Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Larry J. Copus v. City of Edgerton
96 F.3d 1038
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1996-09-25
- Topic
- general
reversing dismissal for failure to exhaust after district court had erred by converting § 1983 case to habeas case | “The district court was not authorized to convert a § 1983 action into a § 2254 action, a step that carries disadvantages . . . for litigants” | “When a plaintiff files a § 1983 action that cannot be resolved without inquiring into the validity of confinement, the court should dismiss the suit without prejudice.” | "When a plaintiff files a § 1983 action that cannot be resolved without inquiring into the validity of confinement, the court should dismiss the suit without prejudice." | “The district court was not authorized to convert a § 1983 action into a § 2254 action, a step that carries disadvantages . . . for litigants” | “[w]hen a plaintiff files a § 1983 action that cannot be resolved without inquiring into the validity of confinement, the court should dismiss the suit without prejudice,” rather than convert it into a petition for habeas corpus | dismissal of claim barred by Heck is without prejudice
Citator
- Cited by
- 43 opinions
Robert G. Krohn, John W., Roethe, Roethe, Buhrow, Roethe Pope, Edgerton, WI, for City of Edgerton, Kenneth Burdick, Officer Meehan.
Robert G. Krohn, Roehte Buhrow, Roethe, Buhrow, Roethe Pope, Edgerton, WI, for Michael Strizic.
Robert M. Hunter, Office of the Attorney General, Wisconsin Department of Justice, Madison, WI, Robert G. Krohn, Roethe, Buhrow, Roethe Pope, Edgerton, WI, for Wisconsin Department of Corrections.
No. 96-C-101-C
Barbara B. CRABB, Judge.
[2] Such a certificate is unnecessary. The district court was not authorized to convert a sec. 1983 action into a sec. 2254 action, a step that carries disadvantages (exhaustion and the certificate of appealability only two among many) for litigants. A collateral attack must be prosecuted against one's custodian. Copus did not name his custodian as a defendant, and therefore this action cannot be a collateral attack. It may be that as a sec. 1983 suit it is defective, but if so the proper step would have been to dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6) or grant summary judgment, rather than to "convert" the case to an impossible or inappropriate alternative suit. Clayton-EL v. Fisher, No. 92-1246 (7th Cir. Sept. 12, 1996), slip op. 7 n. 2.
[3] When a plaintiff files a sec. 1983 action that cannot be resolved without inquiring into the validity of confinement, the court should dismiss the suit without prejudice. Heck v. Humphrey,114 S.Ct. 2364(1994). Several claims in Copus's complaint are untenable under Heck. But the claim concerning an unconstitutional search and seizure may well be maintainable. Consider the possibilities. The evidence might have been suppressed in the state case, and if so would not have contributed to confinement; or (since this is a probation revocation), the state tribunal might have declined to invoke the exclusionary rule, so that the propriety of the search was not adjudicated in the state case. See Homola v. McNamara,59 F.3d 647,650-51(7th Cir. 1995). Under Heck it is essential to determine whether the conduct complained of had an effect on the custody; if not, the damages action can proceed. See also Allen v. McCurry,449 U.S. 90(1980); Haring v. Prosise,462 U.S. 306(1983); Clayton-EL, slip op. 10-14.
[4] The judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.