Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Hoffman v. Construction Protective Services, Inc.
Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc., 541 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2008)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 2008-09-16
- Topic
- general
explaining that exclusion of evidence is appropriate unless the failure to disclose was 23 substantially justified or harmless | recognizing in dicta that case 13 law is unsettled regarding individualized opt-in discovery in FLSA cases | finding that harm would occur when allowing evidence would require additional briefing and reopening discovery | discussing that the late disclosure of damages would have most likely required 21 the court to create a new briefing schedule and perhaps re-open discovery, modifications of 22 which were not harmless | upholding, district court’s exclusion of- previously undisclosed evidence because Rule 37 is a “self-executing, automatic sanction to provide a strong inducement for disclosure of material” | finding no substantial justification where plaintiffs argued that the “right to individualized discovery” in the class action context was “unsettled” | affirming exclusion of damages evidence at 19 trial because “[d]isclosure of damage calculations was mandated under Rule 26(a)” | affirming district court’s exclusion of damages evidence because “[d]isclosure of damage calculations was mandated under Rule 26(a)” | affirming a district-court order excluding the plaintiffs’ damages evidence because they failed to disclose 22 computations of those damages before the pretrial conference | finding failure to properly disclose pursuant to Rule 26(a) was not harmless where 1 the court would be required “to create a new briefing schedule” | affirming district 17 court’s determination that late disclosure of damage calculations was not harmless and 18 therefore justified exclusion under Rule 37(c)(1 | citing- Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005) | finding that “[l]ater disclosure of damages would have mostly likely required the court to create a new briefing schedule and perhaps re-open discovery,” and “[s]uch modifications to the court’s and the parties’ schedules supports a finding that the failure to disclose was not harmless.” | affirming district court’s exclusion of damage claims as to 64 of 66 plaintiffs due 4 to late disclosure, because “[d]isclosure of damage calculations was mandated under Rule 5 26(a | referring to 20 Rule 37(c)(1) as “a self-executing, automatic sanction ...” | referring to 20 Rule 37(c)(1) as “a self-executing, automatic sanction ...” | "Any local rule requiring a conference prior to the court's imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(c) would be inconsistent with Rule 37(c) and, therefore, unenforceable” | “‘[W]e 20 give particularly wide latitude to the district court’s discretion to issue sanctions under Rule 21 37(c)(1).’” | belated disclosure, which could have “perhaps 22 [necessitated] re-open[ing] discovery, rather than simply set[ing] a trial date,” was not 23 harmless. | “Under Rule 37, exclusion of evidence not disclosed is appropriate unless the failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless.” (citation omitted) | “[W]e give particularly wide latitude to the district court’s discretion to issue sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1).” (citation omitted) | “[W]e give particularly wide latitude to the district court’s discretion to issue sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1).” (citation omitted) | “Any local rule requiring a conference prior to 27 the court’s imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(c) would be inconsistent with Rule 37(c) and, therefore, unenforceable.” | when late disclosure will “likely require[] the court to create a new 5 briefing schedule and perhaps re-open discovery . . . the failure to disclose [is] not 6 harmless” | “Rule 37(c)(1) gives teeth to [Rule 13 26(a)(1)’s and 26(e)’s] requirements by forbidding the use at trial of any information required to 14 be disclosed by Rule 26(a) that is not properly disclosed.” | applying Rule 37(c)(1) to a violation of Rule 26(e)(1)(A) | Rule 37(c)(1) exclusion 3 sanction requested in a motion in limine | Rule 37(c)(1) exclusion 3 sanction requested in a motion in limine | “L
Citator
- Cited by
- 58 opinions
Jim D. Newman and Howard M. Knee, Knee, Ross Silverman LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for the appellee.
Although the parties proceeded with conducting discovery, at no time prior to trial did Hoffman and Lopez disclose damagePage 1178calculations either for each individual Opt-In Plaintiff other than themselves or for the group as a whole. Prior to trial, CPS filed a motionin limineto exclude evidence not produced pursuant to Rule 26.
At the pre-trial conference, the court was expecting to proceed to trial on the claims of approximately sixty-six plaintiffs, including the Opt-In Plaintiffs. The number of plaintiffs concerned the court, a concern that grew as the court began to realize that Hoffman and Lopez's counsel did not have a solid understanding of his clients' damages.
Based on the confusion over damages and the court's concerns, the court decided to take the motionin limineto exclude evidence under submission. The court was then presented with an oral motion to sever Hoffman's and Lopez's claims from those of the Opt-In Plaintiffs and allow the trial to proceed as scheduled on the severed claims. The court continued the pre-trial conference to allow the parties to determine whether the case could be tried as scheduled.
Three days later, the court reconvened the pre-trial conference. The court began by noting its decision to exclude from trial all evidence of damages not relating to Hoffman and Lopez. The court then determined that it would be appropriate to sever Hoffman's and Lopez's claims from those of the Opt-In Plaintiffs due to potential factual differences relating to the claims brought under California law.
The court issued a written ruling on February 21, 2006. Its conclusions were consistent with the rulings made at the pre-trial conference, including the exclusion of damages evidence. The court made no mention of the severance or its potential effect on the upcoming trial. Trial began the same day, with the jury ultimately returning partial verdicts in favor of Hoffman and Lopez.
Hoffman, Lopez and the Opt-In Plaintiffs (collectively, Plaintiffs) appeal the exclusion of damages evidence and the award of attorney's fees.
No pre-motion meeting was required in this instance. Local Rule 37-1 provides: "Prior to the filing of any motion relating to discovery pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 26-37, counsel for the parties shall confer in a good faith effort to eliminate the necessity for hearing the motion or to eliminate as many of the disputes as possible." To the extent that Local Rule 37-1 applies, it must "be consistent with — but not duplicate — federal statutes and rules." Fed.R.Civ.P.83(a)(1).
Rule 37(c)(1) provides that a party failing to provide information required by Rule 26(a) or (e) "is not allowed to use that information . . . to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." As such, CPS's motioninliminewas not a motion "relating to discovery pursuant to[Rules] 26-37." Local Rule 37-1. Rather, it was a motion relating to sanctions pursuant to Rule 37. Any local rule requiring a conference prior to the court's imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(c) would be inconsistent with Rule 37(c) and, therefore, unenforceable.
Under Rule 37, exclusion of evidence not disclosed is appropriate unless the failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless.Id.at 1106. Plaintiffs assert that they were substantially justified in failing to disclose damage computations for each opt-in plaintiff because the law is unsettled as to the obligation to disclose such information on an individual basis in FLSA opt-in class actions. Although the district court accepted Plaintiffs' argument that the right to individualized discovery in this context remains unsettled,compare Adkins v. Mid-American Growers, Inc.,143 F.R.D. 171,174(N.D.Ill. 1992) (precluding individual discovery in FLSA case as inappropriate under the circumstances)withKrueger v. N.Y. Tel. Co.,163 F.R.D. 446,451(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (permitting individualized discovery relating to damages in opt-in class action), their argument ignores the fact that each individual opt-in plaintiff was also proceeding on multiple state law causes of action that were not included in the class action. As to those causes of action, Plaintiffs have cited no case, and there appears to be none, to support the argument that disclosure on an individual basis was not required.Cf.Fed.R.Civ.P.26(a)(1)(A)(iii) (requiring disclosure by each party of "a computation of each category of damages claimed"). Disclosure of damage calculations was mandated under Rule 26(a) and the Opt-In Plaintiffs' failurePage 1180to disclose was not substantially justified.
Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that any failure to disclose was harmless because of the district court's decision to sever the claims of the Opt-In Plaintiffs. We disagree. Later disclosure of damages would have most likely required the court to create a new briefing schedule and perhaps re-open discovery, rather than simply set a trial date. Such modifications to the court's and the parties' schedules supports a finding that the failure to disclose was not harmless.See Wong v. Regents of the Univ.of Cal.,410 F.3d 1052,1062(9th Cir. 2005),asamendedIt was eminently reasonable for the court to require full disclosure of damages for the entire case.
Finally, we reject the notion that the district court was required to make a finding of willfulness or bad faith to exclude the damages evidence. To the contrary the portion of Rule 37 relied on by the district court has been described as "a self-executing, automatic sanction to provide a strong inducement for disclosure of material."Yeti,259 F.3d at 1106(citation, alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The implementation of the sanction is appropriate "even when a litigant's entire cause of action . . . [will be] precluded."Id.(citation omitted). Because the district court acted within its discretion when it precluded presentation of undisclosed evidence of damages, we affirm the ruling of the district court.Affirmed.