Russell C. Baker v. Howard N. Lyles, Warden Lawrence Carpenter, Security Chief Major Thompson, Acting Security Chief Lt. Elijah Thomas

Acting on information received, I conducted an investigation in an effort to locate some of the escape tools that wasPage 927[sic], and still is [sic], suspected of being in this institution.

During my inquiries, I received information from avery reliable sourcethat Inmate Russell Baker # 161861 had knowledge of the whereabuts [sic] on some of the tools which had been used. My sources assured me that they could obtain the tools if given the opportunity to be able to talk to the Chief of Security. I did tell the source that I could make certain that they were given the chance to speak with the Chief of Security. (Emphasis Added).

At approximately 2:30 p.m., August 31, 1985, I was given one (1) hacksaw carbine blade and one (1) jewelers string by one of the persons previously mentioned. I asked him where did he get these items from and he stated that he got them from Inmate Russell Baker (see attached statement).¹

This request for administrative segregation placement pertains to the above captioned inmates, who were found guilty by the institution's Adjustment Team, given extensive segregation sentence for their involvement and/or participation in an escape attempt from this institution. However, on August 29, 1985, I learned that several inmates were planning a mass escape attempt from the institution, by way of an exhaust fan, located in this institution's Chapel, by sawing several grill gate bars. When a search was conducted of the Chapel on August 29, 1985, several bars were found cut; which created a large hole in the grill gate of the Chapel, enabling a person(s) to crawl through to gain access to a [sic] exhaust fan on the wall, leading out into the street.

Afterwards, a further check of the Chapel area was made. The wall exhaust fan, inside of it, had been tampered with, the bolts and fan belt was [sic] removed; indicating that an escape attempt was in fact in progress. During my investigation into this instant matter, the above captioned inmates were either identified as having knowledge of and/or participated in planning the escape attempt. Also, if the plan was successful, they were actually planning to escape.

Each of the above inmates' base files were reviewed and indicated that since their incarceration in the Division of Correction, they have incurred a number of serious infractions, which their base files will disclose.

Based on the above information, I have reasons to believe that the above inmates are escape risks and are a danger to the security of this institution. Therefore, please make immediate arrangements to evaluate them for assignment to administrative segregation; and if approved, assigned to that status at the completion of their present segregation sentences.

Although the Commission respects confidentiality of informants within a prison environment, the institution should show credibility of a "phantom witness". In this case the "phantom witness's" testimony was not properly documented by the Hearing Officer and the testimony should be purged.

There are means to apprise the prosecutor of evidence acceptable for conviction without revealing the source, but in fairness to the defendant this must be done.

There was no documentation on file for review from this adjustment hearing. There was no attempt to determine the reliability of the "phantom witness".

is not graven in stone. As the nature of the prison disciplinary process changes in future years, circumstances may then exist which will require further consideration and reflection of this Court. It is our view, however, that the procedures we have now required in prison disciplinary proceedings represent a reasonablePage 930accommodation between the interests of the inmates and the needs of the institution.

We have repeatedly said both that prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage and that lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interest. As to the first point, we have recognized that broad discretionary authority is necessary because the administration of a prison is "at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking,"Wolff v. McDonnell,[418 U.S. at 566,94 S.Ct. at 2979], and have concluded that "to hold . . . thatanysubstantial deprivation imposed by prison authorities triggers the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts."Meachum v. Fano,[427 U.S. 215,225,96 S.Ct. 2532,2538,49 L.Ed.2d 451(1976) (emphasis in original)]. As to the second point, our decisions have consistently refused to recognize more than the most basic liberty interest in prisoners. "Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system."Price v. Johnston,334 U.S. 266,285[68 S.Ct. 1049,1060,92 L.Ed. 1356] (1948). Thus, there is no "constitutional or inherent right" to parole,Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates,442 U.S. 1,7[99 S.Ct. 2100,2104,60 L.Ed.2d 668] (1979), and "the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison,"Wolff v. McDonnell,[418 U.S. at 557,94 S.Ct. at 2975], despite the undoubted impact of such credits on the freedom of inmates. Finally, inMeachum v. Fano,[427 U.S. at 225,96 S.Ct. at 2538], the transfer of a prisoner from one institution to another was found unprotected by "the Due Process Clause in and of itself," even though the change of facilities involved a significant modification in conditions of confinement, later characterized by the Court as a "grievous loss."Moody v. Daggett,429 U.S. 78,88n. 9 [97 S.Ct. 274,279n. 9,50 L.Ed.2d 236] (1976). As we have held previously, these decisions require that "[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight."Montanyev. Haymes,427 U.S. 236,242[96 S.Ct. 2543,2547,49 L.Ed.2d 466] (1976).See also Vitek v. Jones,445 U.S. 480,493[100 S.Ct. 1254,1264,63 L.Ed.2d 552] (1980).

It is plain that the transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictivePage 931quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence. The phrase "administrative segregation," as used by the state authorities here, appears to be something of a catchall: it may be used to protect the prisoner's safety, to protect other inmates from a particular prisoner, to break up potentially disruptive groups of inmates, or simply to await later classification or transfer. [Statute omitted.] Accordingly, administrative segregation is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration. This conclusion finds ample support in our decisions regarding parole and good-time credits. Both these subjects involve release from institutional life altogether, which is a far more significant change in a prisoner's freedoms than that at issue here, yet inGreenholtzandWolffwe held that neither situation involved an interest independently protected by the Due Process Clause. These decisions compel an identical result here.

The requirements of due process are flexible and depend on a balancing of the interests affected by the relevant government action.E.g., CafeteriaWorkers v. McElroy,367 U.S. 886,895[81 S.Ct. 1743,1748,6 L.Ed.2d 1230] (1961). Where a prisoner has a liberty interest in good time credits, the loss of such credits threatens his prospective freedom from confinement by extending the length of imprisonment. Thus the inmate has a strong interest in assuring that the loss of good time credits is not imposed arbitrarily.[Wolff,]418 U.S., at 561[94 S.Ct. at 2977]. This interest, however, must be accommodated in the distinctive setting of a prison, where disciplinary proceedings "take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so."Ibid.Consequently, in identifying the safeguards required by due process, the Court has recognized the legitimate institutionalPage 932needs of assuring the safety of inmates and prisoners, avoiding burdensome administrative requirements that might be susceptible to manipulation, and preserving the disciplinary process as a means of rehabilitation. See,e.g., Ponte v.Real,471 U.S. 491[105 S.Ct. 2192,85 L.Ed.2d 553] (1985);Baxter v. Palmigiano,425 U.S. 308,321-322[96 S.Ct. 1551,1559-60,47 L.Ed.2d 810] (1976);Wolff v. McDonnell,[418 U.S.] at 562-563 [94 S.Ct. at 2977-78].

Requiring a modicum of evidence to support a decision to revoke good time credits will help to prevent arbitrary deprivations without threatening institutional interests or imposing undue administrative burdens. In a variety of contexts, the Court has recognized that a governmental decision resulting in the loss of an important liberty interest violates due process if the decision is not supported by any evidence. See,e.g., Douglas v.Buder,412 U.S. 430,432[93 S.Ct. 2199,2200,37 L.Ed.2d 52] (1973) (per curiam) (revocation of probation);Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,353 U.S. 232,239[77 S.Ct. 752,756,1 L.Ed.2d 796] (1957) (denial of admission to bar);United Statesex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration,273 U.S. 103,106[47 S.Ct. 302,303,71 L.Ed. 560] (1927) (deportation). Because the written statement mandated byWolffrequires a disciplinary board to explain the evidence relied upon, recognizing that due process requires some evidentiary basis for a decision to revoke good time credits will not impose significant new burdens on proceedings within the prison. Nor does it imply that a disciplinary board's factual findings or decisions with respect to appropriate punishment are subject to second-guessing upon review.

We hold that the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time credits. This standard is met if "there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. . . ."United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner ofImmigration,273 U.S., at 106[47 S.Ct. at 304]. Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.

We think an informal, nonadversary evidentiary review is sufficient both for the decision that an inmate represents a security threat and the decision to confine an inmate to administrative segregation pending completion of an investigation into misconduct charges against him. An inmate must merely receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation. Ordinarily a written statement by the inmate will accomplish this purpose, although prison administrators may find it more useful to permit oral presentations in cases where they believe a written statement would be ineffective. So long as this occurs, and the decisionmaker reviews the charges and then-available evidence against the prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied. This informal procedure permits a reasonably accurate assessment of probable cause to believe that misconduct occurred, and the "value [of additional `formalities and safeguards'] would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of constitutional principle[,] that they must be adopted,Gerstein v. Pugh,[420 U.S. 103,122,95 S.Ct. 854,867,43 L.Ed.2d 54] (1975)]."