Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Bossard v. Exxon Corp.
Bossard v. Exxon Corp., 559 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1977)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1977-09-23
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- noting that when a trial court considers evidence beyond the pleading in a motion to dismiss, the grant of that motion is to be treated as summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Bossard v. Exxon Corp.. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Authority status
- pending
- Cited by
- 15 opinions
BOSSARD v. EXXON CORP.,559 F.2d 1040(5th Cir. 1977)
ELLA WEESE WATSON BOSSARD, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF DONALD BOSSARD, AND GENIEVEVE BOSSARD AND BERTHA LEE BOSSARD,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. EXXON CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, LAMAR
LABAUVE, TOM WOLFE, JOSEPH LABAUVE, AND DELTA LABORATORIES, DEFENDANTS.
No. 76-1364.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
September 23, 1977.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied October 25, 1977.
Page 1041
E. Burt Harris, John F. Reid, New Orleans, La., for Exxon.
Andrew J. Bennett, Jr., Baton Rouge, La., for Delta Lab., et al.
David W. Robinson, Baton Rouge, La., for Fidelity Casualty Co.
Before GEWIN, RONEY and HILL, Circuit Judges.
[2] This appeal raises certain questions not presented inHess.First, the plaintiffs argue dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6) was improper, because they stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. The argument misstates the nature of the district court's decision. Both the language of the rule and the law of this Circuit indicate that when a trial court takes into consideration depositions and other information outside the pleadings, as was done here, the grant of a motion to dismiss is to be treated as summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P.56.Herronv. Herron,255 F.2d 589(5th Cir. 1958).SeeWright Miller,Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1366 n. 67 (1971). Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any prejudice or lack of notice sufficient to establish an exception. Consequently the case does not turn on the failure to state a claim, but on whether the plaintiffs have produced a material issue of fact which, if proved, would entitle them to relief as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P.56.
[3] Part IV of theHessopinion deals with the shipowner's liability for open and obvious dangers on board the vessel. The gas in the tank which asphyxiated the plaintiffs' decedent was such a danger. It was one of the conditions that Port Allen Marine was hired to correct. While, under Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 343, 343A (1965), as interpreted inGay v. OceanTransport Trading Ltd.,546 F.2d 1233(5th Cir. 1977), the shipowner is potentially liable for injuries caused by such dangers if the danger cannot be appreciated by invitees or cannot be avoided, neither circumstance applies to this case. Port Allen Marine and Bossard knew of the danger.See Gulf Oil Corp. v.Bivins,276 F.2d 753,756-758(5th Cir.),cert. denied,364 U.S. 835,81 S.Ct. 70,5 L.Ed.2d 61(1960).
[4] The plaintiffs assert a ground for liability not mentioned inHess.They allege the defendants breached two sets of federal regulations, so that a material issue of fact with respect to their negligence exists. Neither set of regulations, however, applies to the facts of this case. The Coast Guard regulations,46 C.F.R. 35.01-1(1976), pertain to precautions taken when riveting or welding a barge tank and do not apply toPage 1042cleaning. The safety and health regulations for longshoremen, 29 C.F.R. 1915.11-12 (1976), impose duties on Port Allen Marine, but not on the shipowner.Brown v. Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko,550 F.2d 331(5th Cir. 1977);see generally90 Harv.L. Rev. 1041 (1977).
[5] AFFIRMED.Page 1265