Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Davis v. Davis
646 F.2d 123
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1981-04-07
- Topic
- bankruptcy
PER CURIAM: The petitioner, a prisoner of the Commonwealth of Virginia, was convicted on charges of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of marijuana, and received two consecutive sentences of a $10,-000 fine and twenty years imprisonment. The district court granted a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that these sentences were so disproportionate to the offenses as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 432 F.Supp. 444 (W.D.Va.1977). A panel of this court reversed. 585 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1978). Upon rehearing en banc on the motion of the petitioner, this court affirmed the district court’s judgment. 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court granted the respondent’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated this court’s judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Rummel v.
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DAVIS v. DAVIS,646 F.2d 123(4th Cir. 1981)
ROGER TRENTON DAVIS, APPELLEE v. JACK F. DAVIS, DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA STATE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AND R. M. MUNCY, SUPERINTENDENT, POWHATAN
CORRECTIONAL CENTER, APPELLANTS.
No. 77-1782.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued October 7, 1980.
Decided April 7, 1981.
Page 124
Edward L. Hogshire, Charlottesville, Va. (Paxson, Smith, Boyd, Gilliam Gouldman, P. C.; John C. Lowe, Lowe Gordon, Ltd., Charlottesville, Va., on brief), for appellee.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and WINTER, BUTZNER, RUSSELL, WIDENER, HALL, PHILLIPS, MURNAGHAN, SPROUSE and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, sittingen banc.
[2] Upon rehearingen bancon the motion of the petitioner, this court affirmed the district court's judgment.601 F.2d 153(4th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court granted the respondent's petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated this court's judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light ofRummelv. Estelle,445 U.S. 263,100 S.Ct. 1133,63 L.Ed.2d 382(1980).
[3] The judgment of the district court is affirmed on an equal division of theen banccourt.
[4]AFFIRMED.
[7] Further, because the judgment of this court in the en banc decision in this very case,601 F.2d 153(4th Cir. 1979), was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court2for further consideration in the light ofRummel v. Estelle,445 U.S. 263,100 S.Ct. 1133,63 L.Ed.2d 382(1980), I think the decision inRummeldeserves special consideration.Rummel,as I see it, takes essentially the same view as does the panel opinion in this case which reversed the district court.3If that is true, as IPage 125think it is, the disposition of the present en banc court in this case should have been a simple reversal for which no extensive opinion was necessary, if any opinion at all, for the various views of the law in this case had been sufficiently explored in the panel opinion and in the Supreme Court's opinion inRummel.
[8] Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
- In the panel opinion at page 1233, speaking to the sufficiency of the evidence, we relied onWilliams v. Peyton,414 F.2d 776(4th Cir. 1969), which at that time was circuit precedent as to the sufficiency of evidence in habeas corpus review using the any evidence at all rule as found inThompsonv. Louisville,362 U.S. 199,80 S.Ct. 624,4 L.Ed.2d 654(1960). In 1979, however,Jackson v. Virginia,443 U.S. 307,99 S.Ct. 2781,61 L.Ed.2d 560(1979), was decided, changing the standard for habeas corpus review from any evidence at all to one that required evidence which would permit "anyrational trier of fact" . . . "to have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Italics in original.) Under the rule inJackson v. Virginia,as inWilliams v. Peyton,the evidence in this case not only permits the finding as to punishment by a rational trier of fact, it fully supports it. This isnota case of life imprisonment for a parking ticket, seeRummel,445 U.S. at 274, n. 11,100 S.Ct. at 1139, or even a simple street corner sale of drugs from one high school child to another. ↩
- 445 U.S. 947,100 S.Ct. 1593,63 L.Ed.2d 732(1980) sub nomDavis v. Hutto. ↩
- Specifically, the Supreme Court, in its opinion inRummel,rejected our decision inHart v. Coiner,483 F.2d 136(4th Cir. 1973).Hartwas relied on by the district court in its opinion, and the only reason for the judgment of the en banc court given in its per curiam opinion, other than that less than nine ounces of marijuana was involved, was that it affirmed "for reasons sufficiently stated by the district judge in his opinion."601 F.2d at 154. The Supreme Court also construedWeems v. United States,217 U.S. 349,30 S.Ct. 544,54 L.Ed. 793(1910), in the same manner as did the panel in this case. The district court opinion which is affirmed in this case relied onWeemsandHartjust as did the majority of the Fifth Circuit panel inRummel,see445 U.S. at 267,100 S.Ct. at 1135, which was overruled by the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc, see445 U.S. at 268,100 S.Ct. at 1136. The en banc opinion of the Fifth Circuit, of course, was affirmed byRummel. WeemsandHartare the essential roots of all the argument in this case, and the construction given by the district court to each of them has been specifically rejected by the Supreme Court inRummel. ↩