Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Jimmy Frank v. Frank Blackburn, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary

646 F.2d 902

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1981-01-26
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • new plea agreement bargained for after first plea withdrawn

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Jimmy Frank v. Frank Blackburn, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Authority status
pending
Cited by
52 opinions
FRANK v. BLACKBURN,646 F.2d 902(5th Cir. 1981)
JIMMY FRANK, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, v. FRANK BLACKBURN, WARDEN, LOUISIANA
STATE PENITENTIARY, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.
No. 78-3452.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
January 16, 1981.
Further Observations in Dissent Following Order on Rehearing January 26,
1981.
J. Donice Alverson, New Orleans, La. (Court-appointed), for petitioner-appellant.

Robert Brinkman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Opelousas, La., for respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana; Nauman S. Scott, Judge.
[1] ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
[2] (Opinion November 17, 1980, 5 Cir.,646 F.2d 873)
Before COLEMAN, Chief Judge, and BROWN, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, CHARLES CLARK, RONEY, GEE, TJOFLAT, HILL, FAY, RUBIN, VANCE, KRAVITCH, FRANK M. JOHNSON, Jr., GARZA, HENDERSON, REAVLEY, POLITZ, HATCHETT, ANDERSON, RANDALL, SAM D. JOHNSON and THOMAS A. CLARK, Circuit Judges.fn*
PER CURIAM:
[3] IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing filed in the above entitled and numbered cause be and the same is hereby granted in part. We delete the sentence that appears on page 1323 of the slip opinion and reads as follows:
"Even if the trial provided no additional evidence of character, the mere fact that Jimmy Frank refused to acknowledge his guilt and showed no willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct may have led the judge to conclude that this defendant lacked potential for rehabilitation thus justifying the imposition of a greater sentence than that offered in exchange for a guilty plea."


[4] In all other respects the petition is DENIED.
[5] HILL, Circuit Judge, with whom KRAVITCH, FRANK M. JOHNSON, Jr., REAVLEY and THOMAS A. CLARK, join, in further observations in dissent following order on rehearing:
[6] A. And Whispering "I Will Ne'er Consent" — Consented
[7] In response to Motion for Rehearing, my colleagues in the majority revised the opinion by striking one sentence from it. Presumably it was taken out because the majority of our Court concluded that it does not state that law. I agree that the deleted sentence was incorrect. Yet I submit that if it is not the holding of this court, there is no support left in the majority opinion for a judgment affirming the district court.

[8] Stripped of the omitted sentence, the majority opinion openly embracesPearce.On page 883 the majority purports to "set forth some of the [trial judge's] reasons for the [thirty-three year] sentence." An exhaustive two page recitation follows. It appears to be an effort to justify the trial judge's "second sentence" by "objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original proceeding."North Carolina v. Pearce,395 U.S. 711,726,89 S.Ct. 2072,2081,23 L.Ed.2d 656(1969). Quite simply the majority has acknowledged that the rule ofPearceshould be applied. No other justification for their holding exists.

[9] Yet the majority continues to protest that "the rule ofNorthCarolina v. Pearce,[is] completely inapplicable to post-plea bargaining sentencing proceedings."1At 885.Page 903Regrettably, I have come to the conclusion that the majority's opinion is based upon a misunderstanding ofPearceand its progeny. The majority states:
ThePearcerule appliesonlyto sentencing after retrial[2], and even in that situation, "the Due Process Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of `vindictiveness.'"Blackledge v. Perry,417 U.S. 21,94 S.Ct. 2098,40 L.Ed.2d 628(1974). We find nothing in the record of the present case to indicate a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness" on the part of the trial judge.


[10] At 885 (emphasis in original).

[11]Blackledge,the very opinion on which the majority relies, is explicit in stating that a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness" isnotdetermined by a review of the record insofar as it might reveal the existencevel nonof vindictiveness. Rather, it is determined by assessing the posture of the judge, jury or prosecutor in question. To make this point clear we need do no more than set out in full the paragraph inBlackledgefrom which the majority has quoted.
The lesson that emerges fromPearce, Colten[Colten v. Kentucky,407 U.S. 104,92 S.Ct. 1953,32 L.Ed.2d 584] andChaffin[Chaffin v.Stynchcombe,412 U.S. 17,93 S.Ct. 1977,36 L.Ed.2d 714] is that the Due Process Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of "vindictiveness." Unlike the circumstances presented by those cases, however, in the situation here the central figure is not the judge or the jury, but the prosecutor.The questionis whether the opportunities for vindictiveness inthis situation are such as to impel the conclusionthat due process of law requires a rule analogous tothat of the Pearce case.We conclude that the answer must be in the affirmative.


[12]417 U.S. at 27,94 S.Ct. at 2102(emphasis added).

[13] Indeed, the Court inBlackledgereached its holding while concluding at the same time that the record was devoid of prosecutorial vindictiveness.3417 U.S. at 28,94 S.Ct. at 2102. In sum, the majority has bluntedPearceby misapplication. A finding of a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness" has nothing to do with reviewing the record to find out whether or not vindictiveness actually existed.

[14] It is not necessary to repeat the analysis of our original dissent.646 F.2d 873, at 893 (Hill, J., dissenting). Suffice it to say that when a trial judge actively participates in the plea bargaining process by announcing an "appropriate" sentence for the defendant should he stand convicted upon a plea of guilty, the "opportunities for vindictiveness in this situation are such as to impel the conclusion that due process of law requires a rule analogous to that of thePearcecase."417 U.S. at 27,94 S.Ct. at 2102.Page 904
[15] B. A Comparison Reconsidered
[16] I take this opportunity to acknowledge Judge Rubin's observations touching upon my having equated civil case settlements with settlements in criminal cases. I persist in my view that they are remarkably similar proceedings, when accomplished by negotiation between legitimate adversaries. I acknowledge one fundamental difference. The settlement of civil cases frequently — perhaps usually — involves a compromise of the issue of defendant's liability or innocence. Plea bargaining in criminal cases cannot stand — the guilty plea may not be taken — unless the judge be satisfied that the facts establish a proper basis for concluding that the defendant is guilty. Otherwise, agreements resolving uncertain consequences into certainty is the end result of negotiation in criminal and civil disputes.
[17] ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge, with whom RANDALL, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring in Circuit Judge JAMES C. HILL's further observations in dissent following order on rehearing:
[18] I concur in Part A of Judge Hill's further observations. I continue to believe that there are greater differences between the compromise of civil actions and plea bargaining in criminal cases than the one important distinction noted in Part B of his observations, but I agree fully that he has pointed out a significant one.
  1. Judges Albert Tate, Jr. and Jerre S. Williams did not participate in the en banc consideration of or decision in this case. ↩
  2. A little still she strove, and much repented, And whispering, "I will ne'er consent" — consented.

    Byron,Don Juan,canto I (1818). ↩
  3. We are baffled by the majority's statement that:

    "ThePearcerule appliesonlyto sentencing after retrial . . . ." At 885 (emphasis in original). In the very next clause the majority goes on to quoteBlackledge v. Perry,417 U.S. 21,94 S.Ct. 2098,40 L.Ed.2d 628(1974). That case involved the threat of prosecutorial misconduct; specifically, the felony reindictment of Perry after his initial misdemeanor indictment was dismissed. It clearly did not involve "sentencing after retrial." Yet the rule ofPearcewas explicitly applied.See417 U.S. at 27,94 S.Ct. at 2102. ↩
  4. "There is,
    of course
    , no evidence that the prosecutor in this case acted in bad faith or maliciously in seeking a felony indictment against Perry."Blackledge v. Perry,417 U.S. 21,28,94 S.Ct. at 2102(1974) (emphasis added). We underscore "of course" to emphasize a point which is basic to the understanding of this case. As recognized in bothBlackledgeandPearce,common sense and experience dictate that affirmative acts of vindictiveness will rarely — if ever — find their way into the record. Stated differently, it borders on folly to search a record for a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness" except insofar as the record reveals the posture of the judge at the time the action under investigation was taken. ↩