Edward A. Ashford v. Charles Steuart, Don Erby, Ray Beaman, Steve Stedfelt, and Maynard Ross

holding that the court should take “into 9 consideration the interest of finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to 10 learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties.” | holding that the court should take “into 3 consideration the interest of finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to 4 learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties.” | noting that 3 when the time for appeal has passed, the interest in finality is heightened | setting forth factors to determine whether a Rule 60(b) motion was filed within a “reasonable time” | upholding denial of 60(b) motion filed more than thirty days after judgment | setting forth factors to determine whether a Fed. R, Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(3) motion has been filed within a “reasonable time”; where the time for a direct appeal has passed, “the interest in finality must be given great weight” | “Because the time for appeal had passed in this case, the interest in finality must be given great weight.” | “Because the time for appeal had passed in 20 this case, the interest in finality must be given great weight.” | “Because the time for appeal had passed in this case, the interest in finality must be given great weight.” | 30 days held unreasonable when movant offered no explanation for his failure to challenge the ruling in question on direct appeal | ‘An unsuccessful party may not ... frustrate ... res judicata by cloaking the same cause of action in the language of a theory untried in the previous litigation.’ | see 15 also 12 James Wm. Moore, et. al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.48[3][c] (3d ed. 2005) (“fault 16 by movant usually means [a] lack of ‘extraordinary circumstances’” | "What constitutes `reasonable time' depends on the facts of each case, taking into consideration the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties" | "What constitutes `reasonable time' depends on the facts of each case, taking into consideration the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties"