Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Irving LANCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee
Irving LANCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. United States, Defendant-Appellee, 70 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 1995)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1995-11-27
- Topic
- employee-benefits-and-executive-compensation
concluding district court properly dismissed the plaintiff's “action to the extent 28 [the] complaint named Does 1 through 20 as additional defendants” | concluding district court properly dismissed 19 the plaintiff’s “action to the extent [the] complaint named Does 1 through 20 as additional 20 defendants” | holding the district 10 court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s “action to the extent [the] complaint named Does 1 11 through 20 as additional defendants” | “The United States is the only proper defendant 6 in an FTCA action.” | “The United States is the only proper 22 defendant in an FTCA action.” | “The district court also properly dismissed [Plaintiff’s] action to the extent 4 his complaint named Does 1 through 20 as additional defendants: the United States is the 5 only proper defendant in an FTCA action.” | “The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.” | “The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.” | “The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.” | “The district cou 2 ||also properly dismissed Lance’s action to the extent his complaint named Does 1 through 20 ; 3 || additional defendants: the United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.” | “The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.” | "FECA would therefore clearly bar an FTCA suit .. . ." | affirming 23 dismissal of Doe defendants in an FTCA case | affirming dismissal of Doe defendants in FTCA 13 action
Citator
- Cited by
- 34 opinions
Suzette Clover, Assistant United States Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for the defendant-appellee.
D.C. No. CV-94-02374-ER
[2] [1] FECA provides the exclusive remedy against the federal government for federal employees injured at work.5 U.S.C. § 8116(c). Volunteer workers at Veteran's Administration hospitals are "employees" for FECA purposes.5 U.S.C. § 8101(1)(B);38 U.S.C. § 513. FECA would therefore clearly bar an FTCA suit by Lance to recover for the injury he suffered at work. Although Lance isn't suing for the injury he suffered at work, but for medical malpractice arising out of the injury, this is a distinction without a difference.
[3] [2] When it comes to federal employees, FECA benefits are the only "liability of the United States . . .becauseof the injury."5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (emphasis added). As a matter of textual interpretation, there's a strong argument that liability based on medical malpractice arising out of an injury is liability "because of the injury." FECA's rationale confirms this reading of the statute. Congress enacted FECA to give federal employees smaller but more certain and less costly recoveries in exchange for the right to sue the government in tort.SeeLockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States,460 U.S. 190,194(1983). Under traditional tort causation principles, a plaintiff's right to recover for an injury generally includes the right to recover for medical malpractice arising out of the injury.SeeRestatement (Second) of Torts § 457 (1965). Therefore, when Congress gave federal employees the right to recover for an injury under FECA, it took away their right to sue the government in tort for medical malpractice arising out of the injury, as well as for the injury itself.See, e.g., McCall v.United States,901 F.2d 548,550-51(6th Cir. 1990) (citing cases).
[4] The district court also properly dismissed Lance's action to the extent his complaint named Does 1 through 20 as additional defendants: The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.See Woods v. United States,720 F.2d 1451,1452n. 1 (9th Cir. 1983).
[5]AFFIRMED.