Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Gwynn H. GILLIAM, Appellant, v. CITY OF OMAHA, a Municipal Corporation, Et Al., Appellees

459 F.2d 63

Type: Opinion
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1972-04-25
Topic: general

How later courts describe this case

holding as to suggestion that § 1981 plaintiff must exhaust Nebraska state administrative remedies, “[i]t is now well settled that the exhaustion of remedies requirement does not apply to claims for relief under the Civil Rights Act”

Citator

Gwynn H. GILLIAM, Appellant, v. CITY OF OMAHA, a Municipal Corporation, Et Al., Appellees has been questioned or limited by later authorities: relies on overruled authority: 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (overruled by Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.). Read them before relying on it. 15 later decisions cite it.

Authority status: caution
Cited by: 15 opinions

GILLIAM v. CITY OF OMAHA,459 F.2d 63(8th Cir. 1972)

GWYNN H. GILLIAM, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF OMAHA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ET

AL., APPELLEES.

No. 71-1697.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted April 14, 1972.

Decided April 25, 1972.

Ben Wall, Wall Wintroub, Omaha, Neb., for appellant.

Kent N. Whinnery, Asst. City Atty., James E. Fellows, Omaha, Neb., for appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska.

Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, BRIGHT, and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

[1] Gwynn Gilliam, a black woman, appeals from a district court order,331 F. Supp. 4, dismissing her civil rights complaint for relief from the allegedly discriminatory employment practices of the defendant City of Omaha. On December 1, 1967, plaintiff was hired as a counselor by the Omaha Neighborhood Youth Corps, a project operated by the City of Omaha. She resigned from this position on April 10, 1970. After resigning, she filed a complaint with the Nebraska Equal Opportunities Commission (NEOC) alleging that she had been discriminated against by defendant because of her race and sex. On November 18, 1970, the NEOC held a hearing and made probable cause findings on two of plaintiff's claims. The NEOC has not yet rendered a final decision in this administrative proceeding.

[2] On March 10, 1971, plaintiff filed the present action seeking relief under the provisions of42 U.S.C. § 1981and1983. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to exhaust her state administrative remedies. We reverse.

[3] It is now well settled that the exhaustion of remedies requirement does not apply to claims for relief under the Civil Rights Acts. Carter v. Stanton,405 U.S. 669,92 S.Ct. 1232,31 L.Ed.2d 569(April 3, 1972); Wilwording v. Swenson,404 U.S. 249,92 S.Ct. 407,30 L.Ed. 2d 418(1971); Houghton v. Shafer,392 U.S. 639,88 S.Ct. 2119,20 L.Ed. 2d 1319(1968); Damico v. California,389 U.S. 416,88 S.Ct. 526,19 L.Ed.2d 647(1967); McNeese v. Board of Education,373 U.S. 668,83 S.Ct. 1433,10 L.Ed.2d 622(1963); Monroe v. Pape,365 U.S. 167,81 S.Ct. 473,5 L.Ed.2d 492(1961); Stradley v. Andersen,456 F.2d 1063(8th Cir., 1972).

The remedy provided by these Acts "is supplementary to the state remedy,Page 64and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." [Wilwording v. Swenson,404 U.S. 249,251,92 S.Ct. 407,409(1971)]

[4] The district court did not consider Monroe v. Pape, and its progeny to be controlling because the state administrative proceeding remained pending at the time plaintiff filed the federal action. This is not a meaningful distinction. Since the remedy provided by the Civil Rights Acts is supplementary to state remedies, the pendency of state proceedings is immaterial.

[5] Reversed.Page 65