Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Jerome L. ARCHAMBAULT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED COMPUTING SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant-Appellee

Jerome L. ARCHAMBAULT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED Comput. Sys., INC., Defendant-Appellee, 695 F.2d 551 (11th Cir. 1983)

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1983-01-14
Topic
general

PER CURIAM: In this age discrimination suit brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(c)(1), a magistrate served as a special master under 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(2), apparently with the consent of the parties. The findings of such a special master are entitled to the same deference as those of the typical factfinder, reviewable by a district court under the clearly erroneous standard. Fed. R.Civ.P. 53(e)(2) (“[T]he court shall accept the master’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.”). Contrast this with the designation of a magistrate to conduct hearings under 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1) where, on objection to the magistrate’s findings, the district court must “make a de novo determination.” E.g., Nettles v.

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ARCHAMBAULT v. UNITED COMPUTING SYSTEMS, INC.,695 F.2d 551(11th Cir. 1983)
JEROME L. ARCHAMBAULT, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. UNITED COMPUTING SYSTEMS,
INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
No. 82-5378.
Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
January 14, 1983.
Joseph Egan, Jr., Pilacek, Egan, Cohen Williams, Orlando, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

Michael G. Williamson, Maguire, Voorhis Wells, Orlando, Fla., Byron J. Beck, Morrison, Hecker, Curtis, Kuder Parrish, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before RONEY, VANCE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
[1] In this age discrimination suit brought pursuant to29 U.S.C.A. § 626(c)(1), a magistrate served as a special master under28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(2), apparently with the consent of the parties. The findings of such a special master are entitled to the same deference as those of the typical factfinder, reviewable by a district court under the clearly erroneous standard. Fed.R.Civ.P.53(e)(2) ("[T]he court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous."). Contrast this with the designation of a magistrate to conduct hearings under28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1) where, on objection to the magistrate's findings, the district court must "make a de novo determination."E.g., Nettles v. Wainwright,677 F.2d 404,409(5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc).

[2] The magistrate here made an express finding of discrimination. The district court correctly reviewed that finding under the then law of this Circuit which provided that discrimination was an issue ofPage 552"ultimate fact" to which the clearly erroneous standard of appellate review did not apply.E.g., Thompson v. Leland PoliceDepartment,633 F.2d 1111,1112(5th Cir. 1980);East v.Romine, Inc.,518 F.2d 332,338-39(5th Cir. 1975);Causeyv. Ford Motor Co.,516 F.2d 416,421(5th Cir. 1975).1Shortly thereafter, however, the Supreme Court rejected this Circuit's approach, concluding that a finding of discrimination is reviewable only for clear error.Pullman-Standard v. Swint,456 U.S. 273,282,102 S.Ct. 1781,1787,72 L.Ed.2d 66,78-79(1982). AlthoughSwintconcerned Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, not the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA), there is no reason to distinguish between findings under the two statutes for appellate review purposes.Cf. Smith v. Farah Manufacturing Co.,650 F.2d 64,68(5th Cir. 1981) (in a pre-Swintdecision, viewing the existence of age discrimination under the ADEA as an issue of ultimate fact, like the existence of race or other discrimination under Title VII).

[3] We therefore must remand to the district court for reconsideration of the magistrate's finding of discrimination in light of the standard of review set forth inSwint.

[4] VACATED AND REMANDED.Page 1275
  1. The Eleventh Circuit, in the en banc decision ofBonner v.City of Prichard,661 F.2d 1206(11th Cir. 1981), adopted as precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit decided prior to October 1, 1981. ↩