Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Anokwuru v. City of Houston
990 F.3d 956
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 2021-03-16
- Topic
- bankruptcy
holding “isolated violations are not the persistent, often repeated, constant violations that constitute custom and policy” | holding that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a complaint for failure to state a claim, IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that UDF and the Executives’ Motion to Strike Exhibits From Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint, (Dkt. #30 | finding that plaintiff failed to allege a pattern of failure to train where he pointed “only to his own incident as proof of a policy of deliberate indifference” | finding plaintiff who filed objections to magistrate judge’s recommendation undoubtedly had notice and opportunity to respond before dismissal | affirming dismissal of a failure-to- train claim when plaintiff “points only to his own incident as proof of a policy of deliberate indifference” | rejecting plaintiff’s argument that Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), precluded application of the independent intermediary doctrine where complaint lacked specific, nonspeculative allegations of false information | District Judge did not abuse his discretion by adopting Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss plaintiff’s case sua sponte | plaintiff that filed objections to magistrate judge’s recommendation undoubtedly had notice and opportunity to respond before dismissal | “To prevail on a § 1983 false arrest claim, [a plaintiff] must show that the arresting officers did not have probable cause to arrest him.” (cleaned up) | “There is no freestanding right under the Constitution to be free from malicious prosecution.” | “[T]o state a claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege . . . that he was treated differently than persons similarly situated to him . . . .” | discussing Franks as an exception to the independent intermediary doctrine
Citator
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- 26 opinions
Case: 20-20295 Document: 00515782144 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/16/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 16, 2021
No. 20-20295
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Reginald Anokwuru,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
City of Houston; Officer M.R. Francis,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CV-2209
Before Stewart, Higginson, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge:
Reginald Anokwuru appeals the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims, which stem from his arrest in
October 2017. He primarily alleges that Officer M.R. Francis arrested him
without probable cause, maliciously prosecuted him, and racially
discriminated against him. He also contends that the City of Houston is liable
for failing adequately to train its police officers. The district court dismissed
Anokwuru’s claims. We AFFIRM.
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I.
A.
In June 2017, the Houston Police Department (HPD) and Officer
Francis investigated an alleged “gang rape,” involving one adult female
victim and three adult males of Nigerian or African descent. During an
interview, the victim recounted that she was engaged in consensual conduct
with “Idris” when two other men, “Jay” and “CheChe,” entered the room
and raped her while Idris watched.
A month into the investigation, Adeolu Thompson-John, who is also
known as “Jay,” provided a statement to Officer Francis, asserting that he
and his friends, Idris and “Chidera,” engaged in consensual sex with the
victim. Relying on Jay’s statement, Officer Francis suspected that
Anokwuru, whose nickname is “Chidera,” was the man the victim identified
as “CheChe.”
Officer Francis thereafter contacted Anokwuru. According to
Anokwuru, Officer Francis asked for information about Jay and Idris,
“accus[ed] him, underhandly, of raping the complainant,” and demanded
that he submit to a formal interview. Anokwuru responded that he did not
know Jay or Idris and declined any further interview.
In time, HPD and Officer Francis decided to prosecute Anokwuru
based on the victim’s and Jay’s statements. In September, a grand jury
indicted Anokwuru of one count of aggravated sexual assault of an adult.
Magistrate Judge Blanca Villa Gomez then issued a warrant to arrest and
detain Anokwuru. HPD officers executed the warrant, and Anokwuru was
arrested on October 14, 2017. He appeared before a magistrate judge that day
who found probable cause for further detention and set bond at $30,000.
Anokwuru bonded out of jail the next day.
Following Anokwuru’s indictment, the Harris County District
Attorney’s Office presented pictures of Anokwuru to the victim. After
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viewing the pictures, the victim definitively responded that Anokwuru was
not one of her three assailants. As a result, the district attorney’s office
“promptly dismissed” the case against Anokwuru, noting: “No probable
cause exists at this time to believe [Anokwuru] committed the offense[.]”
B.
On June 19, 2019, Anokwuru filed a civil-rights action against the City
of Houston and HPD, asserting claims for false arrest and malicious
prosecution under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and Texas state law. Anokwuru alleged that he was wrongfully arrested based on the similarity of his name “to the real suspect” and HPD’s failure to use a “simple line-up procedure” before his arrest. He sought $1,000,000 in actual damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. The City and HPD responded by filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Anokwuru’s complaint. They argued that (1) HPD was not a proper party; (2) governmental immunity protected the City from Anokwuru’s state-law tort claims; (3) Anokwuru failed to provide timely notice of the state-law tort claims; and (4) Anokwuru’s § 1983 claims against the City were barred under Monell v. Department of Social Services,436 U.S. 658
(1978). On the heels of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Anokwuru
moved for leave to amend his original complaint, which the magistrate judge
granted.
Anokwuru filed his first amended complaint in September 2019. He
added factual allegations concerning the alleged “gang rape” and some
cursory allegations related to the defendants’ policies and policymakers. He
dismissed his state-law claims but maintained claims under § 1983 that his
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights—to be free from false arrest and
malicious prosecution—had been violated. Finally, he asserted an alternative
theory of municipal liability, that the City had a policy of “failing to train,
supervise, and discipline its employees” that likewise violated § 1983.
Anokwuru’s amended pleading prompted the City and HPD to file a
second Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. This second motion largely recited
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the arguments for dismissal set forth in their first motion, except the City also
challenged Anokwuru’s assertion that it violated § 1983 by failing to train its
police officers concerning the proper use of lineups.
The parties convened at a scheduling conference on October 17, 2019.
There, Anokwuru orally moved to amend his complaint again. The
magistrate judge granted the motion and set a one-week deadline, with the
understanding that Anokwuru would drop HPD as a defendant, add
individual officers who were involved in the arrest, and respond to the City
and HPD’s second motion to dismiss.
Instead of filing a second amended complaint on the due date,
Anokwuru filed an opposed “Second Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint” and attached his proposed complaint to the motion. This
version of the complaint did not drop HPD but named six additional
defendants: Officers Francis, Orellana, LaFountain, and Lundy, HPD Chief
of Police Art Acevedo, and Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner. Other than
adding these defendants, however, the putative second amended complaint
mirrored his first amended complaint. Anokwuru then filed a response to the
City and HPD’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss his first amended complaint.
The parties met again at a status conference on February 4, 2020.
Because Anokwuru’s proposed second amended complaint lacked details
concerning the individual officers’ actions that had been promised at the last
conference, the magistrate judge reversed her previous ruling and denied
Anokwuru’s motion for leave to file the second amended complaint. The
magistrate judge observed: “[I]f you want to pursue any claim against the
individuals, you’re going to have to do better than this, . . . [y]ou can’t just
lump everyone together[.]” The magistrate judge then “un-moot[ed]” the
City and the HPD’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint, which
both parties had by then fully briefed.
Before the court ruled on the defendants’ dispositive motion,
Anokwuru moved for a third time for leave to amend. In the newest version
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of his pleading, Anokwuru alleged claims against only two defendants: the
City and Officer Francis. The claims remained the same for the most part,
but Anokwuru added factual allegations concerning Officer Francis’s actions
and the City’s municipal policies and practices. Anokwuru also asserted that
the City and Officer Francis “fail[ed] to meaningfully investigate [the] sexual
assault” and that Officer Francis “put together an arrest warrant and had
other officers arrest [Anokwuru] without probable cause.” In the fact section
of his proposed third amended complaint, Anokwuru also alleged a violation
of his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The City opposed Anokwuru’s third motion for leave to amend. On
behalf of itself and Officer Francis, the City argued that further amendment
of Anokwuru’s complaint would be futile and incorporated the arguments it
made in its (still-pending) Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the first amended
complaint. The City also asserted that Officer Francis was protected from
suit by qualified immunity. Anokwuru did not file a reply.
The magistrate judge issued a Memorandum and Recommendation
that addressed both Anokwuru’s third motion for leave to amend and the
City’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. In short, the
magistrate judge granted Anokwuru leave to amend, allowing Anokwuru’s
third amended complaint to serve as the operative complaint. But the
magistrate judge also recommended granting the City’s pending motion to
dismiss and dismissing all claims against the City and Officer Francis.
Responding to the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss all
his claims, Anokwuru filed objections in the district court and moved to
amend his complaint for a fourth time. On June 4, 2020, the district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation, denied
further leave to amend, and entered final judgment dismissing all claims.
This appeal followed.
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II.
Anokwuru asserts three issues on appeal: (A) whether the district
court erred by dismissing his constitutional claims; (B) whether the district
court erred by denying his last motion for leave to amend; and (C) whether
the district court erred in its sua sponte dismissal of his claims against Officer
Francis. We address each issue in turn.
A.
This court reviews the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de
novo. Budhathoki v. Nielsen, 898 F.3d 504, 507
(5th Cir. 2018). We accept all well-pled facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. Heinze v. Tesco Corp.,971 F.3d 475, 479
(5th Cir. 2020). But we do not accept as true legal conclusions, conclusory statements, or “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 557
(2007)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,550 U.S. at 555
.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983
provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]
“To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
, a plaintiff must plead two—and only two—allegations.” Arnold v. Williams,979 F.3d 262, 266
(5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). “First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right.”Id.
“Second, he must allege that the
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person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or
territorial law.” Id.
Anokwuru argues on appeal that he plausibly pled four distinct
constitutional violations under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments:
(1) false arrest; (2) malicious prosecution; (3) equal protection; and (4)
failure to train. The City disagrees and contends that Anokwuru failed to
allege sufficient facts that could establish any constitutional violation, such
that the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim was proper. We
examine each claim seriatim.
1. False Arrest
Anokwuru first asserts that the district court erred by dismissing his
false arrest claim. He contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated because he was arrested without probable cause. Aligning with the
district court’s decision, the City counters that the arrest was reasonable and
established no constitutional violation. We agree with the City.
To prevail on a § 1983 false arrest claim, Anokwuru must show “that
[the arresting officers] did not have probable cause to arrest him.” Haggerty
v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655
(5th Cir. 2004); see also Brown v. Lyford,243 F.3d 185, 189
(5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The constitutional tort of false arrest . . . require[s] a showing of no probable cause.”). Moreover “if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party.” Deville v. Marcantel,567 F.3d 156, 170
(5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Shields v. Twiss,389 F.3d 142, 150
(5th
Cir. 2004).
The district court determined that because a grand jury had indicted
Anokwuru before he was arrested, the chain of causation for the alleged false
arrest was broken, insulating Officer Francis, and the City, from liability.
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Indeed, Anokwuru’s third amended complaint affirmatively states that he
was indicted by a grand jury. The indictment is also contained in the record
as an exhibit to the City’s operative motion to dismiss. See Walker v.
Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735
(5th Cir. 2019) (citation
omitted) (“When a defendant attaches documents to its motion that are
referred to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claims, the court
may also properly consider those documents.”).
But sometimes there is more to the analysis; the independent-
intermediary doctrine is not absolute. An officer can still be liable if the
officer “deliberately or recklessly provides false, material information for use
in an affidavit” or “makes knowing and intentional omissions that result in a
warrant being issued without probable cause.” Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 264
(5th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (emphasis omitted) (discussing Franks v. Delaware,438 U.S. 154
(1978)); see also Hart v. O’Brien,127 F.3d 424, 434
(5th Cir. 1997) (applying Franks to § 1983 claims), abrogated on other grounds by Kalina v. Fletcher,522 U.S. 118
(1997).
Anokwuru appears to argue that we should reverse the district court’s
dismissal, based on Franks. Specifically, he asserts the district court failed to
address whether he sufficiently pled allegations demonstrating Officer
Francis’s reckless failure to disclose material facts to the grand jury and the
magistrate judge. See Melton, 875 F.3d at 264
. We acknowledge Anokwuru’s
point. The district court, adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation,
concluded: “[Anokwuru] failed to allege that Officer Francis knowingly or
intentionally made any false statement in procuring the warrant, and nothing
in the complaint suggests that Officer Francis falsified any information.”
Absent is any discussion regarding any reckless conduct on the part of Officer
Francis. Nevertheless, Anokwuru’s claim still fails.
In his third amended complaint, Anokwuru alleges that “Officer M.
R. Francis put together an arrest warrant and had other officers arrest
[Anokwuru] without probable cause.” He further alleges that this action was
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intentional. At essence, Anokwuru accuses Officer Francis of pursuing a lead
without probable cause. But Anokwuru fails to allege anything akin to a
specific allegation that Officer Francis “deliberately or recklessly” provided
false information to either the grand jury or magistrate judge. To the extent
Anokwuru’s allegations suggest that Officer Francis withheld information,
we find that these allegations likewise do not rise “above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
. Therefore, the district court did not err by
dismissing Anokwuru’s false arrest claim.
2. Malicious Prosecution
Anokwuru’s malicious prosecution claim can readily be resolved. To
begin, it appears Anokwuru abandons this claim on appeal. In the only
notable mention of this claim in his briefing, he describes the district court’s
holding: “As to Anokwuru’s malicious prosecution claim, Judge Johnson
held that [the] Fifth Circuit did not recognize an independent claim for
malicious prosecution outside of any violations of a defendant’s
constitutional rights.”
This is an accurate statement of the law. There is no freestanding
right under the Constitution to be free from malicious prosecution. Morgan
v. Chapman, 969 F.3d 238
, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Castellano v. Fragozo,352 F.3d 939, 953
(5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[C]ausing charges to
be filed without probable cause will not without more violate the
Constitution. So defined, the assertion of malicious prosecution states no
constitutional claim.”). Therefore, to the extent that Anokwuru does not
concede the issue, the district court properly dismissed this claim as a matter
of law.
3. Equal Protection
Anokwuru also asserts that the district court erred by dismissing his
§ 1983 equal protection claim. He contends that the district court
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impermissibly weighed the evidence in granting the City’s Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. We disagree and affirm the district court’s dismissal.
“The Equal Protection Clause directs that persons similarly situated
should be treated alike.” Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 705
(5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). More specifically, to state a claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege two things. First, he must allege that he was treated differently than persons similarly situated to him; second, he must allege that such treatment stemmed from discriminatory intent. Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist.,804 F.3d 398, 412
(5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “To establish discriminatory intent, a plaintiff must show that the decision maker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected his course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effect on an identifiable group.”Id.
(cleaned up).
Anokwuru’s third amended complaint fails on both counts. In the
operative complaint, Anokwuru alleges that Officer Francis bore “some
unplaced, ill-will against” him. Additionally, he asserts that he was charged
“almost solely” because of his “ethnic or ethnic-sounding nickname.” But
Anokwuru fails to allege that he was treated differently than a person who is
similarly situated. Id.
He likewise fails to allege that his treatment emanated from discriminatory intent. See id.; cf. Crain v. City of Selma,952 F.3d 634, 642
(5th Cir. 2020) (finding the same in the summary judgment context).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim.
4. Failure to Train
Anokwuru’s final claim centers on the City’s alleged liability for its
failure to train its officers. Even though the magistrate judge did not address
Anokwuru’s failure-to-train claim, the district court nonetheless dismissed
it. The court grounded its decision on its conclusion that Anokwuru failed to
allege any violation of a constitutional right for which the City could be liable.
We find the dismissal was proper.
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Generally, to prove municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must
prove three elements: a policymaker; an official policy or custom; and a
violation of constitutional rights whose moving force is the policy or custom.
See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578
(5th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell,436 U.S. at 694
). “A municipality’s failure to train its police officers can without question give rise to § 1983 liability.” World Wide St. Preachers Fellowship v. Town of Columbia,591 F.3d 747, 756
(5th Cir. 2009). To state a cognizable failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff has to plead facts plausibly demonstrating that: (1) the municipality’s training procedures were inadequate, (2) the municipality was deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy, and (3) the inadequate training policy directly caused the violations in question.Id.
Anokwuru’s third amended complaint again misses the mark. The complaint baldly alleges that the City failed to train Officer Francis; that Officer Francis failed to conduct a lineup procedure; and that these failures amounted to a deliberate indifference to Anokwuru’s constitutional rights. Even resolving all questions of fact and any ambiguity in controlling law in Anokwuru’s favor, see Lewis v. Fresne,252 F.3d 352, 357
(5th Cir. 2001), “[i]n order for ‘liability to attach based on an “inadequate training” claim, a plaintiff must allege with specificity how a particular training program is defective.’” Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls,614 F.3d 161, 170
(5th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d at 287, 293 (5th Cir. 2005)).
Indeed, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the municipality was
deliberately indifferent to the need for proper training. World Wide St.
Preachers Fellowship, 591 F.3d at 756
. A plaintiff may do so by alleging that the municipality had “[n]otice of a pattern of similar violations,” which were “fairly similar to what ultimately transpired.” Sanders–Burns v. City of Plano,594 F.3d 366, 381
(5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). But in this case, Anokwuru points only to his own incident as proof of a policy of deliberate indifference. Cf. Bennett v. City of Slidell,728 F.2d 762
, 768 n.3 (5th Cir.
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1984) (citations omitted) (noting that “[i]solated violations are not the
persistent, often repeated, constant violations that constitute custom and
policy”). Granted, in certain limited cases, a plaintiff “may establish
deliberate indifference” through “a single incident.” Burge v. St. Tammany
Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 372
(5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). But Anokwuru’s allegations do not pass muster under this narrow exception because the single-incident exception is generally reserved for those egregious cases in which the state actor was provided no training whatsoever. See Peña v. City of Rio Grande City,879 F.3d 613, 624
(5th Cir. 2018). In sum, Anokwuru has
not plausibly alleged that the City’s training practices were inadequate or that
the City was deliberately indifferent to Anokwuru’s rights. We therefore
affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim.
B.
Turning to his procedural arguments, Anokwuru first asserts the
district court erred by denying his fourth request to amend his complaint.
Under Rule 15, “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course
. . . 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b)[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)(B). If not amended within 21 days, “a party may amend its pleading
only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of
discretion. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 356
.
“Although Rule 15(a) requires the district court to grant leave to
amend freely, leave to amend is in no way automatic.” Body by Cook, Inc. v.
State Farm Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 391
(5th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). “The district court is entrusted with the discretion to grant or deny a motion to amend and may consider a variety of factors including undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party . . . , and futility of the amendment.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,751 F.3d 368, 378
(5th Cir. 2014).
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Anokwuru contends that he did not act with undue delay, bad faith, or
dilatory motive when he moved for leave to amend for a fourth time. That
may well be, but “[d]enying a motion to amend is not an abuse of discretion
if allowing an amendment would be futile.” Marucci, 751 F.3d at 378
. And
we fail to see how Anokwuru’s proposed fourth amended complaint was not
futile. He presented no new factual allegations or additional claims. To the
contrary, the fact section of the fourth amended complaint is an identical
recital of that in his third amended complaint. The only variance between
the two pleadings is the addition of a few immaterial paragraphs in support of
his false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.
Beyond that, Anokwuru was afforded repeated opportunities to cure
the deficiencies in his pleadings. This instance marked his fifth attempt to
assert viable claims. See Heinze, 971 F.3d at 485
. Plainly, Anokwuru thus had every opportunity fully to plead his best case by the time he was granted leave to file his third amended complaint. Brewster v. Dretke,587 F.3d 764, 768
(5th
Cir. 2009). We are therefore satisfied that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying his fourth request for leave to amend.
C.
Finally, Anokwuru asserts that the district court erred by dismissing
sua sponte his constitutional claims against Officer Francis. We review the
dismissal de novo. Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 1173
(5th Cir.
2006).
A district court may dismiss sua sponte a complaint for failure to state
a claim “as long as the procedure employed is fair.” Davoodi v. Austin Indep.
Sch. Dist., 755 F.3d 307, 310
(5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, “fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond.”Id.
(citing Lozano v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB,489 F.3d 636, 643
(5th Cir. 2007)). At times, we will uphold a dismissal sua sponte without requiring notice, “as long as the plaintiff has alleged his best case.” Lozano,489 F.3d at 643
(internal
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quotation marks and citation omitted). We have reasoned that “[a]t some
point a court must decide that a plaintiff has had fair opportunity to make his
best case[, and] if, after that time, a cause of action has not been established,
the court should finally dismiss the suit.” Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792
(5th Cir. 1986).
Anokwuru relies on a single case, Davoodi, for the proposition that his
claims against Officer Francis were unfairly dismissed. In that case, the
plaintiff sued his former employer in state court, asserting claims of
discrimination, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Davoodi, 755 F.3d at 308
. Following removal, the defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss, seeking to dismiss all claims but one.Id. at 309
. The district court granted the defendant’s partial motion to dismiss and then dismissed sua sponte the plaintiff’s remaining claim.Id.
On those facts, we reversed the district court’s dismissal because the plaintiff “had no notice or opportunity to be heard before the district court issued its order of dismissal.”Id. at 310
.
Davoodi is easily distinguishable. Here, Anokwuru received both
notice and ample opportunity to respond prior to the district court’s
dismissal of his claims. Over the course of this action, the City filed a series
of dispositive motions and supporting memoranda, and it similarly opposed
Anokwuru’s serial motions for leave to amend his complaint. Anokwuru
responded to the City’s motions, either through responsive briefing or by
moving for leave to amend his complaint (which led to thorough briefing by
the parties as well). While we recognize that Officer Francis was not formally
added as a party to the suit until the third amended complaint, we find this
motions practice significant because the gravamen of Anokwuru’s complaint
remained the same throughout the litigation. Further, before the district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, which included
dismissal of the claims against Officer Francis, Anokwuru timely filed
objections to those recommendations. In those objections, Anokwuru
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acknowledged that the court was considering dismissal of all of his claims.
Therefore, it is undisputed Anokwuru received notice and the opportunity to
oppose dismissal of these claims, and the district court undoubtedly had the
benefit of the parties’ arguments pro and con before the court entered final
judgment. See Lozano, 489 F.3d at 641
.
But even if Anokwuru had not received notice of the district court’s
intention to dismiss his claims against Officer Francis, the dismissal would
nevertheless stand because Anokwuru had a fair opportunity to plead his best
case before the dismissal. See Jacquez, 801 F.2d at 792
. In a similar (though nonprecedential) case, we upheld a district court’s dismissal sua sponte of the claims at issue after observing that the plaintiff had been given four opportunities to correct the deficiencies in the complaint. Real Est. Innovations, Inc. v. Hous. Ass’n of Realtors, Inc.,422 F. App’x 344, 352
(5th
Cir. 2011). Here, Anokwuru was also given four opportunities to plead his
case: the original complaint (filed June 19, 2019); first amended complaint
(filed September 30, 2019); proposed second amended complaint (filed with
a motion for leave to amend October 24, 2019); and his third amended
complaint (filed March 5, 2020). Accordingly, the district court did not err
in denying his fifth attempt to plead his claims and then dismissing the
operative third amended complaint in its entirety.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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