is not before us, we do not
address whether this narrow holding is consistent with Jackson.
       MUNOZ V. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES CNTY.      9


                           ***
    Because Defendants have Eleventh Amendment
immunity, the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’
claims.
   AFFIRMED.