Roberta Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc. And Heart of America Portraits, Inc.

holding that the district court “has the power to order that notice be given to other potential members of the plaintiff class under the ‘opt-in’ provisions of the [FLSA]” | holding that a district court “has the power to order that notice be given to other potential members of the plaintiff class under the ‘opt-in’ provision of the [FLSA]” | noting that the court’s authority to send notice to “similarly situated” employees “comports with the broad remedial purpose of the Act, which should be given a liberal construction, as well as with the interest of the courts in avoiding multiplicity of suits” | court-authorized notice in an appropriate case “comports with the broad remedial purpose of the [FLSA], ... as well as with the interest of the courts in avoiding multiplicity of suits” | court-authorized notice in an appropriate case “comports with the broad remedial purpose of the [FLSA], ... as well as with the interest of the courts in avoiding multiplicity of suits” | notice to potential plaintiffs “comports with the broad remedial purpose of the Act, which should be given a liberal construction, as well as with the interest of the courts in avoiding multiplicity of suits” | notice to potential plaintiffs “comports with the broad remedial purpose of the Act, which should be given a liberal construction, as well as with the interest of the courts in avoiding multiplicity of suits” | “Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b | “Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b | “Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b | “Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b | “Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b | “Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b | “Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b | “Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b | “Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, we hold that it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of [Section 216(b)], to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.” | “Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, we hold that it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of [Section 216(b)], to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.” | interpreting § 216 “as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice’