Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
James R. Odle v. Margaret H. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services
James R. Odle v. Margaret H. Heckler, Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 707 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1983)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1983-06-03
- Topic
- general
holding that denial of benefits 7 was proper where the claimant’s impairments were responsive to medication | recognizing that an 20 ALJ may consider evidence of “control of . . . pain that was satisfactory” | concluding substantial evidence supported a denial of benefits and noting that treatment addressed claimant’s impairments | noting that an ALJ may 15 consider whether treatment produced a fair response or control of pain which was satisfactory | emphasizing that the medical evidence established the plaintiff had a good response to treatments for his underlying impairments | affirming a denial of 16 benefits and noting that the claimant’s impairments were responsive to medication | affirming a denial of benefits and noting that the claimant’s impairments 2 were responsive to medication | affirming a denial of benefits and noting that the 25 1 |}claimant’s impairments were responsive to medication | affirming a 11 denial of benefits and noting that the claimant and a “fair response” to medication | affirming a denial of benefits and noting that the claimant’s impairments 6 were responsive to medication | affirming a denial of benefits and noting that the claimant’s 25 impairments were responsive to medication | affirming a denial of benefits and noting that the 14 claimant’s impairments were responsive to medication | affirming a denial of benefits and noting that the claimant’s impairments were responsive to medication | affirming a denial of benefits and noting that the claimant’s 28 impairments were responsive to medication | affirming a denial of benefits and noting that the claimant’s 26 impairments were responsive to medication | affirming denial of benefits and noting that 21 the claimant’s impairments were controlled with medication | affirming denial of benefits and noting that 3 the claimant’s impairments were controlled with medication | affirming a denial of 21 benefits and noting that “[m]edical evidence existed to establish [claimant] had a ‘fair response’ 22 with antibiotics” to his physical impairments | affirming 14 non-disability finding in part because some of claimant’s conditions had a “fair 15 response” to medication and other conditions were “satisfactorily” controlled by 16 medication and treatment | affirming denial of benefits and noting that claimant’s impairments were 11 responsive to treatment | affirming denial of benefits and noting that claimant’s 18 impairments were responsive to treatment | affirming denial of benefits and 27 noting that claimant’s impairments were responsive to treatment | affirming 7 denial of benefits and noting that claimant’s impairments were responsive to treatment | affirming denial of benefits and noting that claimant’s 16 impairments were responsive to treatment | affirming denial of benefits and noting that claimant’s impairments were 3 responsive to treatment | affirming denial of benefits and 5 noting that claimant’s impairments were responsive to treatment | affirming 23 denial of benefits and noting that claimant’s impairments were responsive to treatment | affirming denial of benefits 2 and noting that claimant’s impairments were responsive to treatment | affirming denial of benefits and 10 noting that claimant’s impairments were responsive to treatment | noting impairments that are controlled by treatment cannot be 2 considered disabling | noting impairments that are 10 controlled by treatment cannot be considered disabling | noting impairments that are controlled by medication cannot 9 be considered disabling | noting impairments that are controlled 15 by treatment cannot be considered disabling | noting impairments that are controlled 22 by medication cannot be considered disabling | noting impairments that are controlled by 16 treatment cannot be considered disabling | noting impairments that are controlled 15 by treatment cannot be considered disabling | upholding benefit denial where claimant’s impairments 22 responded well to medication | affirm- ing
Citator
- Cited by
- 55 opinions
Gary L. Floerchinger, Dept. of Health Human Services, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellee.
[2] InCampbell,the claimant applied for disability benefits because of a poor back and hypertension. Ms. Campbell was denied benefits and then requested a hearing pursuant to the statutory provision.42 U.S.C. § 405(b). The Administrative Law Judge received testimony and documentary medical evidence and determined Campbell was unable to perform her past work of a hotel maid, but retained the physical capacity to do light work. The ALJ then made findings of Ms. Campbell's age, education, and the nature of her prior employment. Applying the medical-vocational guidelines (20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2), the judge found jobs existed that a person with Campbell's qualifications could perform and concluded she was not disabled.
[3] Odle challenged the regulations on the same grounds rejected inCampbell.The ALJ made findings after hearing testimony from both claimant and his wife and receiving into evidence medical reports and other exhibits. The ALJ found Odle to be 42 years old in 1979, had at least a "limited education" — citing three different sources with ninth grade, tenth grade, and four years of high school completed, respectively, and Odle's prior work experience of farm work as a foreman and cotton ginner to be "semi-skilled," heavy work. Exhibit I, HEW Transcript, 7-79-318-CIV, pp. 12-18, Decision in the Case of James R. Odle, May 22, 1979, p. 6.
[4] The "Decision" discusses the impairments under which appellant suffers in light of the medical evidence before him. The exertional impairments included osteomyelitis in several of his ribs, osteoarthritis in the left knee, and a peptic ulcer. Each was considered, the treatment involved, and the current condition of Mr. Odle in light of the malady. Medical evidence existed to establish appellant had a "fair response" with antibiotics to his rib condition, the swelling of his left knee subsided, and control of that pain was satisfactory. Hypertension and the peptic ulcer were controlled with drugs and antacids, respectively.
[5] Non-exertional impairments included deafness, dizziness, and drug dependence. A hearing aid returned hearing to within "almost normal limits." Dizziness problems remained to some extent and were likely to be recurrent. Drug abuse was satisfactorily controlled through a treatment program. These impairments were found not to significantly limit Odle's exertional capabilities.
[6] There is substantial evidence in support of these conclusions. Though this circuit has precedent requiring the enunciation of "specific jobs" for which the claimant is physically capable of performing,1Campbellexpressly rejected the necessity of this finding in circumstances where the "grids" apply. ___ U.S. at ___, 103 S.Ct. at 1958.
[7] Odle's other claims and arguments were either not raised below or have no merit.
[8] Accordingly, the final decision of the Secretary denying Odle disability insurance benefits and supplemental social security insurance benefits is
[9] AFFIRMED.
[10] Each party will bear his own costs on appeal.Page 441
- Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 43(c)(1), we substitute the name Margaret H. Heckler, successor to the original appellee Patricia Roberts Harris, as the Secretary of Health and Human Services. ↩
- Hall v. Secretary of Health, Education Welfare,602 F.2d 1372, 1377 (9th Cir. 1979).
The Second Circuit and four other circuits also had case law requiring a finding of specific alternate jobs the claimant was capable of performing.Decker v. Harris,647 F.2d 291, 294 (2d Cir. 1981);Rossi v. Califano,602 F.2d 55, 57 (3d Cir. 1979);Hephner v. Mathews,574 F.2d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1978);Taylorv. Weinberger,512 F.2d 664, 665, 666 (4th Cir. 1975); andHernandez v. Weinberger,493 F.2d 1120, 1122 (1st Cir. 1974). ↩