Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Donald L. Dixon v. Larry Brown, Co I

38 F.3d 379

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1994-11-29
Topic
bankruptcy

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that “filing of a disciplinary charge becomes actionable if done in retaliation for the inmate’s filing of a grievance” and stating that such conduct “strikes at the heart of an inmate’s constitutional right to seek redress of grievances”
  • noting that the filing of a disciplinary charge becomes actionable if done in retaliation for exercising a First Amendment right
  • explaining that “the filing of a disciplinary charge becomes actionable if done in retaliation for the [exercise of a First Amendment right]”
  • filing disciplinary charge is actionable under § 1983 if done in retaliation for inmate filing grievance
  • restating the rule recognized in Sprouse that a false disciplinary report filed in retaliation for filing a grievance was actionable even though filing of a false disciplinary charge is not actionable in and of itself
  • inmate need not show separate, independent injury as element of retaliation case; district court improperly granted summary judgment on ground that disciplinary committee dismissed false disciplinary charge and inmate was not punished
  • “Because the retaliatory filing of a disciplinary charge strikes at the heart of an inmate’s constitutional right to seek redress of grievances, the injury to this right inheres in the retaliatory conduct itself.”
  • “Although the filing of a false disciplinary charge is not itself actionable under § 1983, the filing of a disciplinary charge becomes actionable if done in retaliation for the inmate’s filing of a grievance.”

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Donald L. Dixon v. Larry Brown, Co I. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
99 opinions
DIXON v. BROWN,38 F.3d 379(8th Cir. 1994)
DONALD L. DIXON, APPELLANT, v. LARRY BROWN, CO I, APPELLEE.
No. 93-3771.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted September 16, 1994.
Decided October 20, 1994.
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied November 29, 1994.
Donald L. Dixon, pro se.

Alana M. Barragan-Scott, Jefferson City, MO, argued (Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, John R. Munich and Alana M. Barragan-Scott, on the brief), for appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
Before FAGG, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
FAGG, Circuit Judge.
[1] In this42 U.S.C. § 1983action, Missouri inmate Donald L. Dixon asserts correctional officer Larry Brown violated Dixon's First Amendment right of petition by bringing a false disciplinary charge against Dixon in retaliation for Dixon's use of prison grievance procedures. The district court granted Brown summary judgment because the prison disciplinary committee dismissed the charge and Dixon was not punished. The district court believed Dixon could not establish his retaliation claim without showing an independent injury. We disagree and reverse.

[2] InSprouse v. Babcock,870 F.2d 450(8th Cir. 1989), we recognized the First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances includes redress under established prison grievance procedures.Id.at 452. Although the filing of a false disciplinary charge is not itself actionable under § 1983, the filing of a disciplinary charge becomes actionable if done in retaliation for the inmate's filing of a grievance.Id.; seeFranco v. Kelly,854 F.2d 584,589-90(2d Cir. 1988). Having presented evidence that Brown's disciplinary charge was false and made in retaliation for Dixon's grievance against Brown, Dixon need not show a separate, independent injury as an element of his case. Because the retaliatory filing of a disciplinary charge strikes at the heart of an inmate's constitutional right to seek redress of grievances, the injury to this right inheres in the retaliatory conduct itself.See Sprouse,870 F.2d at 452;cf.Hershberger v. Scaletta,33 F.3d 955,956(8th Cir. 1994) (systemic denial of inmates' constitutional right of access to courts is "such a fundamentalPage 380deprivation that it is an injury in itself'). In short, when retaliatory conduct is involved, there is no independent injury requirement.

[3] We thus reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.