Opinion · Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
United States v. Rivera-Ruperto
United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 852 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017)
- Type
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- Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 2017-01-13
- Topic
- litigation
holding that “[t]he question whether Congress has granted a 14 private right of action to a particular plaintiff is not a jurisdictional requirement” | noting that "absent exceptional circumstances, we generally consider as waived issues raised only at oral argument" | noting “there are no ‘hard and fast’ rules for determining the requisite 10 timing and adequacy of pre- and post-deprivation procedures” | deeming a tribe’s proposed funding agreement approved because 25 the United States Department of Interior failed to act within 90 days after receipt | discussing whether RCW 4.96.020(4) is a “special statute 12 of limitations” or a “tolling provision” | finding plaintiff did not need to 28 apply for a conditional use permit which would cost time, money 1 and may not be approved to have standing | noting “[i]n Washington, the catch-all three-year 10 limitations period for any other injury to the person or rights of another’ contained 11 in R.C.W. 4.16.080(2) applies to § 1983 claims”
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United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 12-2364, 12-2367
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
WENDELL RIVERA-RUPERTO,
a/k/a Arsenio Rivera,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
H. Manuel Hernández for appellant.
Robert J. Heberle, Attorney, Public Integrity Section,
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom Francisco
A. Besosa-Martínez, Assistant United States Attorney, Nelson
Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division, and Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney,
were on brief, for appellee.
January 13, 2017
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. This case arises out of a now-
familiar, large-scale FBI investigation known as "Operation Guard
Shack," in which the FBI, in an effort to root out police
corruption throughout Puerto Rico, orchestrated a series of staged
drug deals over the course of several years.1 For his participation
in six of these Operation Guard Shack drug deals, Defendant-
Appellant Wendell Rivera-Ruperto stood two trials and was found
guilty of various federal drug and firearms-related crimes. The
convictions resulted in Rivera-Ruperto receiving a combined
sentence of 161-years and 10-months' imprisonment.
Although Rivera-Ruperto raises similar challenges in his
appeals from the two separate trials, each trial was presided over
by a different district judge. Thus, there are two cases on
appeal, and we address the various challenges today in separate
opinions.2 In this present appeal from the first trial, Rivera-
Ruperto argues that the district court committed reversible errors
when it: (1) denied his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
during the plea-bargaining stage; (2) failed to instruct the jury
that it was required to find drug quantity beyond a reasonable
1 See, e.g., United States v. Navedo-Ramirez, 781 F.3d 563
(1st Cir. 2015); United States v. González-Pérez,778 F.3d 3
(1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Diaz-Castro,752 F.3d 101
(1st Cir.
2014).
2 Co-defendants Miguel Santiago-Cordero and Daviel Salinas-
Acevedo were tried along with Rivera-Ruperto at his second trial,
and we address their challenges in our companion decision as well.
- 2 -
doubt; (3) either declined to consider or rejected his sentencing
manipulation claim; and (4) sentenced him to a grossly
disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the district
court.
OVERVIEW
We keep our summary of the facts brief for now, saving
the specific details related to Rivera-Ruperto's various
challenges for our later discussion.
Rivera-Ruperto provided armed security during six
Operation Guard Shack sham drug deals, which occurred on April 9,
April 14, April 27, June 9, June 25, and September 16 of 2010.3
Each of the sham deals followed the same pattern. They involved
undercover officers posing as sellers and buyers of fake cocaine,
and took place at FBI-monitored apartments wired with hidden
cameras. The April 9 and April 14 deals each involved 12 kilograms
of fake cocaine, the April 27 and June 9 deals each involved 8
kilograms of fake cocaine, and the June 25 and September 16 deals
each involved 15 kilograms of fake cocaine. On top of rendering
armed security services, Rivera-Ruperto brought along with him
3Although Rivera-Ruperto was not a police officer, he was
invited to participate in Operation Guard Shack after he
misrepresented himself to the FBI's confidential informant as a
prison corrections officer.
- 3 -
additional recruits.4 And at the April 27 deal, Rivera-Ruperto
did even more; he sold a handgun, including magazines, to a
confidential FBI informant posing as a drug dealer. For his
services, Rivera-Ruperto received a payment of $2,000 for each of
the deals, except for the September 16 deal, for which he received
$3,000.
The government charged Rivera-Ruperto under three
separate indictments (two on September 21, 2010 and one on
September 23, 2010) for his illegal participation in the six sham
drug deals.5 For each of the transactions, the indictments charged
Rivera-Ruperto with one count each of conspiracy and attempt to
possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, as well
as possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime.
Additionally, Rivera-Ruperto was charged with possessing a firearm
with an obliterated serial number during the April 27 deal.
Rivera-Ruperto's case proceeded to trial after plea
negotiations with the government failed -- a point of contention
4 Among those Rivera-Ruperto recruited, at least one was a
police officer.
5 On September 21, 2010, Rivera-Ruperto was indicted for his
participation in the April 14, April 27, June 9, and June 25, 2010
deals. On the same day, the government separately indicted Rivera-
Ruperto for his participation in the April 9, 2010 deal.
Superseding indictments were later filed, but the charges remained
the same. Rivera-Ruperto was then indicted a third time on
September 23, 2010 for his participation in the final September
16, 2010 deal.
- 4 -
that we get to shortly. For purposes of trial, the first September
21 indictment (which charged Rivera-Ruperto for the April 14, April
27, June 9, and June 25 deals) and the September 23 indictment
(which charged him for the September 16 deal) were consolidated
and tried together. A jury found Rivera-Ruperto guilty of all
charges and the district judge sentenced him to 126-years and 10-
months' imprisonment. It is this first trial which is the topic
of the present appeal. As we discuss in more detail below, Rivera-
Ruperto takes issue both with the judge's jury instructions and
with the sentence he ultimately received.
Over defense counsel's objections, the second September
21, 2010 indictment (which charged Rivera-Ruperto for his
involvement in the transaction on April 9, 2010 only) was tried
several months later before a different district judge. After a
second jury found Rivera-Ruperto guilty on all counts, Rivera-
Ruperto received a 35-year sentence of imprisonment.
Rivera-Ruperto, who is presently serving his combined
sentence of 161 years and 10 months, now timely appeals. Putting
aside, as we are required to do, whatever misgivings we might have
as to the need for or the wisdom in imposing a near two-life-term
sentence to punish a crime that involved staged drug deals, sham
drugs, and fake dealers, we turn to the task of assessing whether
any of Rivera-Ruperto's legal arguments entitle him to relief. As
we have already noted, we address only Rivera-Ruperto's challenges
- 5 -
from his first trial, saving those from the second for discussion
in our separate, related opinion.
DISCUSSION
I. Lafler Motion
Rivera-Ruperto first challenges the district court's
denial of his claim that his first court-appointed attorney
provided ineffective assistance at the plea-bargaining stage. We
begin by recounting what happened below.
A. Background
About a month after Rivera-Ruperto was arraigned, the
government made him an initial plea offer of 14 years that covered
the charged offenses in all three indictments. Rivera-Ruperto's
first court-appointed attorney, Jose Aguayo ("Aguayo"),
successfully negotiated that offer down to 12 years. When Rivera-
Ruperto refused to take the 12-year deal, Aguayo attempted to
negotiate an even lower sentence, but the prosecution told Aguayo
that its 12-year offer was final.
Aguayo then showed Rivera-Ruperto the email, which
spelled out the government's final offer of 12 years, and explained
to him the repercussions of not taking the plea deal. But Rivera-
Ruperto rejected the offer still, and directed Aguayo to make a
counteroffer of 8 years instead. Unsurprisingly, the government
refused the 8-year counteroffer.
- 6 -
In a last-ditch effort, Aguayo joined defense attorneys
for five other Operation Guard Shack defendants to attempt to
negotiate a global plea deal for the six defendants as a group.
The government responded to these overtures by renewing its 12-
year offer for Rivera-Ruperto, but this time the offer had an
expiration date. When Aguayo showed Rivera-Ruperto the renewed
offer, Rivera-Ruperto, once again, rejected it. The offer lapsed
on February 4, 2011. Accordingly, on February 7, 2011, the
government filed an informative motion, in which it notified the
court that plea negotiations had terminated and that a trial
schedule needed to be set.
On that same day, Aguayo, apparently alarmed by Rivera-
Ruperto's behavior during their meetings regarding the plea
negotiations, filed a request for a psychiatric exam for Rivera-
Ruperto. In the motion, Aguayo stated that during their meetings,
he had witnessed Rivera-Ruperto "exhibiting strange behavior which
has progressively worsened," and that Rivera-Ruperto "refuses to,
or lacks the ability to appreciate the seriousness of his case,
refuses to review the discovery material, appears to lose his
lucidity, rants and raves, and vehemently argues with imaginary
people in the attorney-client visiting room." The district court
granted the motion by electronic order.
Shortly after being examined in early June 2011, Rivera-
Ruperto sent Aguayo an email, in which he stated that he wanted to
- 7 -
take the (by then, already expired) 12-year plea offer. Aguayo
responded by advising Rivera-Ruperto that the 12-year deal had
timed out, and that they should await the results of the mental
evaluation before resuming further plea negotiations. If he were
to withdraw the request for the psychiatric examination before
they saw the results, Aguayo explained, Rivera-Ruperto could later
argue, even after accepting an offer, that he had not been mentally
competent to accept it after all.
When the results of the psychological exam came back in
late June, the report deemed Rivera-Ruperto "stable" and contained
no diagnoses for mental disorders that would affect Rivera-
Ruperto's competency to stand trial.6 As promised, Aguayo then
reached out to the government to attempt to reopen plea
negotiations. At first, it appeared the government would be
unwilling to engage in further plea bargaining with Rivera-
Ruperto, whom the government believed had shown himself to be a
"malingerer." But Aguayo was insistent that it was not Rivera-
Ruperto who had requested the psychological exam as a delay tactic,
but Aguayo himself who had requested it, compelled by his duty to
provide Rivera-Ruperto with effective assistance of counsel.
After some back and forth, the government relented and agreed to
entertain one, and only one more counteroffer from Rivera-Ruperto,
6The report also suggested that Rivera-Ruperto may have been
exaggerating psychiatric impairment.
- 8 -
but it warned that the counteroffer had to be "substantial"
(specifically, somewhere in the ballpark of 20-23 years).
Aguayo met with Rivera-Ruperto to relay this
information, making clear that this was their last chance to make
a counteroffer, and that a proposal of less than 20 years would
not be considered. Despite this advice, Rivera-Ruperto insisted
that Aguayo make a counteroffer of only 13 years. Unsurprisingly,
the government again rejected this lowball, but nevertheless made
one final offer of 18 years. Rivera-Ruperto said no, and then
proceeded to fire Aguayo. With plea negotiations over (this time
for good), the case was slated for trial.
On March 23, 2012, nine months after the date of the
psychological evaluation report and three days before trial was to
begin, Rivera-Ruperto, through his second court-appointed
attorney, filed a motion alleging that Aguayo had provided
ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea-bargaining stage and
asking the district court to order the government to reoffer the
12-year deal. The district court granted Rivera-Ruperto's request
for an evidentiary hearing on the issue and, after hearing
testimony from both Rivera-Ruperto and Aguayo and considering the
documentary evidence,7 the district court concluded there was no
7Although the documents themselves are not in the record,
the transcript from the Lafler hearing indicates that the parties'
submissions included email correspondence between Aguayo and the
government regarding plea negotiations, Aguayo's records
- 9 -
merit to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and denied
Rivera-Ruperto's motion. Rivera-Ruperto says this was error.
B. Analysis
We review a district court's determination of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo and any findings
of fact for clear error. Ortiz-Graulau v. United States, 756 F.3d 12, 17
(1st Cir. 2014).
A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to competent counsel
extends to the plea-bargaining process. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1380-81
(2012). A defendant claiming, as Rivera-Ruperto does here, that counsel's assistance was ineffective at the plea- bargaining stage, must meet the two-part test laid out in Strickland v. Washington,466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). Lafler,132 S. Ct. at 1384
. He must show, first, that counsel's performance was deficient, and second, that "the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice."Id.
Rivera-Ruperto argues that he meets both of these
prongs. He contends that he "wanted to accept the 12-year plea
offer, and would have sans his original defense counsel's decision
to seek an unnecessary psychological evaluation, his related
erroneous advice, and his refusal to inform the government and the
containing detailed notes of his visits and conversations with
Rivera-Ruperto, and a document signed by Rivera-Ruperto
memorializing his refusal to accept the government's original
"final" 12-year plea offer.
- 10 -
district Court of [his] decision [to accept the 12-year offer]."8
But this argument fails on both Strickland requirements. To start,
Rivera-Ruperto has failed to establish that Aguayo's performance
was defective.
In order to meet the first Strickland prong, a defendant
must show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688
. Generally speaking, "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment."Id. at 690
. Thus, in order to establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that, "given the facts known at the time, counsel's choice was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made it." Tevlin v. Spencer,621 F.3d 59, 66
(1st Cir. 2010) (citing Knight v. Spencer,447 F.3d 6, 15
(1st Cir. 2006)).
Here, none of Aguayo's actions meets this standard.
Aguayo sought a psychological exam only after he observed Rivera-
Ruperto arguing with imaginary people and exhibiting other
abnormal behavior. While ultimately the results of Rivera-
Ruperto's exam may have shown that Rivera-Ruperto did not have any
8
Rivera-Ruperto appears to limit his deficient-performance
argument to these bases, and does not challenge the district
court's finding that Aguayo otherwise competently made efforts to
get lesser plea deals for his client and adequately explained how
the plea bargaining process worked.
- 11 -
mental health issues, given the erratic behavior Rivera-Ruperto
displayed during their meetings, Aguayo's motion was not "patently
unreasonable." Tevlin, 621 F.3d at 66
(citation omitted).9
Nor do we think Aguayo's performance was deficient on
account of the fact that he advised Rivera-Ruperto to await the
results of the psychological exam before pursuing further plea
negotiations. First, as we get to in a moment, by the time Rivera-
Ruperto had emailed Aguayo to say he wished to take the 12-year
plea offer, there was no actual offer for Rivera-Ruperto to take
because the last 12-year deal had expired some three or four months
prior. But even if there had been a live offer on the table, by
the time Rivera-Ruperto expressed any interest in taking a 12-year
plea deal, he had already been examined and was awaiting the
results. As Aguayo explained to Rivera-Ruperto at the time, it
was Aguayo's professional judgment that withdrawing the motion for
the psychological exam at that point would threaten the durability
of any plea agreement they might have reached because Rivera-
Ruperto could later argue that he had not been mentally competent
to enter into the deal at all. We think this advice was given in
the exercise of reasonable professional judgment, and in any event,
9 In fact, "where there are substantial indications that the
defendant is not competent to stand trial, counsel is not faced
with a strategy choice but has a settled obligation . . . under
federal law . . . to raise the issue with the trial judge and
ordinarily to seek a competency examination." Robidoux v. O'Brien,
643 F.3d 334, 338-39
(1st Cir. 2011).
- 12 -
certainly was not so deficient as to fall below "an objective
standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688
. Rivera-
Ruperto has therefore failed to show that Aguayo's performance was
deficient.
Moreover, even if we were to assume the defective
performance prong has been met, Rivera-Ruperto's claim still fails
because he cannot show the necessary prejudice to meet the second
Strickland prong. In order to establish prejudice, a defendant
claiming ineffective assistance at the plea bargaining stage must
show that "but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a
reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been
presented to the court[,]. . . the court would have accepted its
terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the
offer's terms would have been less severe than under the judgment
and sentence." Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385
. Rivera-Ruperto cannot
do so here.
Rivera-Ruperto argues that he would have accepted the
12-year deal but for Aguayo requesting an "unnecessary and
unwanted" psychological exam and then refusing to withdraw the
request after Rivera-Ruperto told Aguayo that he wished to accept
the 12-year offer. But the facts simply do not bear out Rivera-
Ruperto's theory that Aguayo's actions are what prevented a 12-
year plea deal from being presented to the court. When Rivera-
Ruperto emailed to tell Aguayo that he wanted to take the 12-year
- 13 -
plea offer, it was already early June 2011. By that time, nearly
four months had passed since the 12-year plea offer had expired.
It was therefore not the requested psychological examination that
caused Rivera-Ruperto to "lose" a 12-year plea deal, but the fact
that he had already rejected the offer (more than once, we might
add), leaving no deal on the table for Rivera-Ruperto to accept.
Furthermore, even after the results came back from Rivera-
Ruperto's psychological exam and the government had labeled him a
"malingerer," Rivera-Ruperto had a final opportunity to accept an
18-year plea offer from the government. Rivera-Ruperto rejected
even this offer and opted for trial. Rivera-Ruperto has thus
failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that any
plea deal, much less the 12-year plea deal specifically, would
have been presented to the court but for Aguayo's purported
ineffective assistance.
Because Rivera-Ruperto has failed to show that Aguayo's
performance was defective, and because, even if we were to assume
the performance was defective, Rivera-Ruperto has failed to show
the requisite prejudice, we affirm the district court's ruling on
the Lafler claim.
II. Jury Instructions
Rivera-Ruperto raises on appeal only one challenge
concerning the trial itself. He argues that the district court
erred in failing to instruct the jury that it was required to make
- 14 -
its drug quantity findings beyond a reasonable doubt. We begin
once more with a discussion of what happened below.
A. Background
After closing arguments were made, the trial judge gave
jury instructions, beginning with general instructions, which
explained that the prosecution had the burden "to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." The trial judge then instructed the
jury on the elements of the crimes with which Rivera-Ruperto was
charged.
As a reminder, among other charges, Rivera-Ruperto was
indicted for each of the five drug deals with one count each of
two drug crimes: conspiracy and attempted possession with intent
to distribute a controlled substance. As they are the only
instructions relevant to our inquiry today, we focus our attention
on the judge's instructions regarding drug quantity.
The judge instructed the jury as to the elements of the
two drug offenses, and was explicit that in order to find the
defendant guilty, the jury had to be convinced that the government
had proven each element beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge did
not include drug quantity among these elements, but after
explaining the elements of the drug crimes, the judge did tell the
jury: "If you find that the defendant conspired or attempted to
possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance[,] . . .
you will be asked to also make findings as to the quantity of this
- 15 -
substance that the defendant either conspired or attempted to
possess."
The trial judge referred to drug quantity one other time
in his jury instructions. This was when he described the verdict
forms to the jury, explaining: "[I]f you find [the] [d]efendant
guilty, then you are also asked to provide the amount of drugs
involved in said count. And there's a question for you to find
that."10
Rivera-Ruperto's trial attorney raised no objections to
the jury instructions. After deliberations, the jury returned a
verdict in which it found Rivera-Ruperto guilty of all charges.
With respect to the drug-related offenses, the jury found Rivera-
Ruperto guilty "[i]n the amount of five kilograms or more" for
each of the counts, with the exception of the attempted possession
count for the September 16 deal, for which the jury did not return
a drug quantity finding.11
10 The verdict forms (there were two because there were
originally two indictments that were consolidated for trial) asked
the jury to mark whether it found Rivera-Ruperto "Guilty" or "Not
Guilty" for each of the charged counts. Underneath the drug
related counts, the verdict form asked the following question:
If you find the defendant guilty, please answer the
following additional question:
Do you find that the amount of fake cocaine involved
in that offense was (circle one):
A. 5 kilograms or more
B. At least 500 grams but less than 5 kilograms
C. Less than 500 grams
11 Although the jury found Rivera-Ruperto guilty of that
- 16 -
At sentencing, the district court imposed a sentence for
these drug convictions that was based on the jury's drug quantity
findings. Specifically, because the jury had found that all of
Rivera-Ruperto's drug offenses (except the September 16 attempted
possession count) involved 5 kilograms or more of a controlled
substance, the court imposed concurrent sentences of 21-years and
10-months' imprisonment for each of these convictions.12 The
sentences thus exceeded the 20-year statutory maximum for offenses
involving an indeterminate quantity of drugs, see 21 U.S.C. § 841
(b)(1)(C), and instead fell within the minimum 10-year to maximum life sentencing range for offenses involving 5 kilograms or more of a controlled substance,id.
§ 841(b)(1)(A).
On appeal, Rivera-Ruperto argues that he is entitled to
a new trial because the district court failed to instruct the jury
that it was required to find the drug quantities beyond a
reasonable doubt.
B. Analysis
We typically review jury instruction challenges de novo,
but where, as here, a defendant failed to object to the jury
count, it left the corresponding drug quantity question blank on
the verdict form.
12
For the September 16 attempted possession conviction, for
which the jury had returned no drug quantity finding, the district
court imposed the maximum statutory sentence of 20 years for
offenses involving an indeterminate quantity of drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 841
(b)(1)(C).
- 17 -
instructions below, our review is for plain error. United States
v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d 167, 184
(1st Cir. 2014).
Reversal under the plain error standard requires:
(1) that an error occurred; (2) that the error was obvious;
(3) that it affected the defendant's substantial rights; and
(4) that it threatens the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of the proceedings. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d at 184
. We have noted previously that "[t]his multi-factor analysis makes the road to success under the plain error standard rather steep; hence, reversal constitutes a remedy that is granted sparingly." United States v. Gelin,712 F.3d 612, 620
(1st Cir. 2013).
We begin with the question of error. To satisfy plain
error review, we must conclude not only that the district court
erred in not instructing the jury that it was required to find
drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt, but that the error was
obvious.
The Supreme Court has held that facts such as drug
quantity are to be considered elements of the offense and must be
found beyond a reasonable doubt if those facts "increase the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,"
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490
(2000), or increase the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime, Alleyne v. United States,133 S. Ct. 2151
(2013). In this case, it is clear that drug
quantity was an element of Rivera-Ruperto's charged drug offenses
- 18 -
because the drug quantity findings increased Rivera-Ruperto's
sentence beyond the statutory maximum for undetermined drug
quantities. At trial, the judge did submit the drug quantity
question to the jury, and also instructed the jury that the
government was required to prove each element of the drug offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt. But he never instructed the jury that
drug quantity was an element of the drug crimes, nor did he ever
state explicitly that drug quantity had to be found beyond a
reasonable doubt. The question we must answer, then, is whether
the jury nonetheless would have understood that it was required to
apply the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to its findings on
drug quantity. We conclude that it did, and that the court
therefore did not commit obvious error.
In United States v. Barbour, 393 F.3d 82, 89
(1st Cir. 2004), a case involving similar facts, the district court failed, much like the court in this case, to instruct the jury that drug quantity was an element of the offense, although it should have done so. We concluded, however, that this failure did not constitute obvious error because the jury had been "clearly instructed that the defendant's guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt" and subsequently told, albeit separately, that, if the jury found the defendant guilty, it would be required to make a drug quantity finding.Id.
We reasoned that the
instructions, while not perfect, sufficiently "connected that
- 19 -
burden of proof to the drug quantity determination." Id.
In addition, as in the present case, the verdict form contained a multiple-choice drug quantity question that immediately followed the question regarding the defendant's guilt.Id.
Under those circumstances, we concluded that the district court had not committed plain error.Id.
Likewise, here, although the judge never instructed the
jury that it was required to make its drug quantity findings beyond
a reasonable doubt (though, we stress, he should have), he
correctly submitted the drug quantity question to the jury,
instructed the jury more than once as to the government's beyond-
a-reasonable-doubt burden, and instructed the jury that if it found
Rivera-Ruperto guilty of a drug offense, it would also be required
to make a drug quantity finding. Furthermore, on the verdict form,
after each question that asked whether the jury found Rivera-
Ruperto "guilty" or "not-guilty" of a drug-related offense, a
question directing the jury to make a multiple-choice finding as
to drug quantity immediately followed. Thus, the "link between
the burden of proof and the jury's quantity determination," id. at 89
, was at least as close here as it was in Barbour.
In arguing that the district court nonetheless committed
plain error, Rivera-Ruperto relies on Delgado-Marrero, a case in
which, applying plain error review, we remanded for resentencing
on the basis of an Alleyne error. 744 F. 3d at 186-90
. In Delgado-
- 20 -
Marrero, however, the district court had submitted drug quantity
to the jury as a special verdict question only after the jury had
already deliberated and returned its guilty verdict. Id. 186-87
. The court never directed the jury to apply the beyond-a-reasonable- doubt standard to the special verdict question, nor did it instruct the jury that drug quantity was an element of the drug offense.Id. at 187
. Under those circumstances, "given the timing and manner in which the [drug quantity] question was presented," we reasoned that we could not find that the jury was "sufficiently put on notice of [the drug quantity question's] critical import to this case."Id.
Because the jurors "had no cause to understand the special verdict question as involving another element of the offense," we concluded that the court had obviously erred.Id.
By contrast, here, as we have already noted, drug
quantity was submitted to the jury in the initial jury instructions
and on the verdict form, and the court explicitly instructed the
jury that the government was required to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. Therefore, Rivera-Ruperto has not cleared the
obvious-error hurdle.
Moreover, even if we assumed that the district court's
error was obvious and that it affected the defendant's substantial
rights,13 reversal still would not be warranted because Rivera-
13For all but one of Rivera-Ruperto's convictions, the jury's
drug quantity finding triggered enhanced mandatory minimum
- 21 -
Ruperto cannot show that the error was sufficiently fundamental to
threaten the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
proceedings. See id. at 184
. The evidence in this case that each of the staged drug deals involved more than 5 kilograms of sham cocaine was "overwhelming" and "essentially uncontroverted," which gives us no basis for concluding that the judicial proceedings were so affected. United States v. Cotton,535 U.S. 625, 633
(2002) (holding that the fourth plain-error-review requirement cannot be met where the evidence of an element was "overwhelming" and "essentially uncontroverted" at trial) (quoting Johnson v. United States,520 U.S. 461, 470
(1997)).
At trial, the government showed the jury video footage
from each of the charged drug deals of a confidential informant
weighing the bricks of sham cocaine, and then Rivera-Ruperto
placing each brick into a suitcase. The same confidential
informant also testified on the stand as to the number of kilograms
of sham cocaine that were used during each deal. No conflicting
evidence emerged at trial that might have possibly called into
question the government's drug quantity evidence, and Rivera-
Ruperto does not provide any argument on appeal as to how we might
sentences and resulted in sentences that exceeded the statutory
maximum sentence for undetermined drug quantities. Thus Rivera-
Ruperto's substantial rights would have been affected had the jury
instructions been obviously erroneous, and Rivera-Ruperto would
have met plain error review's third prong.
- 22 -
conclude that, given the evidence presented, any error on the
district court's part threatened the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of his trial.
Let us be clear: we think the district court's jury
instructions were flawed, and that the judge should have instructed
the jury that it was required to make its drug quantity findings
beyond a reasonable doubt. But, as Rivera-Ruperto has not
succeeded in climbing the steep road of plain error review, we
cannot reverse.
III. Sentencing Challenges
Rivera-Ruperto's remaining two arguments are challenges
to his sentence. He argues that the government engaged in improper
sentencing manipulation when it set up the sting operation, and
also that his resulting combined sentence between the two trials
of 161 years and 10 months violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. We begin for a final
time by recounting what happened below.
A. Background
At the beginning of Rivera-Ruperto's sentencing hearing,
defense counsel raised the issue of sentencing manipulation,
arguing that the FBI had arbitrarily chosen to use "large" amounts
(more than 5 kilograms) of sham cocaine for the sole purpose of
enhancing Rivera-Ruperto's sentencing exposure. Defense counsel
argued that, for each of the staged drug transactions, the elements
- 23 -
of the charged offenses would have been fulfilled with lesser
amounts of sham cocaine, and that the FBI's decision to use the 8-
kilogram, 12-kilogram, and 15-kilogram quantities could only have
been for purposes of "mere sentencing enhancement."
Defense counsel also argued that the government's
charging practices constituted impermissible sentencing
manipulation because the series of five drug deals could have been
charged as a single drug conspiracy, in which case Rivera-Ruperto
would have been convicted of just one count of possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924
(c), an offense that carries with it a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years imprisonment,id.
§ 924(c)(1)(A). Instead, the government chose to charge each drug
deal as a separate transaction, counsel contended, fully knowing
that each "second or subsequent" conviction under the subsection
carries with it a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years
imprisonment, id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i), which must be served
consecutively, id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). As a result, Rivera-
Ruperto's sentencing exposure in the first trial was 105-years
imprisonment for the firearms convictions alone.
The government argued that there had been no improper
conduct on its part. Each staged drug deal had in fact been a
separate event, involving varying amounts of sham cocaine. And
Rivera-Ruperto had decided each time to participate voluntarily,
without regard to the amount involved.
- 24 -
After hearing from both sides, the district court,
without making an explicit ruling on the sentencing manipulation
argument, imposed the following sentence. For all but one of the
drug convictions, the district court sentenced Rivera-Ruperto to
concurrent 21-year and 10-month terms of imprisonment.14 For the
remaining attempted possession conviction (for which the jury had
not returned a drug quantity finding), the district court sentenced
Rivera-Ruperto to a term of 20 years (the statutory maximum where
the amount of drugs involved is undetermined). The district court
also sentenced Rivera-Ruperto to 5-years imprisonment for his
conviction for possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial
number during the April 27 drug deal. This 5-year sentence was to
run concurrently with the 21-year-and-10-month and 20-year drug
sentences.
As for the other firearms counts, the district court
imposed a 105-year sentence based on the mandatory 5-year minimum
term for the first conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924
(c), and four
consecutive 25-year mandatory minimum terms for the four
subsequent § 924 convictions. In total, Rivera-Ruperto was
14 Reminder: the jury convicted Rivera-Ruperto of one count
of conspiracy and one count of attempted possession for each of
the five drug deals, and found for each count (except for the
September 16 attempted possession count) that 5 kilograms or more
of sham cocaine were involved.
- 25 -
sentenced to 126-years and 10-months' imprisonment from the first
trial.
Rivera-Ruperto was then also convicted of all counts at
his second trial, and the second judge imposed a sentence of 35-
years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his first
sentence. This brought Rivera-Ruperto's combined sentence for his
participation in six fake drug deals to 161-years and 10-months'
imprisonment.
Rivera-Ruperto now appeals the sentencing manipulation
issue and raises an Eighth Amendment challenge to the total length
of his sentence.
B. Sentencing Manipulation
Sentencing factor manipulation occurs "where government
agents have improperly enlarged the scope or scale of [a] crime."
United States v. Lucena-Rivera, 750 F.3d 43, 55
(1st Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Fontes,415 F.3d 174, 180
(1st Cir. 2005)). Where the government engages in such manipulation, we "recognize[] the court's power to impose a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum as an equitable remedy." Fontes,415 F.3d at 180
.
Rivera-Ruperto begins his sentencing manipulation appeal
by arguing that the district court neglected to address his
properly-raised sentencing manipulation objection at all, and that
- 26 -
this alone constitutes clear error and warrants reversal. We
address this threshold argument first.
It is true that the sentencing hearing transcript
reflects that the district court never made an explicit ruling on
Rivera-Ruperto's sentencing manipulation objection. However, the
transcript also plainly indicates that at the hearing, the judge
invited defense counsel to make any statements he wished. After
defense counsel argued the sentencing manipulation issue, the
judge thanked him, acknowledging that he had heard the argument,
and then, after allowing Rivera-Ruperto himself to speak, invited
the government to respond. The judge gave the government ample
time to argue the sentencing manipulation issue as well, and then
thanked the government lawyer before imposing the sentence.
Based on the transcript, we think it evident that the
judge effectively denied the sentencing manipulation objection
when he chose not to deviate from the statutory minimums in
sentencing Rivera-Ruperto for his crimes. This appears to have
been clear enough to defense counsel as well, because counsel
raised no objection and asked for no clarification as to the
judge's ruling on the sentencing manipulation issue, even when the
judge invited counsel to speak after he imposed the sentence.15 In
15 The judge asked, "That is the sentence of the Court.
Anything else, Counsel?" Defense counsel responded by requesting
abatement for the special monetary assessment (which the judge
granted), but did not bring up the sentencing manipulation issue
- 27 -
the face of such an extraordinary sentence, the district court
should have taken the time to explain why it concluded that the
doctrine of sentencing factor manipulation did not warrant relief,
rather than leave it for this court to draw the necessary
inferences, but we nevertheless conclude that the judge
effectively denied Rivera-Ruperto's sentencing manipulation claim,
and we turn to its merits.
Because "[b]y definition, there is an element of
manipulation in any sting operation," we reserve relief for
sentencing factor manipulation only for "the extreme and unusual
case," Lucena-Rivera, 750 F.3d at 55
(alteration in original) (quoting Fontes,415 F.3d at 180
), such as those situations "involving outrageous or intolerable pressure [by the government] or illegitimate motive on the part of the agents," United States v. Navedo-Ramirez,781 F.3d 563, 580
(1st Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Richardson,515 F.3d 74
, 86 n.8 (1st Cir. 2008)). It is the defendant who bears the burden of establishing sentencing factor manipulation by a preponderance of the evidence, and a district judge's "determination as to whether improper manipulation exists is ordinarily a factbound determination subject to clear-error review." United States v. Gibbens,25 F.3d 28, 30
(1st Cir. 1994).
again.
- 28 -
Here, Rivera-Ruperto argues, as he did below, that the
government engaged in sentencing manipulation by using
unnecessarily high quantities of sham drugs during the deals, by
requiring Rivera-Ruperto to bring a firearm with him to each of
the deals, and then by allowing him to participate in a "seemingly
endless" number of those deals.16 The government's only reason for
structuring the sting operation in this way, he says, was to
inflate his eventual sentence.
But Rivera-Ruperto has not met his burden to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the government's motivations
were indeed improper. At trial, FBI agents testified that the
government used large quantities of sham cocaine for the purpose
of ensuring that the staged deals looked realistic enough to
warrant the need for armed security. Although it is certainly
feasible that, as Rivera-Ruperto argues, the agents could have
used some lesser quantity of drugs and still made the deals look
16 In his brief, Rivera-Ruperto appears not to reprise the
argument, which he raised below, that the prosecution's charging
practices (specifically, its decision to charge the five drug deals
separately as opposed to as a single conspiracy) constituted
impermissible sentencing manipulation. To the extent that counsel
alluded to this issue at oral argument, absent exceptional
circumstances, we generally consider as waived issues raised only
at oral argument. See United States v. Vazquez-Rivera, 407 F.3d 476, 487-88
(1st Cir. 2005). And even if we were to make an
exception here, counsel has provided no evidence that the
government was driven by improper motives in charging the drug
transactions, which occurred on separate days and involved
distinct drug deals, as separate conspiracies.
- 29 -
realistic, the mere fact that they did not, without more, does not
establish that the agents engaged in the kind of "extraordinary
misconduct," United States v. Sánchez-Berríos, 424 F.3d 65, 78-79
(1st Cir. 2005), that is required of a successful sentencing
manipulation claim.
Likewise, it was a part of the sting operation's design
from the get-go that Operation Guard Shack would "hire" corrupt
law enforcement officers to provide armed security at the staged
drug deals, and that those officers would then, in turn, be asked
to recruit others to participate in subsequent deals, thereby
unwittingly assisting the sting in ferreting out additional
corrupt officers.17 Rivera-Ruperto has provided no evidence to
suggest that, in telling him to bring a firearm to the deals or in
allowing him to participate in multiple deals, the FBI agents
engaged in "anything beyond the level of manipulation inherent in
virtually any sting operation" or "lure[d] the appellant[] into
committing crimes more heinous than [he was] predisposed to
commit." Sánchez-Berríos, 424 F.3d at 79
.
Moreover, these same arguments have already been
attempted and lost by other Operation Guard Shack defendants. See
17As we have already noted, Rivera-Ruperto was not himself a
police officer (and turned out not even to be a prison corrections
officer, as he had originally claimed), but among those co-
defendants that he recruited to participate in subsequent
Operation Guard Shack deals, at least one was an officer in the
Puerto Rico Police Department.
- 30 -
Navedo-Ramirez, 781 F.3d at 570
(denying defendant's argument that government's use of high drug quantities constituted sentencing factor manipulation); Lucena-Rivera,750 F.3d at 55
(rejecting the defendant's argument that the government had prolonged its investigation for a year in order to inflate the sentence, where the government argued that it had done so to identify other conspirators, and the defendant did not otherwise present sufficient evidence of an improper motive); Sánchez-Berríos,424 F.3d at 78-79
(denying defendant's argument that the government
connived to make him bring his firearm to the deal in order to
enhance his sentencing exposure). The district court therefore
did not clearly err in denying Rivera-Ruperto's sentencing
manipulation claim.
C. Eighth Amendment
Rivera-Ruperto's final argument on appeal is an Eighth
Amendment challenge to his sentence. Rivera-Ruperto argues that
his combined sentence between the two trials for 161-years and 10-
months' imprisonment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We
assume, favorably to Rivera-Ruperto, that this Eighth Amendment
argument was properly preserved, and review his challenge de
novo.18
18The government makes no argument whatsoever in its brief
in this first appeal as to what standard of review applies, but it
argues in its brief in Rivera-Ruperto's second appeal that Rivera-
Ruperto's Eighth Amendment claim was not properly preserved below,
- 31 -
Let us begin by acknowledging that Rivera-Ruperto's 161-
year and 10-month sentence is indeed extraordinarily long. But in
order to deem it constitutionally infirm under the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause, there are three
criteria we must assess: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." United
States v. Polk, 546 F.3d 74, 76
(1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Solem v. Helm,463 U.S. 277, 292
(1983)). We reach the last two criteria only if we can first establish that the sentence, on its face, is grossly disproportionate to the crime.Id.
To quickly sketch out the underpinnings for Rivera-
Ruperto's sentence once more, of the combined 161 years and 10
months to which Rivera-Ruperto was sentenced, the lion's share of
and that plain error review applies. For his part, Rivera-Ruperto
does not discuss the standard of review in either opening or reply
brief in either appeal.
On our read of the record, at least when it comes to his first
sentence, Rivera-Ruperto probably did enough to preserve an Eighth
Amendment challenge. At the first sentencing hearing after the
first trial, counsel for Rivera-Ruperto argued that the prescribed
statutory minimums had resulted in a punishment that "goes way
over, substantially way over, what's necessary for punishing these
offenses," and resulted in a "horribly, horribly increased
sentence which borderlines on draconian." No similar arguments
were made at Rivera-Ruperto's second sentencing, but for our
purposes today, we will apply the defendant-friendly de novo
standard to Rivera-Ruperto's challenge to his combined sentence.
- 32 -
the sentence -- 130 years to be exact -- was the result of minimum
sentences required by statute for Rivera-Ruperto's six firearms
convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924
(c)(1)(C) (5 years for his first
§ 924 conviction, and 25-year consecutive sentences for each of
the five subsequent convictions).19 Because Rivera-Ruperto bases
his Eighth Amendment challenge on the length of his sentence in
its totality, in order to prevail, he must establish that this
statutorily-mandated 130-year sentence is grossly disproportionate
on its face.20 Thus, we focus our inquiry here on the portion of
his sentence stemming from the § 924(c) convictions.
In noncapital cases, the Eighth Amendment "does not
require a precise calibration of crime and punishment." United
States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 76
(1st Cir. 1995). Rather, "[a]t most, the Eighth Amendment gives rise to a 'narrow proportionality principle,' forbidding only extreme sentences that are significantly disproportionate to the underlying crime."Id.
(quoting Harmelin v. Michigan,501 U.S. 957, 997
(1991) (Kennedy,
J.)). We have previously remarked that "instances of gross
19
As for the rest of Rivera-Ruperto's term of imprisonment,
as we have already explained, 21 years and 10 months of the
sentence were the result of all the remaining convictions from the
first trial, and 10 years of the sentence were from the remaining
convictions from the second trial.
20
In other words, Rivera-Ruperto does not argue that we could
somehow find that the remaining 31 years and 10 months resulting
from his other convictions were, by themselves, grossly
disproportionate to the crimes for which they were imposed.
- 33 -
disproportionality will be hen's-teeth rare." Polk, 546 F.3d at 76
. The Supreme Court has upheld against disproportionality challenges, for example, a sentence of 25 years to life under California's "three strikes law" for the theft of golf clubs, Ewing v. California,538 U.S. 11, 30-31
(2003), and a sentence of 40 years for possession with intent to distribute nine ounces of marijuana, Hutto v. Davis,454 U.S. 370, 370-74
(1982) (per
curiam).
The dissent here argues that in those cases where the
Supreme Court has upheld harsh sentences for seemingly minor
crimes, the Court's rationale was justified because the offenders
were recidivists and recidivism is a legitimate basis on which a
legislature can elect to sentence more harshly. However, we see
no reason why recidivism may be deemed such a legitimate basis,
but crimes involving the combination of drugs and weapons -- like
those targeted by the § 924(c) stacking regime -- may not also be
deemed a legitimate basis. To the contrary, "[t]he Supreme Court
has noted that the 'basic purpose' of § 924(c) is 'to combat the
dangerous combination of drugs and guns'" and "has also noted that
'the provision's chief legislative sponsor . . . said that the
provision seeks to persuade the man who is tempted to commit a
Federal felony to leave his gun at home.'" United States v.
Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 751
(10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Muscarello v. United States,524 U.S. 125, 126
(1998)).
- 34 -
Defendants have a particularly difficult time passing
through the proportionality principle's narrow channel where the
sentence is the result of a statutory mandate. This is because
courts are required to give deference to the judgments of the
legislature in determining appropriate punishments, and must "step
softly and cede a wide berth to the Legislative Branch's authority
to match the type of punishment with the type of crime." Polk,
546 F.3d at 76
; see also Harmelin,501 U.S. at 998
("[T]he fixing
of prison terms for specific crimes involves a substantive
penological judgment that, as a general matter is 'properly within
the province of legislatures, not courts.'" (quoting Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-76
(1980)). Accordingly, "[n]o circuit has held that consecutive sentences under § 924(c) violate the Eighth Amendment." United States v. Robinson,617 F.3d 984, 991
(8th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting United State v. Wiest, 596, F.3d 906, 912 (8th Cir. 2010)). For example, courts have upheld against Eighth Amendment challenges such sentences as a 107-year and 1-month sentence for a defendant's five § 924(c) convictions, United States v. McDonel,362 F. App'x 523, 530
(6th Cir.), cert. denied,562 U.S. 1061
(2010); a 132-year and 1-day sentence, of which 125 years were for § 924(c) convictions, United States v. Ezell,265 F. App'x 70, 72
(3d. Cir. 2008); a 147-year and 8-month sentence based, in large part, on a defendant's six § 924(c) convictions, United States v. Watkins,509 F.3d 277
, 282
- 35 -
(6th Cir. 2007); and a 155-year sentence for seven § 924(c)
convictions, United States v. Hungerford, 465 F.3d 1113, 1117-18
(9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,550 U.S. 938
(2007). Rivera-Ruperto
has not presented any contrary authority upon which we might base
a departure from our sister circuits' holdings here.
At oral argument, counsel for Rivera-Ruperto argued that
we should be swayed by the fact that, in this case, the crime
involved fake drug deals. A near two life-term punishment where
no real drugs and no real drug dealers were involved, he contended,
is a punishment that is grossly disproportionate on its face. But
in coming to this sentence, the judge below was guided by and
correctly employed a sentencing scheme that is written into statute
-- a statute that makes no distinction between cases involving
real versus sham cocaine. At each of the six stings, in fact,
Rivera-Ruperto repeatedly and voluntarily showed up armed and
provided security services for what he believed to be illegal
transactions between real cocaine dealers. The crime of possessing
a firearm in furtherance of such a drug trafficking offense is a
grave one, and Congress has made a legislative determination that
it requires harsh punishment. Given the weight of the case law,
we see no Eighth Amendment route for second-guessing that
legislative judgment.
We thus cannot conclude that Rivera-Ruperto has
established that his sentence, which is largely due to his
- 36 -
consecutive sentences under § 924(c), is grossly disproportionate
to the crime, so as to trigger Eighth Amendment protections.21
21 Because Rivera-Ruperto fails to establish that his
sentence is grossly disproportionate, we need not reach the last
two criteria -- a comparison of his sentence with sentences
received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction or a
comparison of his sentence with sentences imposed for the same
crime in other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, we note that in
comparing Rivera-Ruperto's sentence, the dissent relies largely on
the rationale of Judge Cassell in United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227
(D. Utah 2004), aff'd,433 F.3d 738
(10th Cir. 2006).
However, despite Judge Cassell's misgivings about the resulting
sentence under § 924(c) for a 24 year old first-time offender in
that case, he ultimately (and we think correctly) ruled that:
The court's role in evaluating § 924(c) is quite limited.
The court can set aside the statute only if it is
irrational punishment without any conceivable
justification or is so excessive as to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. After careful deliberation, the court
reluctantly concludes that it has no choice but to impose
the 55 year sentence. While the sentence appears to be
cruel, unjust, and irrational, in our system of
separated powers Congress makes the final decisions as
to appropriate criminal penalties. Under the
controlling case law, the court must find either that a
statute has no conceivable justification or is so
grossly disproportionate to the crime that no reasonable
argument can be made [on] its behalf. If the court is
to fairly apply these precedents in this case, it must
reject [the defendant's] constitutional challenges.
Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1230
.
Similarly, we cannot find that the sentence imposed pursuant
to § 924(c) has no conceivable justification or is so grossly
disproportionate that no reasonable argument can be made on its
behalf. However unfair we may deem the life sentence here, we
cannot say that the Constitution forbids it.
- 37 -
CONCLUSION
Our job now finished, we affirm for the reasons we have
stated above. A second opinion, in which we address Rivera-
Ruperto's separate challenges as to his second trial, issues
herewith.
-Dissenting Opinions Follows-
- 38 -
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge (Dissenting). The majority
today affirms a sentence of 160 years and one month without the
possibility of parole for Rivera-Ruperto. The transgression for
which Rivera-Ruperto was punished in such an extreme manner was
his participation as a security guard in several fake transactions,
while the FBI duped Rivera-Ruperto into believing that the
composite was actually illegal drugs. The FBI ensured that more
than five kilograms of composite moved from one agent's hands to
another at each transaction; the FBI also made sure that the rigged
script included Rivera-Ruperto's possession of a pistol at each
transaction. This combination -- more than five kilograms of
composite, a pistol, and separate transactions -- triggered the
mandatory consecutive minimums of 18 U.S.C. § 924
(c), which make
up 130 years of Rivera-Ruperto's sentence.
In a real drug transaction, all participants would be
guilty of a crime. And, in general, the greater their knowledge
of the crime would be, the harsher the law would punish them. In
the fictitious transaction we are faced with today, however, only
the duped participants, who had no knowledge of what truly
transpired, are punished. The other participants are not only
excused, but indeed rewarded for a job well done.
If Rivera-Ruperto had instead knowingly committed
several real rapes, second-degree murders, and/or kidnappings, he
would have received a much lower sentence; even if Rivera-Ruperto
- 39 -
had taken a much more active role in, and brought a gun to, two
much larger real drug deals, he would still have received a much
lower sentence.22 For these and many other crimes Rivera-Ruperto
would have received sentences that would see him released from
prison during the natural term of his life. For the fictitious
transgressions concocted by the authorities, however, Rivera-
Ruperto will spend his entire life behind bars -- a sentence given
to first-degree murderers, 18 U.S.C. § 1111
, or those who cause death by wrecking a train carrying high-level nuclear waste.18 U.S.C. § 1992
.
From the majority's approval of the draconian sentence
imposed in this case, I respectfully dissent. Rivera-Ruperto's
sentence is grossly disproportionate to his offense, and therefore
violates the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. While some
seemingly excessively harsh sentences have withstood Eighth
Amendment challenges, such harsh sentences have been sanctioned
only in the context of recidivists or those who otherwise dedicated
22 See, e.g., United States v. Carlos Cruz, 352 F.3d 499, 509-10
(1st Cir. 2003) (affirming a sentence of 32 years given to
an actual drug dealer -- who was caught with actual cocaine,
heroin, cocaine base, two machine guns, a rifle, a pistol, and a
large amount of ammunition -- on seven counts related to possession
with intent to distribute illegal drugs and to possession of
firearms); United States v. Grace, case no. 1-16-cr-0039-001 (D.
Maine Dec. 13, 2016) (sentence of 15 years for conspiracy to
distribute and possess 100 or more grams of heroin. Defendant had
two prior convictions and admitted to importing more than 20,000
bags of cocaine).
- 40 -
themselves to a life of crime -- a context that explained the
severity of the sentences. But Rivera-Ruperto has no criminal
record, nor has he dedicated himself to a life of crime. Not even
under the infamous § 924(c) has a first-time offender like Rivera-
Ruperto ever been condemned to spend his entire life in jail.23
I. The Eighth Amendment
The Court's cases addressing the proportionality of
sentences fall within two general classifications.
The first involves challenges to the length of term-
of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a
particular case. The second comprises cases in which
the Court implements the proportionality standard by
certain categorical restrictions on the death
penalty.
In the first classification the Court considers all
of the circumstances of the case to determine whether
the sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59
(2010).
The second classification has evolved to encompass not
only the death penalty, but also prison sentences. See id.
at 61-
62, 82 (holding that a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole for non-homicide offenses by juveniles violates the Eighth
23 See infra Section II.A. Although § 924(c) has rightly
been the subject of much scathing criticism, the statute as such
is not the focus of this dissent. See, e.g., Judge Paul Cassell,
Statement on Behalf of the Judicial Conference of United States
from U.S. District Judge Paul Cassell before the House Judiciary
Committee Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security,
2007 WL 3133929
, Fed. Sent'g Rep. 19(5) (2007). Rather, what is
at issue today is the proportionality of Rivera-Ruperto's
sentence, not the proportionality of sentences under § 924(c) in
general.
- 41 -
Amendment); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469
(2012)
(holding that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for
juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment).
In the present case, this court is faced with a challenge
that falls under the first classification: a challenge to the
length of Rivera-Ruperto's sentence based on the circumstances of
his case; in other words, an as-applied constitutional challenge
to the length of Rivera-Ruperto's sentence.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this first
classification is animated by the principle of proportionality in
punishment, as well as by deference to the legislature's judgment
as to what punishment is merited.
A. Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is deeply embedded into
the very roots of our legal system. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284
(1983). "In 1215 three chapters of Magna Carta were devoted to the rule that 'amercements' [the most common criminal sanction at the time] may not be excessive" -- and disproportionate penalties were invalidated accordingly by the royal courts.Id. at 284-85
. When the Framers adopted the language of the Eighth
Amendment from the English Bill of Rights -- which provided that
"excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines
imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted" -- they
also adopted the principle of proportionality, for it was a major
- 42 -
theme of the era that Americans had all the rights of English
subjects. Id. at 285-86
.
The principle of proportionality is not merely of
historical interest, however. In that same case, the Court went
on to observe that "[t]he constitutional principle of
proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for
almost a century." Id. at 286
. The Court proceeded to cite from
no fewer than eleven of its precedents ranging from 1892 to 1982,
in which the principle of proportionality was recognized24 -- and
24 To wit: O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (the Eighth Amendment "is directed ... against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged"); Trop v. Dulles,356 U.S. 86, 100
(1958) (plurality opinion);id. at 111
(Brennan, J., concurring);id.
at 125–26 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Weems v. United States,217 U.S. 349, 367, 372-73
(1910) ("that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to offense," and endorsing
the principle of proportionality as a constitutional standard);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667
(1962) ("But the question
[of excessive punishment under the Eighth Amendment] cannot be
considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel
and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold.");
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982) (death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia,433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977) (plurality
opinion) ("sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment for the crime of rape"); id., at 601
, (Powell,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
("ordinarily death is disproportionate punishment for the crime of
raping an adult woman"); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685
(1978); Ingraham v. Wright,430 U.S. 651, 667
(1977); Gregg v. Georgia,428 U.S. 153
, 171–72 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Hutto v. Davis,454 U.S. 370, 374
, and n.3 (1982)
(per curiam) (recognizing that some prison sentences may be
constitutionally disproportionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
- 43 -
this was not even an exhaustive list. See id. at 287-88, n.11,
12. The Court proceeded to hold that a punishment of life without
the possibility of parole was disproportionate to the offense of
issuing a no account check in the amount of $100 (even though it
was the defendant's seventh offense) -- and that this sentence
therefore violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 303.
The Supreme Court has continued to recognize that prison
sentences must be proportional under the Eighth Amendment in every
case that has dealt with that question since Solem.25 See Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)26
("[t]he Eighth Amendment proportionality principle also applies to
noncapital sentences"); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20
(2003)
("The Eighth Amendment . . . contains a 'narrow proportionality
principle' that 'applies to noncapital sentences.'") (internal
citations omitted); id. at 33
(Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer,
JJ., dissenting) ("The concurrences prompt this separate writing
to emphasize that proportionality review is not only capable of
263, 272, n.11 (1980) ("[o]utside the context of capital
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of
particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare").
25I here limit my consideration to non-capital cases, because
capital cases fall within the second classification of Eighth
Amendment proportionality challenges. Note, however, that in
capital cases, the principle of proportionality certainly applies
as well. See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 59-61
.
26 This concurrence has since been described as
"controlling." Graham, 560 U.S. at 59
.
- 44 -
judicial application but also required by the Eighth Amendment.");
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72
(2003) ("Through this thicket
of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, one governing legal principle
emerges as 'clearly established' under § 2254(d)(1): A gross
disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms
of years."); Graham, 560 U.S. at 59
("The concept of
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment."); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463
(same).27
B. Deference to the Legislature
The same case law is also clear that respect for the
judgment of the legislature as to what constitutes appropriate
punishment is in order. See, e.g., Solem, 463 U.S. at 290
("[w]e
hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be
proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been
convicted. Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial
deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily
possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for
crimes"); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24
(noting that "[t]hough three
strikes laws may be relatively new, our tradition of deferring to
state legislatures in making and implementing such important
27
Although the position that the Eighth Amendment does not
contain a proportionality principle was occasionally raised, it
never achieved a majority in the Supreme Court, and has been
squarely rejected. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2483
("The
[Eighth Amendment] does not contain a proportionality principle.")
(Thomas, Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
- 45 -
policy decisions is longstanding", and adding "[o]ur traditional
deference to legislative policy choices finds a corollary in the
principle that the Constitution 'does not mandate adoption of any
one penological theory'"). The proportionality principle is
therefore sometimes described as "narrow," and only in
"exceedingly rare" instances of "gross disproportionality" should
the courts apply the Eighth Amendment to overturn a sentence. See,
e.g., id. at 20, 21.
C. The Three-Step Analysis
Thus it is clear that proportionality is of crucial
importance in our sentencing law, but its "precise contours . . .
are unclear". Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72, 73
. It is also clear that
these contours are primarily determined by deference to the
legislature's judgment as to appropriate punishment. This has led
to the emergence of a three-step analysis that assesses both
proportionality and the legislature's judgment. In performing
this three-part test, courts must look at the actual severity of
a defendant's offenses (as opposed to merely looking at the laws
he violated), as well as look at the actual severity of the penalty
(rather than merely at the name of the penalty); and courts must
give recidivism great weight when assessing the gravity of an
offense, and thus when justifying a harsh sentence.
- 46 -
1. The Three Steps
The controlling opinion in Harmelin explained its
approach for determining whether a sentence for a term
of years is grossly disproportionate for a particular
defendant's crime. A court must begin by comparing
the gravity of the offense and the severity of the
sentence. '[I]n the rare case in which [this]
threshold comparison . . . leads to an inference of
gross disproportionality' the court should then
compare the defendant's sentence with the sentences
received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction
and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in
other jurisdictions. If this comparative analysis
'validate[s] an initial judgment that [the] sentence
is grossly disproportionate,' the sentence is cruel
and unusual.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 60
(internal citations omitted; alterations in
original).
2. Actual Severity of the Offense and of the Punishment
In performing the three-step analysis, the Supreme Court
has considered the actual severity of the acts committed by
defendants, as well as the importance of the laws they violated.
See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18-19, 28
(detailing defendant's
past nine criminal convictions and considering the dollar value of
the merchandise stolen by the defendant in his latest conviction).
Similarly, the Supreme Court has been clear that for the
purposes of the three-step analysis, courts must look to the actual
severity of the penalty -- that is, the actual amount of time a
defendant will serve in prison -- and not to what his penalty is
called.
- 47 -
[The defendant's] present sentence is life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. . . .
Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state
penitentiary. This sentence is far more severe than
the life sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle.
Rummel was likely to have been eligible for parole
within 12 years of his initial confinement, a fact on
which the Court relied heavily.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 297
.28
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this approach in 2012, its
most recent pronouncement on the issue:
The two 14–year–old offenders in these cases were
convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. . . . State law
mandated that each juvenile die in prison even if a
judge or jury would have thought that his youth and
its attendant characteristics, along with the nature
of his crime, made a lesser sentence (for example,
life with the possibility of parole) more appropriate.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460
(original emphasis).
3. Recidivism
The Supreme Court has upheld several harsh sentences for
seemingly relatively minor crimes. The Supreme Court reasoned
that the severity of these sentences was justified because they
involved recidivist offenders and recidivism was a legitimate
28 The Court explicitly rejected the Government's argument
that the possibility of executive clemency made a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole the same as a sentence of life
with the possibility of parole. Id. at 303 ("The possibility of
commutation is nothing more than a hope for 'an ad hoc exercise of
clemency.' It is little different from the possibility of executive
clemency that exists in every case in which a defendant challenges
his sentence under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a
bare possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth
Amendment meaningless.").
- 48 -
basis on which a legislature could elect to sentence more harshly.
For instance, in Rummel v. Estelle, the Supreme Court upheld a
sentence of life with the possibility of parole for obtaining
$120.75 under false pretenses, but reasoned that:
Moreover, given Rummel's record, Texas was not
required to treat him in the same manner as it might
treat him were this his first "petty property
offense." Having twice imprisoned him for felonies,
Texas was entitled to place upon Rummel the onus of
one who is simply unable to bring his conduct within
the social norms prescribed by the criminal law of
the State.
The purpose of a recidivist statute such as that
involved here is not to simplify the task of
prosecutors, judges, or juries. Its primary goals are
to deter repeat offenders and, at some point in the
life of one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses
serious enough to be punished as felonies, to
segregate that person from the rest of society for an
extended period of time. This segregation and its
duration are based not merely on that person's most
recent offense but also on the propensities he has
demonstrated over a period of time during which he
has been convicted of and sentenced for other crimes.
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284
.
In Ewing, to use another example, the Supreme Court
devoted an entire section of its opinion to explaining that the
defendant's sentence of 25 years to life for stealing three golf
clubs under California's three strikes law must be understood in
the context of recidivism, and explained: "California's
justification is no pretext. Recidivism is a serious public safety
concern in California and throughout the Nation." Ewing, 538 U.S. at 26
. "In weighing the gravity of Ewing's offense, we must place
- 49 -
on the scales not only his current felony, but also his long
history of felony recidivism." Id. at 29
.
Indeed, of the seven cases that address as-applied
proportionality challenges under the Eighth Amendment, five deal
with recidivist offenders.29 Of the remaining two cases, one
(Harmelin) deals with a career criminal (another important
justification for meting out sentences that appear harsh on their
face); and in the final case (Weems) the punishment was held to
violate the Eighth Amendment.
II. Discussion
A. Three-Step Test
Rivera-Ruperto's case has no difficulty clearing the
first step of the three-step analysis, in which "[a] court must
begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of
the sentence. '[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold
comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality'
the court should then [proceed to the second step of the
analysis]." Graham, 560 U.S. at 59
(internal citations omitted).
In over forty years on the federal bench, I have never seen so
disproportionate a penalty handed down, particularly where the
offense is based on fiction. I am certainly not alone in finding
this sentence to be vastly disproportionate to the offense.
29 To wit, Rummel, Hutto, Solem, Ewing, Lockyer.
- 50 -
Speaking on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Judge Paul Cassell, after describing mandatory minimum sentences
-- in particular under § 924(c) -- as "one-size-fits-all
injustice," "bizarre," "irrational," "cruel and unusual, unwise
and unjust," concluded that the mandatory minimum system of
sentencing "must be abandoned in favor of a system based on
principles of fairness and proportionality."30 The Sentencing
Commission, too, views sentences such as Rivera-Ruperto's as
disproportionate -- not only would its Guidelines recommend a far
lower sentence, but the Commission stated that sentences as a
result of § 924(c) stacking "can lead to sentences that are
excessively severe and disproportionate to the offense
committed."31 As an example, the Commission cited the case of
Weldon Angelos, a marijuana dealer who received a sentence of 61.5
years (55 years of which was mandatory minimum sentence under
30 Judge Paul Cassell, Statement on Behalf of the Judicial
Conference of United States from U.S. District Judge Paul Cassell
before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 2007 WL 3133929
, Fed. Sent'g
Rep. 19(5) (2007) (quoting Senior Judge Vincent L. Broderick,
Southern District of New York, speaking for the Criminal Law
CommRRep. 19(5) (2007) (quoting Senior Judge Vincent L. Broderick,
Southern District of New York, speaking for the Criminal Law
Committee of the Judicial Conference in testimony before the
Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, July 28, 1993).
31 United States Sentencing Commission, 2011 Report to the
Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal
Justice System 359 (2011).
- 51 -
§ 924(c) for bringing (but not using or brandishing) a gun to three
marijuana deals)32 -- Rivera-Ruperto, however, is faced with a
sentence of 160 years (130 years due to stacking under § 924(c)).
Rivera-Ruperto's case also has no trouble passing the
second step, namely a comparison of "the defendant's sentence with
the sentences received by other offenders in the same
jurisdiction." Graham, 560 U.S. at 60
. "If more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive." Solem,463 U.S. at 291
. Rivera-Ruperto received,
effectively, a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility
of parole ("LWOP") -- because 160 years is about two human
lifetimes. The district court has effectively condemned him to
die in prison. As noted above, this court is to consider the
actual time a defendant is to spend incarcerated -- in Rivera-
Ruperto's case, that means his whole life. See supra Section
I.C.2. If, however, one compares his offense to other offenses
that would result in mandatory LWOP under federal law, then his
offense pales in comparison. I have been able to locate forty-
nine statutes that prescribe a mandatory penalty of LWOP.33
32 Id. n.903.
33
See United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum
Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, App. A (2011).
- 52 -
Seventeen of these are for first degree murder.34 The general
statute imposing a mandatory minimum for first degree murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111
, goes back to 1790. Congress has steadily widened its application since then, and it now covers many specific situations, from killing the president,18 U.S.C. § 1751
(a), to killing an eggs product quality inspector,21 U.S.C. § 1041
(b). Other statutes mandate a sentence of LWOP for such crimes as genocide killing -- perhaps the gravest crime imaginable --18 U.S.C. § 1091
, wrecking a train carrying high level nuclear material and thereby causing death,18 U.S.C. § 1992
, and hostage taking resulting in death,18 U.S.C. § 1203
. Rivera-Ruperto's
offenses simply do not rise to the level of the offenses in this
chart. The complete chart follows.
Statute (Guideline) Description Date Minimum
Enacted35 Term36
1 15 U.S.C. § 1825
(a)(2)(c) First degree murder of horse 1970 Life**
(§2A1.1) official
34Note that the statutes permit the death penalty for first
degree murder. 18 U.S.C. § 1111
. Because the statutes only
mandate a sentence of LWOP and the death penalty is given only
rarely, I include the statutes in the comparison. After all, the
statutes reflect Congress's judgment that first degree murder,
without more -- already a heinous offense far worse that Rivera-
Ruperto's -- is adequately punished by LWOP.
35 I follow the Sentencing Commission here by indicating the
year during which the mandatory minimum was first enacted with
respect to the substantive offense proscribed by the relevant
statute. See supra n.11, Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the
Federal Criminal Justice System.
36All sentences are without the possibility of parole, for
parole has been abolished in the federal system. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections
- 53 -
Statute (Guideline) Description Date Minimum
Enacted35 Term36
2 18 U.S.C. § 115
(§§2A1.1, First degree murder of 1984 Life**
2A1.2, 2A2.1, 2X1.1) federal official's family
member
3 18 U.S.C. § 175c(c)(3) If the death of another 2004 Life
(§2M6.1) results from a person's
violation of subsection (a)
(knowingly produce, engineer,
synthesize, acquire, transfer
directly or indirectly,
receive, possess, import,
export, or use, or possess and
threaten to use, variola
virus)
4 18 U.S.C. § 229a Develop/produce/acquires/tra 1998 Life**
nsfer/possess/use any
chemical weapon that results
in the death of another
person.
5 18 U.S.C. § 351
(§§2A1.1, First degree murder of 1971 Life**
2A1.2, 2A1.3, 2A1.4) Congress, Cabinet, or Supreme
Court member
6 18 U.S.C. Second or subsequent 1986 Life
§ 924(c)(1)(C)(ii)(§2K2. conviction of using or
4) carrying a firearm during a
crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime and fire
arm is a machine gun or
destructive device or the
firearm is equipped with a
silencer or muffler
7 18 U.S.C. § 930
(c) First degree murder involving 1988 Life**
(§2K2.5) the possession or use of a
firearm or other dangerous
weapon in a Federal Facility
8 18 U.S.C. § 1091
(§2H1.3) Genocide killing 1988 Life** 918 U.S.C. § 1111
First degree murder 1790 Life**
(§§2A1.1, 2A1.2)
10 18 U.S.C. § 1114
First degree murder of 1934 Life**
(§§2A1.1, 2A1.2, 2A1.3, federal officers
2A1.4, 2A1.2)
11 18 U.S.C. § 1116
First degree murder of 1972 Life**
(§§2A1.1, 2A1.2, 2A1.3, foreign officials, official
2A1.4, 2A2.1) guests, or internationally
protected persons
12 18 U.S.C. § 1118
Murder in a federal 1994 Life**
(§§2A1.1, 2A1.2) correctional facility by
inmate sentenced to a term of
life imprisonment
13 18 U.S.C. § 1119
(b) First degree murder of a U.S. 1994 Life**
(§§2A1.1, 2A1.2, 2A1.3, national by a U.S. national
2A1.4, 2A2.1)
of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
- 54 -
Statute (Guideline) Description Date Minimum
Enacted35 Term36
while outside the United
States
14 18 U.S.C. § 1120
Murder by escaped federal 1996 Life**
(§§2A1.1, 2A1.2, 2A1.3, prisoner
2A1.4)
15 18 U.S.C. § 1121
(a)(1) First degree murder of a state 1996 Life**
(§§2A1.1, 2A1.2) or local law enforcement
officer or any person
assisting in a federal crime
investigation
16 18 U.S.C. § 1201
(a) Kidnapping 2003 Life** 1718 U.S.C. § 1203
Hostage taking resulting in 2003 Life**
(§§2A4.1, 2X1.1) the death of any person
18 18 U.S.C. § 1503
(b)(1) First degree murder of an 1948 Life**
(§2J1.2) officer of the court or juror
19 18 U.S.C. § 1512
(a)(1) First degree murder of any 1982 Life**
(§§2A1.1, 2A1.2, 2A1.3, person with the intent to
2A2.1) prevent their attendance or
testimony in an official
proceeding
20 18 U.S.C. § 1512
(a)(2) Obstructing justice by using, 1982 Life
(§§ 2A1.1, 2A1.2, 2A1.3, or attempting to use,
2A2.1) physical force against
another
21 18 U.S.C. § 1512
(a)(3)(A) Obstructing justice by 1982 Life
(§§2A1.1, 2A1.2, 2A1.3, tampering with a witness,
2A2.1) victim, or an informant
22 18 U.S.C. § 1651
Piracy under the laws of the 1790 Life
nation
23 18 U.S.C. § 1652
Piracy by U.S. citizen 1790 Life 2418 U.S.C. § 1653
Piracy against the United 1790 Life
States by an alien
25 18 U.S.C. § 1655
Piracy in the form of assault 1790 Life
on a commander
26 18 U.S.C. § 1661
Robbery ashore by a pirate 1790 Life 2718 U.S.C. § 1751
(a) Killing the President of the 1965 Life**
(§§2A1.1, 2A1.2, 2A1.3, United States, the next in
2A1.4) order of succession to the
Office of the President, or
any person who is acting as
the President of the United
States; or any person
employed in the Executive
Office of the President or
Office of the Vice President
28 18 U.S.C. § 1958
(a) Causing death through the use 1984 Life**
(§2E1.4) of interstate commerce
facilities in the commission
of a murder-for-hire
29 18 U.S.C. § 1992
Wrecking train carrying high 2006 Life**
level nuclear waste and
thereby causing death
30 18 U.S.C. § 2113
(e) Causing death in the course 1934 Life**
(§§2A1.1, 2B3.1) of a bank robbery, avoiding
- 55 -
Statute (Guideline) Description Date Minimum
Enacted35 Term36
apprehension for a bank
robbery, or escaping custody
after a bank robbery
31 18 U.S.C. § 2241
(c) Second or subsequent offense, 1986 Life**
(§2A3.1) engaging in a sexual act with
a child under the age of 12,
or engaging in a sexual act
by force with a child who is
above the age of 12, but under
the age of 16
32 18 U.S.C. § 2332g If death of another results 2004 Life
(§2K2.1) from knowingly produc[ing],
acquir[ing], transferr[ing],
or possess[ing] missile
systems designed to destroy
aircraft
33 18 U.S.C. § 2332
(h)(c)(3) If death results from 2004 Life
(§2M6.1) knowingly produc[ing],
acquir[ing], transferr[ing],
or possess[ing] any weapon
designed to release radiation
or radioactivity at a level
dangerous to human life
34 18 U.S.C. § 3559
(c)(1) Upon conviction for a serious 2003 Life†,††
violent felony, if offender
has two or more prior serious
violent felony convictions,
or one or more prior serious
violent felony convictions
and one or more prior serious
drug offense conviction
35 18 U.S.C. § 3559
(d)(1) If the death of a child less 2003 Life
than 14 years results from a
serious violent felony
36 18 U.S.C. § 3559
(e)(1) Where a federal sex offense 2003 Life**,
committed against a minor and †
the offender has a prior sex
conviction in which minor was
a victim.
37 21 U.S.C. § 461
(c) Killing any person engaged in 1957 Life**
(§2N2.1) or on account of performance
of his official duties as
poultry or poultry products
inspector.
38 21 U.S.C. § 675
(§§2A1.1, Killing any person engaged in 1907 Life**
2A1.2, 2A1.3, 2A1.4, or on account of performance
2A1.2, 2A2.3) of his official duties as a
meat inspector
39 21 U.S.C. § 841
(b)(1)(A) Second offense manufacturing, 1986 Life*,†
(§2D1.1) distributing, or possessing a
controlled substance or
counterfeit substance with
intent to distribute, if
death or serious bodily
- 56 -
Statute (Guideline) Description Date Minimum
Enacted35 Term36
injury results from the use
of such substance
21 U.S.C. §§ 859
(b)
(distribution to a person
under the age of 21), 860(b)
(distribution or manufacture
in or near a school or
college), and 861(c)
(employing or using a person
under the age of 21 to engage
in a controlled substance
offense) all incorporate the
minimum terms set by
§ 841(b)(1)(A).
40 21 U.S.C. § 841
(b)(1)(A) Third offense, manufacturing, 1986 Life*,†
(§2D1.1) distributing, or possessing a
controlled substance or
counterfeit substance with
intent to distribute
21 U.S.C. §§ 859
(b)
(distribution to a person
under the age of 21), 860(b)
(distribution or manufacture
in or near a school or
college), and 861(c)
(employing or using a person
under the age of 21 to engage
in a controlled substance
offense) all incorporate the
minimum terms set by
§ 841(b)(1)(A).
41 21 U.S.C. § 841
(b)(1)(B) Second or any subsequent 1984 Life*,†
(§2D1.1) offense, manufacturing,
distributing or possessing a
controlled substance or
counterfeit substance with
intent to distribute, death
or serious bodily injury
results
21 U.S.C. §§ 859
(b)
(distribution to a person
under the age of 21), 860(b)
(distribution or manufacture
in or near a school or
college), and 861(c)
(employing or using a person
under the age of 21 to engage
in a controlled substance
offense) all incorporate the
minimum terms set by
§ 841(b)(1)(A).
- 57 -
Statute (Guideline) Description Date Minimum
Enacted35 Term36
42 21 U.S.C. § 848
(b) Any offense; 1986
principal, Life**
(§2D1.5) administrator, organizer, or
leader ("kingpin") of
continuing criminal
enterprise
43 21 U.S.C. § 960
(b)(1) Second or any subsequent 1986 Life*,†
(§2D1.5) offense, unlawful import or
export of controlled
substance, death or serious
bodily injury results
44 21 U.S.C. § 960
(b)(2) Second or any subsequent 1986 Life†
offense, unlawful import or
export of controlled
substance, death or serious
bodily injury results
45 21 U.S.C. § 960
(b)(3) Second or any subsequent 1986 Life†
offense, unlawful import or
export of controlled
substance, death or serious
bodily injury results
46 21 U.S.C. § 1041
(b) Killing any person engaged in 1970 Life**
or on account of performance
of his official duties under
Chapter 15-Eggs Product
Inspection
47 42 U.S.C. § 2272
(b) Violation of prohibitions 1954 Life
(§2M6.1) governing atomic weapons;
death of another resulting
48 49 U.S.C. Committing or attempting to 1958 Life**
§ 46502(a)(2)(B) commit aircraft piracy in
(§§2A5.1, 2X1.1) special aircraft jurisdiction
of the U.S.; resulting in
death of another individual
49 49 U.S.C. Violation of Convention for 1958 Life**
§ 46502(b)(1)(B) the Suppression of Unlawful
(§§2A5.1, 2X1.1) Seizure of Aircraft outside
special aircraft jurisdiction
of U.S.; resulting in death
of another individual
* Safety valve applies (18 U.S.C. § 3553
(f)), allowing for sentencing below the mandatory minimums for certain low-level, first-time offenders. ** Statute also permits the imposition of the death penalty. † Recidivism required for the mandatory term of life imprisonment to apply. ††18 U.S.C. § 3582
(c)(1), commonly known as the "compassionate release"
provision, applies. This provision allows certain criminals to be released at
age 70 if they have served at least 30 years in prison.
If one approaches the analysis under this second step
from another angle, one arrives at the same conclusion. That is,
if one looks to offenses far graver than those Rivera-Ruperto
- 58 -
committed, one finds that they carry far less severe sentences
than Rivera-Ruperto's. In sentencing to a mandatory term of 55
years a defendant who had committed three offenses under § 924(c),
Judge Cassell compiled a table of offenses under federal law that
would result in a shorter sentence than those 55 years -- but were
clearly graver than the defendant's offenses. Judge Cassell's
comparison applies even to Rivera-Ruperto's considerably longer
sentence. Examples from his table include "an aircraft hijacker
(293 months), a terrorist who detonates a bomb in a public place
(235 months), a racist who attacks a minority with the intent to
kill and inflicts permanent or life-threatening injuries (210
months), a second-degree murderer, or a rapist." United States v.
Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1244-45
(D. Utah 2004), aff'd,433 F.3d 738
(10th Cir. 2006). Judge Cassell went on to compare the
sentence before him to triple offenders, and arrived at the
conclusion that,
[a]mazingly, [the Defendant's] sentence under
§ 924(c) is still far more severe than criminals who
committed, for example, three aircraft hijackings,
three second-degree murders, three kidnappings, or
three rapes. . . . [Defendant] will receive a longer
sentence than any three-time criminal, with the sole
exception of a marijuana dealer who shoots three
people. ([The defendant] still receives a longer
sentence than a marijuana dealer who shoots two
people.)
Id. at 1246.
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Similarly telling is a comparison to the federal three-
strikes provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3559
(c). This statute mandates that a court impose a sentence of LWOP on a criminal with two prior serious violent felony convictions when this criminal commits a third such offense -- but such an offender can then be released at age 70 if he has served at least 30 years in prison under18 U.S.C. § 3582
(c)(1), the so-called "compassionate release clause." That
is, if Rivera-Ruperto had committed a violent felony, been
convicted, then committed a second violent felony, then been
convicted again, and then committed a third violent felony, and
been convicted yet again, he -- even though a seemingly
incorrigible recidivist -- would have been eligible for release at
age 70. As a first-time offender sentenced under § 924(c),
however, Rivera-Ruperto will never be eligible for release.37
37 See also Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1250-51
("The
irrationality only increases when section § 924(c) is compared to
the federal 'three strikes' provision. Criminals with two prior
violent felony convictions who commit a third such offense are
subject to 'mandatory' life imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3559
(c)- -the federal 'three–strikes' law. But then under18 U.S.C. § 3582
(c)(1)--commonly known as the 'compassionate release'
provision--these criminals can be released at age 70 if they have
served 30 years in prison. But because this compassionate release
provision applies to sentences imposed under § 3559(c)--not §
924(c)--offenders like [the Defendant] are not eligible. Thus,
while the 24–year–old [Defendant] must serve time until he is well
into his 70's, a 40–year–old recidivist criminal who commits second
degree murder, hijacks an aircraft, or rapes a child is potentially
eligible for release at age 70. In other words, mandatory life
imprisonment under the federal three-strikes law for persons
guilty of three violent felony convictions is less mandatory than
mandatory time imposed on the first-time offender under § 924(c).
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At the third, and final, step of the analysis, "the court
should . . . compare [Rivera-Ruperto's sentence] . . . with the
sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. If
this comparative analysis 'validate[s] an initial judgment that
[the] sentence is grossly disproportionate,' the sentence is cruel
and unusual." Graham, 560 U.S. at 60
(internal citations omitted).
Rivera-Ruperto's case also clears this final step without
difficulty. Sentences for offenses like Rivera-Ruperto's are much
lower under state law.38 (This brings with it a number of serious
Again, the rationality of this arrangement is dubious.
This possibility, too, is no mere hypothetical. This
morning, the court had before it for sentencing Thomas Ray Gurule.
Mr. Gurule is 54–years–old with a lifelong history of criminal
activity and drug abuse. He has spent more of his life incarcerated
than he has in the community. He has sixteen adult criminal
convictions on his record, including two robbery convictions
involving dangerous weapons. His most recent conviction was for
carjacking. In August 2003, after failing to pay for gas at a
service station, Mr. Gurule was pursued by the station manager. To
escape, Mr. Gurule broke into the home of a young woman, held her
at knife point, stole her jewelry, and forced her to drive him
away from the scene of his crimes. During the drive, Mr. Gurule
threatened both the woman and her family.
For this serious offense--the latest in a long string of
crimes for which he has been convicted--the court must apparently
sentence Mr. Gurule to "life" in prison under 18 U.S.C. § 3559
(c).
But because of the compassionate release provision, Mr. Gurule is
eligible for release after serving 30–years of his sentence. Why
Mr. Gurule, a career criminal, should be eligible for this
compassionate release while [the Defendant is not] is not obvious
to the court.").
38 Erik Luna and Paul Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1
, 16 (2010) ("Most drug and weapons crimes
amenable to federal mandatory minimums are actually prosecuted in
state courts pursuant to state laws carrying much lower
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issues, such as prosecutors choosing to bring cases in federal
court merely because of the higher sentences -- but such issues
are not the focus of this dissent.).39 There is also some
suggestion that courts may need to look to foreign law in this
step of the analysis. In cases involving the second classification
of Eighth Amendment challenges -- applying categorical
restrictions on the death penalty or LWOP -- the Supreme Court
"has looked beyond our Nation's borders for support for its
independent conclusion that a particular punishment is cruel and
unusual. . . . Today we continue that longstanding practice in
noting the global consensus against the sentencing practice in
question." Graham, 560 U.S. at 80
. It is unclear whether in the
first classification of Eighth Amendment challenges -- such as the
as-applied challenge before us today -- courts should also look to
sentences.") (emphasis added).
39Id. ("It is hardly disputed, however, that the possibility
of severe punishment can influence the choice of whether to pursue
a federal or state prosecution. For some, this prospect raises
serious questions about the propriety of bringing charges in
federal rather than state court, particularly where the
prosecution is pursued, not because the case implicates a special
national interest, but because it jacks up the potential
punishment."). See also Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1243
("Indeed,
the government conceded that [the Defendant's] federal sentence
[of 55 years in prison] after application of the § 924(c) counts
is more than he would have received in any of the fifty states.");
Id. at 1259 ("[Defendant's] sentence [of 55 years under § 924(c)]
is longer than he would receive in any of the fifty states. The
government commendably concedes this point in its brief, pointing
out that in Washington State [the Defendant] would serve about
nine years and in Utah would serve about five to seven years.").
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foreign law. I therefore note that foreign law further supports
the proposition that Rivera-Ruperto's sentence is out of
proportion to his crime, for "LWOP . . . scarcely exists elsewhere
in the world. Yet today, the number of defendants sentenced to
LWOP by American courts approaches 50,000. . . . In fact, what
separates the American criminal justice system from the rest of
the world, and brands it as distinctively harsh, is the number of
inmates dispatched to prison for the duration of their lives,
without offering a legal mechanism for freedom."40 Indeed,
Germany, France, and Italy have declared LWOP to be
unconstitutional, and other European countries apply it only very
rarely.41
40 Craig S. Lerner, Who's Really Sentenced to Life Without
Parole?: Searching for "Ugly Disproportionalities" in the
American Criminal Justice System, 2015 Wis. L. Rev. 789
, 792 (2015). See Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life without Parole Sentences in the United States, Fed. Sent'g. Rep. 23(1) (2010),2010 WL 6681093
at *30 ("In many other
industrialized nations, serious offenders are typically released
after a maximum prison term of no more than thirty years. For
instance, in Spain and Canada, the longest sentence an offender
can receive is twenty-five or thirty years. In Germany, France,
and Italy, LWOP has been declared unconstitutional. In the United
Kingdom, it is allowable, but used quite sparingly; according to
a recent estimate, only twenty-three inmates were serving this
sentence. In Sweden, parole-ineligible life sentences are
permissible, but never mandatory. The Council of Europe stated in
1977 that 'it is inhuman to imprison a person for life without the
hope of release,' and that it would 'be compatible neither with
the modern principles on the treatment of prisoners . . . nor with
the idea of the reintegration of offenders into society.'")
(footnotes omitted).
41 Id.
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B. Additional Observations
The analysis could stop here. But because this is such
a rare case, a few additional observations are in order.
1. Direct Comparison to Other Cases
A direct comparison of Rivera-Ruperto's offense and its
sentence to offenses and their sentences that the Supreme Court
held constitutional is enlightening. There are five such cases.
See supra, Section I.C.3. Four of these cases involve recidivists
-- and the Supreme Court weighed the recidivism heavily in its
proportionality analysis. See id. The fifth case involved a
career criminal, another important factor in determining the
appropriate sentence. See id. However, Rivera-Ruperto is neither
a recidivist nor a career criminal. He is a first-time offender
who has not led a life of crime. I therefore place his crime on
one side of the scales -- without adding the weight of recidivism
or a career of crime -- and his sentence on the other. And the
weight of the sentence dwarfs the weight of his offense.
Such a direct comparison also holds if the present case
is compared to cases from other circuits. The Government, in its
28j letter, has provided this court with eleven cases of sentences
from 55 to 186 years given under § 924(c).42 The Government notes
42 To wit: United States v. Wiest, 596 F.3d 906
(8th Cir. 2010); United States v. McDonel,362 F. App'x 523
(6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Walker,437 F.3d 71
(3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Watkins,509 F.3d 277
(6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Khan,
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that these lengthy sentences were "based largely on recidivist
violations of § 924(c)." In fact, only three of these cases
concerned recidivist offenders; six involved career criminals; the
final one involved terrorists who were involved in, inter alia,
planning the attacks on 9/11. It is telling indeed that in
providing this court with cases in which sentences of comparable
length to Rivera-Ruperto's weathered Eighth Amendment challenges,
the Government has presented this court with such grave offenses
as:
461 F.3d 477
(4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Angelos,433 F.3d 738
(10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hungerford,465 F.3d 1113
(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Beverly,369 F.3d 516
(6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Marks,209 F.3d 577
(6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Arrington,159 F.3d 1069
(7th Cir. 1998). The Government also cites United States v. Hernández-Soto, No. 12-2210 (1st Cir. Aug. 19, 2015); although Hernández-Soto did involve a lengthy sentence, there was no Eighth Amendment challenge in that case, and I therefore do not consider it here. Finally, the Government cites United States v. Polk,546 F.3d 74
(1st Cir. 2008), a case in which this court rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to a fifteen-year sentence imposed under18 U.S.C. § 2251
(e). The defendant in Polk had engaged in online conversation with a person he thought was a 13-year-old girl, and he pressured her to take sexually explicit photographs of herself and to send them to him. In addition, "The presentence investigation report told a seamy story: it revealed an earlier conviction for aggravated sexual assault on a toddler, sexual involvement with teenage girls on at least two occasions, and yet another series of sexually charged computer chats with a minor. The defendant conceded these facts . . . ." Polk,546 F.3d at 75
. I see no difficulty in reconciling
the proposition that Polk's sentence of 15 years did not violate
the Eighth Amendment with the proposition that Rivera-Ruperto's
sentence of, effectively, LWOP, does violate the Eighth Amendment.
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Seven bank robberies (in four of which a firearm was
brandished) by "a repeat bank robber whose criminal record
reflects a life of violent crime interrupted only by terms of
imprisonment." Arrington, 159 F.3d at 1073
.
A defendant who "was convicted of six separate robberies,
each of which involved the brandishing of a firearm."
Watkins, 509 F.3d at 283
. Although a first-time offender, the
defendant "and/or his accomplices entered the homes of
victims by force and threatened to seriously harm or kill not
only the victims, but, in multiple cases, their spouses and
small children." Id.
Defendants who were involved in the planning of the terrorist
attack on 9/11 and who were convicted on "various counts
related to a conspiracy to wage armed conflict against the
United States and a conspiracy to wage armed conflict against
a country with whom the United States is at peace." Khan,
461 F.3d at 83.
Thus, the Government confirms that when long sentences
are applied to serious offenses by recidivists, career criminals,
or terrorists, the Eighth Amendment does not protect the offenders,
for the severe punishment is not grossly disproportionate to the
grave crimes. But Rivera-Ruperto is a first-time offender; he is
no career criminal; and he is no terrorist. Note that even in the
case of recidivist, but minor, offenses, the punishment may violate
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the Eighth Amendment. See Ramírez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755
(9th
Cir. 2004) (holding that a sentence of 25 years to life for a third
shoplifting offense violated the Eighth Amendment).
2. Penological Goals
There is also a suggestion in the case law that courts
may consider penological goals in their analysis, specifically:
deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24
. As for deterrence, harsh punishment can have a deterrent effect, but deterrence alone cannot justify disproportionate punishment: "The inquiry focuses on whether, a person deserves such punishment, not simply on whether punishment would serve a utilitarian goal. A statute that levied a mandatory life sentence for overtime parking might well deter vehicular lawlessness, but it would offend our felt sense of justice". Rummel,445 U.S. at 288
(Powell, J., dissenting). As for
retribution, it is not clear how Rivera-Ruperto has caused any
injury -- for the transaction was a sham -- but even if one ignores
that obstacle, Rivera-Ruperto clearly caused less of an injury
than those who receive LWOP under federal law, or, for that matter,
than those who receive a lesser punishment under federal law. See
supra, Section II.A. Indeed, had Rivera-Ruperto been a drug dealer
himself, and transacted a vast quantity of real drugs in a single
transaction to which he brought a gun, he would undoubtedly have
received a much lower sentence. Id. Rehabilitation is clearly
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not served here, because the current sentence means that the law
has judged Rivera-Ruperto to be beyond rehabilitation -- something
that may be understandable in the case of recidivists who have
demonstrated that punishment does not change their ways -- but it
is troubling indeed to say that a first-time offender will not be
given a chance to learn from his mistakes. Finally, as to
incapacitation, Rivera-Ruperto does not present such a danger to
society that society needs to be protected from him forever.
This analysis of penological goals highlights another
facet of the present case that deserves pause. Rivera-Ruperto's
offenses involved a sham drug transaction, at which sham drugs
were transacted. "Proportionality--the notion that the punishment
should fit the crime--is inherently a concept tied to the
penological goal of retribution." Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31
(Scalia,
J., concurring). But Rivera-Ruperto did no injury, and retribution
is therefore not in order. This affects the proportionality
analysis. For the purposes of proportionality, participation in
a sham drug deal and a real drug deal weigh differently, because
retribution applies in the latter, but not in the former. That is
not to say that when a sentence is given out for a sham drug deal
as if it were a real drug deal, then that sentence necessarily
violates the Eighth Amendment. For while such a sentence might be
disproportionate, it would not necessarily be "grossly
disproportionate" so as to violate the Eighth Amendment. But as
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the length of a sentence for a sham deal is multiplied, so is its
disproportionality. This is simply arithmetic and common sense.
3. The Legislature's Judgment
The three-step analysis already incorporates due respect
for the judgment of the legislature as to the severity of
penalties, and, as shown above, Rivera-Ruperto's case passes that
analysis. Because the judgment of the legislature deserves great
deference, however, it is worth pointing out that, on the
particular facts of this case, I am not questioning the judgment
of the legislature. Rather, § 924(c), as the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist pointed out, presents a good example of "unintended
consequences" of legislative action.43 Indeed, § 924(c) was the
result of a floor amendment (so there is no legislative history)
passed by a legislature that wanted to appear tough on gun crime
soon after the assassinations of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther
King, Jr.44 Not only were the minimums in that law much lower than
they have become since, but -- crucially -- the law was understood
as a recidivist statute for a good 25 years. It was not until
43 William H. Rehnquist, Luncheon Address (June 18, 1993),
in U.S. Sentencing Comm'n., Proceedings of the Inaugural Symposium
on Crime and Punishment in the United States, 286 (1993).
44 Judge Paul Cassell, Statement on Behalf of the Judicial
Conference of United States from U.S. District Judge Paul Cassell
before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 2007 WL 3133929
, Fed. Sent'g.
Rep. 19(5) (2007) at *347.
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Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129
(1993), that the statute became applied the way it is today -- not as a recidivist statute, but rather as one that requires stacking of mandatory minimums on first-time and recidivist offenders alike. Not only is this court generally cautious to infer anything from Congressional inaction, but in this case, it would not even make sense to try. For Congress's inaction cuts both ways: for the first 25 years after § 924(c) was enacted, the statute applied to recidivists only; after Deal, that changed -- but Congress did not act on either understanding of the statute. Furthermore, as has been pointed out countless times, applications of § 924(c) such as in the case before us today contravene the intent of Congress in many ways: most importantly, § 924(c) has led to significant sentencing disparity, directly contradicting the intent behind the major sentencing reform of the 1980s. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited,1999 WL 730985
, Fed. Sent'g. Rep.
11(4)(1999). This is yet another facet of the present case that
distinguishes it from this court's decision in, for instance, Polk.
See supra, n.20. In that case, this court was faced with a harsh
sentence -- but that sentence was clearly so intended by Congress,
Congress had clearly resolved that the offense in question deserved
that harsh penalty. But in the present case, this court is faced
not with a Congressional assessment of the gravity of this offense,
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but rather with an unintended consequence of a statute hastily
implemented and judicially altered.
III. Conclusion
The present case is "hen's-teeth rare". Polk, 546 F.3d at 76
. It may very well be even rarer than that. I would hold
that Rivera-Ruperto's sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.
Indeed, the present case is so rare that it is distinguishable
from the cases in which the Supreme Court rejected Eighth Amendment
challenges to sentences for a term of years (already rare cases),
and it is also distinguishable from cases the Government cited in
which other circuits rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to
sentences under § 924(c) (also rare cases). Never before has a
first-time offender who has not dedicated his life to crime been
condemned to spend his entire life in prison for a transgression
such as Rivera-Ruperto's, not even in cases in which the
transgression was real -- and Rivera's-Ruperto's transgression is
fictitious.
The Government has effectively asked this court to
pronounce the Eighth Amendment dead for sentences for a term of
years. I respectfully refuse to join in this pronouncement.
"Unless we are to abandon the moral commitment embodied in the
Eighth Amendment, proportionality review must never become
effectively obsolete." Graham, 560 U.S. at 85
(Stevens, Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, JJ., concurring).
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