Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc.
9 F.3d 849
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1993-10-28
- Topic
- general
holding that only class members had standing to object to award of attorney fees paid from class settlement fund | explaining that Aviation Act’s judicial review provision divests district courts of subject matter jurisdiction over “claims against FAA . . . officials involving final orders that are otherwise subject to judicial review under the Act.” | explaining that “[t]o have standing, one must be aggrieved by the order from which appeal is taken” and that “[c]ounsel have standing to appeal from orders issued directly against them, but not from orders applicable only to their clients” (citations omitted) | affirming award of fees to objectors’ counsel based on benefit conferred to class | “rarely are all the Johnson factors applicable; this is particularly so in a common fund ease.” | “rarely are all the Johnson factors applicable; this is particularly so in a common fund case.” | It is not the court's role to “second-guess” an ALJ's 10 reasonable interpretation of a claimant's testimony | objective medical evidence is a relevant factor in 10 evaluating the severity of pain | implying a preference for the percentage of the fund method | implying a preference for the percentage of the fund method. | “While subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the 10 sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical 11 evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant's pain and its 12 disabling effects.” | approving fee award of 29% of the common fund
Citator
- Cited by
- 53 opinions
David Pomeroy, Fuller, Tubb Pomeroy, Oklahoma City, OK, for objecting class members.
[3] Class counsel urge us to revisit the common fund considerations addressed inBrownand reformulate our approach to the reasonableness question in addressing their fee claim. Specifically, class counsel advocate a three-pronged test (class benefit, litigation risk, and professional hours and expenses) they consider exemplified byIn re Domestic Air Transp.Antitrust Litigation,148 F.R.D. 297(N.D.Ga. 1993). Actually, the district court inDomestic Airdid not limit its analysis to these points, but followed Eleventh Circuit precedent and determined the appropriate percentage of the fund fee in a manner quite similar toBrown. See148 F.R.D. at 350-57(examining several pertinentJohnsonfactors supporting award);see alsoCamden,946 F.2d at 775("Johnsonfactors continue to be appropriately used in evaluating, setting, and reviewing percentage fee awards in common fund cases"). We will not involve the entire court in an attempt to improve upon the approach carefully set out inBrown. See United States v. Jones,933 F.2d 807,812(10th Cir. 1991) (prior panel decisions are binding and may only be overruled en banc).
[4] Class counsel raise a second preliminary point, regarding our standard of review. Fee determinations are subject to reversal only for an abuse of discretion.Aguinaga v. United FoodCommercial Workers Int'l Union,993 F.2d 1480,1481(10th Cir. 1993). Class counsel assert that a less deferential review standard is appropriate when, as here, the district judge who made the fee award did not preside over the case for a significant period of time before making that award. We will not assume the district court was less able to render a decision consistent with the applicable law because that court presided over less than the entire proceeding.See Swedish HospitalCorp.,1 F.3d 1261,1272("We can hardly imagine a more futile and foolhardy endeavor than struggling to review each district court's degree of familiarity with a case to decide how much deference to grant its findings and conclusions."). Accordingly, we consider only whether the district court "made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds ofPage 854permissible choice in the circumstances."McEwen v. City ofNorman,926 F.2d 1539,1553-54(10th Cir. 1991) (quotingUnited States v. Ortiz,804 F.2d 1161,1164n. 2 (10th Cir. 1986), for abuse of discretion standard). We see nothing in the record to indicate the district court failed to carefully and adequately familiarize itself with this litigation before rendering the fee award.
[6] This court expressly recognized inBrownthat "rarely are all of theJohnsonfactors applicable; this is particularly so in a common fund situation."Brown,838 F.2d at 456. Further, the district court's findings, which are more extensive than those approved inBrown,reflect explicit consideration of all but two of theJohnsonfactors.SeeSupp.App. tab 26, at 108-16. We will not second guess the district court's judgment that those two, time constraints and the nature of counsel's relationship with the client, would have added little to its analysis.
[7] Noting that much of the common fund monies at issue in this fee dispute were freed up by the failure of potential claimants to join the plaintiff class, the district court characterized its primary task as distributing this available money fairly between class counsel and the class.Id.at 116-17. The district court decided that the majority of the money should go to class members, who had lost the benefit of their funds for nearly ten years, rather than class counsel, who would still receive a fee comparing favorably with awards made in similar cases.Id.at 117-18. Class counsel object that this analysis is improper under our prior decisions. To the contrary, the district court appropriately assumed its role as "`fiduciary for the beneficiaries' of the fund,"Brown,838 F.2d at 456(quoting Report of the Third Circuit Task Force,Court Awarded AttorneyFees,108 F.R.D. 237,251(1985)), to properly "determine a reasonable fee by weighing the appropriate interests of the beneficiaries in light of the efforts of counsel on their behalf."Id.
[8] Following a reasoned discussion of pertinent considerations, the district court arrived at a percentage near the top of the range for comparable common fund cases.See Brown,838 F.2d at 455n. 2 (collecting cases);Swedish Hospital Corp.,1 F.3d 1261,1265-66(same); H. Newberg,Attorney Fee Awards,§ 2.08, § 2.32 Chart (1986 Supp. 1993) (same). Class counsel argue this determination is unsupported by the evidence. We have reviewed the record mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition that "[a] request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation,"Hensley v. Eckerhart,461 U.S. 424,437,103 S.Ct. 1933,1941,76 L.Ed.2d 40(1983), and disagree. We affirm the district court's award.
[10] Standing is a jurisdictional issue that may be raised by the court at any time.Board of County Comm'rs v. W.H.I., Inc.,992 F.2d 1061,1063(10th Cir. 1993). To have standing, one must be aggrieved by the order from which appeal is taken.ConcordeResources, Inc. v. Woosley (In re Woosley),855 F.2d 687,687-88(10th Cir. 1988). Counsel have standing to appeal from orders issued directly against them,see, e.g., Riggs v. Scrivner,Inc.,927 F.2d 1146,1149(10th Cir.) (sanction imposed against counsel),cert. denied,___ U.S. ___,112 S.Ct. 196,116 L.Ed.2d 156(1991), but not from orders applicable only to their clients,see, e.g., Pontarelli v. Stone,978 F.2d 773,775(1st Cir. 1992)Page 855(client's entitlement to attorneys' fees from opposing party);Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C O Enter.,886 F.2d 1485,1494(7th Cir. 1989) (client's motion to disqualify opposing counsel);Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc.,877 F.2d 1120,1127(2d Cir. 1989) (sanction imposed against client);Solimanv. Ebasco Servs., Inc.,822 F.2d 320,323(2d Cir. 1987) (client's entitlement to prejudgment interest),cert. denied,484 U.S. 1020,108 S.Ct. 732,98 L.Ed.2d 680(1988). Here, the fee awarded to objecting counsel came out of the common fund remaining after payment of class counsel's fee. Only the plaintiff class, none of whose members is a party to this appeal, could be considered aggrieved by that award. Thus, this portion of class counsel's appeal is dismissed.
[12] The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, the appeal is DISMISSED in part, and the cause is REMANDED for an award of appellate fees to counsel for objecting class members.
- The Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior United States District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. ↩
- After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal.SeeFed.R.App.P.34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. ↩
- Although only class counsel E.W. Keller and Joseph Long were named in the notice of appeal, the third attorney representing the class, Trent W. Keller, was included as an appellant in the docketing statement. Because the latter was filed within the time allotted for commencing appeal, Trent W. Keller's participation in this appeal was thereby secured.SeeHubbert v. City of Moore,923 F.2d 769,772(10th Cir. 1991). ↩