Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Roberta Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc. And Heart of America Portraits, Inc.

600 F.2d 335

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1979-05-14
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that the district court “has the power to order that notice be given to other potential members of the plaintiff class under the ‘opt-in’ provisions of the [FLSA]”
  • holding that a district court “has the power to order that notice be given to other potential members of the plaintiff class under the ‘opt-in’ provision of the [FLSA]”
  • noting that the court’s authority to send notice to “similarly situated” employees “comports with the broad remedial purpose of the Act, which should be given a liberal construction, as well as with the interest of the courts in avoiding multiplicity of suits”
  • court-authorized notice in an appropriate case “comports with the broad remedial purpose of the [FLSA], ... as well as with the interest of the courts in avoiding multiplicity of suits”
  • notice to potential plaintiffs “comports with the broad remedial purpose of the Act, which should be given a liberal construction, as well as with the interest of the courts in avoiding multiplicity of suits”
  • “Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice . . . it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b
  • “Although one might read the [FLSA], by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, we hold that it makes more sense, in light of the ‘opt-in’ provision of [Section 216(b)], to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.”
  • interpreting § 216 “as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice’

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Roberta Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc. And Heart of America Portraits, Inc.. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Authority status
pending
Cited by
125 opinions
BRAUNSTEIN v. E. PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORIES,600 F.2d 335(2nd Cir. 1978)
ROBERTA BRAUNSTEIN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. EASTERN PHOTOGRAPHIC
LABORATORIES, INC. AND HEART OF AMERICA PORTRAITS, INC.,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
No. 411, Docket 78-7464.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued November 17, 1978.
Decided November 17, 1978.
Petition for Rehearing Denied January 24, 1979.
Petition for Certiorari Denied May 14, 1979.
Shaun S. Sullivan, New Haven, Conn. (William J. Doyle, Marshall B. Babson, and Wiggin Dana, New Haven, Conn., of counsel), for defendants-appellants.

A. Reynolds Gordon, Bridgeport, Conn., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the District of Connecticut.
Before WATERMAN, TIMBERS and VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
[1] We affirmed by our order entered November 17, 1978 the order of the district court from which an appeal was taken and which appeal was expedited by a prior order of our Court entered September 21, 1978. In light of the petition for rehearing by defendants-appellants addressed to the panel that heard this appeal on the merits and in accordance with our practice in appropriate cases of publishing previously unpublished decisions or orders of this Court,Continental Stock Transfer Trust Co.v. SEC,566 F.2d 373(2 Cir. 1977) (per curiam), we now publish the following opinion in the instant case which in substance is our order entered November 17, 1978.

[2] The essential issue raised on this appeal is whether a district court has the power to order that notice be given to other potential members of the plaintiff class under the "opt-in" provision of the Fair Labor StandardsPage 336Act dealing with actions for nonpayment of statutorily required minimum wages and overtime compensation.29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976).

[3] We believe that Judge Daly took the proper course in authorizing notice to other potential plaintiffs in this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Although one might read the Act, by deliberate omission, as not providing for notice, we hold that it makes more sense, in light of the "opt-in" provision of § 16(b) of the Act,29 U.S.C. § 216(b), to read the statute as permitting, rather than prohibiting, notice in an appropriate case.Cantu v. Owatonna Canning Co.,Docket No. 3-76-Civ. 374 (D.Minn. April 12, 1978);Lantz v. B-1202 Corp.,429 F.Supp. 421 (E.D.Mich. 1977);Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, Inc.,Docket No. C73-41 (N.D.Ohio 1973).Contra, Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes,564 F.2d 859(9 Cir. 1977). Although we agree with Judge Choy's view inKinneythat due process does not require notice, we do not agree with his conclusion that there is no power in the district court to order it in a proper case.

[4] In our view, this holding comports with the broad remedial purpose of the Act, which should be given a liberal construction, as well as with the interest of the courts in avoiding multiplicity of suits. In short, we believe that the recent trend in the law,see, e.g., Bates O'Steen v. State Bar of Arizona,433 U.S. 350(1976), strips Judge Wyzanski's rationale of a decade and a half ago inCherner v. Transitron ElectronicsCorp.,201 F.Supp. 934 (D.Mass. 1962), of much of its force — a rationale which in any event is not controlling on this Court.

[5] Aside from publishing our opinion above, the petition for rehearing is in all respects denied.