Faulk v. Jeld-Wen, Inc.

                   FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID G. FAULK; BONNIE J.                     No. 24-4078
FAULK,
                                               D.C. No.
                                            3:22-cv-00171-
              Plaintiffs - Appellants,
                                                 SLG
 v.
                                               OPINION
JELD-WEN, INC., doing business as
Pozzi Window Company; SPENARD
BUILDERS SUPPLY, LLC;
RODERICK C. WENDT,

              Defendants - Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court
                  for the District of Alaska
      Sharon L. Gleason, Chief District Judge, Presiding

           Argued and Submitted August 15, 2025
                    Anchorage, Alaska

                  Filed November 14, 2025

  Before: Susan P. Graber, John B. Owens, and Ryan D.
                 Nelson, Circuit Judges.

                 Opinion by Judge R. Nelson
2                    FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC.


                          SUMMARY *


            Removal / Class Action Fairness Act

    The panel vacated the district court’s order dismissing a
second amended complaint with prejudice, and remanded
with instructions to remand the case to state court unless
defendants establish another basis for federal jurisdiction.
    Plaintiffs amended their complaint to remove all class
allegations. The district court denied their motion to remand
because this Court’s precedent suggested that post-removal
amendments to class action complaints, amending the nature
of the claims, did not undermine federal jurisdiction.
    Under Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 

604 U.S. 22

 (2025), the panel held that jurisdiction is lacking
when a plaintiff amends her complaint post-removal and
excises the class action allegations that had provided the sole
basis for subject matter jurisdiction. This Court’s prior
precedent, holding that diversity jurisdiction under the Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA) is determined only at the time
of removal, is clearly irreconcilable with Royal Canin.
    The panel concluded that under Royal Canin, there was
no subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint. With plaintiffs’ excision of their class
action allegations, there was no longer minimal diversity
under CAFA. Because plaintiffs, an Alaska couple, also
sued Spenard Builders Supply, LLC, an Alaska corporation,


*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                   FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC.                3


complete diversity was lacking. With no diversity or federal
question jurisdiction, no “original jurisdiction” remained.



                        COUNSEL

Michelle S. Nesbett (argued) and David K. Gross, Birch
Horton Bittner & Cherot, Anchorage, Alaska, for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
Richard N. Sieving (argued), The Sieving Law Firm APC,
Sacramento, California; Jennifer M. Coughlin, Landye
Bennett Blumstein LLP, Anchorage, Alaska; James S. Nolan
(argued), Richmond & Quinn, Anchorage, Alaska; for
Defendants-Appellees.
4                  FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC.


                        OPINION

R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

    David and Bonnie Faulk, an Alaskan couple, brought a
class action in state court alleging state-law claims against
an Alaska and a Delaware corporation. Defendants removed
the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA), 

28 U.S.C. § 1332

(d).
    The Faulks amended their complaint to remove all class
action allegations. The district court denied their motion to
remand because our precedent suggested that post-removal
amendments to class action complaints, amending the nature
of the claims, do not undermine federal jurisdiction. See
Broadway Grill, Inc. v. Visa Inc., 

856 F.3d 1274, 1279

(9th Cir. 2017).    After Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v.
Wullschleger, 

604 U.S. 22

 (2025), that is no longer true.
“When a plaintiff amends her complaint following her suit’s
removal, a federal court’s jurisdiction depends on what the
new complaint says.” 

Id. at 30

.
    We recently recognized that Royal Canin overruled our
prior precedent holding that post-removal amendments do
not undermine federal jurisdiction. See Walker v. State of
Arizona, --- F.4th ----, No. 24-1806, 

2025 WL 2970598

, at
*4 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2025) (recognizing that Royal Canin
overruled Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass’n of
Securities Dealers, Inc., 

159 F.3d 1209

 (9th Cir. 1998)).
Royal Canin’s rule also governs when a plaintiff amends
their class complaint and excises the claims necessary for
CAFA’s minimal diversity standards to apply. Our
precedent holding otherwise is overruled by Royal Canin.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order dismissing
the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, and remand
                   FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC.                 5


with instructions to remand to state court unless another
basis for federal jurisdiction is established.
                              I
    Appellants David and Bonnie Faulk bought more than
one hundred windows manufactured by JELD-WEN from
Spenard Builders Supply for their custom-built home. The
Faulks allege that the windows were defective in breach of
an oral warranty.
    The Faulks brought a class action against Defendants
Spenard and JELD-WEN in Alaska state court, alleging
state-law claims. The Faulks are Alaska citizens and
residents. Spenard is incorporated in Alaska and JELD-
WEN in Delaware. Defendants removed the case to federal
court under CAFA. See 

28 U.S.C. § 1332

(d)(2).
    As relevant to this appeal, the Faulks sought to remand
the action to state court and to file a second amended
complaint (SAC), which removed the class action
allegations. The Faulks argued that the removal of those
allegations “should be relevant for the Court’s CAFA
analysis or otherwise provide independent grounds for
divesting jurisdiction.”
    The district court noted that the Faulks’ “procedural
move reek[ed] of forum manipulation” to the extent they
sought “to destroy federal jurisdiction by eliminating the
class aspect of this action.” Faulk v. JELD-WEN, Inc., No.
3:22-CV-00171-JMK, 

2023 WL 7321584

, at *2 (D. Alaska
Nov. 7, 2023). But it declared that “jurisdiction is
determined at the time of removal.” 

Id.

 (citing United Steel,
Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. &
Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Shell Oil Co.,

602 F.3d 1087

, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2010)). Therefore, “[a]s
6                  FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC.


Broadway Grill made clear, post-removal amendments to
narrow (or eliminate) a class does not destroy CAFA
jurisdiction.” 

Id.

 (citation omitted). Relying on our
precedent that protected federal jurisdiction after post-
removal amendment, the district court granted “leave to
amend to eliminate the class allegations” because, if the
Faulks “no longer wish to bring a class action, they should
not be forced to.” 

Id.

 at *2–*3. But the district court also
denied the Faulks’ renewed motion to remand as moot,
because it had already ruled that remand was inappropriate
under the original complaint. Id. at *2. The Faulks then filed
a class-action-free SAC with only state-law claims.
    The district court ultimately dismissed the SAC with
prejudice. Most of the claims were time-barred, and one was
insufficiently pled. This timely appeal followed.
                              II
    We have an independent obligation to assure ourselves
of jurisdiction. See West v. United States, 

853 F.3d 520, 522

(9th Cir. 2017). Under Royal Canin, we conclude that we
lack jurisdiction when a plaintiff amends her complaint post-
removal and excises the class action allegations that had
provided the sole basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
                             III
    To adjudicate a case, a federal court must ensure that
both constitutional and statutory jurisdiction are satisfied.
See Royal Canin, 

604 U.S. at 26

. This case is about the latter
requirement, also known as “subject matter jurisdiction.”
E.g., 

id. at 28

.
    Our subject matter jurisdiction over a claim is generally
satisfied in one of two ways. The first, known as “federal
question jurisdiction,” e.g., Wander v. Kaus, 

304 F.3d 856

,
                    FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC.                   7


858 (9th Cir. 2002), is to bring a “civil action[] arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” 

28 U.S.C. § 1331

.         The second, known as “diversity
jurisdiction,” e.g., Royal Canin, 

604 U.S. at 37

, is to bring a
civil action satisfying diversity-of-citizenship, amount-in-
controversy, and other requirements, see 

28 U.S.C. § 1332

.
     Different degrees of diversity are required to establish
different kinds of jurisdiction. Normally, we need what is
called “complete diversity” of citizenship, which means that
no plaintiff can share citizenship with any defendant. E.g.,
Weeping Hollow Ave. Tr. v. Spencer, 

831 F.3d 1110, 1112

(9th Cir. 2016). That is not true for class actions under
CAFA, in which diversity of citizenship may be satisfied if,
for example, “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a
citizen of a State different from any defendant.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1332

(d)(2)(A). Such a requirement is known as
“minimal diversity” and is satisfied if any class member has
a citizenship different from any defendant. E.g., Ehrman v.
Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 

932 F.3d 1223, 1226

 (9th Cir. 2019)
(citation omitted).
     This case raises the question of when we determine
whether the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are
satisfied. Should we assess whether diversity jurisdiction
exists based on the complaint at the time of removal? Or
should we look instead to a post-removal amended
complaint? Our existing precedent instructs us to do the
former. See Broadway Grill, 

856 F.3d at 1279

. We have
held that “citizenship of the class for purposes of minimal
diversity must be determined as of the operative complaint
at the date of removal.” 

Id.

   Earlier this year, the Supreme Court decided Royal
Canin. The Court recognized that a plaintiff is “‘master of
8                   FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC.


the complaint,’ and therefore controls much about her
suit[,] . . . extend[ing] beyond the time her first complaint is
filed.” Royal Canin, 

604 U.S. at 35

 (citation omitted). When
a plaintiff removes the basis for federal jurisdiction from her
complaint, that plaintiff “alter[s] a federal court’s authority.”

Id. at 39

. So when “any federal anchor” supporting
jurisdiction is “gone, . . . jurisdiction over the residual state
claims disappears as well.” 

Id.

    We have since held that Royal Canin abrogated our
precedent holding that “the availability of supplemental
jurisdiction depended on the allegations in the complaint at
the time of removal, and that subsequent amendments did
not eliminate the district court’s ability to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.” Walker, --- F.4th ----, 

2025 WL 2970598

, at *4. Now we must determine whether our prior
precedent involving class claims under CAFA remains good
law. Our precedent holding that diversity jurisdiction under
CAFA is determined solely at the time of removal is clearly
irreconcilable with Royal Canin.
                               A
    Under our prior precedent, the district court correctly
held that it had jurisdiction even after the Faulks excised the
class action allegations from their complaint. The post-
removal amendment is important because the class action
allegations provided the sole basis for federal jurisdiction
under CAFA.
    The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under
CAFA at the time of removal. Minimal diversity was
satisfied because the Faulks are Alaska citizens and JELD-
WEN is incorporated in Delaware.            See 

28 U.S.C. § 1332

(d)(2)(A); see also Brinkley v. Monterey Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 

873 F.3d 1118, 1121

 (9th Cir. 2017). The complaint at
                       FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC.                         9


the time of removal also satisfied CAFA’s other
requirements. See 

28 U.S.C. § 1332

(d)(2)–(6).
    But, while this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
decided Royal Canin, in which a plaintiff who initially
brought state and federal claims in state court amended her
complaint to remove all federal claims. See 604 U.S. at 28–
29. The Court held that “[w]hen an amendment excises the
federal-law claims that enabled removal, the federal court
loses its supplemental jurisdiction over the related state-law
claims.” 

Id.

 at 25–26. In those instances, “[t]he case must
therefore return to state court.” 

Id.

 We have considered how
Royal Canin applies in regard to supplemental jurisdiction.
Walker, --- F.4th ----, 

2025 WL 2970598

, at *15–17. Here,
we must consider the effect of Royal Canin on our prior
precedent regarding diversity jurisdiction in CAFA cases,
namely Broadway Grill and United Steel. 1 As a three-judge
panel, we must adhere to circuit precedent unless that
precedent “is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or
theory of intervening higher authority.” Miller v. Gammie,

335 F.3d 889, 893

 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). If that standard
is met, “a three-judge panel should consider itself bound by
the later and controlling authority, and should reject the prior
circuit opinion as having been effectively overruled.” 

Id.

1
  Following Royal Canin, we briefly discussed the importance of looking
to the operative complaint in the CAFA context. See Rosenwald v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 

152 F.4th 1167

, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2025).
Rosenwald involved what was largely a fact-driven inquiry about a
proposed amended complaint in an action originally filed in federal court
where the amendments affected only the amount in controversy. See
infra n.3. As a result, the Rosenwald panel distinguished Broadway
Grill, which is about whether to remand a removed case when a post-
removal amendment excises the basis for jurisdiction under CAFA. 152
F.4th at 1181.
10                  FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC.


    Royal Canin and Walker instruct us to look to the
operative complaint, including any post-removal
amendments, when determining jurisdiction. And if the
federal jurisdictional hook is excised from the complaint by
post-removal amendment, subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking, and the case should be remanded.
    Although those cases addressed supplemental
jurisdiction, their logic applies to diversity jurisdiction under
CAFA as well. Royal Canin was driven in part by the text
of 

28 U.S.C. § 1367

, which extends supplemental
jurisdiction to “any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction.” And CAFA confers original
jurisdiction over civil actions meeting certain requirements.
See 

28 U.S.C. § 1332

(d)(2) (“The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action [meeting CAFA’s
requirements].”). Because “[t]he plaintiff is ‘the master of
the complaint,’” “[s]he gets to determine which substantive
claims to bring against which defendants.” Royal Canin,

604 U.S. at 35

 (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 

482 U.S. 386

, 398–99 (1987)). “And in so doing, she can
establish—or not—the basis for a federal court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction.” 

Id.

                               B
    Some of our relevant caselaw is “clearly irreconcilable
with the reasoning or theory of” Royal Canin. Miller, 

335 F.3d at 893

. Not all of it though. With some caveats, see
infra n.2, Royal Canin overrules our precedent holding that
federal jurisdiction is based on the complaint at the time of
removal. See Walker, --- F.4th ----, 

2025 WL 2970598

, at
*15. This case was removed under CAFA based on minimal
diversity, but complete diversity was lacking. In that
scenario, federal jurisdiction is extinguished by the excision
                    FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC.                 11


of the class allegations, as minimal diversity no longer
satisfies the diversity requirement.
    Some of Broadway Grill’s dicta and holdings
irreconcilably conflict with Royal Canin. We made broad
statements about CAFA: The legislative history revealed
that CAFA prevented “amendment[s] changing the nature of
the class to divest the federal court of jurisdiction” and that
“post-removal amendments cannot affect jurisdiction.”
Broadway Grill, 856 F.3d at 1278–79. Further, after
surveying out-of-circuit precedent warning against forum
manipulation, we stated that “plaintiffs’ attempts to amend a
complaint after removal to eliminate federal jurisdiction are
doomed to failure.” 

Id. at 1277

. So we held that “citizenship
of the class for purposes of minimal diversity must be
determined as of the operative complaint at the date of
removal.” 

Id. at 1279

.
    That reasoning and those holdings from Broadway Grill
are clearly irreconcilable with Royal Canin, which holds that
a plaintiff may extinguish jurisdiction through post-removal
amendments, 

604 U.S. at 35

.
    Nor may we rely on forum-manipulation concerns to
maintain federal jurisdiction. Consider the Supreme Court’s
discussion in Royal Canin of Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United
States, 

549 U.S. 457

 (2007). In a footnote in Rockwell, the
Court suggested that “forum-manipulation concerns . . . do
not exist when it is the plaintiff who chooses a federal forum
and then pleads away jurisdiction through amendment.” 

Id.

at 474 n.6. Although the Court in Royal Canin was
understanding of courts relying on the footnote—“[w]e do
not at all fault any court that relied on the Rockwell footnote
to find jurisdiction in a case like this one”—it rejected
Rockwell footnote six. 

604 U.S. at 43

 & n.10. The footnote
12                      FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC.


was “beside the point” and “dictum.” 

Id. at 42

. It was
“barely reasoned” and put “policy-based concerns,” which
themselves were ill reasoned, over the text of § 1367. Id. at
42, 42 n.9. Therefore, the “forum-manipulation benefit of
the Rockwell footnote’s approach to removed federal-
question cases is likely quite marginal.” Id. at 42 n.9. “As
the master of his complaint, [the plaintiff] can decide what
claims to present and in what forum to litigate.” Walker, ---
F.4th ----, 

2025 WL 2970598

, at *8.
    Accordingly, Broadway Grill’s holding that the
complaint at the time of removal “remained the only one
which should have been considered for determining the
existence of minimal diversity,” 

856 F.3d at 1279

, conflicts
directly with Royal Canin. So too its reasoning regarding
CAFA’s legislative history and its discussion of out-of-
circuit practices. 

Id.

 at 1277–79. That holding and
reasoning, at a minimum, conflict with the logic and
reasoning of Royal Canin and are no longer good law. 2 We


2
  Royal Canin does not entirely overrule Broadway Grill, which also
limited the types of amendments district courts should permit in the
CAFA context. See Broadway Grill, 856 F.3d at 1277–78 (narrowing
amendments permitted after Benko v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 

789 F.3d 1111

 (9th Cir. 2015)). Nor do we pass judgment on our CAFA caselaw
which concludes that denial of class certification does not immediately
deprive a district court of CAFA jurisdiction. See, e.g., United Steel, 602
F.3d at 1091–92. Those rules appear to govern what can be done within
a complaint putting forth class allegations, rather than to deny a plaintiff
the right to remove parties or causes of action. Whether Royal Canin
affects those holdings is not before us. Cf. Royal Canin, 

604 U.S. at 38

n.8 (stating that the rule of St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab
Co., 

303 U.S. 283

, 289–93 (1938)—that “an amendment reducing the
alleged amount-in-controversy to below the statutory threshold . . . will
usually not destroy diversity jurisdiction”—was “inapposite” to the
question presented “by virtue of its subject and function alike”).
                       FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC.                          13


do not fault the district court for its reliance on then-existing
precedent. But Royal Canin requires us to overrule our prior
precedent.
                                    C
    Under Royal Canin, there is no subject matter
jurisdiction over the Faulks’ SAC. With the Faulks’ excision
of their class action allegations, we can no longer rely on
minimal diversity under CAFA. See 

28 U.S.C. § 1332

(d)(2).
Because the Faulks, an Alaska couple, also sued Spenard, an
Alaska corporation, complete diversity is lacking. See 

id.

§ 1332(a)(1).     With no diversity or federal question
jurisdiction, no “original jurisdiction” remains. Without
another basis for federal jurisdiction, “[t]he case must
therefore return to state court.” Royal Canin, 

604 U.S. at 26

. 3
     Put another way, the Faulks are masters of their
complaint. See Royal Canin, 

604 U.S. at 35

; Walker, ---
F.4th ----, 

2025 WL 2970598

, at *8. They sacrificed a
litigation advantage by excising their class action
allegations. With that currency, they appear to have
purchased a remand to state court. Royal Canin requires that
we accept the exchange. We leave it to the district court to
determine whether it is appropriate to entertain Spenard’s

3
  The district court cases that Defendants cite do not persuade us
otherwise. E.g., Nichols v. 300 M St. Dev. Grp., 

783 F. Supp. 3d 273

,
277–78 (D.D.C. 2025). They do not answer the question before us:
Whether Royal Canin conflicts with maintaining jurisdiction over state-
law claims after CAFA allegations are excised from a complaint and the
requirements of diversity jurisdiction are left unsatisfied. Nor do we take
a side on whether federal jurisdiction remains where the amendment of
class allegations only alters the amount in controversy. See Rosenwald,
152 F.4th at 1181 (pointing out the amount-in-controversy “exception to
the rule” from Royal Canin).
14                  FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC.


fraudulent joinder claim, raised for the first time at oral
argument.
                              IV
    Under Royal Canin, federal subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking.    Accordingly, we vacate and remand with
instructions for the district court to remand to state court,
unless Defendants establish another basis for federal subject
matter jurisdiction.
     VACATED and REMANDED with instructions.
     Appellants shall recover their costs on appeal.