United States v. Robert Dahle Sparrow

On or about a day between the 28th day of May, 1976, and the 12th day of July, 1976, ROBERT DAHLE SPARROW did transport in interstate commerce from Sandy, Utah, within the Central Division of the District of Utah, to Boise, Idaho, a falsely made, forged and altered security, that is, a title to a 1976 Cadillac Coupe De Ville vehicle, knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged and altered; all in violation of Section 2314, Title 18, United States Code.

On or about the 8th day of September, 1976, ROBERT DAHLE SPARROW did transport or cause to be transported in interstate commerce from Salem, Oregon, to Sandy, Utah, within the Central Division of the District of Utah, a falsely made, forged and altered security, that is, a title to a 1976 Cadillac Coupe DeVille vehicle, knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged and altered; all in violation of Section 2314, Title 18, United States Code.

On or about the 8th day of September, 1976, at Sandy, Utah, in the Central Division of the District of Utah, ROBERT DAHLE SPARROW knowingly did make a materially false statement in a security submitted as collateral on a loan previously obtained from the Walker Bank and Trust Company, Sandy, Utah Branch, a bank the deposits of which were then insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, for the purpose of influencing the action of said bank regarding its security interest in a 1976 Cadillac Coupe DeVille vehicle, in that ROBERT DAHLE SPARROW stated and represented that the vehicle had been registered in the State of Oregon and stolen in the State of Idaho, when in truth and in fact, as ROBERT DAHLE SPARROW then and there well knew, the 1976 Cadillac vehicle had been registered in the State of Idaho and sold in the State of Utah; all in violation of Section 1014, Title 18, United States Code. [R. Vol. II, at pp. 1-2.]

Under18 U.S.C.A. § 2314, it is unlawful for any person to transport "in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps, knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited; . . ." It is obvious that to prove the commission of an offense under this portion of section 2314 the Government must show that the instrument traveled interstate in its forged or altered condition. The difficulty of detecting and proving the locale of the alteration or forgery of the security has engendered a presumption in aid of proof. As early as 1822 Judge Story instructed a jury that there exists a presumption that an instrument was forged where it was first found in its altered state or uttered.United States v. Britton,C.C.D.Mass. 1822, 24 Fed.Cas. 1239, 1241 (No. 14,650). Applying this rule to the instant case, a presumption arises that the five money orders which the defendant attempted to utter were falsely made and forged in Louisiana. Of course, as the Government correctly notes, this presumption does not obtain when circumstances reasonably indicate that alteration or forgery occurred outside the jurisdiction where the instrument was first found in its forged state or uttered.See, e. g., Castle v. United States,5 Cir. 1961,287 F.2d 657. In the instant case the Government advances several circumstances which allegedly assuage the probative force of this presumption and affirmatively show beyond a reasonable doubt that the five money orders did not make an interstate journey in their pristine state. 460 F.2d at p. 469.

As to the substantive charge under section 2314, the courts have been consistent in holding that the cashing of a check or money order in one state, drawn on a bank in another state, is competent evidence that the instrument would of necessity have to travel in interstate commerce.There is no requirement ofactual physical transportation by a defendant and itis sufficient that a defendant cause the instrumentto be transported by the negotiation process. Pereirav. United States,347 U.S. 1,74 S.Ct. 358,98 L.Ed. 435;United States v. Gundersen,9 Cir.,518 F.2d 960;United States v. Roby,10 Cir.499 F.2d 151.It is also clearly established that actual knowledgeof the interstate transportation of the instrument onthe part of the defendant is not required. UnitedStates v. Masters,9 Cir.,456 F.2d 1060;UnitedStates v. Powers,9 Cir.,437 F.2d 1160;UnitedStates v. Mingoia,2 Cir.,424 F.2d 710.Theessence of the offense is the fraudulent schemeitself and the interstate element is only included toprovide a constitutional basis for the exercise offederal jurisdiction. United States v. Roselli,9 Cir.,432 F.2d 879,cert. denied,401 U.S. 924,91 S.Ct. 883,27 L.Ed.2d 828. [Emphasis supplied.] 531 F.2d at p. 981.

The case authority indicates that the intent of Congress in enacting the National Stolen Property Act was to provide a means whereby federal authority could be invoked to punish unlawful deprivations of property which, by virtue of their interstate character, might escape the prosecutorial efforts of the states. As stated by the Supreme Court inUnitedStates v. Sheridan,329 U.S. 379,384,67 S.Ct. 332,335,91 L.Ed. 359(1946), in reference to the statutory predecessor of § 2314:

Congress had in mind preventing further frauds or the completion of frauds partially executed. But it also contemplated coming to the aid of the states in detecting and punishing criminals whose offenses are complete under state law, but who utilize the channels of interstate commerce to make a successful get away and thus make the state's detecting and punitive processes impotent.

In the subsequent cases ofLyda v. United States,279 F.2d 461,464(5th Cir. 1960), the Fifth Circuit emphasized the broad reach of § 2314 with respect to unlawful deprivations of property, a reach limited only by the subsequent fact of transportation in interstate commerce:

* * * The aim of the statute is, of course, to prohibit the use of interstate transportation facilities for goods having certain unlawful qualities. This reflects a congressional purpose to reach all ways by which an owner is wrongfully deprived of the use or benefits of the use of his property. * * * Congress by the use of broad terms was trying to make clear that if a person was deprived of his property by unlawful means * * * by fraud, swindling, or by conversion by one rightfully in possession, the subsequent transportation of such goods in interstate commerce was prohibited as a crime.

These observations as to congressional intent lead to the conclusion that the requirement of interstate transportation under § 2314 was intended merely to supply a constitutional basis for the exercise of federal power. As aptly stated by the Ninth Circuit inUnited States v. Roselli,432 F.2d 879,891(9th Cir. 1970),cert. denied,401 U.S. 924,91 S.Ct. 883,27 L.Ed.2d 828(1971):

* * * section 2314 is aimed at the evils of theft, fraud, and counterfeiting and not at the regulation of interstate transportation. Suppression of movement of the fruits of theft and fraud is only the means to the end of suppressing theft and fraud themselves. The sole reason for conditioning the statutes' prohibitions upon use of interstate commerce is to provide a constitutional basis for the exercise of federal power.

Since interstate transportation is merely the linchpin for federal jurisdiction and bears no relationship, in terms of culpability, to the underlying criminal acts which are the objects of § 2314, it follows that the government should not have to prove that the interstate transport was in any way reasonably foreseeable. Of course, this conclusion is in accord with the wording of the statute, which does not by its terms include any requirement of reasonable foreseeability as to the interstate element of the offense. More important, several appellate cases have held that the fact of interstate transportation, without more, is sufficient under the statute. 523 F.2d at p. 707.

As used in criminal statutes, the words "falsely made" and "forged" are homogeneous,Page 234partaking of each other. They have always been synonymously construed to describe a spurious or fictitious making as distinguished from a false or fraudulent statement. The words relate to genuineness of execution and not falsity of content.UnitedStates v. Moore,D.C., 60 F. 738;United States v.Wentworth O'Neil,C.C., 11 F. 52;Territory v.Gutierrez,13 N.M. 312,84 P. 525;DeRosev. People,64 Colo. 332,171 P. 359, L.R.A. 1918C, 1193;State v. Ford,89 Or. 121,172 P. 802;People v. Kramer,352 Ill. 304,185 N.E. 590;Graham v. State,121 Tex.Cr.R. 100,51 S.W.2d 369; Words Phrases, p. 137. Making application of this construction of the words as employed in Section 2314, it has been uniformly held that a check drawn by a true maker on an existing bank is not "falsely made" or "forged" within the meaning of the statute, even though there were no funds to the account of the drawer in the drawee bank; and, that an indictment or information which affirmatively describes the falsely made and forged security in this manner states no federal offense under Section 2314. 216 F.2d at p. 763.

As used in criminal statutes, the words "falsely made" and "forged" are homogeneous. They have been used to describe a "spurious or fictitious making", and, as such, relate to the "genuineness of execution".Marteney v. United States,216 F.2d 760(10th Cir. 1954),cert. denied,348 U.S. 953,75 S.Ct. 442,99 L.Ed. 745(1955).Crim knew at theexecution of the checks that the signature of "Cole"was falsely made and not genuine, since he was nolonger using the name "Cole"; such knowledge may beimputed to him. United States v. Tasher,453 F.2d 244(10th Cir. 1972). Furthermore,by signing anassumed name, Crim's actions tended to establishfraudulent intent. Kreuter v. United States,201 F.2d 33(10th Cir. 1952).They likewise tended toestablish a scheme to defraud. United States v.Scott,457 F.2d 848(10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,409 U.S. 866,93 S.Ct. 160,34 L.Ed.2d 114(1972). Crim's actions further caused the checks to move in interstate commerce in violation of Section 2314,supra. Kreuter v. United States,376 F.2d 654(10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,390 U.S. 1015,88 S.Ct. 1267,20 L.Ed.2d 165(1968). [Emphasis supplied]. 527 F.2d at p. 294.

Appellant's argument that the trial court erred in not giving the proffered instruction setting forth that which the appellant refers to as the commonly accepted definition of "forged" is apparently predicated on the proposition that since the blank money order was genuine, the appellant's subsequent spurious, fictitious and unauthorized execution of it did not constitute forgery or false making.Thisargument is without merit. There is substantialevidence in the record that Williams did not haveauthority to possess the money order; that he was notauthorized to sign his name as payee, that thepurported drawer had no authority to sign the moneyorder; that the amountPage 235of money showing thereon had been placed there bymeans of a stolen check protector; and that theexecution and/or making of the money order wasspurious and fictitious.[Emphasis supplied]. 498 F.2d at p. 551.