Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Claybrook v. Birchwell
199 F.3d 350
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 2000-01-11
- Topic
- general
holding that no seizure occurred when a stray bullet hit a bystander during a police gunfight | holding that conscience-shocking behavior must be taken “towards the plaintiff’s federally protected rights” | holding that conscience-shocking behavior must be taken "towards the plaintiff's federally protected rights" | holding that § 1983 claims are “entirely personal to the direct victim of the alleged constitutional tort” and are not available to the victim's family members who may suffer emotional distress or other “consequent collateral injuries” | noting that such situations can be “rapidly evolving, fluid, and dangerous predicament[s] [that] preclude[] the luxury of calm and reflective pre-response deliberation” | explaining that “only the purported victim . . . may prosecute a Section 1983 claim” | explaining that "a section 1983 cause of action is entirely personal to the direct victim of the alleged constitutional tort" | noting that such situations can be “rapidly evolving, fluid, and dangerous predicament[s] [that] preclude[] the luxury of calm and reflective pre-response deliberation” | noting that such situations can be “rapidly evolving, fluid, and dangerous predicament[s] [that] preclude[] the luxury of calm and reflective pre-response deliberation” | noting that “the authorities could not ‘seize’ any person other than the one who was a deliberate object of their exertion of force” | affirming the district court's order granting summary judgment to the defendants on Counts III and IV of the plaintiffs' complaint | affirming the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants on Counts III and IV of the plaintiffs’ complaint | noting that a § 1983 claim requires a Plaintiff to demonstrate personal harm | determining that plaintiff, who was struck by errant bullet during police shootout with her father-in-law, was not seized because officers were aiming at her father-in-law and did not realize she was hiding in nearby parked car | finding the "malicious or sadistic intent" standard of Lewis to apply to innocent third party harmed in police shoot-out | noting that Section 1983 actions are personal to the victim and no action may lie under Section 1983 “for emotional distress, loss of a loved one, or any other consequent collateral injuries suffered personally by the victim’s family members” | explaining there is no § 1983 claim for emotional distress or other “consequent collateral injuries allegedly suffered personally by the victim’s family members.” | finding no “conscience-shocking” behavior where defendant officers shot and killed a bystander victim that they were unaware was present | relying on Brower and holding the Fourth Amendment doesn’t apply to “physical injuries inadvertently inflicted upon an innocent third party by police officers’ use of force while attempting to seize a perpetrator” | police action does not shock the conscience even if negligent and in violation of department policy | Fourth Amendment standard does not apply where innocent third-party bystander wounded by police fire in shoot-out | government actions must have been malicious, sadistic, and "for the very purpose of causing harm" | "[T]he authorities could not `seize' any person other than one who was a deliberate object of their exertion of force." | “An official capacity claim filed against a public employee is equivalent to a lawsuit directed against the public entity which that agent represents.” | “An official capacity claim filed against a public employee is equivalent to a lawsuit directed against the public entity which that agent represents.” | “An official capacity claim filed against a public employee is equivalent to a lawsuit directed against the public entity which that agent represents.” | “An official capacity claim filed against a public employee is equivalent to a lawsuit directed against the public entity which that agent represents.” | “[a]n official capacity claim filed against a public employee
Citator
- Cited by
- 107 opinions
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0014P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 00a0014p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
;
ROYAL E. CLAYBROOK, JR.,
GWANNETTE CLAYBROOK,
PETRECE CLAYBROOK, CO-
No. 98-6029
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE
ESTATE OF ROYAL >
CLAYBROOK, SR., and
QUINTANA CLAYBROOK,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
JESSE BIRCHWELL, STEVE
LEWIS, KEN SPENCER,
ROBERT KIRCHNER, and
GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE
METROPOLITAN
& DAVIDSON COUNTY,
Defendants-Appellees.
1
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 96-00157—John T. Nixon, District Judge.
Argued: August 10, 1999
Decided and Filed: January 11, 2000
1
2 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. No. 98-6029 No. 98-6029 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. 23
Before: KRUPANSKY, BOGGS, and CLAY, Circuit and Four of the complaint. I would also reinstate the
Judges. supplemental state law claims.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: E. E. Edwards III, EDWARDS, SIMMONS &
OLIVER, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants. Kennetha
Sawyers, THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
LAW, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: E.
E. Edwards III, Wesley M. Oliver, EDWARDS, SIMMONS
& OLIVER, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants. Kennetha
Sawyers, THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
LAW, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees.
KRUPANSKY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in
which BOGGS, J., joined. CLAY, J. (pp. 19-23), delivered
a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs-appellants
Royal E. Claybrook Jr. (“Royal Jr.”), Gwannette Claybrook
(“Gwannette”), Petrece Claybrook (“Petrece”), and Quintana
Claybrook (“Quintana”) have disputed the district court’s
dismissal of their complaint for failure to state a claim, and/or
its award of summary judgment to the defendants,1 against the
1
The district court cast its ruling as an alternate dismissal of the
complaint for failure to state a claim and/or summary judgment adverse
to the plaintiffs.
"Whether a district court has correctly dismissed a suit pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) [failure to state a claim] is a question of law, and
therefore subject to de novo review. The district court must construe the
22 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. No. 98-6029 No. 98-6029 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. 3
officers when Mr. Claybrook refused to throw down his gun, defendants-appellees Jesse Birchwell (“Birchwell”), Steve
as opposed to firing at him. Indeed, the officers testified that Lewis (“Lewis”), Ken Spencer (“Spencer”), Robert Kirchner
they attempted to pull out their badges only “during the (“Kirchner”), and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville
gunfire,” or after the gunfire had already begun. Notably, and Davidson County, Tennessee (“Nashville”). The
there were no emergency circumstances present so as to plaintiffs have alleged that peace officers Birchwell, Lewis,
require the officers to begin shooting without following and Spencer used excessive force, in violation of 42 U.S.C.
protocol and without making a reasoned decision as to § 1983,2 which resulted in the death of Royal Claybrook Sr.
whether the vehicle was occupied. Accordingly, under these
circumstances, a jury should decide whether the officers acted
with deliberate indifference to Ms. Claybrook’s rights. See
Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1719 (noting the instances of “deliberate complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all of the factual
allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can
indifference” could be found in the context of pretrial custody prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to
where “forethought about an inmate’s welfare is not only relief. When an allegation is capable of more than one inference, it must
feasible but obligatory under a regime that incapacitates a be construed in the plaintiff's favor." Columbia Natural Resources, Inc.
prisoner to exercise ordinary responsibility for his own v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101
, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). welfare”); see also Stemler v. City of Florence,126 F.3d 856
, Although the complaint’s allegations are construed liberally for the
868 (6th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that under substantive due plaintiff, a complaint which does not contain allegations sufficient to
support a claim under any legal theory must be dismissed. Id.
A court is process, “‘a duty to protect can arise in a noncustodial setting not bound to accept alleged legal conclusions or unwarranted factual if the state does anything to render an individual more inferences. Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken,829 F.2d 10, 12
(6th Cir. vulnerable to danger’”) (quoting Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 1987).41 F.3d 1061, 1065
(6th Cir. 1994)). Reasonable minds
surely could differ as to whether the plainclothes officers’ Following adequate opportunities for discovery and upon adversarial
decision to open fire on Mr. Claybrook at nine o’clock in the motion, summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 must be entered
against a plaintiff who has failed to produce evidence sufficient to support
evening outside of a market in an area where patrons of the each element of his or her prima facie case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
store could have been seated in their vehicles, when the U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Because sufficiency of the evidence is a
officers admitted that they did not feel that they were in question of law, a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, like a
imminent danger, rose to the level of deliberate indifference dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), is subject to plenary scrutiny.
to Ms. Claybrook’s rights. Indeed, a reasonable person could Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 566
(6th Cir. 1999); Grider v. conclude that officers who open fire on a public street at nine Abramson,180 F.3d 739
, 756 n.7 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,120 S. Ct. 528
(1999).
o’clock in the evening when they are in no imminent danger
have every reason to believe that they may recklessly injure 2
Section 1983 provides, in pertinent segment:
members of the public. Under the facts presented by this
case, Ms. Claybrook should not be deprived of her right to Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
trial on the question of whether the circumstances of the regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes
shooting violated her substantive due process rights. to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
Accordingly, I would reverse the district court’s dismissal privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
of Ms. Claybrook’s claim against the officers for violation of equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]
her substantive due process rights as set forth in Counts Three
In any action under section 1983, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he
has been deprived of a right secured by the United States constitution or
4 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. No. 98-6029 No. 98-6029 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. 21
(“Claybrook”) and the serious bodily injury of Quintana department rules requiring them to radio for a marked car and
Claybrook. They further contended that Kirchner, as the uniformed officers, and they made a conscious decision to
Chief Executive Officer of the Nashville-Davidson County request such support. The officers were also aware that the
Metropolitan Police Department, failed to properly train department rules mandated that they refrain from
and/or supervise the three faulted field officers, and neglected investigating the situation unless emergency circumstances
to develop appropriate official departmental guidelines arose. Significantly, at the point when they discovered Mr.
restraining the unjustifiable utilization of lethal force. The Claybrook standing outside with this gun, Officer Birchwell
trial court concluded that (1) Royal Jr., Gwannette, and testified that he did not believe that the officers were in
Petrece Claybrook (the children of Royal Sr.) lacked standing imminent danger or that exigent circumstances requiring the
to recover for alleged personal losses derivatively generated use of force existed. However, after having made a decision
by their father’s violent demise, and had failed to seek to request backup, the officers inexplicably proceeded to
recovery for Claybrook’s alleged constitutional injuries as engage Mr. Claybrook in a violent confrontation without
representatives oft his estate; and (2) Quintana had suffered awaiting the arrival of the uniformed officers. Contrary to the
no cognizable constitutional tort. majority’s assertion, the officers here were hardly involved in
a high-speed pursuit or any high-pressure confrontation at the
On the evening of February 28, 1995, plainclothes time that they decided to act, as were the officers in Lewis.
caucasian undercover police officers Birchwell, Lewis, and See 118 S. Ct. at 1720-21. As such, Ms. Claybook’s claims
Spencer of the Nashville Crime Suppression Unit were should be analyzed using the “deliberate indifference”
engaged in anti-crime surveillance, from an unmarked squad standard; which is to say, her claim should be viewed in the
vehicle, in a high-crime Nashville neighborhood. At context of whether the officers had time to make a reasoned
approximately 9:11 p.m., they observed an African-American judgment about their conduct. Id.; see Moreland v. Las Vegas
male (later identified as Royal Claybrook Sr.) standing near Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365
, 373 (9th Cir. 1998)
the street curb in the dimly-lit parking lot of the F & J Market (recognizing that the critical question when applying the
(“the market”) while displaying a long gun at port-arms. A appropriate standard of culpability under Lewis is “whether
gray Maxima automobile blocked the business’ entrance. The the circumstances allowed the state actors time to fully
patrolmen knew that the market had been the target of recent consider the potential consequences of their conduct”).
crimes. Suspecting that a robbery was in progress, the driver
of the incognito patrol car, Officer Birchwell, in conformity When viewing the officers’ actions under this standard,
with his department’s standard operating procedures, radioed questions of fact remain for the jury to decide with respect to
the police force headquarters to report the gunman’s location whether the officers’ conduct violated Ms. Claybrook’s
and to request the immediate dispatch of a marked police substantive due process rights. For example, questions of fact
cruiser containing uniformed law enforcers. exist as to whether the officers observed Ms. Claybrook enter
the car or reasonably should have known that Ms. Claybrook
Birchwell then drove the undercover vehicle into the was in the car, in that if the officers passed by the market at
market’s parking lot. He intended to stop his vehicle on what the time they claimed, a reasonable person could believe that
they observed Ms. Claybrook leaving the market and entering
the car. Furthermore, a question of fact exists as to whether
laws, (2) the defendants who allegedly caused that deprivation acted the officers should have provoked the confrontation with Mr.
under color of state law, and (3) the deprivation occurred without due Claybrook before the uniformed back-up officers arrived, and
process of law. O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 995
(6th whether they should have identified themselves as police Cir. 1994). 20 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. No. 98-6029 No. 98-6029 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. 5 In Lewis, the Supreme Court reviewed the range of conduct appeared to be a driveway or alleyway which abutted the under which a substantive due process claim may arise under building’s western side, to enable the officers to the Fourteenth Amendment. See 118 S. Ct. at 1717. The surreptitiously observe the firearm-toting suspect and the Court began by reiterating the long-held standard that one suspicious gray automobile, pending arrival of the summoned may state a claim of deprivation of substantive due process by marked squad car. However, Birchwell subsequently alleging conduct “‘that shocks the conscience’ and violates discovered that no contiguous roadway paralleled the the ‘decencies of civilized conduct.’” Id. (quoting Rochin v. structure’s west end. Consequently, while repositioning his California,342 U.S. 165, 172-73
(1965)). However, the vehicle to prevent the armed suspect from facing the officers’
Court went on to recognize that the measure of “what is backs, Birchwell maneuvered the unidentified patrol car
conscience-shocking is no calibrated yard stick,” and towards the stationary gray automobile.
observed that “[r]ules of due process are not . . . subject to
mechanical application [such that] [d]eliberate indifference That movement prompted the wary gunman to advance
that shocks in one environment may not be so patently menacingly behind the hood of the gray Maxima while facing
egregious in another, and our concern with preserving the the intruders. Unbeknownst to the peace officers,
constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands Claybrook’s daughter-in-law, Quintana Claybrook, worked at
an exact analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power the market. Because that establishment served as a “front” for
is condemned as conscience-shocking.” Id. at 1717-1719. an unlawful “numbers” gambling operation, thieves
The Court emphasized that liability may lie for actions that occasionally targeted it. Quintana was responsible for
amount to “deliberate indifference” where the officials depositing illegal betting proceeds. The associated physical
involved enjoyed the luxury of “time to make unhurried danger prompted Claybrook habitually to escort Quintana,
judgments, upon the chance for repeated reflection, largely while armed, from the store to her automobile. He
uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations.” Lewis, customarily remained in the parking lot, holding his shotgun
118 S. Ct. at 1720. The Court explained as follows: in plain view, until Quintana had exited the area. Claybrook
was acting as a security guard for his daughter-in-law on the
When such extended opportunities to do better are evening of February 28, 1995. When the unmarked police
teamed with protracted failure even to care, indifference vehicle arrived at the scene, Quintana was already inside the
is truly shocking. But when unforeseen circumstances Maxima, seated behind the steering wheel with her back
demand an officer’s instant judgment, even precipitate towards the three defendant peace constables, although each
recklessness, fails to inch close enough to harmful of them testified that he did not know that anyone then
purpose to spark the shock that implicates “the large occupied that automobile.
concerns of the governors and the governed.”
Quintana testified that a passenger within the strange
Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332
(1986)). vehicle (the unmarked police car) ordered Claybrook to drop
his weapon, to which he responded, “no, you drop your gun.”
When conducting an “exact analysis” of the facts of this She further attested:
case in the light most favorable to Ms. Claybrook, it is clear
that the officers had sufficient time to make an unhurried And then the next thing I know, I heard like a
judgment about their conduct upon seeing Mr. Claybrook firecracker sound, and then I felt something in my back,
with his weapon such that a lower level of fault should be and I kind of jumped, like, you know. And I really didn’t
applied. As the officers testified, they were aware of
6 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. No. 98-6029 No. 98-6029 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. 19
know what had happened, because, you know, I hadn’t ______________________________________________
heard a gun shot, you know, before.
CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART
And then I kind of felt like I was wet, and so I kind of ______________________________________________
felt, and I was like, you know, -- and then I realized that
I had been shot. And I kind of leaned over in the seat, CLAY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
and I looked up at my father-in-law, and he looked at me. part. I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse the district
He was still standing in front of my car. court’s dismissal of Counts One and Two of the complaint;
however, because I believe that the district court’s dismissal
And then I just -- you know, I saw like -- I guess it was of Counts Three and Four should also be reversed, I
a burst of fire or something. I don’t know what it was. respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the
It was just like some fire or something. And I heard a big dismissal of these counts.
boom. And then I just heard a whole bunch of just
fireworks and, you know. And then I heard another I disagree with the majority’s application of what it
boom.3 And I was like, we're getting robbed. considers to be the appropriate standard under which the
Somebody's robbing us. substantive due process claim of Quintana Claybrook (“Ms.
Claybrook”), as set forth in Counts Three and Four, should be
Tragically, Quintana’s back had been struck by a stray analyzed. The majority applies the “conscious shocking”
bullet. She testified that she unsuccessfully attempted to standard used for situations involving instances when police
telephone “911" on her cellular phone. She then called her officers are called to make “fast action[s]” such as when
husband, Royal Jr., to report that armed assailants were facing an ensuing prison riot or when in the throes of a high-
attempting to rob her and Claybrook. However, because she speed chase. Under such circumstances, a much higher
crouched inside her vehicle following the initial volley, she standard of fault, such as “‘whether force was applied in a
did not witness the shoot-out. good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
During much of the ensuing firefight, Claybrook shielded harm,’” must be shown in order to hold a police officer liable.
himself behind the Maxima. Rounds discharged by See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833
, 118 S. Ct. Claybrook struck the windshield, hood, and door of the 1708, 1720 (1998) (quoting Witley v. Albers,475 U.S. 312
, officers’ cruiser. The three police officers testified, contrary 320 (1986)). Because the record does not support the to Quintana’s assertion, that Claybrook discharged his firearm majority’s application of this standard, the less stringent at least twice before they were able to return the assailant’s standard of culpability – that which is considered “something fire. They further asserted that, following the initial exchange more than negligence but less than intentional conduct, such of gunfire, they endeavored to identify themselves as police as recklessness or gross negligence” – should be applied. See officers by verbalizations reinforced by manual displays of Lewis,118 S. Ct. at 1718
(internal quotation marks omitted).
their official badges which each wore on a neck chain. Under this standard, coined by the Supreme Court as
Nevertheless, Claybrook continued to shoot at them. Officer “deliberate indifference,” a question of fact remains for trial
as to whether the officers’ conduct regarding Ms. Claybrook
rose to this level.
3
Birchwell testified that "it's very easy to distinguish a pistol shot
from a shotgun. A pistol shot is sort of like a firecracker," while "a
shotgun is a deep, low boom."
18 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. No. 98-6029 No. 98-6029 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. 7
Furthermore, because the charged official conduct did not Birchwell sustained gunshot wounds to his right thigh and
inflict any constitutional deprivation upon Quintana, knee and left foot. He then reported to the police dispatcher,
defendant Kirchner, in his official capacity as the Chief via radio, that shots had been fired, and again requested
Executive Officer of the Nashville-Davidson County immediate back-up assistance. At approximately that time,
Metropolitan Police Department, cannot be liable to her for the suspected perpetrator fled behind the market. However,
any alleged neglect to train or supervise those officers, or apparently rejecting the available option of escaping
failure to develop appropriate deadly force policies; therefore unharmed by means of an adjacent street, Claybrook
the lower court’s summary dismissal of count four was also circumambulated the structure in a bid to ambush the agents
proper. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796
, 799 from the rear.
(1986) (per curiam) (“If a person has suffered no
constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police Claybrook concealed himself behind a slightly elevated
officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have concrete structure which afforded a dominant strategic firing
authorized the use of unconstitutionally excessive force is posture. Each of the three officers testified that they once
quite beside the point.”) (emphasis the Court’s). again warned the assailant to drop his weapon. Instead, he
aimed his shotgun directly at them. The officers defensively
Accordingly, the summary judgments for the defendants fired at the suspect, bringing him to the ground.
which disposed of counts three and four of the amended Approximately at that same moment, marked police units
complaint are AFFIRMED; whereas the summary dismissals transporting uniformed officers, as well as an ambulance
of counts one and two are REVERSED, and the action containing emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”), arrived
REMANDED for further proceedings concerning those two at the scene. The entire incident had transpired within only
causes of action as are consistent with this opinion. one or two minutes.
Claybrook, pronounced dead at the scene, had sustained a
mortal head wound. Upon discovering the seriously injured
Quintana inside the Maxima, the EMTs rushed her to
Vanderbilt University Hospital, where she received
emergency medical attention and subsequent extended
hospitalization.
On February 12, 1996, the plaintiffs instigated a complaint
in district court under section 1983 and Tennessee law.
Count one asserted that Royal Jr., Gwannette, and Petrece
Claybrook, as the “heirs at law” of their deceased father,
suffered injuries consequent to the three defendant officers’
alleged violations of their parent’s civil rights. Via Count
two, Claybrook’s three children sought recovery from Robert
Kirchner, the Chief Executive Officer of the Nashville-
8 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. No. 98-6029 No. 98-6029 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. 17
Davidson County Metropolitan Police Department,4 for his that no conscience-shocking behavior was implicated by a
alleged failure to (1) properly train and/or supervise the three deputy sheriff’s emergency enlistment of a civilian
police officer defendants and/or (2) implement adequate bystander’s assistance in subduing a dangerous assailant
departmental policies circumscribing the application of deadly which prompted the perpetrator to slay the civilian),14 cert.
force. Count three advanced the claims of Quintana and her denied, 119 S. Ct. 869
(1999).
husband Royal Jr. for the officers’ averred infringements of
Quintana’s civil rights. Count four articulated Quintana’s Indeed, the record reflected, without contradiction, that the
claim against Kirchner anchored in allegations similar to three defendant undercover agents did not know that anyone
those stated in count two. Count five, asserted by all was present in the gray Maxima prior to, or during, the
plaintiffs, alleged that Birchwell, Lewis, and Spencer had exchange of gunfire which caused Quintana’s injury. Thus,
committed state law torts.5 the defendants could not have acted maliciously or
sadistically towards that unknown individual. See Farmer v.
Each of Claybrook’s three children requested $125,000 in Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36
(1994) (explaining that actual damages, plus an equivalent sum in punitive damages, malicious or sadistic behavior entails unjustifiable intentional against each defendant. Quintana sought $250,000 in conduct undertaken with the direct purpose of causing harm compensatory damages for her personal injuries, plus an to the victim). equivalent amount of punitives, against each defendant. The plaintiffs further petitioned for an award of attorney fees Hence, construing all supported allegations and record under42 U.S.C. § 1988
(b), an equitable declaration that the evidence most favorably for Quintana, no rational fact finder
Nashville police had violated their civil rights, and an could conclude that Officers Birchwell, Lewis, and/or
injunction compelling reform of the Nashville police Spencer violated her substantive due process rights, because
department’s deadly force policies. the plaintiff cannot prove that they acted with malice or
sadism towards her. Thus, the lower court’s summary
Following the lodging of the defendants’ answers to the judgment for those defendants on count three of the amended
initial complaint, the plaintiffs, on May 23, 1996, filed a complaint was correct. See Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1714
n.5.
four-count amended complaint which reiterated, with
14
The Radecki court explained:
4
On April 10, 1997, the district court dismissed all claims asserted Deputy Barela had no time for deliberation. The undisputed
against Chief Robert Kirchner in his individual capacity, but retained him facts in this record make clear that Deputy Barela was
as an official capacity defendant, which ruling is not before this appellate confronted with the kind of instantaneous judgment call that is
forum. An official capacity claim filed against a public employee is so often required of law enforcement personnel, prison officials,
equivalent to a lawsuit directed against the public entity which that agent and many other government actors called to emergency
represents. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165
(1985). situations. Sometimes these decisions are negligent, sometimes Municipalities and counties are “persons” exposed to litigation under they are even reckless, sometimes indifferent. Under these section 1983. Mumford v. Basinski,105 F.3d 264, 267
(6th Cir.), cert. circumstances, however, where Plaintiffs have not even alleged denied,522 U.S. 914
(1997). that Deputy Barela acted with an intent to harm the participants
5 or to worsen their legal plight, under the Lewis standard there is
On April 10, 1997, the trial judge dismissed count five with no constitutional liability.
prejudice in the exercise of its statutory discretion to decline to extend
supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(c). Radecki v. Barela,146 F.3d 1227, 1232
(10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, That mandate is not before this reviewing forum.119 S. Ct. 869
(1999).
16 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. No. 98-6029 No. 98-6029 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. 9
prompted by "unforeseen circumstances [which] demand[ed] modifications, causes one through four of their original
an officer's instant judgment," to a prison riot. Id. Thus, the complaint. However, the plaintiffs added, inter alia, language
more exacting “malicious or sadistic” standard of proof, to their complaint intended to clarify that Royal Jr.,
rather than the comparatively relaxed “deliberate Gwannette, and Petrece Claybrook did not seek satisfaction
indifference” evidentiary criterion, controlled the “shocks the for alleged losses personal to themselves; rather, they were
conscience” substantive due process element. Id. at 1720-21. prosecuting the instant action, as representatives of the
Similarly, the “malicious or sadistic” test of conscience- decedent’s estate, for compensation of Claybrook’s pre-death
shocking behavior controls the instant action because, beyond constitutional deprivations. The caption of the amended
controversy, Officers Birchwell, Lewis, and Spencer had no complaint listed the plaintiffs as:
opportunity to ponder or debate 13their reaction to the
dangerous actions of the armed man. ROYAL E. CLAYBROOK, JR., GWANNETTE
CLAYBROOK, PETRECE CLAYBROOK, CO-
Hence, even if, as the plaintiffs have argued, the actions of ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF ROYAL
the three defendant patrolmen violated departmental policy or E. CLAYBROOK, SR., AND QUINTANA
were otherwise negligent, no rational fact finder could CLAYBROOK[.]
conclude, even after considering the evidence in the light
most favorable to Quintana, that those peace enforcement (Boldface added).
operatives acted with conscience-shocking malice or sadism
towards the unintended shooting victim. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at The two counts advanced by Claybrook’s three children
1721 (dictating that, “[r]egardless whether [Deputy] Smith’s related:
behavior offended the reasonableness held up by tort law or
the balance struck in law enforcement’s own codes of sound COUNT ONE
practices, it does not shock the conscience, and petitioners are
not called upon to answer for it under § 1983.”). See Radecki 33
. On the basis of the allegations in paragraphs 1 v. Barela,146 F.3d 1227, 1232
(10th Cir. 1998) (concluding through 32 [generally averring the plaintiffs' version of
the events of February 28, 1995], defendants Birchwell,
Lewis and Spencer are liable, both jointly and severally,
to plaintiffs Royal E. Claybrook, Jr., Gwannette
13
The plaintiffs' contention that the defendant officers wrongfully
Claybrook and Petrece Claybrook, the heirs at law of
incited the violence which injured Quintana by entering the parking lot Royal E. Claybrook, Sr., for the defendants’ conduct,
and driving towards the stationary gray vehicle was misconceived. See individually and in concert, to violate the civil rights of
Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1720-21
. As the Seventh Circuit has commented: Royal E. Claybrook, Sr. under the First, Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
Other than random attacks, all such cases [involving the use of States Constitution. These rights include the right to be
force by criminal justice personnel] begin with the decision of a
police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. If free from unlawful arrest and from unreasonable and
the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have excessive use of police force, to freedom of movement,
been used. In this sense, the police officer always causes the to keep and bear arms, to be free from cruel and unusual
trouble. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to punishment, to due process of law and to equal
cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within protection of law.
constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing.
Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150
(7th Cir. 1994).
10 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. No. 98-6029 No. 98-6029 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. 15
COUNT TWO Fundamentally, the substantive component of the due
process clause insulates citizens against the arbitrary exercise
34. On the basis of the allegations in paragraphs 1 of governmental power. Id. at 1716. Accordingly, conduct of
through 32, defendant Robert Kirchner is liable to a law enforcement officer towards a citizen which “shocks the
plaintiffs Royal E. Claybrook, Jr., Gwannette Claybrook conscience” denies the victim fundamental substantive due
and Petrece Claybrook, the heirs at law of Royal E. process. Id. at 1717. In situations wherein the implicated
Claybrook, Sr., for his failure to develop policies and state, county, or municipal agent(s) are afforded a reasonable
procedures, to properly train police conduct [sic] in opportunity to deliberate various alternatives prior to electing
undercover activities, to train with regard to the use of a course of action (such as, for example, most occasions
deadly force and to supervise and regulate adequately so whereby corrections officials ignore an inmate’s serious
as to protect Royal E. Claybrook, Sr. and to prevent the medical needs), their actions will be deemed conscience-
violations of the said Claybrook Sr.'s rights as alleged in shocking if they were taken with “deliberate indifference”
paragraph 30 [paragraph 33?] above. towards the plaintiff’s federally protected rights. Id. at 1719.
In contradistinction, in a rapidly evolving, fluid, and
Additionally, the amended complaint alleged (1) the parent- dangerous predicament which precludes the luxury of calm
child relationship of Claybrook to Royal Jr., Gwannette, and and reflective pre-response deliberation (such as, for example,
Petrece (paragraphs one through four); (2) that “Plaintiffs a prison riot), public servants’ reflexive actions “shock the
Royal, Gwannette and Petrece Claybrook are co- conscience” only if they involved force employed
administrators of the Estate of Royal E. Claybrook, Sr." “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
(paragraph six); and (3) that "[a]s a result of the wrongful acts harm" rather than "in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
of the defendants, plaintiffs Royal E. Claybrook, Jr., discipline[.]"12 Id. at 1720 (citation omitted).
Gwannette Claybrook and Petrece Claybrook incurred
medical and funeral expenses, as well as great emotional loss Applying those principles, the Lewis Court analogized a
associated with the wrongful death of their father." (paragraph high-speed motorcycle chase, which led to the accidental
thirty-one). Furthermore, the plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief death of the pursued motorbike’s innocent passenger,
sought personal compensatory and punitive damage awards
for each of them, as well as collective equitable relief, in
conformity with their original complaint’s prayer; but it did
not expressly request any relief for the Estate of Royal E. 12
As aptly observed by the Lewis Court:
Claybrook, Sr..
[T]he police on an occasion calling for fast action have
Following discovery, the district court, on July 1, 1998, obligations that tend to tug against each other. Their duty is to
granted the defendants’ motions for dismissal of the amended restore and maintain lawful order, while not exacerbating
disorder more than necessary to do their jobs. They are
complaint and/or summary judgment. The plaintiffs noticed supposed to act decisively and to show restraint at the same
a timely appeal on July 20, 1998. moment, and their decisions have to be made in haste, under
pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance.
In the Sixth Circuit, a section 1983 cause of action is
entirely personal to the direct victim of the alleged County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1720
(1998) (citations constitutional tort. Jaco v. Bloechle,739 F.2d 239, 241
(6th omitted). See also Graham v. Connor,490 U.S. 386, 397
(1989) (“police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in
Cir. 1984). See also Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941
, circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving -- about the 948-49 n.6 (6th Cir. 1991); May v. County of Trumbull, 127 amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”). 14 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. No. 98-6029 No. 98-6029 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. 11 [sic] in undercover activities, to train with regard to the F.3d 1102 (Table),1997 WL 651662
, at **4 (6th Cir. Oct. 20, use of deadly force and to supervise and regulate 1997) (per curiam); Tinch v. City of Dayton,77 F.3d 483
adequately so as to protect Quintana Claybrook and to (Table),1996 WL 77445
, at **1 (6th Cir. Feb. 20, 1996) (per
prevent the violations of the said Quintana Claybrook's curiam). Accordingly, only the purported victim, or his
rights as alleged in paragraph 32 [paragraph 35?] above. estate’s representative(s), may prosecute a section 1983 claim;
conversely, no cause of action may lie under section 1983 for
On review, Quintana has disputed only the trial court’s emotional distress, loss of a loved one, or any other
dismissal of her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due consequent collateral injuries allegedly suffered personally by
process claim.10 Ordinarily, a charge that law enforcement the victim’s family members. Id.
Despite the amended personnel used excessive force to effect a plaintiff’s arrest, complaint’s caption, which named plaintiffs Royal Jr., which caused bodily injury to that individual, is assessed Gwannette, and Petrece as co-administrators of Claybrook’s under Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” estate, coupled with an express allegation at paragraph six to standards.11 Graham v. Connor,490 U.S. 386
, 394-97 that same effect, the district court construed counts one and (1989); Tennessee v. Garner,471 U.S. 1, 7-9
(1985). two as seeking only compensation for alleged personal losses Accordingly, when an arrestee is “seized” by means of deadly and suffering experienced individually by Claybrook’s three force, any dependent section 1983 claim initiated by the children. Consequently, the district court dismissed counts target, or his or her estate, must be supported by proof that, one and two because the plaintiffs lacked standing to initiate under the pertinent circumstances, the means used to detain personal claims stemming from alleged violations of their the suspect were objectively “unreasonable.”Id.
However, deceased father’s federally protected liberties.6 the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard does not apply to section 1983 claims which seek remuneration for Upon de novo review of a trial court’s dismissal of a physical injuries inadvertently inflicted upon an innocent complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations of the third party by police officers’ use of force while attempting complaint should be construed liberally in the plaintiffs’ to seize a perpetrator, because the authorities could not favor. Lewis v. ACB Business Services, Inc.,135 F.3d 389
, “seize” any person other than one who was a deliberate object 405 (6th Cir. 1998). “[A] complaint should not be dismissed of their exertion of force. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that 593, 596 (1989). Rather, constitutional tort claims asserted the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim by persons collaterally injured by police conduct who were which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 not intended targets of an attempted official “seizure” are U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (emphasis added; note omitted). In this adjudged according to substantive due process norms. County case, the lower court dismissed counts one and two on the of Sacramento v. Lewis,118 S. Ct. 1708, 1714-16
(1998). sole rationale that the plaintiffs had failed to plead that they
sought damages as representatives of their deceased father’s
estate for his alleged constitutional injuries. However,
10 plenary scrutiny of the material allegations of the amended
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution complaint reveals that, when construed in the light most
stipulates, in pertinent segment, that “No state shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
6
11 Because the lower court’s analysis of counts one and two focused
The Fourth Amendment posits, in relevant portion, that “The right exclusively upon the sufficiency of the amended complaint’s allegations,
of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . this review construes the trial court’s dismissal of those causes of action
seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. as a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim.
12 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. No. 98-6029 No. 98-6029 Claybrook, et al. v. Birchwell, et al. 13
favorable for the plaintiffs, they have adequately requested By contrast, the district court correctly resolved that counts
compensation for Claybrook’s alleged constitutional injuries three and four of the amended complaint were not supported
in their representative capacities as co-administrators of his by sufficient evidence.8 Those causes of action recited:
estate.
COUNT THREE
Notwithstanding that certain allegations of the amended
complaint also appear to aver that Claybrook’s children 35. On the basis of the allegations in paragraphs 1
suffered personal losses caused by the defendants’ alleged through 32, defendants Birchwell, Lewis and Spencer are
impingements of their decedent’s constitutionally safeguarded liable, both jointly and severally, to plaintiff Quintana
interests, which created some ambiguity regarding the identity Claybrook for the defendants' conduct, individually and
of the person(s) whose injuries in fact were asserted in counts in concert, to violate the civil rights of Quintana
one and two, this reviewing forum regards those extraneous Claybrook under the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
allegations to constitute mere surplusage which ultimately and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
have no substantive effect. Because the plaintiffs have Constitution. These rights include the right to be free
unequivocally alleged in plain language that they have from unlawful arrest and from unreasonable and
prosecuted the subject action as the co-administrators of excessive use of police force, to freedom of movement,
Claybrook’s estate, matched with clear allegations in counts to keep and bear arms, to be free from cruel and unusual
one and two that the defendants’ actions had deprived punishment, to due process of law and to equal
Claybrook of his civil rights, it cannot be said that they have protection of law. Said defendants are liable to plaintiff
pleaded no set of facts in counts one and two which could Royal E. Claybrook, Jr. for the loss of companionship,
conceivably entitle them, as representatives of Claybrook’s love and affection of his wife, Quintana Claybrook.9
estate, to relief. Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal of
counts one and two for failure to state a claim, which was COUNT FOUR
justified solely on the rationale that the plaintiffs had not pled
that they sought recovery for their late parent’s injuries as 36. On the basis of the allegations in paragraphs 1
representatives of his estate, constituted legal error. Hence, through 32, defendant Robert Kirchner is liable to
the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals of counts one and two are plaintiff Quintana Claybrook for his failure to develop
reversed, and the case remanded to the district court for policies and procedures, to properly train police conduct
further proceedings regarding7 those causes of action as are
consistent with this decision.
the amended complaint.
7 8
This court emphasizes that, as to counts one and two of the amended Because consideration of the sufficiency of the record evidence is
complaint, it rules only that the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that necessary to dispose of counts three and four, as developed below, this
they are seeking monetary compensation, as the co-administrators of the review construes the lower court’s rejection of those causes of action as
decedent’s estate, for alleged constitutional torts personally suffered by a summary adjudication. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) & 56.
Claybrook, which affords them standing as vindicators of Claybrook’s 9
individual federal rights to the extent that his tort claims survived, under For the reasons developed above, Royal Claybrook Jr. lacks
Tennessee law, beyond his own death. See Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d standing under section 1983 to claim compensation for any indirect
239, 241-45 (6th Cir. 1984); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-5-102
& 106 (1994 injuries allegedly caused to him by reason of any constitutional tort & Supp. 1998). This reviewing forum expresses no opinion regarding the suffered by his spouse Quintana Claybrook, irrespective of the potential substantive merits of any claim asserted within counts one and/or two of merits of Quintana’s personal claims.