Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Irving LANCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee

Irving LANCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. United States, Defendant-Appellee, 70 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 1995)

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1995-11-27
Topic
employee-benefits-and-executive-compensation

How later courts describe this case

  • concluding district court properly dismissed the plaintiff's “action to the extent 28 [the] complaint named Does 1 through 20 as additional defendants”
  • concluding district court properly dismissed 19 the plaintiff’s “action to the extent [the] complaint named Does 1 through 20 as additional 20 defendants”
  • holding the district 10 court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s “action to the extent [the] complaint named Does 1 11 through 20 as additional defendants”
  • “The United States is the only proper defendant 6 in an FTCA action.”
  • “The United States is the only proper 22 defendant in an FTCA action.”
  • “The district court also properly dismissed [Plaintiff’s] action to the extent 4 his complaint named Does 1 through 20 as additional defendants: the United States is the 5 only proper defendant in an FTCA action.”
  • “The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.”
  • also properly dismissed Lance’s action to the extent his complaint named Does 1 through 20 ; 3

Citator

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Cited by
62 opinions
LANCE v. U.S.,70 F.3d 1093(9th Cir. 1995)
IRVING LANCE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
No. 94-56579.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted November 14, 1995fn*Pasadena, California
Filed November 27, 1995
Page 1094
Barry S. Zelner, Beverly Hills, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Suzette Clover, Assistant United States Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for the defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

D.C. No. CV-94-02374-ER
Before: Jerome Farris, Melvin Brunetti and Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
[1] Lance was a volunteer worker at a Veterans Administration hospital. He was injured at the hospital and received treatment for the injury there. He's now suing the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for medical malpractice based on the treatment.Page 1095As explained below, the Federal Employees Compensation Act preempts FTCA suits based on medical malpractice arising out of federal employees' injuries at work. The district court therefore properly dismissed Lance's FTCA suit.

[2] [1] FECA provides the exclusive remedy against the federal government for federal employees injured at work.5 U.S.C. § 8116(c). Volunteer workers at Veteran's Administration hospitals are "employees" for FECA purposes.5 U.S.C. § 8101(1)(B);38 U.S.C. § 513. FECA would therefore clearly bar an FTCA suit by Lance to recover for the injury he suffered at work. Although Lance isn't suing for the injury he suffered at work, but for medical malpractice arising out of the injury, this is a distinction without a difference.

[3] [2] When it comes to federal employees, FECA benefits are the only "liability of the United States . . .becauseof the injury."5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (emphasis added). As a matter of textual interpretation, there's a strong argument that liability based on medical malpractice arising out of an injury is liability "because of the injury." FECA's rationale confirms this reading of the statute. Congress enacted FECA to give federal employees smaller but more certain and less costly recoveries in exchange for the right to sue the government in tort.SeeLockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States,460 U.S. 190,194(1983). Under traditional tort causation principles, a plaintiff's right to recover for an injury generally includes the right to recover for medical malpractice arising out of the injury.SeeRestatement (Second) of Torts § 457 (1965). Therefore, when Congress gave federal employees the right to recover for an injury under FECA, it took away their right to sue the government in tort for medical malpractice arising out of the injury, as well as for the injury itself.See, e.g., McCall v.United States,901 F.2d 548,550-51(6th Cir. 1990) (citing cases).

[4] The district court also properly dismissed Lance's action to the extent his complaint named Does 1 through 20 as additional defendants: The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.See Woods v. United States,720 F.2d 1451,1452n. 1 (9th Cir. 1983).

[5]AFFIRMED.
  1. The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for submission on the record and briefs and without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P.34(a), 9th Cir.R. 34-4. ↩