Doe v. Grindr Inc.

                 FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN DOE, an individual,                    No. 24-475
                                              D.C. No.
            Plaintiff - Appellant,
                                           2:23-cv-02093-
                                              ODW-PD
 v.

GRINDR INC.; GRINDR LLC,
                                             OPINION
            Defendants - Appellees.

       Appeal from the United States District Court
          for the Central District of California
       Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding

        Argued and Submitted December 3, 2024
                 Pasadena, California

                 Filed February 18, 2025

Before: Jay S. Bybee, Sandra S. Ikuta, and Bridget S. Bade,
                      Circuit Judges.

                 Opinion by Judge Ikuta
2                       DOE V. GRINDR INC.


                          SUMMARY *


                Communications Decency Act

    The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal, as
barred by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, of an
action brought by an underage Grindr application user
against Grindr Inc. and Grindr LLC, alleging sex trafficking
in violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act and causes of action under state law.
    Under § 230, interactive computer service providers are
immune from state law liability when plaintiffs seek to treat
those providers as publishers of third-party content. The
panel held that § 230 barred the plaintiff’s state law claims
for defective design, defective manufacturing, negligence,
failure to warn, and negligent misrepresentation because
those claims necessarily implicated Grindr’s role as a
publisher of third-party content.
    The panel held that the plaintiff failed to state a plausible
claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act because he did not plausibly allege that
Grindr either was a knowing perpetrator of sex trafficking or
knowingly benefitted from the sex trafficking. Accordingly,
he could not invoke a statutory exception to § 230 immunity
under the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex
Trafficking Act of 2018.




*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                    DOE V. GRINDR INC.                  3


                       COUNSEL

Carrie Goldberg (argued), Roxanne Rimonte, and Naomi E.
Leeds, CA Goldberg PLLC, Brooklyn, New York, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Ambika Kumar (argued), Davis Wright Tremaine LLP,
Seattle, Washington; Adam S. Sieff, Davis Wright Tremaine
LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Defendants-Appellees.
Matthew W.H. Wessler and Alisa Tiwari, Gupta Wessler
LLP, Washington, D.C.; Jefferey R. White, American
Association for Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus
Curiae American Association for Justice.
Jacob B. Wolk and Mark Gottlieb, Public Health Advocacy
Institute, Boston, Massachusetts, for Amicus Curiae Public
Health Advocacy Institute.
Megan Iorio and Tom McBrien, Electronic Privacy
Information Center, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae
Electronic Privacy Information Center.
Samir Jain, Kate Ruane, and Becca Branum, Center for
Democracy & Technology, Washington, D.C., for Amicus
Curiae Center for Democracy & Technology.
Kathleen R. Hartnett, Ariana E. Bustos, and Harrison B.
Park, Cooley LLP, San Francisco, California; Alexander J.
Kasner, Cooley LLP, Washington, D.C.; Aaron Mackey and
Sophia Cope, Electronic Frontier Foundation, San
Francisco, California; Lawrence G. Walters, Walters Law
Group, Longwood, Florida; for Amici Curiae Electronic
Frontier Foundation and Woodhull Freedom Foundation.
4                         DOE V. GRINDR INC.


                             OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

    Under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of
1996, interactive computer service providers are immune
from state law liability when plaintiffs seek to treat those
providers as publishers of third-party content. See 

47 U.S.C. § 230

(c)(1). John Doe alleges that Grindr Inc. and Grindr
LLC (collectively “Grindr”), the owners and operators of the
Grindr application (referred to herein as the “App”), are
liable for injuries that Doe incurred as an underage user of
the App. Doe also brings a federal sex trafficking claim
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act (“TVPRA”), 

18 U.S.C. § 1595

(a). Grindr argues that it
is immunized from liability under § 230.
    We hold that the district court properly dismissed each
of Doe’s claims as barred by § 230. Because Doe’s state law
claims necessarily implicate Grindr’s role as a publisher of
third-party content, § 230 bars those claims. Doe fails to
state a plausible TVPRA claim, so Doe cannot invoke a
statutory exception to § 230 immunity. Therefore, we affirm
the district court’s dismissal of Doe’s claims in their
entirety. 1
                                   I
    Under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, “[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.” 47

1
 We grant the motion to file an untimely amicus curiae brief filed by the
Public Health Advocacy Institute. Dkt. No. 25.
                      DOE V. GRINDR INC.                     

5 U.S.C. § 230

(c)(1). “No cause of action may be brought and
no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that
is inconsistent with” § 230. Id. § 230(e)(3). Although § 230
is broad, it does not provide “a general immunity from
liability deriving from third-party content.” Barnes v.
Yahoo!, Inc., 

570 F.3d 1096, 1100

 (9th Cir. 2009). As
applied to state law claims, it “only protects from liability
(1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service
(2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of
action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided
by another information content provider.” 

Id.

 at 1100–01.
There is no dispute that Grindr is an interactive computer
service provider, so we consider only the remaining two
prongs.
    The second and third prongs of Barnes require us to
consider each cause of action alleged “to determine whether
a plaintiff’s ‘theory of liability would treat a defendant as a
publisher or speaker of third-party content.’” Calise v. Meta
Platforms, Inc., 

103 F.4th 732

, 740 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Barnes, 

570 F.3d at 1101

). The second prong requires us to
ask whether plaintiff claims that the defendant breached a
duty that “derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as
a publisher or speaker.” 

Id.

 (internal quotation marks
omitted). If the duty does not derive from such status or
conduct, but rather from another source, then § 230 does not
immunize the defendant. Id. The third prong requires us to
ask whether the cause of action targets “content provided by
another.” Barnes, 

570 F.3d at 1102

. A defendant loses its
immunity to the extent that the cause of action seeks to treat
the defendant “as the publisher or speaker of its own
content—or content that it created or developed in whole or
in part—rather than [as] the publisher or speaker of entirely
third-party content.” Calise, 103 F.4th at 744.
6                    DOE V. GRINDR INC.


                             II
    Grindr is the owner and operator of the App, which is its
namesake dating App for gay and bisexual men. The App
matches users based on proximity, and it allows matched
users to send direct messages to each other. The App
requires users to be over 18, but it does not verify users’
ages. Grindr has marketed the App on Instagram and
TikTok, social media platforms that are popular with minors.
The App is free to download and use; Grindr makes money
from the App through ads and paid subscriptions, which
provide users with enhanced features.
    In the spring of 2019, John Doe was a 15-year-old boy
residing in Canada. Doe downloaded and signed up for the
App. To use the App, Doe represented that he was over 18
years old. From April 4 through April 7, 2019, the App
matched Doe with four adult men. Doe alleges that each
adult man raped him on consecutive days. Three of those
men later received criminal sentences for their crimes
against Doe, while the fourth remains at large.
    Doe’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against
Grindr, the operative complaint on appeal, alleged the
following six causes of action:

       (1) Defective design, as the App’s
       geolocation function matched adults and
       children for illegal sexual activity, and safer
       alternative designs were feasible,
       (2) Defective manufacturing, as the App
       matched adults and children for illegal sexual
       activity,
                           DOE V. GRINDR INC.                             7


         (3) Defective warning, as the App did not
         adequately instruct users about known risks
         of child sexual abuse,
         (4) Negligence, as Grindr owed Doe a duty to
         avoid matching Doe with adult men who
         would rape him,
         (5) Negligent misrepresentation, as Grindr
         negligently misrepresented that the App was
         designed to create a safe and secure
         environment for its users, and,
         (6) Violation of the TVPRA, 

18 U.S.C. § 1595

, as Grindr directly and knowingly
         participated in a sex trafficking venture, and
         knowingly benefitted financially from
         trafficking.

Grindr moved to dismiss the FAC, arguing that § 230 barred
all of Doe’s claims. 2 The district court dismissed the FAC
with prejudice, on the ground that all of Doe’s state law
claims were barred by § 230. The district court also held that
Doe failed to state a TVPRA claim. Doe timely appealed.
                                    III
                                    A
   We have jurisdiction to review a final judgment under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291

. “We review de novo the district court’s
decision to grant” a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

2
  Grindr also argued to the district court, and argues again on appeal, that
the First Amendment barred Doe’s state law claims, and that Doe’s state
law claims were inadequately pleaded. Because we affirm on the § 230
ground reached by the district court, we do not address Grindr’s
alternative arguments.
8                     DOE V. GRINDR INC.


of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Est. of Bride ex rel.
Bride v. YOLO Techs., Inc., 

112 F.4th 1168

, 1174–75 (9th
Cir. 2024).
                              B
    Each of Doe’s state law claims necessarily implicates
Grindr’s role as a publisher of third-party content. The
theory underpinning Doe’s claims for defective design,
defective manufacturing, and negligence faults Grindr for
facilitating communication among users for illegal activity,
including the exchange of child sexual abuse material. Doe
claims that Grindr had a duty to suppress matches and
communications between adults and children, so as to
prevent the harmful sharing of messages between users that
could lead to illegal activity. These claims necessarily
implicate Grindr’s role as a publisher of third-party content,
because discharging the alleged duty would require Grindr
to monitor third-party content and prevent adult
communications to minors.
    In Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, we held that § 230
barred similar state law claims. See 

934 F.3d 1093, 1097

(9th Cir. 2019). In Dyroff, the defendant publisher operated
a website that allowed its users to anonymously interact
through online communities. 

Id.

 at 1094–95. A victim
purchased tainted drugs from a fellow website user, which
led to the victim’s fatal overdose. 

Id. at 1095

. The plaintiff,
victim’s mother, alleged that the defendant was liable
because its website allowed users to engage in illegal
activity, that its algorithm promoted those communications,
and that it failed to expel users who engaged in illegal
activity. 

Id.

 We affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims
as barred by § 230. Id. at 1097–98. Though defendant “used
features and functions, including algorithms, to analyze user
                      DOE V. GRINDR INC.                    9


posts on [the website] and recommended other user groups,”
these neutral features were “meant to facilitate the
communication and content of others” and were “not content
in and of themselves.” Id. at 1098. Because the defendant
acted as a publisher, and third-party communications caused
the harm to the victim, the defendant was immune from
liability under § 230.
    Doe’s theory of liability is that Grindr breached its duty
not to design or manufacture defective products by failing to
prevent a minor from being matched with predators, by
matching users based on geographic data it extracted from
them, and by allowing Doe to communicate with abusive
adults. But, as in Dyroff, Doe used “features and functions”
of Grindr that were “meant to facilitate the communication
and content of others,” and the features and functions were
“content neutral” on their own. Id. at 1098, 1100. Therefore,
as in Dyroff, § 230 bars the defective design, defective
manufacturing, and negligence claims.
    Doe’s attempts to compare his claims to those in
Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 

995 F.3d 1085

, 1092–93 (9th Cir.
2021), are unpersuasive. In Lemmon, plaintiffs alleged a
product defect flowing from “the interplay between [the
defendant’s] reward system” and a feature on the
defendant’s app which allowed users to overlay their real-
life speed over shared media; this interplay allegedly
encouraged users to drive at dangerous speeds. 

Id.

 at 1088–
89, 1092. Defendant allegedly violated a duty to design a
reasonably safe product. 

Id. at 1093

. We concluded that
defendant’s alleged violation of this duty had “nothing to do
with its editing, monitoring, or removing of the content that
its users generate through” the app. 

Id. at 1092

 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The duty to avoid designing a
product that encouraged dangerous driving was “fully
10                        DOE V. GRINDR INC.


independent of [defendant’s] role in monitoring or
publishing third-party content,” and it did not “seek to hold
[the defendant] responsible as a publisher or speaker.” 

Id. at 1093

. By contrast, the challenged features of the App are
not independent of Grindr’s role as a facilitator and publisher
of third-party content. 3
    Nor can Grindr be held liable for failure to warn. This
theory of liability is that Grindr had a duty to warn Doe about
the risks of child sexual exploitation on the App. We have
held that an interactive computer service provider has a duty
to warn a user when the provider is aware of a “known
conspiracy operating independent of the site’s publishing
function.” Est. of Bride, 

112 F.4th at 1181

 (citing Internet
Brands, 824 F.3d at 851). In Internet Brands, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant, the owner and operator of a
website, knew that two men were using the website to
identify targets for a rape scheme. 824 F.3d at 848–49. The
plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim was not based on the
defendant’s failure to remove any user content or on the
defendant’s publishing or monitoring of third-party content.
Id. at 851. Rather, the plaintiff faulted the defendant for
“failing to warn her about information it obtained from an
outside source.” Id.; see id. at 853. We concluded that the
plaintiff’s claim did not seek to hold the defendant liable as
a publisher or speaker of third-party content. Id. at 851.
Here, by contrast, Doe does not allege that Grindr had
independent knowledge of a conspiracy, and Grindr’s role as

3
  It is analytically insignificant whether Doe’s injuries would not have
occurred “but for” Grindr’s role as a publisher. See, e.g., Est. of Bride,

112 F.4th at 1176

 n.2 (“[W]e have explicitly disclaimed the use of a ‘but-
for’ test because it would vastly expand § 230 immunity beyond
Congress’[s] original intent.”) (citing Doe v. Internet Brands, 

824 F.3d 846, 853

 (9th Cir. 2016)).
                      DOE V. GRINDR INC.                    11


a publisher of third-party content does not give it a duty to
warn users of “a general possibility of harm” resulting from
the App. Est. of Bride, 

112 F.4th at 1181

. Therefore, § 230
bars this claim.
    Nor can Grindr be held liable for negligent
misrepresentation. This theory of liability faults Grindr for
stating that it would maintain a “safe and secure environment
for its users” on the App but failing to do so. We have held
that § 230 does not bar causes of action seeking to enforce
contracts or promises unrelated to a defendant’s role as a
publisher or speaker of third-party content. In Barnes, 

570 F.3d at 1099

, a defendant promised to take down indecent
profiles impersonating a plaintiff, and in Estate of Bride, 

112 F.4th at 1173

, a defendant promised to unmask the identities
of users sending harassing messages. In each case, the
plaintiff sought to hold the defendant accountable for a
specific promise or representation, “not for failure to take
certain moderation actions,” 

id.

 at 1178–79; see also Barnes,
570 F.3d at 1107–09. By contrast, Grindr’s general
statement that the App is “designed to create a safe and
secure environment for its users,” is not a specific promise,
but a description of its moderation policy, and thus protected
from liability under § 230. Moreover, compared to the
aforementioned promises, the statement that an interactive
computer service provider will create a safe and secure
environment is too general to be enforced.
                              C
    Doe also brings a federal claim under the civil remedy
provision of the TVPRA, 

18 U.S.C. § 1595

(a), which allows
an “individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter”
to bring a civil action against either a perpetrator of sex
trafficking, or “whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts or
12                    DOE V. GRINDR INC.


conspires to benefit,” from “participation in a venture which
that person knew or should have known” was engaged in sex
trafficking.
    To allow TVPRA lawsuits against online enterprises to
go forward, Congress enacted an exception to § 230(c) in the
Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking
Act of 2018 (“FOSTA”). See 

47 U.S.C. § 230

(e)(5). As
applicable here, the FOSTA exception provides that nothing
in § 230 (other than an inapplicable subsection) shall impair
or limit any civil action brought under 

18 U.S.C. § 1595

, “if
the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a violation of
section 1591 of that title.” See 

id.

 § 230(e)(5)(A). In turn,

18 U.S.C. § 1591

 provides in relevant part that any
defendant who “knowingly” engages in child sex trafficking,
or benefits financially by doing so, shall be punished.
    A plaintiff bringing an action under 

18 U.S.C. § 1595

, as
allowed by 

47 U.S.C. § 230

(e)(5)(A), must plausibly allege
that the defendant either was a knowing perpetrator of sex
trafficking, or was a person that knowingly benefitted from
the sex trafficking. The defendant’s “own conduct” must
violate 

18 U.S.C. § 1591

. Does v. Reddit, Inc., 

51 F.4th 1137

, 1141 (9th Cir. 2022). “Mere association with sex
traffickers is insufficient absent some knowing
‘participation’ in the form of assistance, support, or
facilitation.” 

Id.

 at 1145 (citing 

18 U.S.C. § 1591

(e)(4)).
    A defendant’s own conduct violates 

18 U.S.C. § 1591

when the defendant “actually engaged in some aspect of the
sex trafficking.” 

Id.

 (internal quotation marks omitted). Not
only must the defendant have actual knowledge of the sex
trafficking, but there must be “a causal relationship between
affirmative conduct furthering the sex-trafficking venture
and receipt of a benefit.” 

Id.

 (citation omitted); see also A.B.
                     DOE V. GRINDR INC.                   13


v. Salesforce, Inc., 

123 F.4th 788

, 798–99 (5th Cir. 2024)
(holding that the plaintiff’s showing that defendant provided
“back-office business services to a company it knew (or
should have known) was engaged in sex trafficking” was
sufficient to show that defendant knowingly benefitted from
and assisted in sex trafficking). But turning a blind eye to
trafficking that may occur on a platform does not constitute
active participation in sex trafficking. Reddit, 51 F.4th at
1145–46.
    Here, Doe fails to state a TVPRA claim, and therefore
FOSTA’s carveout to § 230 immunity for such claims does
not apply.       Doe must plausibly allege that Grindr
“knowingly” sex trafficked a person by a list of specified
means. 

18 U.S.C. § 1591

(a)(1). But the FAC merely shows
that Grindr provided a platform that facilitated sharing of
messages between users. The FAC’s allegation that Grindr
“knowingly introduces children to adults for in-person
sexual encounters,” is not supported by any plausible factual
allegations. To the contrary, the FAC asserts that Grindr
matches users who have represented to the App that they are
over eighteen years old. The allegation that Grindr “recruits
both children and adults to use” the App does not plausibly
allege that Grindr’s own conduct perpetrated sex trafficking;
rather, it alleges general advertising of the App on social
media. At most, the FAC shows only that Grindr “turned a
blind eye” to facilitating matches between minors and adults,
which is insufficient to show even beneficiary liability.
Reddit, 51 F.4th at 1145.
    Doe’s beneficiary theory of TVPRA liability also fails,
as the FAC does not plausibly allege that Grindr benefitted
from the alleged sex trafficking beyond generally receiving
advertising revenues. An interactive computer services
provider is not liable as a beneficiary if it merely turns a
14                       DOE V. GRINDR INC.


blind eye to the source of its revenue; there must be “actual
knowledge and a causal relationship between affirmative
conduct furthering the sex-trafficking venture and receipt of
a benefit.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Doe’s
references to Grindr’s constructive knowledge of child
sexual abuse on its platform do not plausibly allege Grindr’s
active participation in a sex trafficking venture. The FAC
does not causally connect Grindr’s advertising revenues with
any affirmative conduct by Grindr that furthered the sex-
trafficking venture alleged in this case. At most, it alleges
that Grindr turned a blind eye to sex trafficking on the App
and generally benefitted from sex traffickers’ use of the App.
Thus, the FAC does not plausibly allege a claim under the
TVPRA and the carveout in FOSTA. 4
   In sum, the district court correctly held that Doe’s
“TVPRA claim, whether direct or beneficiary, fails.”
Because Doe cannot “plausibly allege that [Grindr’s] own
conduct violated [18 U.S.C. §] 1591,” Doe cannot “invoke
FOSTA’s immunity exception” to § 230 immunity. Id. at
1141. Therefore, § 230 bars Doe’s TVPRA claim.
                                  IV
    The district court properly dismissed all of Doe’s claims
as barred by § 230. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of
Doe’s FAC.
     AFFIRMED.


4
  Our conclusion comports with a recent decision of our sister circuit.
See M.H. ex rel. C.H. v. Omegle.com LLC, 

122 F.4th 1266

, 1276 (11th
Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (holding that the plaintiff failed to plausibly
allege that defendant benefitted from participating in a sex trafficking
venture because it failed to allege either defendant’s actual knowledge
or overt participation in sex trafficking).