Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Samuel James Jackson v. John T. Cox, Ted L. Potter and James E. Walker
540 F.2d 209
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1976-10-08
- Topic
- general
PER CURIAM: Appellant was convicted of forgery and is now serving a life sentence in the Texas Department of Corrections as a habitual criminal. He brings a civil rights action alleging that the three attorney-defendants conspired to defraud him of $750 without rendering any legal assistance in his appeal. Appellant relies on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3), 1986, 1988. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Griffin v.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Samuel James Jackson v. John T. Cox, Ted L. Potter and James E. Walker. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 10 opinions
JACKSON v. COX,540 F.2d 209(5th Cir. 1976)
SAMUEL JAMES JACKSON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JOHN T. COX, TED L. POTTER AND
JAMES E. WALKER, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
No. 76-1303.
Summary Calendar.fn*
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
October 8, 1976.
John T. Cox, Ted L. Potter, James E. Walker, Belton, Tex., for defendants-appellees.
Before COLEMAN, GOLDBERG and GEE, Circuit Judges.
[2]Griffin v. Breckenridgemade § 1985(3) applicable to private actions but stressed that the statute was not intended to reach "all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others."403 U.S. 88,101,91 S.Ct. 1790,1798,29 L.Ed.2d 338(1971). Section 1985(3) was designed to prevent deprivation of equal protection of the laws and equal privileges and immunities, not to serve as a general federal tort law that would permit a suit for fraud or breach of contract, which is the essence of appellant's complaint here.
The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional purpose — by requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment. . . . The language requiring intent to deprive ofequalprotection, orequalprivileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all.
[3]Id.at 102,91 S.Ct. at 1798.
[4] The pleading here fails to allege the kind of class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action required byGriffin v. Breckenridge.Plaintiff alleged no more than that he was black and defendants were white, and his pleadings offered but one phrase alluding to racial bias as one motivating factor. Not otherwise put before the district court and nowhere urged to this court on appeal, plaintiff has failed to assert a racially discriminatory conspiracy that would raise any question as to the applicability ofGriffin.The district court's dismissal of the complaint is AFFIRMED.
- Rule 18, 5 Cir.;see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. CitizensCasualty Co. of New York et al.,5 Cir. 1970,431 F.2d 409, Part I. ↩