Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Ulery
787 F.2d 1239
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1986-04-02
- Topic
- litigation
How later courts describe this case
- “Although all parties join in urging us to accept th[e] position [that the issue of qualified immunity is immediately appealable], we must still examine it for ourselves, as it concerns our own subject-matter jurisdiction.”
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Ulery. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 9 opinions
CHICAGO NORTH WESTERN TRANSP. CO. v. ULERY,787 F.2d 1239(8th Cir. 1986)
CHICAGO NORTH WESTERN TRANSPORTATION CO., R.L. WILSON, JESS PAUL, DALE
WALROD, DARREL ACHENBACH, ROBERT ELFFNER, J.B. KIDDER, AND CHARLES MILES,
APPELLANTS, v. LARRY ULERY, JOHN I. RIKER, MIKE J. HILL, AND FLOYD A.
WELTHA, APPELLEES.
Misc. No. 86-8019.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted March 14, 1986.
Decided April 2, 1986.
Page 1240
Mark W. Bennett of the Iowa Civil Liberties Union in Des Moines and Thomas M. Werner of the Iowa Civil Liberties Union, Des Moines, Iowa, for Larry Ulery, et al.
Before McMILLIAN, ARNOLD, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.
[2] Now before the Court is a joint petition from both sides of the case asking us to reconsider the denial of the interlocutory appeal. This petition is denied.
[3] The parties also suggest that at least the issue of qualified immunity is immediately appealable, citingMitchell v. Forsyth,___ U.S. ___,105 S.Ct. 2806,86 L.Ed.2d 411(1985). Although all parties join in urging us to accept this position, we must still examine it for ourselves, as it concerns our own subject-matter jurisdiction. Having considered the matter, we are unable to agree with the position asserted by the parties.Mitchelladopted a rule of immediate appealability from orders denying dismissals of complaints on the ground of qualified immunity. Such immunity, like absolute immunity, the Supreme Court reasoned, is an immunity not only from liability, but also from the obligation to stand trial. The underlying reason for the Court's conclusion was that public officials, by far the most common targets of actions under42 U.S.C. § 1983or directly under the Constitution, should not be subjected to the harassment of suit and trial if in fact they took no actions in violation of clearly established constitutional rights. Unless public officials have this protection, they will be afraid to fulfill their duties promptly and properly.
[4] This rationale has no application in the instant case, where the defendants, appellants here, are not public officials butPage 1241private parties suable under42 U.S.C. § 1983only because they allegedly conspired with other persons acting under color of state law.1Nothing inMitchellindicates that it should apply to such a case, nor have the parties cited any case extendingMitchellin this fashion. Because the rationale ofMitchellis inapplicable here, and because to extend it would erode the vitally important policies underlying the final-judgment rule, we decline to accept the position urged upon us.
[5] We hold that the order appealed from is not final under28 U.S.C. § 1291as interpreted inMitchell,and we therefore dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
[6] It is so ordered.
- All of the appellants are private, in the sense of nongovernmental, persons. If some of them were public officials, entitled to the immediate-appeal privilege created byMitchell,it might make sense to allow the interlocutory appeal to proceed as to all appellants, public and private. We express no view on what the law would be in this situation. ↩