Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Charles Johnson, Jr. v. City of Atlanta
107 F.4th 1292
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 2024-07-12
- Topic
- litigation
holding that evidence considered under the incorporation by reference doctrine need not be referred to or attached to the complaint | holding that “because no constitutional violation occurred, [the plaintiff] cannot succeed on his Monell claim against the City” | explaining that when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court generally may not consider matters outside of the pleadings | holding that “when resolving a motion to dismiss . . . a court may properly consider a document not referred to or attached to a complaint under the incorporation-by- reference doctrine if the document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claims; and (2 | affirming the district court’s consideration of bodycam footage at the motion to dismiss stage because its authen- ticity was not challenged | noting the district court properly considered body camera footage because the video was central to the plaintiff’s claims and the video’s authenticity was not challenged | following Maxcess under the prior panel precedent rule and rejecting the requirement that “a complaint must refer to” a document for the incorporation-by- reference doctrine to apply | permitting consideration of bodycam footage at the motion to dismiss stage | “[A] court generally may not consider matters outside of the pleadings” on a motion to dismiss | “[A] court may properly consider a document not referred to or attached to a complaint under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine . . . .” | “It is well established than an arrest of someone suspected of violating the law is within the discretionary authority of a police officer.” | “[B]ecause no constitutional violation occurred, [the plaintiff] cannot succeed on his claim against the City.” | “[I]f [a court] treats the motion [to dismiss] as one for a reply. See Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint, (Doc. 71; Reply | “[A] court may properly consider a document not referred to 5 or attached to a complaint under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine if the document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claims; and (2) undisputed, meaning that its authenticity is not challenged.” | “[W]hen resolving a motion to dismiss . . . a court may properly consider a document not referred to or attached to a complaint under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine if the document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claims[] and (2 | explaining the incorporation by reference doctrine
Citator
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- 28 opinions
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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11359
____________________
CHARLES JOHNSON, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF ATLANTA,
GARRETT ROLFE,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-01977-JPB
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11359
Before BRANCH, GRANT, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
Charles Johnson, Jr., sued Officer Garrett Rolfe and the City
of Atlanta bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
, Monell v. New
York Department of Social Services, 1 and Georgia state law, for injuries
he sustained when Rolfe arrested him on the side of an interstate
highway for driving while intoxicated. This appeal requires us to
determine whether the district court properly considered video
evidence—which was not mentioned in Johnson’s complaint—
showing Johnson refusing to comply with Rolfe’s instructions and
resisting being placed in handcuffs when it granted Rolfe’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings and the City’s motion to dismiss.
After review and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude
that because the video evidence (1) shows the events central to
Rolfe’s claims and (2) its authenticity is not challenged, the district
court properly considered the videos under the incorporation-by-
reference doctrine. And because the videos establish that Rolfe did
not use excessive force and he did not intend to injure Johnson in
arresting him, Rolfe is entitled to qualified immunity on Johnson’s
federal claims and official immunity on his state law claims.
Accordingly, after careful review and with the benefit of oral
argument, we affirm the district court’s order.
1 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
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I. Background
A. Allegations in the Complaint
Johnson filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia. His bare-boned complaint alleged
the following.
“On or about May 22, 2020, [Johnson] was driving a vehicle
while intoxicated” when Rolfe pulled him over. Johnson behaved
in a respectful manner, did not raise his voice, never used any force
against Rolfe, and did not otherwise provide Rolfe “with a legal
basis to use force against him.” However, because Johnson “did
not comply with . . . Rolfe’s command as quickly as [Rolfe] would
have liked, [Rolfe] grabbed him and after[ward] threw [Johnson] to
the ground, thoroughly breaking [Johnson’s] collar bone” which
required two surgeries to repair.
Rolfe had a “history” of citizen complaints, including for
shooting and killing a man. Johnson alleged that the City was
responsible for Rolfe’s alleged use of excessive force against him
because it “encouraged, tolerated, ratified” and was deliberately
indifferent to “policies, patterns, practices, and actions” related to
“[t]he use of force by police officers; [t]he proper exercise of police
power, including but not limited to the use of force; [and] [t]he
failure to identify and to take remedial or disciplinary actions
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11359
against police officers who were the subject of prior citizen or
internal complaints of misconduct.”
Based on these allegations, Johnson brought five counts
“under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
. . . for the use of excessive force[] against
him” as well as under Georgia law for excessive force and battery.2
The City moved to dismiss Johnson’s complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that
Johnson’s complaint failed to state a claim against the City for
Monell liability because its threadbare allegations did not allege
sufficient facts to plausibly establish that it had an official custom
or policy, nor an unofficial custom or practice, that caused
Johnson’s injures. 3
Rolfe, on the other hand, answered the complaint and raised
several affirmative defenses, including qualified immunity on the
2 Because of the manner in which the complaint was drafted, in particular its
sparse allegations, the district court was forced to interpret what claims
Johnson was bringing. It found that Count I alleged “constitutional claims
(United States and Georgia) for unreasonable search and seizure and abuse of
arrestees plus a state law claim for battery” against Rolfe; Count II alleged a
“failure to supervise [claim] against the City;” Count III alleged a
“constitutional claim (Georgia) for unreasonable search and seizure and a
willful intent to injure” against Rolfe; Count IV alleged a “constitutional claim
(Georgia) for abuse” against Rolfe; and Count V alleged a state law battery
claim against Rolfe. No party challenges this determination on appeal. For
simplicity, this appeal will refer to Johnson’s claims as the federal claims and
the state-law claims, respectively.
3 In Monell, the Supreme Court held that municipalities and other local
governments may be held directly liable under § 1983 for constitutional
violations if the injury stems from the government’s enforcement of a policy
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22-11359 Opinion of the Court 5
federal claims and official immunity on the Georgia state-law
claims. Rolfe’s answer referenced his body camera and dashcam
footage, which he also filed with the court. Rolfe then moved for
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the body camera and
dashcam footage established that he did not use excessive force and
he was therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Johnson’s
federal claims and official immunity on his state law claims. The
body camera and dashcam footage that Rolfe attached to his
answers tell a different story than the one Johnson alleged in his
complaint.
B. Body Camera and Dashcam Footage
On a rainy night, Rolfe pulled Johnson over for going 85
miles per hour in a 55 mile-per-hour zone on Interstate 85 in
Atlanta, Georgia. Their vehicles were stopped on a bridge or
overpass that was higher than the streetlights on the ground below,
and only a waist-height wall separated Rolfe from the drop to his
right. Rolfe approached Johnson’s vehicle and spoke with him and
his passenger. The officer asked Johnson if he had consumed any
alcohol that night, and Johnson said no. Rolfe then noticed an open
can of beer underneath Johnson’s seat and instructed Johnson to
or custom. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694
. To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must
allege facts showing: “(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that
the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate
indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom
caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289
(11th Cir. 2004).
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11359
step out of the vehicle. Rolfe began questioning Johnson regarding
the open container, and Johnson initially denied drinking and
driving. Johnson eventually admitted to drinking one beer during
the course of the evening and after asking Johnson additional
questions, Rolfe told Johnson he was going to conduct a field
sobriety test. Johnson responded by saying he “just wanted to go
home” and that he was safe to drive.
For approximately ten minutes, Rolfe attempted to conduct
various field sobriety tests but after completing the first, Johnson
continuously refused to complete any other tests. An at times
emotional Johnson stated that he did not know if he would pass the
tests, and he did not want to fail the tests because he did not want
to lose his CDL license, which he had just reacquired. He also
refused to perform a breathalyzer test. Throughout the encounter,
Johnson continued to request that Rolfe give him a “break” and
please let him leave and just let Johnson’s passenger—who had also
been drinking—drive. Eventually Rolfe informed Johnson that he
was placing him under arrest based on the facts Rolfe knew:
Johnson (1) was speeding in unsafe conditions (the roads were
wet); (2) had an open container of alcohol in the vehicle; (3) initially
lied to Rolfe about drinking; (4) was exhibiting signs of impairment;
and (5) was refusing to perform any sobriety tests. Accordingly,
Rolfe instructed Johnson to place his hands behind his back so that
he could handcuff him.
As Rolfe attempted to handcuff Johnson, Johnson repeatedly
refused to put both hands behind his back and pulled his hands
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22-11359 Opinion of the Court 7
away multiple times. Rolfe told Johnson to put his hands behind
his back four times in a row, told him not to pull away, and then
told him again to put his hands behind his back. Johnson jerked his
right arm away. Rolfe said: “Hey, hey, hey: Put your hand behind
your back. Put your hand behind—don’t pull away from—”. Rolfe
then tackled Johnson by wrapping his right arm around Johnson’s
torso and taking him to the ground. Rolfe landed partially on
Johnson, with his upper body on Johnson’s back and his legs and
hips on the pavement to the side of Johnson. Once on the ground,
Johnson continued to refuse Rolfe’s instructions to place his hands
behind his back until Johnson’s passenger told him to “calm down”
multiple times. After finally handcuffing Johnson, Rolfe helped
Johnson to his feet and told him he was under arrest for DUI. Rolfe
placed Johnson in the back of Rolfe’s patrol vehicle, and Johnson
told Rolfe that he dislocated his shoulder. Rolfe asked Johnson
multiple times if he needed an ambulance, and Johnson said he
would just “deal with it.” Aside from Johnson’s statements that he
had dislocated his shoulder, there was no indication in the videos
that Johnson was in pain or injured in any way.
C. District Court’s Ruling on the City’s Motion to Dismiss and Rolfe’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Johnson opposed both the City’s 12(b)(6) motion and Rolfe’s
12(c) motion, arguing that the district court could not consider the
footage in deciding Rolfe’s Rule 12(c) motion because his
complaint did not attach the videos as exhibits or otherwise refer
to the videos. He also argued that the videos were not central to
his claims and asserted that the body camera footage was not
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11359
conclusive because it did not show Rolfe take Johnson to the
ground.4 At bottom, Johnson argued that based solely on the
allegations in the complaint as well as Rolfe’s answer, Rolfe was
not entitled to judgment on the pleadings and Johnson had stated
a viable claim for Monell liability against the City.
The district court granted Rolfe’s Rule 12(c) motion and the
City’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First, it determined that even though
Johnson did not refer to the body camera and dashcam footage in
his complaint, it could nevertheless consider videos under the
incorporation-by-reference doctrine because they were central to
Johnson’s claims and Johnson did not challenge their authenticity.
Then, based on the videos’ contents, it determined that (1) Rolfe’s
use of force was objectively reasonable and he was therefore
entitled to qualified immunity on Johnson’s federal claims; 5 (2)
Rolfe was entitled to official immunity on Johnson’s state-law
claims because Rolfe did not intend to hurt Johnson; and (3) the
Monell claim against the City was due to be dismissed because there
was no underlying violation of excessive force. The district court
also determined that the Monell claim against the City was due to
be dismissed “for the independent reason that the threadbare
allegations in the Complaint [did] not sufficiently allege that the
4 Johnson did not discuss the dashcam footage, which shows a clear view of
the tackle in question.
5 The district court also determined that even if Rolfe had used excessive force,
he would nevertheless be entitled to qualified immunity on the independent
basis that the law was not clearly established that Rolfe’s use of force was
excessive at the time of Johnson’s arrest.
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City had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference
to Johnson’s constitutional rights and that such policy or custom
caused Rolfe’s alleged violations.”
Johnson timely appealed the district court’s order.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s grant of Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c)
motions de novo. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Winder Lab’ys, LLC, 73 F.4th 934, 940
(11th Cir. 2023); Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., Ga.,69 F.4th 1277, 1294
(11th Cir. 2023). “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when
there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Cont’l Cas. Co., 73 F.4th at 940
. For both 12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions we accept the facts
alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Myrick, 69 F.4th at 1294
; Cannon v. City
of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301
(11th Cir. 2001).
III. Discussion
Johnson raises three primary arguments on appeal. First, he
argues that the district court improperly considered the body
camera and dashcam footage in ruling on Rolfe’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Second, he argues that the district
court erred in determining that Rolfe was entitled to qualified
immunity on Johnson’s federal claims and official immunity on his
state-law claims. And third, he argues that because the district
court incorrectly found that Rolfe did not use excessive force while
arresting him, it likewise erred in granting the City’s motion to
dismiss on his Monell claim. We address the first two arguments
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-11359
and reject them in turn. And because no constitutional violation
occurred, Rolfe cannot succeed on his Monell claim against the City.
A. Rolfe’s body camera and dashcam footage.
Johnson argues on appeal that the district court erred in
considering the body camera and dashcam footage under the
incorporation-by-reference doctrine because (1) the footage is not
a written instrument and therefore cannot be incorporated under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c); and (2) his complaint did not
reference the footage. His first argument is foreclosed by our
precedent. In Horsley v. Feldt, we extended the applicability of the
incorporation-by-reference doctrine from 12(b)(6) motions to 12(c)
motions and in doing so explained that the “written instrument”
provision of Rule 10(c) had no bearing “insofar as the incorporation
by reference doctrine is concerned.” 304 F.3d 1125
, 1134–35 (11th
Cir. 2002). And in Baker v. City of Madison, Alabama, in an excessive
force case, we applied the incorporation-by-reference doctrine to
police body camera footage. 67 F.4th 1268
, 1276–77 (11th Cir.
2023). His second argument, however, requires us to closely
examine our circuit’s precedent regarding the incorporation-by-
reference doctrine to determine whether a court may consider
evidence not referred to in the complaint in deciding a motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
Pursuant to Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion, a court
generally may not consider matters outside of the pleadings
without treating the motion as a motion for summary judgment,
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22-11359 Opinion of the Court 11
and if it treats the motion as one for summary judgment, the court
must give a reasonable opportunity for the parties to present all
evidence that is relevant to the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
However, “[t]here are two exceptions to this conversion rule: (1)
the incorporation-by-reference doctrine and (2) judicial notice.”
Baker, 67 F.4th at 1276
. At issue here is the incorporation-by-
reference doctrine.
1. The proper test for the incorporation-by-reference doctrine.
We have issued seemingly conflicting opinions about what
is required for a court to consider a document not attached to a
complaint under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. In some
of our opinions, we have stated that the incorporation-by-reference
doctrine only has two requirements: that the document be “(1)
central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (2) undisputed.” Horsley, 304 F.3d at 1134
; see also Julmist v. Prime Ins. Co.,92 F.4th 1008, 1016
(11th
Cir. 2024) (determining the district court appropriately considered
an insurance policy attached to the motion to dismiss because it
was central to the plaintiff’s claims and undisputed); Boyle v. City of
Pell City, 866 F.3d 1280
, 1286 n.2 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he district
court was permitted to consider [an agreement and a
memorandum about that agreement that were not attached to the
operative complaint] because they were central to [the plaintiff’s]
claims and neither party disputed their authenticity.”); Perez v. Wells
Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329
, 1340 n.12 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[O]n a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, documents that are not part of the
pleadings may be considered, as long as they are central to the
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-11359
claim at issue and their authenticity is undisputed.”); Maxcess, Inc.
v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 433 F.3d 1337
, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that even where the complaint does not mention a
document, “a document outside the four corners of the complaint
may still be considered if it is central to the plaintiff’s claims and is
undisputed in terms of its authenticity.”); Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272
, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he court may consider a document
attached to a motion to dismiss without converting the motion into
one for summary judgment if the attached document is (1) central
to the plaintiff’s claims and (2) undisputed.”).
We have stated in other opinions, however, that three
requirements must be met: (1) the plaintiff must refer to the
documents in the complaint; (2) those documents must be central
to the plaintiff’s claim; and (3) the documents’ contents must not
be disputed, meaning the documents’ authenticity are not
challenged. Baker, 67 F.4th at 1276
; see also Hi-Tech Pharms., Inc. v.
HBS Int’l Corp., 910 F.3d 1186, 1189
(11th Cir. 2018) (“Under the
doctrine of incorporation by reference, we may also consider
documents attached to the motion to dismiss if they are referred to
in the complaint, central to the plaintiff’s claim, and of undisputed
authenticity.”); Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225
, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2014) (declining to consider a contract at
the motion-to-dismiss stage partially because the contract was not
attached to the complaint nor was it referred to in the complaint);
Smith v. Casey, 741 F.3d 1236
, 1239 n.2 (11th Cir. 2014) (determining
that we could consider a contract not attached to the complaint
because it was nevertheless “referred to in the complaint, [was]
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22-11359 Opinion of the Court 13
undisputed, and [was] central to the [plaintiff’s] claims.”); Starship
Enters. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Coweta Cnty., Ga., 708 F.3d 1243
, 1252 n.13
(11th Cir. 2013) (“Although analysis of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is
limited primarily to the face of the complaint and attachments
thereto, a court may consider documents attached to the motion
to dismiss if they are referred to in the complaint and are central to
the plaintiff’s claim.”); Hoffman-Pugh v. Ramsey, 312 F.3d 1222, 1225
(11th Cir. 2002) (noting that a book “was properly before the court
on the motion to dismiss because [the plaintiff] referred to it in her
complaint and it [was] central to her claims”).
Thus, some of our cases have stated that a complaint must
refer to the documents for the incorporation-by-reference doctrine
to apply whereas other cases have not articulated such a
requirement. Because this issue is dispositive as to whether the
district court properly considered the body camera and dashcam
footage in this case, we address which standard is the correct
formulation under our precedent.
To do so, we turn to the prior panel precedent rule, which
provides that “each succeeding panel is bound by the holding of the
first panel to address an issue of law, unless and until that holding
is overruled en banc, or by the Supreme Court.” Breslow v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A, 755 F.3d 1265, 1267
(11th Cir. 2014) (quotations
omitted). The holding of a case “is comprised both of the result of
the case and those portions of the opinion necessary to that result.”
Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300
, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2011)
(quotations omitted). Dicta, on the other hand “is defined as those
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-11359
portions of an opinion that are not necessary to deciding the case
then before us.” Id.
“When we have conflicting case law, we
follow our oldest precedent.” Comm’r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr. v.
Advance Loc. Media, LLC, 918 F.3d 1161, 1167
(11th Cir. 2019)
(quotations omitted). Thus, in the instant matter, we must identify
the first case in this circuit to consider the incorporation-by-
reference doctrine where the complaint neither referred to the
document at issue nor included the document as an attachment to
the complaint. Only in that factual circumstance would it have
been necessary for us to determine if the incorporation-by-
reference doctrine requires the complaint to refer to the document
at issue or attach it. The first case in this circuit to deal with this
factual scenario is Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 433 F.3d 1337
(11th Cir. 2005).
In Maxcess, the plaintiff brought nine different tort claims
regarding alleged misrepresentations that the defendant made in
committing fraud against the plaintiff. Id.
at 1339–40. Despite the
complaint not mentioning any contract, the district court relied on
a Purchase Agreement between the parties, which included a
24-month limitation on the parties’ ability to sue one another, to
dismiss the complaint as time-barred. Id.
at 1340 & n.3. The
plaintiff argued on appeal “that the district court was barred from
considering the Purchase Agreement when considering [the
defendant’s] motion to dismiss because it was not mentioned in,
nor attached to, [the] complaint.” Id.
at 1340 n.3. We rejected this
argument, determining that “a document outside the four corners
of the complaint may still be considered if it is central to the
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22-11359 Opinion of the Court 15
plaintiff’s claims and is undisputed in terms of authenticity.” Id.
(citing Horsley,304 F.3d at 1135
). And because neither party
disputed the authenticity of the Agreement and it was central to
the plaintiff’s claim, we concluded that “the district court properly
considered the Purchase Agreement when ruling on [the
defendant’s] 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Id.
Because Maxcess was the first case to resolve the issue before
us, we must follow it in accordance with the prior panel precedent
rule. Accordingly, when resolving a motion to dismiss or a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, a court may properly consider a
document not referred to or attached to a complaint under the
incorporation-by-reference doctrine if the document is (1) central
to the plaintiff’s claims; and (2) undisputed, meaning that its
authenticity is not challenged. 6 With the proper test in mind, we
now apply this test to the facts at hand.
6 Many of our opinions that have articulated the additional requirement that
the complaint must refer to the document at issue have cited to Brooks v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369
(11th Cir. 1997), in
support of this requirement. See, e.g., Baker, 67 F.4th at 1276
; Hi-Tech Pharms.,
Inc., 910 F.3d at 1189
; Starship Enters.,708 F.3d at 1252
n.13. But the portion
of Brooks that those cases have relied upon is not Eleventh Circuit precedent.
In Brooks, we summarily affirmed “[t]he district court’s grant of summary
judgment . . . based upon the holdings and rationale contained in Part III.A of
the district court’s . . . order,” a copy of which we attached as an appendix to
our opinion. Brooks, 116 F.3d at 1365
. We explicitly stated that “[w]e ha[d] no
occasion to reach the remaining issues addressed in other parts of that order
and impl[ied] no view concerning any of them.” Id.
The portion of Brooks
that many of our opinions have relied upon for the additional requirement
that the complaint must reference the document at issue for the incorporation-
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16 Opinion of the Court 22-11359
2. Application of the incorporation-by-reference doctrine.
Here, the requirements of the incorporation-by-reference
doctrine are easily satisfied. The body camera and dashcam
footage clearly depict the events that are central to Johnson’s
claims. The bodycam footage shows Rolfe’s interaction with
Johnson from the time he pulled Johnson over through him placing
Johnson in the back of his patrol vehicle. And although the
bodycam footage does not show the technique or force Rolfe used
in taking Johnson to the ground because Johnson’s body blocks the
lens during this timeframe, Rolfe’s dashcam footage fills in this gap
and provides a clear view of the force and technique that Rolfe used
in restraining Johnson. And Johnson does not argue that the videos
were altered in any way or do not depict what actually happened;
thus, he has not challenged their authenticity. Accordingly, we
determine that the district court properly considered the body
camera and dashcam videos in ruling on Rolfe’s Rule 12(c) motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
B. Qualified immunity on the federal claims
With it established that the district court properly
considered Rolfe’s body camera and dashcam footage, we now
turn to whether the videos established that Rolfe was entitled to
qualified immunity on Johnson’s federal excessive force claim. See
by-reference doctrine to apply appears in Part II.A of the district court’s order,
a portion we explicitly did not adopt. See id.
at 1368–69.
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22-11359 Opinion of the Court 17
Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277–78 (“[W]here [the] video is clear and
obviously contradicts the plaintiff’s alleged facts, we accept the
video’s depiction instead of the complaint’s account, and [we] view
the facts in the light depicted by the video.”) As explained below,
we affirm the district court’s determination that Rolfe is entitled to
qualified immunity because no constitutional violation occurred.
“Qualified immunity shields government employees from
suit in their individual capacities for discretionary actions they
perform [in carrying out] their duties.” Brooks v. Miller, 78 F.4th 1267, 1279
(11th Cir. 2023). “To determine whether qualified
immunity applies, we engage in a burden-shifting analysis.” Id. at 1280
. The first step requires a defendant to show that he was acting
within the scope of his discretionary authority when committing
the challenged act. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194
(11th Cir.
2002). “Once the defendant does that, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff, who must show that qualified immunity is not
appropriate.” Miller, 78 F.4th at 1280
. To show that qualified
immunity is not appropriate, “the plaintiff must establish two
things: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) that
constitutional right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the
defendant’s actions.” Id.
(quoting Powell v. Snook,25 F.4th 912, 920
(11th Cir. 2022)). “Courts have ‘discretion to decide which of the
two prongs of the qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.’” Id.
(alteration adopted) (quoting Ashcroft v. alKidd,563 U.S. 731
, 735
(2011)).
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Johnson does not dispute that Rolfe was operating within
the scope of his discretionary authority when he placed Johnson
under arrest. And for good reason. It is well established that an
arrest of someone suspected of violating the law is within the
discretionary authority of a police officer. See Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 877
(11th Cir. 2003) (noting it was clear that an officer
“was acting within the course and scope of his discretionary
authority when he charged and arrested [a suspect]”). Accordingly,
the burden is on Johnson to establish that Rolfe violated a
constitutional right in arresting him and that the right was clearly
established at the time of Johnson’s arrest. We begin and end our
qualified immunity analysis by addressing the first requirement.
The Fourth Amendment provides a “right of the people to
be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. This right “encompasses the plain right to
be free from the use of excessive force.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197
. The
Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard governs
the excessive force inquiry. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388
(1989). “With respect to a claim of excessive force . . . [n]ot every
push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace
of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 396
(quotations and internal citation omitted).
“In determining the reasonableness of the force applied, we
look at the fact pattern from the perspective of a reasonable officer
on the scene with knowledge of the attendant circumstances and
facts, and balance the risk of bodily harm to the suspect against the
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gravity of the threat the officer sought to eliminate.” McCullough v.
Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1206
(11th Cir. 2006). A court must look at
the “totality of the circumstances” in making this assessment.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9
(1985). The Supreme Court has
identified a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider under the
totality of the circumstances, including “the severity of the crime
at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest for flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396
. We have said that “[o]ther considerations are the need for the
application of force, the relationship between the need and the
amount of force used, the extent of the injury inflicted, and
whether the force was applied in good faith or maliciously and
sadistically.” Baker, 67 F.4th at 1279
. “The calculus of
reasonableness must embody the allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.
“Determining whether an officer’s use of force is
unconstitutionally excessive involves two steps.” Charles v. Johnson,
18 F.4th 686, 699
(11th Cir. 2021). First, we must determine
“whether the specific kind of force is categorically
unconstitutional.” Id.
“Second, if the kind of force is not
categorically unconstitutional,” we must weigh the Graham factors
to determine if the amount of force used was excessive. Id.
Because “[w]e have never held that a tackle is a categorically
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20 Opinion of the Court 22-11359
unconstitutional kind of force,” we must therefore proceed to the
second step and determine if Rolfe’s tackle was objectively
reasonable. Id.
Johnson argues that the district court erred in determining
that Rolfe’s use of force was objectively reasonable. He asserts that
the district court incorrectly determined that his injuries were de
minimis and that a proper weighing of the totality of the
circumstances would have resulted in a finding that Rolfe’s tackle
was not objectively reasonable. We disagree.
For starters, the district court never determined that
Johnson’s injuries were de minimis. Instead, the district court found
that “the level of force Rolfe used was de minimis” based on the
totality of the circumstances. We agree.
While it is true that Johnson’s underlying offense of driving
under the influence of alcohol is a misdemeanor, see O.C.G.A. § 40-
6-391(c), the remaining Graham factors all weigh in favor of finding
that Rolfe’s tackle was reasonable.
Rolfe pulled Johnson over late on a rainy night on I-85—a
major highway—and attempted to get Johnson to perform various
sobriety tests after discovering an open container under Johnson’s
seat. After Johnson was continuously noncompliant, Rolfe
informed Johnson that he would have to place him under arrest
based on the facts that Johnson (1) was clocked going 30 miles per
hour over the speed limit in unsafe road conditions, (2) had an open
container of alcohol in his car, and (3) was exhibiting signs of
impairment. Rolfe then attempted to handcuff Johnson and
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22-11359 Opinion of the Court 21
repeatedly told him to place his hands behind his back and not to
pull away. After continuing not to comply, Johnson resisted by
jerking his right arm away from Rolfe, at which point Rolfe tackled
Johnson to the ground. Given Johnson’s inebriated state, the
proximity to cars speeding by on a major interstate at night in wet
conditions, and the risk of a multi-story fall off the ledge of the
highway, Johnson’s actions placed the lives of himself, Rolfe, his
passenger, and other drivers on the highway in danger. There is
no indication that Rolfe acted maliciously in tackling Johnson—
indeed, Rolfe asked Johnson if he needed an ambulance when
Johnson told Rolfe that his shoulder was dislocated. And while
Johnson now alleges that his collarbone was broken in the tackle,
he admits that his “injuries were not severe.” Based on these facts,
we find Rolfe did not use excessive force in detaining Johnson. See
Charles, 18 F.4th at 699–700 (finding that an officer did not use
excessive force when he made an arrest by tackling a suspect who
ignored commands to place his hands behind his back and pulled
away from the officer’s grip to prevent handcuffing); Durruthy v.
Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080
, 1093–1095 (11th Cir. 2003) (determining that
two arresting police officers did not use excessive force when they
pulled an arrestee to the ground in an attempt to handcuff him).
Because we conclude that Rolfe did not use excessive force
in tackling Johnson, there was no constitutional violation. We
therefore conclude at the first step of our analysis that Rolfe was
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22 Opinion of the Court 22-11359
entitled to qualified immunity, and we do not address the second
prong—whether the law was clearly established. 7
C. Official Immunity on State-Law Claims
Johnson argues that the district court erred in granting
Rolfe’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on his state-law
claims after determining that Rolfe was entitled to official
immunity under Georgia law. He makes this argument because in
his view, the videos show that Rolfe deliberately intended to injure
Johnson. We again disagree.
Under Georgia law, “[t]he doctrine of official immunity . . .
offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in
their personal capacit[ies].” Cameron v. Lang, 549 S.E.2d 341, 344
(Ga. 2001). Official immunity is a matter of the state constitution
and establishes that officers carrying out their discretionary duties
are “only subject to suit when performed with actual malice or
intent to cause injury.” Barnett v. Caldwell, 809 S.E.2d 813, 816
(Ga.
2018) (citing Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, para. IX(d)). “In the context of
Georgia’s official immunity doctrine, ‘actual malice’ requires a
deliberate intention to do wrong.” Wyno v. Lowndes Cnty., 824 S.E.2d 297, 304
(Ga. 2019) (quotations omitted). “A ‘deliberate
intention to do wrong’ such as to constitute the actual malice
7 Because we find that no underlying constitutional violation occurred, we
likewise determine that the district court properly dismissed Johnson’s Monell
claim against the City. See Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1261
(11th Cir. 2006)
(“Because [the plaintiff] has failed to establish that his constitutional rights
were violated, he has necessarily failed to establish the City’s liability.”).
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22-11359 Opinion of the Court 23
necessary to overcome official immunity must be the intent to
cause the harm suffered by the plaintiffs.” Williams v. DeKalb Cnty.,
840 S.E.2d 423, 434
(Ga. 2020) (quotations omitted).
It is clear from the video that Rolfe’s tackle of Johnson was
not done with the intent of injuring Johnson. Instead, Rolfe was
attempting to arrest a noncompliant and resisting Johnson. As
discussed above, immediately after securing Johnson, Rolfe helped
him to his feet; and when Johnson expressed concerns regarding
his shoulder, Rolfe asked him if he wanted Rolfe to call an
ambulance. Nothing in this interaction indicates that Rolfe
intended to injure Johnson when he tackled him. Accordingly,
Rolfe is entitled to official immunity on Johnson’s state-law claims.
See Tittle v. Corso, 569 S.E.2d 873
, 876–78 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)
(concluding that an officer was entitled to official immunity where
his use of profanity, his threat to hurt the plaintiff if the plaintiff
moved, and his act of “slamming” the plaintiff against his patrol
care were insufficient to establish “actual malice”).
IV. Conclusion
Based on the prior panel precedent rule, we conclude that
the incorporation-by-reference doctrine allows a court to consider
documents outside the complaint so long as the documents are
central to the plaintiff’s claims and the authenticity of the
documents are undisputed. Because both of these requirements
were met for Rolfe’s body camera and dashcam footage, the district
court properly considered their contents in ruling on Rolfe’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Furthermore, the contents
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24 Opinion of the Court 22-11359
of the videos establish that no constitutional violation occurred
because Rolfe did not use excessive force in tackling Johnson to the
ground and that Rolfe was entitled to official immunity on
Johnson’s state-law claims. And, because there was no
constitutional violation, Johnson’s related Monell claim necessarily
failed. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.
AFFIRMED.