Robert Lovett v. Walter S. Ray, Chairman, Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles

holding that the statute of limitations for bringing § 1983 claims in Georgia is two years | holding that statute began to run when plaintiff was notified by the defendants in September 1998 that he would not be reconsidered for parole until 2006 | holding that continuing violation doctrine did not apply to parole board’s decision to change plaintiff’s parole reconsideration date because decision was one-time act with continuing consequences and, therefore, limitations period was not extended | holding that “[f]ederal law determines when the statute of limitations begins to run.” | holding that a party waives arguments not made in initial appellate brief | concluding that a prisoner informed in 1998 that he would not be reconsidered for parole until 2006 “knew, or should have known, all the facts necessary to pursue a cause of action” at that time | noting that, in § 1983 cases, federal courts apply the state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions | finding doctrine did not apply to parole board’s decision to change date of plaintiff’s reconsideration for parole because decision was a one-time act with continued consequences | refusing to consider arguments presented for the first time in a reply brief | refusing to consider arguments presented for the first time in a reply brief | affirming dismissal of challenge to changes in parole statute as time barred | declining to consider argument raised for first time in reply brief | "Because he raises that argument for the first time in his reply brief, it is not properly before us." | Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims brought in federal court in Georgia | “Because he raises th[e] argument for the first time in his reply brief, it is not properly before us.” | “Because [appellant] raises [his] argument for the first time in his reply brief, it is not properly before us.” | “Because he raises that argument for the first time in his reply brief, it is not properly before us.” | “Federal courts apply their forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” | “Federal courts apply their forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” | not applying continuing violation doctrine where the defendants’ decision not to consider the plaintiff for parole until a later date “was a one[-]time act with continued consequences” | “[T]he defendants’ act (deciding not to consider Lovett for parole again until 2006) was a one time act with continued consequences, and the limitations period is not extended.” | defendants’ act of deciding not to consider prisoner for parole again until 2006 “was a one time act with continued consequences” that did not extend the limitations period | applying OCGA § 9-3-33 to § 1983 claims in Georgia | “Federal law determines when the statute of limitations begins to run.” | “The critical distinction in the continuing violation analysis is whether the plaintiff complains of the present consequence of a one time violation, which does not extend the limitations period, or the continuation of that violation into the present, which does.”