Hope, Inc., an Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation, Plaintiffs v. The County of Dupage, Illinois

"Nevertheless, as inWarth,the plaintiffs have not alleged that the County rejected a proposed project in which they could have lived. The difference in this case is that the major reason plaintiffs cannot make such an allegation is the alleged conspiracy between the developers and the county."

"Another new issue in the suburbs is housing for low income people. Low income housing in DuPage County is like buying a case of cancer. It would result in too many people with too little tax revenue to pay for services — again, primarily schools — needed by these people."

"Board Chairman Gerald R. Weeks (R. Milton Twp.) said the NAACP, if it goes ahead with the plans, will help the board prove that the county does not practice exclusion. `They'll find out they'll be treated just like everybody else,' he said. Weeks said the NAACP housing will be welcomed if it conforms to the county's zoning laws. But, he said, the housing will not be welcomed `if they want us to lift the laws so they can build fire traps and slums.'"

"The proposal became a controversial issue in Wheaton in the spring 1971 elections for the Wheaton city council. A slate of candidates who opposed the application were victorious and at the first meeting after the election revoked the authority previously given to the DuPage Housing Authority to apply for HUD funds. As a result, the proposal and project were abandoned."

"[T]he County Board members are going to be very reluctant to approve this proposal unless there is adequate proof that it is something that the residents of Village of Glendale Heights want. Fifty-one percent would not be enough. The County Board would want evidence, through the elected officials of the Village, of overwhelming support for this proposal."

"(1) the question of whether the development would generate sufficient taxes to pay for the public services used by its residents, and particularly the cost of education, was discussed in 65% of the zoning files,

(2) the effect which the proposed development might have on the value of nearby property was discussed in 88% of the files, and

(3) no specific reference to racial composition of the residents of the developments was made in any of the files."

"A finding is `clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."

"Plaintiffs and the plaintiff class have established that they have been and continue to be injured by the actions of the defendants and that their inability to secure housing in DuPage County is fairly traceable to the County's actions. Accordingly, they have standing to challenge those actions."

"In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. This inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. . . . In both dimensions it is founded in concern about the proper — and properly limited — role of the courts in a democratic society."

"Those who do not possess Art. III standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts of the United States. Article III, which is every bit as important in its circumscription of the judicial power of the United States as in its granting of that power, is not merely a troublesome hurdle to be overcome if possible so as to reach the `merits' of a lawsuit which a party desires to have adjudicated; it is a part of the basic charter promulgated byPage 804the Framers of the Constitution at Philadelphia in 1787, a charter which created a general government, provided for the interaction between that government and the governments of the several States, and was later amended so as to either enhance or limit its authority with respect to both States and individuals."

"[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to `show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,'Gladstone, Realtors v. Village ofBellwood,441 U.S. 91,99, [99 S.Ct. 1601,1608,60 L.Ed.2d 66] (1979), and that the injury `fairly can be traced to the challenged action' and `is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision,'Simon v.Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,426 U.S. 26,38,41, [96 S.Ct. 1917,1924,1925,48 L.Ed.2d 450] (1976)."

"if none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class."

"The individual respondents sought to maintain this suit as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated.That a suit may be a classaction, however, adds nothing to the question ofstanding,for even named plaintiffs who represent a class `must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.'"

"We must assume, taking the allegations of the complaint as true, that Penfield's zoning ordinance and the pattern of enforcement by respondent officials have had the purpose and effect of excluding persons of low and moderate income, many of whom are members of racial or ethnic minority groups. We also assume, for purposes here, that such intentional exclusionary practices, if proved in a proper case, would be adjudged violative of the constitutional and statutory rights of the persons excluded."

"But the fact that these petitioners share attributes common to persons who may have been excluded from residence in the town is an insufficient predicate for the conclusion that petitioners themselves have been excluded, or that the respondents' assertedly illegal actions have violated their rights. Petitioners must allege and show thatthey personally have been injured,not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent. Unless these petitioners can thus demonstrate the requisite case or controversybetween themselves personally andrespondents,`none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class.'O'Shea v.Littleton,414 U.S. 488,494[94 S.Ct. 669,675,38 L.Ed.2d 674] (1974). See,e.g., Bailey v.Patterson,369 U.S. 31,32-33[82 S.Ct. 549,550-551,7 L.Ed.2d 512] (1962)."

"We may assume, as petitioners allege, that respondents' actions have contributed, perhaps substantially, to the cost of housing in Penfield. But there remains the question whether petitioners' inability to locate suitable housing in Penfield reasonably can be said to have resulted, in any concretely demonstrable way, from respondents' alleged constitutional and statutory infractions. Petitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably could be inferred that, absent the respondents' restrictive zoning practices, there is asubstantial probabilitythat they would have been able to purchase or lease in Penfield and that, if the court affords the relief requested, the asserted inability of petitioners will be removed.Linda R.S.v. Richard D.,410 U.S. 614[93 S.Ct. 1146,35 L.Ed.2d 536] (1973)."

"In support of their position, petitioners refer to several decisions in the District Courts and Courts of Appeals, acknowledging standing in low-income, minority-group plaintiffs to challenge exclusionary zoning practices. In those cases, however, the plaintiffs challenged zoning restrictionsas appliedto particular projectsthat would supply housing within their means, and of which they were intended residents. The plaintiffs thus were able to demonstrate that unless relief from assertedly illegal actions was forthcoming, their immediate and personal interests would be harmed. Petitioners here assert no like circumstances. Instead, they rely on little more than the remote possibility, unsubstantiated by allegations of fact, that their situation might have been better had respondents acted otherwise, and might improve were the court to afford relief."

"[A] plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harmhim,and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention."

"The facts, as we have found them, are that developers, because they are aware of the County's housing policies, do not apply for zoning variations or special use exceptions to build projects in which plaintiffs and the class members could reside either as tenants or owners. While we have not found a conspiracy between the County and the developer defendants, we have found that developers simply do not attempt to build integrated low and moderate income projects in DuPage County."

"This is not to say that the plaintiff who challenges a zoning ordinance or zoning practices must have a present contractual interest in a particular project. A particularized personal interest may be shown in various ways, which we need not undertake to identify in the abstract. But usually the initial focus should be on a particular project. See,e.g.,cases cited in n. 17,supra.We also note that zoning laws and their provisions, long considered essential to effective urban planning, are particularly within the province of state and local legislative authorities. They are, of course, subject to judicial review in a proper case. But citizens dissatisfied with provisions of such laws need not overlook the availability of the normal democratic process."

"Petitioners also alleged that in furtherance of a policy of exclusionary zoning, . . . the defendant members of Penfield's Town, Zoning, and Planning Boards had acted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner: they had delayed action on proposals for low- and moderate-cost housingPage 812for inordinate periods of time; denied such proposals for arbitrary and insubstantial reasons; refused to grant necessary variances and permits, or to allow tax abatements; failed to provide necessary support services for low- and moderate-cost housing projects, and had amended the ordinance to make approval of such projects virtually impossible."

"We dealt with the question of plaintiffs' standing in our opinion of February 4, 1976.Planning forPeople Coalition v. DuPage County,70 F.R.D. 38(N.D.Ill. 1976). We there held that plaintiffs did have standing and that the Court had jurisdiction. Subsequent to that holding, the Supreme Court, inVillage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan HousingDevelopment Corp., supra,upheld the standing of persons like plaintiffs and the members of the plaintiffs class who would probably move' into housing in DuPage County if it were available to them. InArlington Heights,only one project or development was involved. In the instant case, the possibility of development in all of the unincorporated areas of the County is involved."

"The injury Ransom asserts is that his quest for housing nearer his employment has been thwarted by official action that is racially discriminatory. If a court grants the relief he seeks, there is at least a `substantial probability,'Warth v. Seldin, supra,[422 U.S.] at 504 [95 S.Ct. at 2208], that the Lincoln Green project will materialize, affording Ransom the housing opportunity he desires in Arlington Heights. His is not a generalized grievance.Instead, as we suggested in Warth,supra,at 507, 508, n. 18 [95 S.Ct. at 2209,2210, n. 18],it focuses on a particular project and it isnot dependent on speculation about the possibleactions of third parties not before the court.SeeId.at 505 [95 S.Ct. at 2208];Simon v. EasternKy. Welfare Rights Org.,426 U.S., at 41-42, [96 S.Ct. at 1925,1926].Unlike the individualplaintiffs in Warth, Ransom has adequately averred an`actionable causal relationship' between ArlingtonHeights' zoning practices and his asserted injury.Warth v. Seldin, supra,at 507 [95 S.Ct. at 2209]."

"Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may enjoy standing to sue on behalf of its members if (1) the conduct challenged is injurious to its members, (2) the claim asserted is germane to the association's purposes, and (3) the cause can proceed without the participation of the individual members affected by the challenged conduct.Hunt v. Washington State Apple AdvertisingCommission,432 U.S. 333,343,97 S.Ct. 2434,2441,53 L.Ed.2d 383(1977).

`The association must allege that its members, or any of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit. [. . .] So long as this can be established, and so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make the individualPage 814participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the cause, the association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled to invoke the court's jurisdiction.'

Warth v. Seldin,422 U.S. 490,511,95 S.Ct. 2197,2211,45 L.Ed.2d 343(1975) (citation omitted)."

"The Commission, while admittedly a state agency, for all practical purposes performs the functions of a traditional trade association representing the Washington apple industry. As previously noted, its purpose is the protection and promotion of the Washington apple industry; and, in the pursuit of that end, it has engaged in advertising, market research and analysis, public education campaigns, and scientific research. It thus serves a specialized segment of the State's economic community which is the primary beneficiary of its activities, including the prosecution of this kind of litigation.

Moreover, while the apple growers and dealers are not `members' of the Commission in the traditional trade association sense, they possess all of the indicia of membership in an organization. They alone elect the members of the Commission; they alone may serve on the Commission; they alone finance its activities, including the cost of this lawsuit, through assessments levied upon them. In a very real sense, therefore, the Commission represents the State's growers and dealers and provides the means by which they express their collective views and protect their collective interests. Nor do we find it significant in determining whether the Commission may properlyPage 815represent its constituency that `membership' is `compelled' in the form of mandatory assessments. Membership in a union, or its equivalent, is often required. Likewise, membership in a bar association, which may also be an agency of the State, is often a prerequisite to the practice of law. Yet in neither instance would it be reasonable to suggest that such an organization lacks standing to assert the claims of its constituents."