Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Guzzino v. Felterman

Guzzino v. Felterman, 191 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 1999)

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1999-09-30
Topic
general

noting that district courts have “wide discretion” to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims once all federal claims have been dismissed | agreeing with the district court that “plaintiffs get to pick their forum and pick the claims they want to make unless they are blatantly forum shopping” | agreeing with the district court that “plaintiffs get to pick their forum and pick the claims they want to make unless they are blatantly forum shopping” | noting “wide discretion vested in the trial court to order a remand of state claims on the heels of a dismissal of federal claims” | noting “the wide discretion vested in the trial court to order a remand of state claims on the heels of a dismissal of federal claims” | agreeing with the district court that “plaintiffs get to pick their forum and pick the claims they want to make unless they are blatantly forum shopping” | agreeing with the district court that “plaintiffs get to pick their forum and pick the claims they want to make unless they are blatantly forum shopping” | agreeing with the district court that “plaintiffs get to pick their forum and pick the claims they want to make unless they are blatantly forum shopping” | finding the judicial economy factor to favor remand where, despite “substantial pretrial activity,” “the parties’ work product could be taken, with little loss, to the state litigation” | “Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” | describing the district court’s “wide discretion” in this arena

Citator

Cited by
26 opinions
GUZZINO v. FELTERMAN,191 F.3d 588(5th Cir. 1999)
LEONARD G. GUZZINO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, v. JODY M. FELTERMAN, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS, DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF
CROSS-CLAIMANT/APPELLANT, v. PETER J. LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK; WHITNEY
HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M. FELTERMAN,
CROSS-DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. GARY MASSICOT, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. JODY M.
FELTERMAN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC.,
DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF CROSS-CLAIMANT/APPELLANT, v. PETER J.
LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK; WHITNEY HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M. FELTERMAN, CROSS-DEFENDANT/APPELLEE.
GLENDA RICE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR FOR HER TWO MINOR CHILDREN;
RICE CHILDREN TRUST, ON BEHALF OF RENA DESLATTE; RICE ELECTRONICS, INC; RICE
ELECTRONICS OF TEXAS, INC; DAVID P. RICE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR
FOR HIS TWO MINOR CHILDREN, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, v. JODY M. FELTERMAN, ET
AL., DEFENDANTS,
Page 589
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF
CROSS-CLAIMANT/APPELLANT, v. PETER J. LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK;
WHITNEY HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M.
FELTERMAN, CROSS-DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. C. KEITH VISCARDIS; PHYLLIS VISCARDIS;
DENNIS BUSINELLE, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, v. JODY M. FELTERMAN, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS, DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF
CROSS-CLAIMANT/APPELLANT, v. PETER J. LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK;
WHITNEY HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M.
FELTERMAN, CROSS-DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. SHANNA HEBERT; KEVIN HEBERT; RAYMOND
VERRETT; MRS. RAYMOND VERRETT; CLARENCE E. LASSITER; MRS. CLARENCE E.
LASSITER; IVY ST. ROMAIN, JR; E.J. MASON; MRS.E.J. MASON; RICK MASON;
JOYCE B. LASSEIGNE; JERRY M. LIPARI; MRS. JERRY M. LIPARI; LUCY LIPARI;
COLLINS PELLEGRIN, JR; MRS. COLLINS PELLEGRIN, JR; CRYSTAL PELLEGRIN,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF STEPHANIE SUIRE; TROY HATCH; MRS. TROY
HATCH; ROBERT N. HUGHES; MRS. ROBERT N. HUGHES; PENNY HEBERT; PATRICK
HEBERT; GORDON BILLIOT; MRS. GORDON BILLIOT; SIDNEY P. HEBERT, SR; MRS.
SIDNEY P. HEBERT, SR; JERRY JACKSON; AUDREY JACKSON; FORREST CALLAIS; MRS.
FORREST CALLAIS; RONALD FROMENTHAL; MRS. RONALD FROMENTHAL; STERLING
HEBERT; MRS. STERLING HEBERT; ERROLL J. THERIOT; HELEN THERIOT; NEWTON
VERRETT; MRS. NEWTON VERRETT; ALEX GIROIR; MRS. ALEX GIROIR; CLARENCE P.
HEBERT, SR; MRS. CLARENCE P. HEBERT, SR; WILLOW JEAN GANAWAY; PETER
VANDEN-AARDWEG; GERALD CRAPPELL; MRS. GERALD CRAPPELL; OPAL JOUBERT,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TESTAMENTARY EXECUTRIX ON BEHALF OF RANDY
JOUBERT, SR. ESTATE, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, v. DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC.,
DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF CROSS-CLAIMANT/APPELLANT, v. PETER J.
LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK; WHITNEY HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M. FELTERMAN, DEFENDANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT
APPELLEE. LEVY B. ROY; IRIS ROY, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, v. ABC INSURANCE
CO., ET AL., DEFENDANTS, DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY
PLAINTIFF APPELLANT v. PETER J. LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK; WHITNEY
HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M. FELTERMAN,
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. PETER VANDENAARDWEG, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v. DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS,
Page 590
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF
CROSS-CLAIMANT/APPELLANT, v. PETER J. LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK;
WHITNEY HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND
JODY M. FELTERMAN, CROSS-DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. RUDY SPARKS;
DIANE SPARKS, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, v. ABC INSURANCE CO., ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS, DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF
APPELLANT, v. PETER J. LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK; WHITNEY HOLDING CORP.,
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS/ APPELLEES, AND
JODY M. FELTERMAN, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. TRAVIS ROY; TIFFANY
ROY, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, v. DEAN WITTER DISCOVER AND CO., FORMERLY
KNOWN AS DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS, DEAN
WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF APPELLANT, v. PETER
J. LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK; WHITNEY HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M. FELTERMAN, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT/APPELLEE.
ROBERT ADAMS, III, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. DEAN WITTER DISCOVER AND CO.,
FORMERLY KNOWN AS DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS, DEAN
WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF APPELLANT, v. PETER
J. LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK; WHITNEY HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M. FELTERMAN, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT/APPELLEE.
JERRY F. ADAMS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. DEAN WITTER DISCOVER AND CO., ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS, DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF
APPELLANT v. PETER J. LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK; WHITNEY HOLDING CORP.,
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M. FELTERMAN, THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. GERALD CRAPPELL; PENNY CRAPPELL, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,
v. DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., ET AL, DEFENDANTS, DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS,
INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF CROSS-CLAIMANT/APPELLANT, v. PETER J.
LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK; WHITNEY HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M. FELTERMAN, CROSS-DEFENDANT/APPELLEE.
Page 591
D. LEE FELTERMAN; JAN B. FELTERMAN, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, v. DEAN WITTER
DISCOVER AND CO., FORMERLY KNOWN AS DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS, DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF
APPELLANT, v. PETER J. LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK; WHITNEY HOLDING CORP.,
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M. FELTERMAN, THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. DANIEL C. FELTERMAN; LINDA B. FELTERMAN,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, v. DEAN WITTER DISCOVER AND CO., FORMERLY KNOWN
AS DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS, DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS,
INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF APPELLANT v. PETER J. LIPARI;
PATTERSON STATE BANK; WHITNEY HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M. FELTERMAN, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT/APPELLEE.
MARIJEANNE CHRISTIE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, ROBERT S. ROBERTSON,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. JODY M. FELTERMAN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, DEAN WITTER
REYNOLDS, INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF CROSS-CLAIMANT/APPELLANT,
v. PETER J. LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK; WHITNEY HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M. FELTERMAN, CROSS-DEFENDANT/APPELLEE.
MURRAY DUVAL; ANNA JEAN DUVAL, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, v. JODY M. FELTERMAN,
ET AL., DEFENDANTS, DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY
PLAINTIFF CROSS-CLAIMANT/APPELLANT, v. PETER J. LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE
BANK; WHITNEY HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M.
FELTERMAN, CROSS-DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. SEBASTIAN J. CARDINALE,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. JODY M. FELTERMAN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, DEAN M.
WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF
CROSS-CLAIMANT/APPELLANT, v. PETER J. LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK; WHITNEY
HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M. FELTERMAN,
CROSS-DEFENDANT/APPELLEE.
Page 592
JEFFREY CARDINALE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. DEAN
WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS, DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC.,
DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF CROSS-CLAIMANT/APPELLANT, v. PETER J.
LIPARI; PATTERSON STATE BANK; WHITNEY HOLDING CORP., THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, AND JODY M. FELTERMAN, CROSS-DEFENDANT/APPELLEE.
No. 98-30222.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
September 30, 1999.
Bob F. Wright, Carla M. Perron, Dommengeaux, Wright, Moroux Roy, Lafayette, LA, for Massicot, C. Keith and Phyllis Viscardis, Businelle, Shanna and Kevin Hebert, Verrett, Mr. and Mrs. Clarence Lassiter, St. Romain, Mr. and Mrs. E. J. Mason, Rick Mason, Lasseigne, Mr. and Mrs, Jerry Lipari, Lucy Lipari, Mr. and Mrs. Collins Pellegrin, Jr., Crystal Pellegrin, Mr. and Mrs. Troy Hatch, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Hughes, Penny and Patrick Hebert, Mr. and Mrs. Gordon Billiot, Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Hebert, Jerry and Audrey Jackson, Mr. and Mrs. Forrest Callais, Mr. and Mrs. Ronald Fromenthal, Mr. and Mrs. Sterling Hebert, Errol and Helen Theriot, Mr. and Mrs. Newton Verrett, Mr. and Mrs. Alex Giroir, Mr. and Mrs. Clarence Hebert, Sr., Ganaway, Robertson, Murray and Anna Jean Duval, Vandenaardweg, Gerald and Penny Crappell, Sebastian and Jeffrey Cardinale and Joubert.

Victor James Versaggi, Lafayette, LA, for Daniel, Linda D., Lee and Jan Felterman, Adams, Travis and Tiffany Roy, Jerry Adams, Iris Roy, Judy and Diane Sparks and Levy B. Roy.Page 593

Scott D. Levy, Houston, TX, for Glenda Rice, Rice Children Trust, Rice Electronics, Inc., Rice Electronics of Texas, Inc. and David Rice.

Cliffe E. Laborde, III, Robert Edwin Torian, Laborde Neuner, Lafayette, LA, Clave E. Gill, Patricia A. Bollman, Gill Shinn, Covington, LA, for Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

Robert J. Burvant, Margaret Mary Sledge, Clare P. Hunter, Elizabeth M. Mayeaux, King, LeBlanc Bland, New Orleans, LA, for Peter J. Lipari and Patterson State Bank.

W. Gerald Gaudet, Bradley Joseph Haight, Voorhies Labbe, Lafayette, LA, for Jody M. Felterman.

Gary J. Russo, Perret, Doise, Daigle, Lonfman, Russo Zaunbrecher, Lafayette, LA, for Whitney Holding Corp.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.
Before POLITZ and JOLLY, Circuit Judges, and BARBIER, District Judge.fn*
POLITZ, Circuit Judge:
[1] Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. appeals the trial court's remand order issued under the discretionary provision of28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Plaintiffs counter that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal and, joined by the third-party defendants, contend that the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering the remand. For the reasons assigned, we deny plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal, affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.
BACKGROUND
[2] This case arose from the illegal conduct of a Dean Witter stockbroker, Jody M. Felterman. Felterman conducted a Ponzi1scheme designed to bilk investors of their money and, when his activities were discovered, pleaded guilty to money laundering and wire fraud. The many investors — the plaintiffs in this litigation — brought suit in Louisiana state court against Felterman and Dean Witter. Dean Witter filed a third-party complaint against two banks in which Felterman maintained accounts and the president and chief executive officer of one of these banks.2

[3] Plaintiffs were grouped according to the names of their attorneys: theBaldwinandHaspelplaintiffs; theStansburyplaintiffs; theWrightplaintiffs; theVersaggiplaintiffs; and theRiceplaintiffs. Dean Witter successfully removed all cases to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' complaints, other than those filed by theStansburyplaintiffs, alleged RICO3and federal securities violations. The actions were consolidated and the court scheduled nine4plaintiffs for trial. After active litigation for approximately two years, the court granted Dean Witter's motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment on all federal and some state claims of the nine plaintiffs set for trial. Anticipating the inevitable, all remaining plaintiffs, with the exception of fiveVersaggiplaintiffs, voluntarily dismissed their federal claims against Dean Witter. Plaintiffs also abandoned their claims against Felterman, who, unlikePage 594Dean Witter, had not asked the court to enter judgment in his favor on any of plaintiffs' claims.5As a result, no federal claims remained pending, other than those by theVersaggiplaintiffs, and plaintiffs moved the trial court to remand the case to state court. Although the trial court initially declined to do so, it subsequently reconsidered and remanded the case to state court. From this ruling, Dean Witter appeals.
ANALYSIS
[4] At the threshold we pause to consider the challenge to our appellate jurisdiction. Our pause need only be brief. Plaintiffs suggest that the trial court should have remanded under the authority of28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), an order for which appellate review is precluded by28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). They further contend that a decision to remand under28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) is reviewable only by a petition for writ of mandamus. Both propositions are foreclosed by our jurisprudence.6We have jurisdiction to review this appeal.

[5] Alternatively, plaintiffs and third-party defendants submit that the remand order fell within the court's discretionary powers. Section 1367 provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under ArticleIIIof the United States Constitution. . . .


[6] (c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if —

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law;
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction;
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction; or
(4) in exceptional circumstances there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.7


[7] The Supreme Court inUnited Mine Workers v. Gibbs8has instructed federal courts that the justification for pendent jurisdiction
lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound to apply state law to them. Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.9


[8] TheGibbstest is a flexible one, under which courts should conduct a fact-specificPage 595inquiry, considering the totality of circumstances of each case.10

[9] The trial court noted the general rule favoring dismissal of state claims when the federal claims to which they are pendent are dismissed.11Further, the trial court stressed that about seventy related cases remained pending in state court and suggested that it would be desirable for all cases to be considered by a single court, thus facilitating settlement, conserving judicial resources, and avoiding the risk of inconsistent rulings. A mediation between the parties may have failed in part because of the unresolved state cases. The trial court observed that the discovery conducted in federal court likely would be available for use in state court and that the parties' other preparatory steps for trial would not be wasted. Finally, the trial court referred to a "myriad of unique state law issues," which also counseled against retaining the cases in federal court.

[10] Dean Witter vigorously argues that the trial court exceeded its discretionary authority in remanding the cases. It insists that the intensive, protracted pretrial preparation in federal court brings this case within the rubric ofNewport Ltd. v. Sears,Roebuck and Co.,12where we reversed the trial court's remand order in light of the substantial judicial and party resources devoted to the litigation in the federal forum. Further, Dean Witter disputes the trial court's conclusion that state law issues remaining in the case are particularly novel. Charging plaintiffs with engaging in blatant forum manipulation by dismissing the federal claims against Felterman, and accusing the third-party defendants of supporting remand in order to revisit adverse rulings by the federal court, Dean Witter urges that remanding the cases would invite duplicative, possibly conflicting rulings and would reward unseemly machinations in the courts.

[11] In evaluating Dean Witter's arguments — which are not wholly lacking in persuasive force — we are mindful of the wide discretion vested in the trial court to order a remand of state claims on the heels of a dismissal of federal claims.13While it is true that substantial pretrial activity was had following removal, the trial court observed that much of its involvement in the cases related to resolving plaintiffs' failed claims and that the parties' work product could be taken, with little loss, to the state litigation. Further, this action is readily distinguishable fromNewport— here there are seventy related pending cases in state court. This is no small matter. We agree with the trial court that this circumstance heavily supports a remand, eliminating the disfavored prospect of state and federal proceedings running on parallel, and possibly nonharmonious tracks. Thus, even if, as Dean Witter represents, the state law implicated by the case is prosaic, considerations relating to conservation of and respect for judicial resources and interests of comity and federalism markedly tip the balance in favor of a remand.

[12] Dean Witter suggests that those seeking a remand are engaged in forum manipulation. We are not persuaded. The trial court considered and rejected this contention, noting:
The plaintiffs get to pick their forum and pick the claims they want to make unless they are blatantly forum shopping. I don't think that we are looking at that. I think they would have loved to have stayed here and fought their RICO and [federal] securities claims; but once they lost them, then they [sic] would like to go back.
Page 596

[13] Further, the trial court stated that "considering this [c]ourt's rulings dismissing the same federal claims against Dean Witter, . . . it is not surprising that plaintiffs would dismiss the federal claims against . . . Felterman, which are at best hollow."

[14] Similarly, to the extent that the status of the state cases — which impeded settlement, according to the trial court — factored into the decision to remand, we are persuaded that Dean Witter suffered no prejudice. The trial court cited various reasons for the remand, and this "extra-record" observation was only one of many. We have no hesitation whatever in accepting the inference that the pendency of a large number of related cases would have a chilling effect on the consummation of a settlement which did not include those cases.

[15] Finally, our review of the total record, in light of the briefs and oral arguments of counsel, convinces us that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering the remand order. The order, however, is too embracive. The remand order is based on the court's belief that only state law claims remained in any of the remanded actions. That understanding is incorrect. The actions involving theVersaggiplaintiffs have outstanding federal claims against Dean Witter. We must therefore vacate and remand the order of the trial court as it relates to the actions by theVersaggiplaintiffs. On remand the district court will be free to consider anew a remand request should the federal claims issue be resolved so as to permit such. In all other respects the remand order appealed is affirmed.

[16] AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
  1. District Judge of the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation. ↩
  2. The term was coined from the last name of the swindler inCunningham v. Brown,265 U.S. 1(1924). ↩
  3. The third-party defendants are: First National Bank in St. Mary Parish, merged into Whitney National Bank; Patterson State Bank; and President and Chief Executive Officer of Patterson State Bank, Peter J. Lipari. ↩
  4. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,18 U.S.C. § 1961et seq. ↩
  5. There exists some confusion as to whether the correct number is nine or seven. As the discrepancy does not impact our analysis of the issues, we will simply assume (as the parties do) that the correct number is nine. ↩
  6. It appears that Felterman may now be impecunius. ↩
  7. Burks v. Amerada Hess Corp.,8 F.3d 301(5th Cir. 1993),
    abrogated on other grounds by
    Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans,Inc.,172 F.3d 332(5th Cir. 1999);Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc.,101 F.3d 448(5th Cir. 1996);Eastus v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P.,97 F.3d 100(5th Cir. 1996) (citingQuackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,517 U.S. 706(1996)). ↩
  8. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c). ↩
  9. 383 U.S. 715(1966). ↩
  10. Id.at 726 (footnotes and citations omitted). ↩
  11. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,484 U.S. 343(1988). ↩
  12. See Parker Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus.,972 F.2d 580(5th Cir. 1992). ↩
  13. 941 F.2d 302(5th Cir. 1991). ↩
  14. Robertson v. The Neuromedical Center,161 F.3d 292(5th Cir. 1998),
    cert
    .
    denied
    ,119 S.Ct. 1575(1999). ↩