Gottlieb v. Barry

holding that, although either method is permissible in common fund cases, “Uselton implies a preference for the percentage of the fund method” | holding that, although either method is permissible in common fund cases, “Uselton implies a preference for the percentage of the fund method” | holding that, although either method is permissible in common fund cases, “Uselton implies a preference for the percentage of the fund method” | holding that, although either method is permissible in common fund cases, “Uselton implies a preference for the percentage of the fund method” | recognizing that the relevant market rate is “based upon the norm for comparable private firm lawyers in the area in which the court sits” | holding that, although either method is permissible in common fund cases, “Uselton implies a preference for the percentage of the fund method” | holding that, although either method is permissible in common fund cases, “Uselton implies a preference for the percentage of the fund method” | holding that, although either method is permissible in common fund cases, “Uselton implies a preference for the percentage of the fund method” | holding that, although either method is permissible in common fund cases, “Uselton implies a preference for the percentage of the fund method” | holding that, although either method is permissible in common fund cases, “Uselton implies a preference for the percentage of the fund method” | recognizing that “[m]any courts have addressed the propriety of utilizing the percentage of the fund instead of the lodestar in calculating attorneys’ fees in common fund cases” | stating that a decision-maker's determination about the particular circumstances of a case is like a finding of credibility | stating that a decision-maker’s determination about the particular circumstances of a ease is like a finding of credibility | stating that Johnson factors must be considered regardless of whether court uses lodestar method or percentage of fund method to calculate attorney’s fee | stating that Johnson factors must be considered regardless of whether court uses lodestar method or percentage of fund method to calculate attorney’s fee | stating that the Tenth Circuit applies the twelve Johnson factors in statutory fee cases | stating that the Tenth Circuit applies the twelve Johnson factors in statutory fee cases | stating that the Tenth Circuit applies the twelve Johnson factors in statutory fee cases | stating that the Tenth Circuit applies the twelve Johnson factors in statutory fee cases | approving the district court's determination that out-of-state counsel's higher rates were reasonable for the services rendered | approving the district court’s determination that out-of-state counsel’s higher rates were reasonable for the services rendered | holding 22.5% well within range of permissible reasonable fee awards | reversing a district court’s decision not to award attorneys’ fees to non-class counsel when a special master determined that non-class counsel “conferred a benefit on the class” | requiring district courts to consider the twelve Johnson factors in statutory fee cases | noting requirement to consider Johnson factors in assessing reasonableness of attorney fees | recognizing advantages and disadvantages with both methods | "Where the district court rejects a factual finding by the master, we ... directly review the findings of the special master, thereby effectively ignoring the district court's review of the master's findings." | “Where the district court rejects a factual finding by the master, we ... directly review the findings of the special master, thereby effectively ignoring the district court’s review of the master’s findings.” | court utilizing the percentage-of-the-fund approach must consider the Johnson factors | court utilizing the percentage-of-the-fund approach must consider the Johnson factors | "Under either methodology, the fee award must be reasonable." | discussing Uselton's impl