Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Brissett v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority
Brissett v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 472 F. App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2012)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 2012-07-09
- Topic
- bankruptcy
11-2554 Brissett v. Manhattan and Bronx Surface Operating Auth. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
Citator
- Cited by
- 34 opinions
SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant Alice Brissett, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her employment discrimination action pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(v) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to her non-compliance with discovery orders. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
This Court reviews the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal, for abuse of discretion, and the factual findings made in support of the district court’s decision for clear error. See S. New England Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123, 143 (2d Cir.2010). “[I]n evaluating a district court’s exercise of discretion to dismiss an action under Rule 37,” this Court has considered: “(1) the willfulness of the non-compliant party or the reason for noncompliance; (2) the efficacy of lesser sanctions; (3) the duration of the period of noncompliance, and (4) whether the non-compliant party had been warned of the consequences of ... noncompliance.” Agiwal v. Mid Island Mortg. Corp., 555 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir.2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also S. New England Tel. Co., 624 F.3d at 144 (stating that “these factors are not exclusive, and they need not each be resolved against the party challenging the district court’s sanctions for us to conclude that those sanctions were within the court’s discretion” (citation omitted)). Moreover, “[t]he severe sanction of dismissal with prejudice may be imposed even against a plaintiff who is proceeding pro se, so long as a warning has been given that noncompliance can result in dismissal.” Valentine v. Museum of Modern Art, 29 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir.1994) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
After an independent review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Brissett’s complaint. We recognize that dismissal is a harsh sanction, particularly for a pro se litigant. But where, as here, a litigant has been warned explicitly and repeatedly that failure to comply with the court’s orders will lead to dismissal, it cannot be called abuse of discretion when that sanction is ultimately imposed for continued non-compliance.
We have considered Brissett’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.