Larone Elijah v. Richard Dunbar

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                                               PUBLISHED

                                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT


                                               No. 21-7352


        LARONE F. ELIJAH,

                             Petitioner - Appellant,

                      v.

        RICHARD S. DUNBAR, Warden,

                             Respondent - Appellee.



        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Beaufort.
        Joseph Dawson, III, District Judge. (9:20-cv-03040-JD)


        Argued: March 9, 2023                                              Decided: April 21, 2023


        Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WYNN, Circuit Judge, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.


        Vacated and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote
        the opinion, in which Judge Wynn and Judge Floyd joined.


        ARGUED: Sophia E. Evans, Holl M. Chaisson, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL
        OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Andrew Robert de Holl, OFFICE OF
        THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON
        BRIEF: J. Scott Ballenger, Catherine E. Stetson, Appellate Litigation Clinic,
        UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for
        Appellant. Adair F. Boroughs, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
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        GREGORY, Chief Judge:

               This appeal stems from the district court’s dismissal of Larone F. Elijah’s (“Elijah”)

        petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2241

. An incarcerated person at

        Federal Correctional Institution Williamsburg, Elijah alleged that the Bureau of Prisons

        had miscalculated his release date by not retroactively applying the First Step Act to his

        previous sentence and crediting the resulting good conduct time to his release date. After

        the Warden moved for summary judgment, a magistrate judge issued a report and

        recommendation (“R&R”) concluding that Elijah’s petition should be dismissed. Elijah

        objected to the recommendation in detail; nonetheless, the district court did not review the

        R&R de novo because Elijah had only “reargue[d] his case.” J.A. 137. After reviewing

        for clear error, the district court adopted the R&R and dismissed Elijah’s petition.

               On appeal, Elijah first submits—and the Warden concedes—that the district court

        erred by failing to review the R&R de novo. Elijah further requests that we proceed to the

        merits of his habeas petition and consider the retroactive applicability of the First Step Act.

        Finally, Elijah asks this Court to recall its previous mandate dismissing his 2015 appeal of

        his revocation sentence.

               We agree with Elijah that his grounds for objection were clear and thus should have

        prompted a de novo review of the magistrate’s R&R. Because the district court only

        reviewed the R&R for clear error, we vacate and remand with directions to review Elijah’s

        grounds for objection de novo. We decline, however, to consider the merits of Elijah’s

        petition or recall our previous mandate.



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                                                      I.

               On October 25, 2007, Elijah pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute

        eight grams of cocaine base in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 841

(a)(1). Because his § 841(a)(1)

        conviction qualified him as a Class B felon under 

18 U.S.C. § 3559

, Elijah was sentenced

        to 108 months’ imprisonment. In May of 2014, Elijah completed his custodial sentence,

        and began a five-year term of supervised release.

               On July 11, 2015, Elijah was arrested by federal authorities for possession with

        intent to distribute methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin in violation of his supervised

        release terms, which the district court subsequently revoked. Notably, since his sentencing,

        Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 

Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124

 Stat. 2372,

        2372, which demoted Elijah’s original 2007 charge from a class B to a class C felony. 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841

(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (creating sentencing scheme for drug possession); 

18 U.S.C. § 3559

 (classifying felonies). Nevertheless, the district court sentenced Elijah as a class B

        felon under § 3583(e)(3) and imposed a thirty-six-month revocation sentence.

               In November of 2015, Elijah appealed his revocation sentence to this Court, arguing,

        in part, that the district court should have treated him as a class C felon under presently

        controlling law. However, the appeal came two months after the filing deadline, and in a

        sealed order, was dismissed as untimely.

               Two years into his revocation sentence, in March of 2017, Elijah pleaded guilty to

        possession with intent to distribute based on the facts of his 2015 arrest, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841

(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C). He was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment to run

        consecutively with his revocation sentence, followed by three years’ supervised release.

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               In 2019, while Elijah was serving his second possession sentence following the

        completion of his revocation sentence, the First Step Act of 2018, 

Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132

 Stat. 5194, amended 

18 U.S.C. § 3624

 to increase the maximum good conduct time

        (“GCT”) available to prisoners from forty-seven to fifty-four days per year of their imposed

        sentence.   Pursuant to this amendment, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) credited an

        additional seven days of GCT for each year of Elijah’s revocation sentence and his second

        possession sentence towards his release date. In October of 2019, Elijah filed a request

        with the BOP asking that it retroactively apply the First Step Act’s expansion to his original

        possession sentence, which would give him an additional sixty-three days towards his

        release date. 1   The Administrator of National Inmate Appeals denied Elijah’s BOP

        complaint in July of 2020, exhausting the administrative remedies available to Elijah.

               Proceeding pro se, Elijah filed a 

28 U.S.C. § 2241

 petition for writ of habeas corpus.

        In his petition, he argued (1) his supervised release constituted “official detention,” and

        thus should be credited towards his release date; (2) the BOP erred by not retroactively

        applying the First Step Act to his original possession sentence; and (3) the Supreme Court

        had invalidated 

18 U.S.C. § 3583

(e)(3) in United States v. Haymond, 

139 S. Ct. 2369

        (2019). 2 The Warden moved for summary judgment. Elijah filed a response, wherein he

        expanded on his original arguments.


               1
                Elijah additionally argued that his supervised release should qualify as “official
        detention time,” and be credited towards his sentence. J.A. 28.
               2
                 In Haymond, the Supreme Court held that 

18 U.S.C. § 3583

(k) was
        unconstitutional because it “closely resemble[d] the punishment of new criminal offenses,
        (Continued)
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               On July 29, 2021, a magistrate judge issued an R&R concluding that the petition

        should be summarily dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

        Elijah filed a timely objection, again advancing his three claims in the same manner as

        before but developing his arguments with new case law and discussion.

               The district court found that because Elijah was attempting to “reargue his case,”

        his objection was “nonspecific.” J.A. 137. The court thereby applied clear error review,

        concluded that the magistrate did not clearly err in her analysis, and adopted the

        magistrate’s recommendation to dismiss Elijah’s petition. Elijah appealed that dismissal

        to this Court.



                                                     II.

               Elijah first argues that because his objection clearly identified the grounds on which

        he disagreed with the magistrate’s R&R, the district court should have reviewed the

        grounds of his objection de novo. The Warden concedes this point, and we agree.

                                                     A.

               The Federal Magistrates Act (“FMA”) allows district courts to delegate pretrial

        matters to a magistrate judge, who then issues a recommendation as to how to resolve those

        matters. 

28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(A). In response to a recommendation, “any party may

        serve and file written objections” whereupon “[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo


        but without granting a defendant the rights, including the jury right, that attend a new
        criminal prosecution.” Haymond, 

139 S. Ct. at 2386

 (Breyer, J., concurring) (plurality
        opinion). Section 3583(e) sets out how a court may modify a sentence after revoking
        supervised release.
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        determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

        recommendations to which objection is made.” 

Id.

 § 636(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added). See

        also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine de novo any part of the

        magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.”). Further, magistrate

        recommendations are merely proposals, and hold no presumptive weight. Mathews v.

        Weber, 

423 U.S. 261

, 270–71 (1976).

               The authority of magistrate judges is narrowly limited by Article III; in fact, the

        constitutionality of the FMA sits precariously on the requirement that “ultimate

        decision[s]” be made solely by the district court, not the magistrate. United States v.

        George, 

971 F.2d 1113, 1118

 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 

447 U.S. 667, 683

 (1980)). Magistrate judges were not intended to replace Article III judges, but to

        increase the efficiency of the court by providing a neutral “preliminary evaluation” for the

        judge’s consideration. Mathews, 

423 U.S. at 271

.

               Mandatory de novo review of litigants’ objections protects the FMA’s otherwise

        precarious position and “advances Congress’s intent that district judges bear ‘primary

        responsibility for supervision of federal magistrates’ functions.’” United States v. De

        Leon-Ramirez, 

925 F.3d 177, 181

 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Schronce, 

727 F.2d 91, 94

 (4th Cir. 1984)). Thus, such review may only be foregone when the parties do

        not object to the magistrate’s recommendation. See, e.g., Diamond v. Colonial Life &

        Accident Co., 

416 F.3d 310, 315

 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory

        committee’s note to 1983 addition).



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               To trigger de novo review, an objecting party “must object to the finding or

        recommendation on that issue with sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district

        court of the true ground for the objection.” United States v. Midgette, 

478 F.3d 616, 622

        (4th Cir. 2007). “Just as a complaint stating only ‘I complain’ states no claim, an objection

        stating only ‘I object’ preserves no issue for review.” Lockert v. Faulkner, 

843 F.2d 1015, 1019

 (7th Cir. 1988). District courts are not expected to relitigate entire cases to determine

        the basis of a litigant’s objection. See Midgette, 

478 F.3d at 622

. If a litigant objects only

        generally, the district court reviews the magistrate’s recommendation for clear error only.

        See, e.g., Diamond, 

416 F.3d at 315

.

               Importantly, objections need not be novel to be sufficiently specific. 3 In Martin v.

        Duffy, 

858 F.3d 239

, 245–46 (4th Cir. 2017), this Court exemplified the specificity analysis

        by looking solely to whether the grounds for objection were clear. There, an objection

        which merely “restated all of [the] claims” was sufficiently specific because it “alerted the

        district court that [the litigant] believed the magistrate judge erred in recommending

        dismissal of those claims.” 

Id. at 246

. 4 If the grounds for objection are clear, district court

        judges must consider them de novo, or else run afoul of both § 636(b)(1) and Article III.


               3
                 Aside from needlessly curtailing litigants’ access to an Article III judge, such a
        requirement could leave litigants with no available arguments, as district court judges are
        not required to consider new arguments posed in objections to the magistrate’s
        recommendation. Samples v. Ballard, 

860 F.3d 266, 275

 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing United
        States v. George, 

971 F.2d 1113, 1118

 (4th Cir. 1992)).
               4
                Despite the intervening and binding rule of Martin, many district courts have
        continued to rely on Abou-Hussein v. Mabus, No. 2:09-1988-RMG-BM, 

2010 WL 4340935

 at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2010), aff’d 414 Fed. App’x 518 (4th Cir. 2011), wherein
        (Continued)
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               Finally, pro se filings must be construed liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 94

 (2007), “so as to do substantial justice.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(f). “[A] pro se complaint,

        ‘however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held to ‘less stringent standards than formal

        pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 

429 U.S. 97, 106

 (1976) (citation

        omitted); accord Erickson, 

551 U.S. at 94

. Thus, when reviewing pro se objections to a

        magistrate’s recommendation, district courts must review de novo any articulated grounds

        to which the litigant appears to take issue. See Martin, 858 F.3d at 245–46. Such a

        requirement advances district courts’ obligation to liberally construe pro se objections

        while maintaining constitutional limitations on a magistrate’s authority.

               Thus, we review the sufficiency of a litigant’s objection de novo. See generally

        Diamond, 

416 F.3d 310

.

                                                     B.

               Elijah’s objections satisfied—and exceeded—the sufficiency standard.           Elijah

        objected by way of three enumerated, detailed legal claims disagreeing with the magistrate’s

        recommendation. First, he argued that he was in “official detention” while in supervised




        this Court affirmed by unpublished opinion a district court’s determination that objections
        could not merely “rehash” previous arguments. See, e.g., Bennett v. Zydron, No.
        2:17CV92, 

2017 WL 4176972

, at *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 21, 2017); Rowland v. Kijakazi, No.
        5:20-cv-02689-TMC, 

2022 WL 203075

, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 24, 2022); Johnson v. Saul, No.
        8:18-cv-03223-TMC, 

2020 WL 881033

, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 2020); Butler v. Berryhill,
        No. 4:16-cv-03209-JMC, 

2018 WL 1556188

, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2018); Nichols v.
        Colvin, 

100 F. Supp. 3d 487, 497

 (E.D. Va. 2015); Godfrey v. Kijazaki, No. 6:20-cv-2504-
        TMC, 

2022 WL 951620

, at *1 (D.S.C. March 30, 2022); Weaver v. United States Postal
        Serv., No. 1:19-cv-2700-JMC, 

2020 WL 3603773

, at *1 (D.S.C. July 1, 2020); Li v. Xu,
        No. 1:20-cv-241, 

2021 WL 8444697

, at *2 (E.D. Va. May 12, 2021). This opinion and
        Martin, not Abou-Hussein, are controlling law.
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        release; therefore, his time in supervised release should be credited towards his current

        sentence. J.A. 131–34. Second, citing United States v. Ward, 

770 F.3d 1090

 (4th Cir. 2014),

        he asserted that the BOP should retroactively apply the First Step Act to his original sentence

        and reduce his current sentence based on the GCT he would have earned for his original

        sentence. 

Id.

 Finally, he argued that Haymond invalidated 

18 U.S.C. § 3583

(e)(3). 

Id.

               The district court concluded that because Elijah repeated his previous arguments,

        he did not object with sufficient specificity to warrant de novo review. However, Martin

        clearly instructs us that Elijah’s objection was sufficiently specific because it “alerted the

        district court that he believed the magistrate judge erred in recommending dismissal of

        those claims.” Martin, 

858 F.3d at 246

. Even if we did not apply the liberal construction

        provided to pro se litigants, Elijah “reasonably alert[ed] the district court of the true ground

        for the objection.” Midgette, 

478 F.3d at 622

. At bottom, we must recognize that the pro

        se construction owed to Elijah makes his grounds even clearer.

               Because Elijah alerted the district court to the grounds on which he objected, the

        court was obligated to review Elijah’s objections de novo. See Martin, 858 F.3d at 245–

        46. It is immaterial that his objections resembled arguments he had made previously;

        district courts must solely consider the specificity, not the novelty, of objections to

        magistrate recommendations. By adopting the recommendation after only clear error

        review, the district court improperly elevated the magistrate’s opinion and failed to satisfy

        its obligations under § 636(b) and Article III. See Raddatz, 

447 U.S. at 668

.




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                                                      C.

               Because “we generally don’t reach factual or legal questions in a magistrate judge’s

        report that were not first subject to de novo review by the district court,” we decline Elijah’s

        invitation to consider the merits of his habeas petition. De Leon-Ramirez, 

925 F.3d at 181

;

        see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. U.S. Envt’l. Prot. Agency, 

663 F.2d 499, 502

 (4th Cir.

        1981). Instead, we remand to the district court to review the magistrate’s recommendation

        de novo. Proceeding to the merits would needlessly abridge Elijah’s access to judicial

        review, but by remanding, we ensure appropriate district court review while leaving the

        door open for future appeals.



                                                      III.

               Finally, we decline Elijah’s request to recall our 2016 mandate dismissing his 2015

        appeal and to reopen the certificate of appealability.

               Inherently, circuit courts have the discretion to recall their own mandates. Calderon

        v. Thompson, 

523 U.S. 538, 549

 (1998) (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 

463 U.S. 1323, 1324

 (1983)). “[H]owever, the power can be exercised only in extraordinary

        circumstances. . . . The sparing use of the power demonstrates it is one of last resort, to be

        held in reserve against grave, unforeseen contingencies.” 

Id.

 (citation omitted). While

        what may rise to a “grave, unforeseen contingency” has never been clearly outlined,

        “[a]lleged erroneous rulings of law are generally not held to be sufficiently unconscionable

        to justify reopening a judgment not void when issued.” Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,



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483 F.2d 963, 964

 (1st Cir. 1973); accord Hines v. Royal Indem. Co., 

253 F.2d 111

 (6th

        Cir. 1958); Iverson’s Est. v. Comm’r, 

257 F.2d 408

 (8th Cir. 1958).

               Here, Elijah asks this Court to recall its mandate dismissing his case for untimeliness

        for fear that we overlooked the merits of his argument. Although we sympathize with

        Elijah’s position it is, in essence, an argument that the Court came to the wrong conclusion.

        As noted, such claims fall short of “grave, unforeseen contingencies.” See In re Brown, 

95 F. App’x 520

 (4th Cir. 2004) (declining to recall mandate when petitioner argued this Court

        had applied the wrong standard); accord Powers, 

483 F.2d at 964

; Hines, 253 F.2d at 113–

        14; Iverson’s Est., 

257 F.2d at 409

.

               Accordingly, we leave our decision dismissing Elijah’s 2015 appeal undisturbed.



                                                     IV.

               Because the district court erred by reviewing the magistrate’s recommendation for

        clear error, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to apply

        de novo review.



                                            VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS




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