Opinion · District Court, W.D. Arkansas

NetChoice, LLC v. Griffin

NetChoice, LLC v. Griffin, No. 5:23-cv-05105, UP10836342 (District Court, W.D. Arkansas Mar. 31, 2025)

Type
Opinion
Court
District Court, W.D. Arkansas
Jurisdiction
Arkansas
Date
2025-03-31
Topic
bankruptcy

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION NETCHOICE, LLC PLAINTIFF V. CASE NO. 5:23-CV-5105 TIM GRIFFIN, in his Official Capacity as Attorney General of Arkansas DEFENDANT MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 3 II. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................... 3 A. The Social Media Safety Act: Objectives and Requirements ......................... 3 B.

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed NetChoice, LLC v. Griffin. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

           IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                        
              WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS                            
                  FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION                               

NETCHOICE, LLC                                            PLAINTIFF       

V.                        CASE NO. 5:23-CV-5105                           

TIM GRIFFIN, in his Official Capacity                                     
as Attorney General of Arkansas                             DEFENDANT     






             MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                             








                            1                                         
                   TABLE OF CONTENTS                                  

I.  INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 3 
II.  BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................... 3 
 A.  The Social Media Safety Act: Objectives and Requirements ......................... 3 
 B.  Social Media Use Among Minors ................................................................... 6 
 C.  Types of Speech Available on NetChoice Members’ Platforms ..................... 7 
 D.  Existing Parental Controls .............................................................................. 9 
 E.  Existing Social Media Protections for Minors ............................................... 12 
III.  LEGAL STANDARD .............................................................................................. 14 
IV.  DISCUSSION ......................................................................................................... 16 
 A.  Standing ....................................................................................................... 16 
 B.  Need for Further Discovery .......................................................................... 16 
 C.  Merits Claims ............................................................................................... 19 
     1.  Burdens on First Amendment Rights: Platform Users’ Rights ............... 19 
        a. Level of Scrutiny ............................................................................. 19 
        b. Act 689 Is Not Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Compelling State 
        Interest ............................................................................................... 24 
     2.  Void for Vagueness:  NetChoice Members’ Claim ................................ 34 
 D.  Irreparable Harm .......................................................................................... 40 
 E.  Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest ............................................ 40 
V.  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 41 










                            2                                         
                  I.    INTRODUCTION                                  
 This case presents a constitutional challenge to Arkansas Act 689 of 2023, the 
“Social Media Safety Act” (“Act 689”). Act 689 requires certain social media platforms to 
verify the age of all account holders who reside in Arkansas in order to prevent minors 

from opening accounts without parental consent. This age verification must be performed 
by a third-party vendor using the account-seeker’s government identification or biometric 
information. Act 689 was set to go into effect September 1, 2023, but was preliminarily 
enjoined by this Court (Doc. 44). Plaintiff NetChoice, LLC, an Internet trade association, 
now moves for summary judgment on its First Amendment and vagueness claims. For 
the reasons that follow, NetChoice’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 66) 
is GRANTED.                                                               
                  II.    BACKGROUND                                   
   A.   The Social Media Safety Act: Objectives and Requirements      
 As described by the State, “Arkansas passed the Social Media Safety Act (Act 

689) to protect children from the widespread dangers of social media” and “prevent[ ] 
online sexual predators from exploiting children in online spaces” by requiring “reasonable 
age verification.” (Doc. 72, p. 1).                                       
 Act 689 is described in detail in the Court’s preliminary injunction order (Doc. 44).1  
The broad strokes are as follows. Under Act 689, “[a] social media company shall not 


1  Act 689 has since been recodified at subchapter 14, rather than subchapter 11, of 
Chapter 88 of the Arkansas Code. In the Court’s preliminary injunction order when 
reading a cite to, e.g., § 1102, the reader should now look to § 1402.    

                            3                                         
permit an Arkansas user who is a minor to be an account holder on the social media 
company's social media platform unless the minor has the express consent of a parent 
or legal guardian.” 
Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-1402
(a). To enforce this prohibition, social 
media companies “shall use a third-party vendor to perform reasonable age verification 

before  allowing  access  to  the  social  media  company's  social  media  platform.”  
Id.
 
§ 1402(c)(1).  “Reasonable  age  verification  methods”  include  providing  the  account 
holder’s digital ID or other government-issued ID to the third-party vendor, or “[a]ny 
commercially reasonable age verification method” a third-party vendor might use. Id. 
§ 1402(c)(2). Other age verification methods currently on the market utilize biometric data 
to perform face or voice analysis. (Doc. 45, pp. 17:12–20). Once their age is verified, an 
adult can access a social media platform. A minor, however, cannot access a social media 
platform unless and until the social media company confirms that the minor has express 
parental consent. Id. § 1402(b)(2). Act 689 does not say how a social media company 
should identify an account-seeking minor’s parents or verify a parent’s consent. 

 Act 689 defines both “social media company” and “social media platform,” and 
neither definition follows common parlance. Under Act 689, a “social media company” is 
defined in terms of what account holders may do on the company’s platform.  A “social 
media company” is one that permits its account holders to: (1) create a public profile “for 
the primary purpose of interacting socially with other profiles and accounts”; (2) upload 
or post content; (3) view content of other account holders; and (4) interact with other 
account holders “through request and acceptance.” Id. at § 1401(7)(A) (emphasis added).  
The definition of “social media company” has multiple exclusions: companies that offer 

                            4                                         
“career development opportunities”; exclusively gaming-related content; or exclusively 
“subscription content in which users follow or subscribe unilaterally.” Id. at § 1401(7)(B).  
That last exclusion comes with an exception: “A social media company that allows a user 
to generate short video clips of dancing, voice-overs, or other acts of entertainment in 

which the primary purpose is not educational or informative does not meet the exclusion 
. . . .”  Id. § 1401(7)(B)(i)(b). And finally, companies that offer “cloud storage services, 
enterprise cybersecurity services, educational devices, or enterprise collaboration tools 
for kindergarten through grade twelve (K-12) schools” and derive “less than twenty-five 
percent (25%)” of their revenue “from operating a social media platform” are excluded.  
Id. § 1401(7)(B)(iii). This exemption shields Google (a subsidiary of Alphabet, Inc.) from 
compliance, so neither Google Hangouts nor Google’s video-sharing platform, YouTube, 
are required to verify the ages of their account holders under the Act.   
 Act 689 defines “social media platform” as a “public or semipublic internet-based 
service or application” of which the “substantial function . . . is to allow users to interact 

socially with each other within the service or application.” Id. § 1401(8)(A)(ii)(a) (emphasis 
added).  The  “social  media  platform”  definition  also  comes  with  multiple  exclusions: 
platforms for which “the predominant or exclusive function is” email or direct messaging; 
e-commerce including classified ads for the sale of goods (but not personal services); 
business-to-business interaction; shared document collaboration; data visualization; tech 
support;  “[a]cademic  or  scholarly  research”;  use  by  educational  entities;  or  hosting 
content that is created, posted, or selected by the provider rather than the user or account 
holder. Id. § 1401(8)(B). Act 689 also exempts platforms controlled by businesses that 

                            5                                         
generate less than $100 million annually. Id. § 1401(8)(C). As a result, platforms like 
Parler, Gab, and Truth Social are not required to verify the ages of their account holders. 
             B.   Social Media Use Among Minors                       
 Social media is used broadly by adults and near-universally by teens. In 2021, 

about 70% of Americans reported that they have used social media. Social Media Use in 
2021, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Apr. 7, 2021).2 And as of 2023, up to 95% of people aged 13–17 
reported using any social media platform. U.S. Surgeon General, Social Media and Youth 
Mental Health 4 (2023).3 “There is broad agreement among the scientific community that 
social media has the potential to both benefit and harm children and adolescents.” Id. at 
5.                                                                        
 “[A]dolescents who spent more than 3 hours per day on social media faced double 
the risk of experiencing poor mental health outcomes including symptoms of depression 
and anxiety.” Id. at 6. And “[a]s of 2021, 8th and 10th graders spen[t] an average of 3.5 
hours per day on social media.” Id. at 7. Social media users may encounter disturbing 

suicide- and self-harm-related content online. Id. at 8. “Social comparison driven by social 
media is [also] associated with body dissatisfaction, disordered eating, and depressive 
symptoms.” Id. And social media users can become victims of cyberbullying, which has 
“a consistent relationship [with] depression among children and adolescents.” Id. at 9. 


2 https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/04/07/social-media-use-in-2021/ 
[https://perma.cc/76X7-VFFQ].                                             

3 https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/sg-youth-mental-health-social-media-
advisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HU9-S6ZA].                                

                            6                                         
 In addition to the risks posed by other minors on social media, these platforms can 
also be used by adults to sexually exploit minors. The State relies on an FBI report that 
found:                                                                    
 Financial sextortion schemes occur in online environments where young 
 people feel most comfortable—using common social media sites, gaming 
 sites,  or  video  chat  applications  that  feel  familiar  and  safe.  On  these 
 platforms, online predators often use fake female accounts and target minor 
 males between 14 to 17 years old, but the FBI has interviewed victims as 
 young as 10 years old.                                               

FBI Nat’l Press Off., FBI and Partners Issue National Public Safety Alert on Financial 
Sextortion Schemes (Dec. 19, 2022) [hereinafter Financial Sextortion].4   
  C.   Types of Speech Available on NetChoice Members’ Platforms      
 It is undisputed that adults and minors use NetChoice members’ online services to 
engage in constitutionally protected speech. (Doc. 68, ¶¶ 4, 6, 14, 21, 30, 34, 37; Doc. 
73, ¶¶ 2, 4, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15). Social media companies and platforms “allow[ ] users to 
gain access to information and communicate with one another about it on any subject 
that might come to mind.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 
582 U.S. 98
, 107 (2017). 
“[U]sers employ these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment 
activity on topics ‘as diverse as human thought.’” 
Id.
 at 105 (quoting Reno v. Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, 
521 U.S. 844, 870
 (1997)). “On [NetChoice member Meta’s platform,] 
Facebook, for example, users can debate religion and politics with their friends and 
neighbors or share vacation photos.” Id. at 104.  On NetChoice member X, “users can 

4 https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-and-partners-issue-national-public-safety-
alert-on-financial-sextortion-schemes [https://perma.cc/K5MN-W7SU].       

                            7                                         
petition their elected representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner.” 
Id. at 104–05.                                                            
 With all that said, the State reminds the Court that social media users “also engage 
in  non-expressive  activity  not  protected  by  the  First  Amendment,  including  criminal 

conduct and that which is harmful to minors.” (Doc. 73, ¶¶ 2, 4, 11, 14). The Court would 
note that “harmful to minors” is not a category of unprotected speech. See United States 
v.  Stevens,  
559 U.S. 460, 468
  (2010)  (“‘From  1791  to  the  present,’  .  .  .  the  First 
Amendment has ‘permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,’ 
and has never ‘include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.’” (second 
alteration in original) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377
, 382–83 (1992))). It 
is, however, true that despite these entities’ efforts to self-regulate, social media users of 
any age may still encounter some speech online that is not entitled to constitutional 
protection,  including  real  threats,  child  pornography,  obscenity,  defamation,  fighting 
words, or speech integral to criminal conduct. See United States v. Alvarez, 
567 U.S. 709, 717
 (2012). In addition, minors may encounter speech online that is constitutionally 
protected as to adults, but not as to minors, and some of that speech may be harmful to 
them.                                                                     






                            8                                         
               D.   Existing Parental Controls                        
 Of course, parents may rightly decide to regulate their child’s use of social media—
including restricting the amount of time they spend on it, the content they may access, or 
even those they chat with. And many tools exist to help parents with this endeavor.  

 The first step to acquiring a social media account is an internet-capable device. 
Parents  decide  what,  if  any,  internet-capable  devices  to  give  their  child.  Most 
manufacturers offer device-level parental controls for parents who chose to give their child 
internet-capable devices. For example, iPhones and iPads empower parents to limit the 
amount of time their children can spend on the device, choose which applications (e.g., 
YouTube, Facebook, Snapchat, or Instagram) their children can use, set age-related 
content  restrictions  for  those  applications,  filter  online  content,  and  control  privacy 
settings. See Apple, Use Parental Controls on Your Child’s iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch 
(Doc. 66, pp. 52–59).5 Google and Microsoft also offer parental controls for their devices. 
See Google, Safety Center, Parental Controls (Doc. 66, pp. 80–85);6 Microsoft, Getting 

Started with Microsoft Family Safety (Doc. 66, pp. 86–90).7 In addition, numerous third-
party applications allow parents to control and monitor their children’s use of Internet-



5 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201304 [https://perma.cc/9PLJ-7CR4].  

6 https://safety.google/families/parental-supervision/ [https://perma.cc/WGU8-KKVS]. 

7 https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/account-billing/getting-Started-with-microsoft-
family-safety-b6280c9d-38d7-82ff-0e4f-a6cb7e659344 [https://perma.cc/F47N-PTSL]. 

                            9                                         
connected devices and online services. See Ben Moore & Kim Key, The Best Parental 
Control Apps for Your Phone, PCMag (Mar. 29, 2022) (Doc. 66, pp. 99–115).8   
 The next step is connecting that internet-capable device to the internet. Devices 
may access the internet through a wireless plan on a particular device, i.e., cell-phone 

data, or by connecting to a wireless or wired network, e.g., home WiFi. At both these 
connection points, parental controls are available. Cell carriers and broadband providers 
have  tools  that  allow  parents  to  block  certain  applications  and  websites  from  their 
children’s devices, ensure that their children are texting and chatting with trusted contacts 
only, and restrict their children’s access to screen time during certain hours of the day. 
See, e.g., AT&T, Learn About the AT&T Secure Family App (Doc. 66, pp. 60–64);9 T-
Mobile, Family Controls and Privacy (Doc. 66, pp. 135–43);10 Comcast Xfinity, Set Up 
Parental Controls for the Internet, (Doc. 66, pp. 65–70).11               
 Wireless routers themselves offer parental controls, too. See Molly Price & Ry 
Crist, How to Set Up and Use Your Wi-Fi Router’s Parental Controls, CNET (Feb. 11, 



8 https://www.pcmag.com/picks/the-best-parental-control-apps-for-your-phone 
[https://perma.cc/ZK7Z-N5AQ].                                             

9 https://www.att.com/support/article/wireless/KM1271913 [https://perma.cc/2NBP-
PNDG].                                                                    

10 https://www.t-mobile.com/privacy-center/education/family-controls      
[https://perma.cc/DJJ3-Q9S5].                                             

11 https://www.xfinity.com/support/articles/set-up-parental-controls-with-comcast-
networking [https://perma.cc/7V5R-BLHC].                                  

                           10                                         
2021) (Doc. 66, pp. 126–34).12 Parents can use these controls to block certain websites 
or online services that they deem inappropriate, set individualized content filters for their 
children, and monitor the websites their children visit and the services they use. 
Id.
 
Parents can also use router settings to turn off their home internet at particular times of 

day or pause internet access for a particular device or user. 
Id.
         
 Finally, there are the internet browsers and the websites or mobile applications 
through which children create social media accounts and access social media content. 
Many browsers offer parents tools to control which websites their children can access. 
See, e.g., Mozilla, Block and Unblock Websites with Parental Controls on Firefox (Doc. 
66, pp. 116–18).13 Microsoft offers “Kids Mode,” which allows children to access only a 
pre-approved list of websites. See Microsoft, Learn More About Kids Mode in Microsoft 
Edge (Doc. 66, pp. 91–98).14  Google has a similar feature. It provides parents with 
“activity reports,” allowing them to see what apps and websites their children access most 
frequently. See Google, Safety Center, Parental Controls (Doc. 66, pp.  80–85).15 

 Some social media platforms also offer parental controls within the platform itself. 
For example, Facebook and Instagram have “supervision tools” through which parents 

12 https://archive.ph/wip/uGaN2.                                          

13 https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/block-and-unblock-websites-parental-controls-
firef [https://perma.cc/2Q6Z-B4P6].                                       

14 https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/learn-more-about-kids-mode-in-
microsoft-edge-4bf0273c-1cbd-47a9-a8f3-895bc1f95bdd [https://perma.cc/96PS-SP65]. 

15 https://safety.google/families/parental-supervision/ [https://perma.cc/96ZQ-Y4TJ]. 

                           11                                         
can set time limits, view privacy and content settings, and monitor what accounts their 
child is connected with. See Declaration of Antigone Davis ¶ 28, (Doc. 66, pp. 11–32) 
[hereinafter Davis Decl.]. Snapchat also offers a “family center” through which parents 
can see who their child is communicating with in the app. See Declaration of David Boyle, 
¶ 7, (Doc. 17-3) [hereinafter Boyle Decl.].16                             

 To be sure, parents may or may not use these tools. The State’s expert explains 
that even though these filtering controls can be “applied in the home, on the router or on 
laptops, tablets, and smartphones through family cellular plans,” research indicates “that 
many parents are unaware of this technology” or “do not know how to use it, or discover 
their children also know how to use it or have circumvented it some other way.” (Doc. 34-
1, ¶ 85). Furthermore, he attests, “Children can be very persuasive, and parents might 
release the controls to allow them to play a game designed for 18+ within a social media 
platform,  unaware  the  game  or  platform  may  be  a  portal  to  pornographic  or  other 
unsuitable content and dangerous functionality.” 
Id.
                      

        E.   Existing Social Media Protections for Minors             
 Some NetChoice members have also developed policies and practices designed 
to protect minor users that operate on their platforms even without parental intervention. 
Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, and Snapchat require users in the United States to be at 

16 NetChoice repeatedly cites “Boyle Declaration” which supposedly appears in the record 
as Exhibit C to NetChoice’s summary judgment motion. First, NetChoice filed its motion 
and all exhibits as a single nearly 200-page document. Second, while NetChoice initially 
cites to the Boyle Declaration as “Exhibit C,” the “Exhibit C” contained in the single 200-
page summary judgment motion is, in fact, the Declaration of Justyn Harriman. The 
Declaration of David Boyle does, however, appear in the record at Doc. 17-3. 

                           12                                         
least 13 years old before they can create an account—though account holders are asked 
only to self-report their ages. See Davis Decl. ¶ 17; Pinterest, All About Pinterest (Doc. 
66, pp. 152–56);17 Boyle Decl. ¶ 5. While none of Plaintiff’s members currently use the 
age verification methods required by Act 689, Meta employs human content reviewers 

who are trained to flag, among other things, Facebook and Instagram users who appear 
to be under 13; if a flagged user cannot prove they meet minimum age requirements, their 
account is taken down. See Davis Decl. ¶ 27. Members also use different default settings 
based  on  age:  Snapchat  defaults  all  minors  to  private  settings,  while  Facebook, 
Instagram, and Pinterest do so for minors under 16. See Boyle Decl. ¶ 6; Davis Decl. 
¶ 17; Pinterest, Teen Safety Options (Doc. 66, pp. 167–72).18             
 NetChoice members also attempt to curate the content that users post and see on 
their platforms. See, e.g., Declaration of Justyn Harriman ¶ 9 (Doc. 66, pp. 33–46) 
[hereinafter Harriman Decl.]. Members attempt to restrict the uploading of violent and 
sexual content, bullying, and harassment. See Declaration of Carl Szabo ¶ 7 (Doc. 66, 

pp.4–10) [hereinafter Szabo Decl.]; Davis Decl. ¶¶ 36–37, 39; Boyle Decl. ¶ 6. Some 
NetChoice members, like Meta, also use age-verification technology to try to keep minors 
from seeing certain content visible to adults, or to keep younger teens from seeing content 
visible to older teens. See Szabo Decl. ¶ 7; Davis Decl. ¶ 32. NetChoice members 
implement these policies through algorithms, automated editing tools, and human review. 


17 https://help.pinterest.com/en/guide/all-about-pinterest [https://perma.cc/S6YD-HY6R]. 

18 https://help.pinterest.com/en/article/teen-safety-options [https://perma.cc/NJL4-S9Y4]. 

                           13                                         
See Davis Decl. ¶¶ 36, 27, 39–40. If a platform decides that certain content violates its 
policies, it may remove the content, restrict it, or add a warning label or disclaimer. See 
Davis Decl. ¶ 39. Nextdoor even gives “Kindness Reminders” before a user publishes a 
post containing potentially offensive language. See Harriman Decl. ¶ 7.b. Repeat violators 

of a platform’s policies may find themselves suspended or banned from the platform. See 
Davis Decl. ¶ 40.                                                         
 NetChoice members also utilize tools directed at the particular issue of child sexual 
exploitation. Meta and Nextdoor use both automated and human review to take down 
harmful content, including child sexual abuse material. See Davis Decl. ¶¶ 36–37; Doc. 
72-2, p. 21:1–17 (Knapp Depo.). Snapchat purports to protect its minor users by only 
recommending minors as friend connections to people already in their contacts or with 
whom they have mutual friends. See Boyle Decl. ¶ 6. Instagram warns minor users when 
a “suspicious” adult tries to interact with them and gives them an option to end the 
conversation and block, report, and/or restrict the adult; adults are flagged as suspicious 

if they are sending a large number of friend or message requests to people under age 18 
or if they have recently been blocked by people under age 18. See Davis Decl. ¶ 30. 
Snapchat similarly provides “in-conversation warnings” if minors connect with someone 
with whom they do not share mutual friends. See Doc. 72-3, pp. 35:20–36:13 (Boyle 
Depo.).                                                                   
                III.   LEGAL STANDARD                                 
 A party moving for summary judgment must establish the absence of a genuine 
dispute of material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. 

                           14                                         
Civ. P. 56; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574
, 586–87 
(1986); Nat’l Bank of Commerce of El Dorado v. Dow Chem. Co., 
165 F.3d 602, 606
 (8th 
Cir. 1999). “As a general rule, summary judgment is proper ‘only after the nonmovant has 
had adequate time for discovery.’” Toben v. Bridgestone Retail Operations, LLC, 
751 F.3d 888, 894
  (8th  Cir.  2014)  (citations  omitted).  Federal  Rule  of  Civil  Procedure  56(d) 
provides:                                                                 
 If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, 
 it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: 

   (1) defer considering the motion or deny it;                       

   (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; 
   or                                                                 

   (3) issue any other appropriate order.                             

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). “The party seeking additional discovery must show: ‘(1) that they 
have set forth in affidavit form the specific facts that they hope to elicit from further 
discovery, (2) that the facts sought exist, and (3) that these sought-after facts are essential 
to resist the summary judgment motion.’” Marlow v. City of Clarendon, 
78 F.4th 410
, 416 
(8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Toben, 
751 F.3d at 895
).                         
 To secure a permanent injunction, a party’s claim must actually succeed on the 
merits. Once a successful merits claim is established, the Court “then considers the 
following factors in deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction: (1) the threat of 
irreparable harm to the moving party; (2) the balance of harms with any injury an injunction 
might inflict on other parties; and (3) the public interest.” Oglala Sioux Tribe v. C & W 
Enters., Inc., 
542 F.3d 224, 229
 (8th Cir. 2008). “The decision to grant or deny permanent 

                           15                                         
injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal 
for abuse of discretion.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
547 U.S. 388, 391
 (2006). 
                   IV.    DISCUSSION                                  
                      A.   Standing                                   

 Arkansas  asserts  that  “NetChoice  does  not  have  standing  to  bring  First 
Amendment claims on behalf of third parties without first making any claims on behalf of 
itself.” (Doc. 72, p. 2). The State does not otherwise address NetChoice’s standing or 
attempt to rebut the Court’s prior standing determination. The factual and legal bases for 
NetChoice’s suit have not changed. Therefore, for the reasons explained in the Court’s 
preliminary injunction order, the Court finds that NetChoice has associational standing to 
assert claims based on the harms to be suffered by its member and third-party standing 
to assert the rights of its members’ users.                               
               B.   Need for Further Discovery                        
 The State argues that, under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Moody v. 

NetChoice, LLC, 
603 U.S. 707
 (2024), the Court should find that more discovery is 
needed to resolve a facial challenge so summary judgment is not appropriate at this 
juncture. The State does not specify what additional factual information it seeks.  
 In Moody, the Supreme Court addressed a facial First Amendment challenge to 
two state laws that “limit[ed] [social media] platforms’ capacity to engage in content 
moderation,” thereby infringing, on the plaintiff’s account, the platforms’ protected editorial 
discretion. 
Id. at 717
. The Court vacated the lower courts’ rulings because “neither Court 
of Appeals properly considered the facial nature of NetChoice's challenge.” 
Id. at 718
. In 

                           16                                         
ruling on a facial challenge under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court said, a court 
must decide “whether a law's unconstitutional applications are substantial compared to 
its constitutional ones. To make that judgment, a court must determine a law's full set of 
applications, evaluate which are constitutional and which are not, and compare the one 

to the other.” 
Id. at 718
. Because “[t]he parties ha[d] not briefed the critical issues” and 
the record was “underdeveloped,” the court vacated and remanded for the lower courts 
“to consider the scope of the laws’ applications, and weigh the unconstitutional as against 
the constitutional ones.” 
Id. at 726
.                                     
 Here, NetChoice’s challenge is based on the First Amendment rights of users, not 
platforms. It is unclear how additional factual development would help illuminate the 
scope of users’ First Amendment interest in accessing regulated platforms. The laws’ 
scope is largely not in dispute. While the parties disagree about some of the platforms 
that are subject to the Act’s requirement, there is no dispute that users engage in 
protected speech on all the platforms that are arguably within the Act’s proscription. 

Moreover, as the Court determines below, the Act imposes a platform-wide burden on 
users’ right to engage in that speech, and the Court struggles to see how this would differ 
between the platforms regulated.                                          
 Notably, Moody went to the Supreme Court in a preliminary injunction posture. 
This case comes before the Court, now, at summary judgment. The State relies entirely 
on Moody and does not attempt to address the requirements for a court to postpone ruling 



                           17                                         
on a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).19 Turning 
to those requirements, the State has not “set forth in affidavit form the specific facts they 
hope to elicit from further discovery,” “that the facts sought exist,” or “that these sought-
after facts are essential to resist the summary judgment motion.” Marlow, 78 F.4th at 416. 

“If a party fails to carry its burden, ‘postponement of a ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment is unjustified.’” Id. (quoting Stanback v. Best Diversified Prods., Inc., 
180 F.3d 903, 911
 (8th Cir. 1999)).                                                
 NetChoice bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute of material 
fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the State can argue that 
NetChoice has not met that burden on the existing record, as it has in its Response. But 
the Court cannot “simply refrain” from ruling on Plaintiff’s motion and “instead allow this 
to proceed to full discovery” when the State has not made out the required showing under 
Rule 56(d).                                                               





19  In fact, the need for more time to conduct discovery has already been litigated here.  
The parties were originally permitted to commence discovery as of October 11, 2023. 
(Doc. 46, ¶ 6).  On October 23, 2023, Arkansas requested six months of discovery. (Doc. 
47,  ¶  6(a)).    On  November  30,  2023,  Arkansas  moved  under  Rule  56(d)  to  delay 
consideration of NetChoice’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  (Doc. 58).  After fulsome 
briefing, the Court defined the boundries of continued limited discovery and granted 
Arkansas an extension of the discovery deadline to June 7, 2024. (Doc. 64).   Even though 
Moody potentially changes the posture of the analysis, Arkansas makes no effort to 
explain why or how it remains prejudiced, despite its discovery opportunities to date. 

                           18                                         
                    C.   Merits Claims                                
  1.  Burdens on First Amendment Rights: Platform Users’ Rights       
                    a.  Level of Scrutiny                             
 NetChoice contends that Act 689’s age-verification requirement targets speech 

based on content, speaker, and viewpoint and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny. The 
State disagrees and argues that Act 689’s age-verification requirement “only regulates 
non-expressive conduct,” namely, minors “entering a social media establishment alone,” 
and so is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all. (Doc. 72, pp. 65–67). The State 
further argues that even if the Act regulates some speech, the effect is merely incidental. 
 Laws regulating speech or conduct unprotected by the First Amendment are 
subject to rational basis review. Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 629, 641
 (1968). On the 
other hand, laws that restrict protected speech or expression are subject to heightened 
scrutiny.  Courts  “apply  the  most  exacting  scrutiny  to  regulations  that  suppress, 
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content. . . . In 

contrast,  regulations  that are  unrelated  to  the  content  of  speech  are  subject  to  an 
intermediate level of scrutiny.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 
512 U.S. 622, 642
 
(1994).                                                                   
 The State focuses on the direct effect of the regulation on the social media 
platforms—ignoring NetChoice’s assertion of users’ rights—to argue that a platform’s 
decision to allow minors on its platform is not “expressive.” The Court need not decide 
whether a social media platform’s decision to distribute speech to minors and by minors 
is itself expressive because the Act ultimately impacts users’ speech by “deputiz[ing] 

                           19                                         
covered businesses into serving as censors for the State.” NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta, 
113 F.4th 1101
, 1118 (9th Cir. 2024).                                         
 The First Amendment protects both the right to speak and the “right to receive 
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth.” Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U.S. 557, 564
  (1969).  The  protections  of the  First  Amendment  extended  to  social  media:  “to 
foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the 
legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 
582 U.S. 98
, 108 (2017). And the State concedes that social media users use these platforms “to 
engage in a broad array of expressive activity, protected by the First Amendment, on a 
wide range of topics.” (Doc. 68, ¶ 4; Doc. 73, ¶ 2).                      
 Act 689 forecloses access to social media for those minors whose parents do not 
consent to the minor’s use of social media. It also burdens social media access for all 
Arkansans—both adults and minors whose parents would allow them to use social media. 
Requiring adult users to produce state-approved documentation to prove their age and/or 

submit to biometric age-verification testing imposes significant burdens on adult access 
to  constitutionally  protected  speech  and  “discourage[s]  users  from  accessing  [the 
regulated]  sites.”  Reno,  
521 U.S. at 856
.  Age-verification  schemes  like  those 
contemplated by Act 689 “are not only an additional hassle,” but “they also require that 
website visitors forgo the anonymity otherwise available on the internet.” Am. Booksellers 
Found. v. Dean, 
342 F.3d 96
, 99 (2d Cir. 2003); see also ACLU v. Mukasey, 
534 F.3d 181, 197
 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding age-verification requirements force users to “relinquish 
their anonymity to access protected speech”).                             

                           20                                         
 Other courts examining similar regulations have found that “[r]equiring Internet 
users to provide . . . personally identifiable information to access a Web site would 
significantly  deter  many  users  from  entering  the  site[  ]  because  Internet  users  are 
concerned about security on the Internet and because Internet users are afraid of fraud 

and identity theft on the Internet.” ACLU v. Gonzales, 
478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 806
 (E.D. Pa. 
2007); see also PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman, 
167 F. Supp. 2d 878, 889
 (W.D. Va. 2001), 
aff'd, 
362 F.3d 227
 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Fear that cyber-criminals may access their [identifying 
information] . . . may chill the willingness of some adults to participate in the ‘marketplace 
of ideas’ which adult Web site operators provide.”). Record evidence also reflects this 
concern. See Harriman Decl. ¶¶ 28–29. The State has made no attempt to address this 
concern  and,  as  in  its  preliminary  injunction  order,  the  Court  agrees  that  the  age-
verification requirement will deter adults from speaking or receiving protected speech on 
social media.                                                             
 Because the Act burdens users’ speech, the Act is subject to intermediate scrutiny 

at a minimum. However, NetChoice also argues that the Act discriminates based on 
content, speaker, and viewpoint. “Content-based laws—those that target speech based 
on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified 
only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state 
interests.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
576 U.S. 155
, 163 (2015). “Government regulation of 
speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic 
discussed or the idea or message expressed.” 
Id.
 “Some facial distinctions based on a 
message are obvious, defining regulated speech by particular subject matter, and others 

                           21                                         
are more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose.” 
Id.
  
 NetChoice argues that the law is content based because whether a particular 
“social media company” or “social media platform” is subject to the Act turns on content 
that users post on that platform. Under Act 689, a “social media company” is regulated if 

users use its online forum “for the primary purpose of interacting socially with other 
profiles.” Ark. Code. Ann. § 4-88-1401(7)(A). Companies that “exclusively offer” “content 
for the purpose of interacting [sic] gaming, entertainment, or associated entertainment,” 
“provide[ ] career development opportunities,” or subscription content so long as that 
content is not “short video clips of dancing, voice-overs, or other acts of entertainment in 
which the primary purpose is not educational or informative,” are, however, exempt. Id. 
§ 1401(7)(B). Similarly, a “social media platform” is regulated if “a substantial function” of 
the platform is “to allow users to interact socially.” Id. § 1401(8)(A). Here, too, platforms 
may be exempt from regulation if they predominantly feature certain types of content 
including  “news,  sports,  entertainment,”  “academic  or  scholarly  research,”  and 

“educational” programming. Id. § 1401(8)(B).                              
 The State argues that Act 689 is not content based because it is not directed at 
“the message that is being expressed,” but instead at “the place where a message is 
expressed.” (Doc. 72, p. 9 (emphasis omitted)). This is a distinction without a difference. 
Under the Act, “whether any particular [company or platform] falls within the ban is 
determined by the content of the [posts] resting inside that [company or platform]. Thus, 
by any commonsense understanding of the term, the ban in this case is ‘content based.’” 
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 
507 U.S. 410, 429
 (1993). A website operating in 

                           22                                         
Arkansas, an enforcement official, a court, or a jury applying the Act, cannot determine 
whether the website is regulated without looking to the content posted on that website. 
And the State itself cannot seem to resist this conclusion either. In its Response, it says: 
“The Act regulates my [sic] subject matter, which is not a viewpoint.” (Doc. 72, p. 12).  

 “[I]t is well established that ‘[t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based 
regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition 
of public discussion of an entire topic.’” Reed, 576 U.S. at 169 (quoting Consolidated 
Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 
447 U.S. 530, 537
 (1980)). “Thus, a 
speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not 
discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.” 
Id.
            
 NetChoice also argues that the Act is a speaker-based restriction. “Laws designed 
or intended to suppress or restrict the expression of specific speakers contradict basic 
First Amendment principles.” United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 
529 U.S. 803, 812
 
(2000). Courts are “deeply skeptical of laws that ‘distinguis[h] among different speakers, 

allowing speech by some but not others.’” Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 
585 U.S. 755
, 777–78 (2018) (citations omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 
558 U.S. 310, 340
 (2010)). This is because “[s]peaker-
based laws run the risk that ‘the State has left unburdened those speakers whose 
messages are in accord with its own views.’” 
Id.
 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 
564 U.S. 552, 580
 (2011)).                                                    
 Act 689 exempts platforms that distribute “licensed media” that is not licensed from 
users, “news, sports, entertainment or other content that is preselected by the provider 

                           23                                         
and not user generated,” and digital news websites with social features “if the news 
content is posted only by the provider of the digital news website.” Ark. Code. Ann. § 4-
88-1401(8)(B). NetChoice argues that “the Act explicitly favors the speech of whoever 
provides the online service” over the speech of users of online services. (Doc. 67, p. 21). 

The Court agrees. This privileges institutional content creators—movie and TV studios, 
mainstream media outlets, and traditional journalists—over the Soundcloud artist, the 
TikTok chef, and the citizen journalist.                                  
 Because the Act draws both content-based and speaker-based distinctions, the 
State bears the burden of demonstrating that it survives strict scrutiny. And Arkansas has 
not done so.                                                              
b.  Act 689 Is Not Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Compelling State Interest 
 As described above, Act 689 is a content-based restriction on both adults’ and 
minors’ access to constitutionally protected speech. “Content-based laws—those that 
target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional 

and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve 
compelling  state  interests.”  Reed,  576  U.S.  at  163.  “The  distinction  between  laws 
burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of degree. The Government's content-
based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based bans.” 
Playboy Ent. Grp., 
529 U.S. at 812
.                                       
 As in the Court’s preliminary injunction order, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Ass’n, 
564 U.S. 786
 (2011), remains instructive. There, a California law prohibited the 
sale or rental of violent video games to minors. 
Id. at 802
. The law “straddle[d] the fence 

                           24                                         
between (1) addressing a serious social problem and (2) helping concerned parents 
control their children.” 
Id. at 805
. The Brown Court recognized these goals as legitimate; 
however,  because  the  law  affected  Californians’ First  Amendment  rights, the  Court 
cautioned that the state’s objectives “must be pursued by means that are neither seriously 

underinclusive nor seriously overinclusive.” 
Id.
 “As a means of protecting children from 
portrayals of violence, the legislation [was] seriously underinclusive, not only because it 
exclude[d]  portrayals  other  than  video  games,  but  also  because  it  permit[ted]  a 
parental . . . veto.” 
Id.
 If the material was indeed “dangerous [and] mindaltering,” the Court 
explained, it did not make sense to “leave [it] in the hands of children so long as one 
parent . . . says it’s OK.” 
Id. at 802
. And “as a means of assisting concerned parents,” the 
Court held that the regulation was “seriously overinclusive because it abridge[d] the First 
Amendment rights of young people whose parents . . . think violent video games are a 
harmless pastime.” 
Id. at 805
. Put simply, the legislation was not narrowly tailored. 
 In the end, the Brown Court rejected the argument “that the state has the power to 

prevent children from hearing or saying anything without their parents’ prior consent,” for 
“[s]uch laws do not enforce parental authority over children’s speech and religion; they 
impose governmental authority, subject only to a parental veto.” 
Id.
 at 795 n.3. “This is 
not the narrow tailoring to ‘assisting parents’ that restriction of First Amendment rights 
requires.” 
Id. at 804
. The Court also expressed “doubts that punishing third parties for 
conveying protected speech to children just in case their parents disapprove of that 
speech  is  a  proper  governmental  means  of  aiding  parental  authority.”  
Id. at 802
. 
“Accepting that position would largely vitiate the rule that ‘only in relatively narrow and 

                           25                                         
well-defined  circumstances  may  government  bar  public  dissemination  of  protected 
materials to [minors].’” 
Id.
 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
422 U.S. 205
, 212–
13 (1975)).                                                               
 The Court does not doubt the reality, well supported by the record, that unfettered 

social media access can and does harm minors. And the State “has a compelling interest 
in protecting minor children.” Mitchell v. Dakota Cnty. Soc. Servs., 
959 F.3d 887
, 897 (8th 
Cir. 2020). The State does not, however, have “a free-floating power to restrict the ideas 
to which children may be exposed. ‘Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor 
subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the 
young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.’” Brown, 
564 U.S. at 794–95 (quoting Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213–14).               
 The State regulation here, like the one in Brown, is not narrowly tailored to address 
the harms that the State has a compelling interest in preventing. The State maintains that 
Act 689 is not underinclusive because it “targets the types of social media that are most 

likely to lead to predators contacting minors while leaving others unregulated.” (Doc. 72, 
p. 20). The State’s evidence undermines this contention.                  
 With respect to incidence of online exploitation, the State cites the National Center 
for Missing and Exploited Children’s (NCMEC) 2022 CyberTipline Report. See Doc. 72, 
p. 15 (citing 2022 CyberTipline Reports by Electronic Service Providers (ESP) 1, National 
Center for Missing & Exploited Children (2023)20). This report lists dozens of electronic 

20 https://www.missingkids.org/content/dam/missingkids/pdfs/2022-reports-by-esp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E9UH-ALR9].                                             

                           26                                         
service providers, including all of the platforms regulated by the Act, and notes the number 
of suspected incidents of child sexual exploitation that each platform self-reported over 
the past year. 
Id.
 As the Court noted in its preliminary injunction order, see Doc. 44, pp. 
44–45, Act 689 regulates Facebook and Instagram, the platforms with the two highest 
numbers of reports.21 But, the Act exempts Google, WhatsApp, Omegle, and Snapchat—

the sites with the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth highest numbers of reports. Nextdoor is at 
the  very  bottom  of  NCMEC’s  list,  with  only  one  report  of  suspected  child  sexual 
exploitation in 2022, yet the State continues to justify Nextdoor’s inclusion based on the 
purported risk to minors. See Doc. 72, p. 21.                             
 The State likewise continues to cite the FBI’s public safety alert on financial 
sextortion. See Doc. 72, p. 16 (citing Financial Sextortion). The alert notes “gaming sites 
or video chat applications that feel familiar and safe [to minors]” are common places 
where adult predators engage in financial “sextortion” of minors. 
Id.
 Act 689 also exempts 
these platforms from age verification.                                    

 The State acknowledges that “private conversations and interactions . . . lead to 
much of the mental-health harm towards and predation on minors.” (Doc. 72, p. 20). Yet 
private-message focused platforms like Snapchat, Kik, and Omegle are unregulated. Mr. 
Tony Allen, the State’s expert, noted this issue as well. When testifying during the 



21 One shortcoming of this data is that it reports the number of total incidents but does not 
report the number of incidents in relation to the number of users. Naturally, platforms with 
more users may have more suspected incidents of sexual exploitation, but it is possible 
that smaller platforms present greater risk on a per-user basis.          

                           27                                         
preliminary injunction hearing, he stated that he did not “want to be unkind to the people 
who drafted [Act 689],” but at least some exempt platforms are ones that adult sexual 
predators commonly use to communicate with children, including Kik, Google Hangouts, 
and interactive gaming websites and platforms. (Doc. 45, pp. 67:17–70:19). 

 The State attempts to justify this exclusion using Snapchat as the prototype. For 
self-identified minors, Snapchat does not “promote connecting with people that you 
wouldn’t know in real life already.” (Doc. 72-3, p. 11:5–6 (Boyle Depo.)). Thus, minors are 
only discoverable by other Snapchat users with whom they share mutual friends or 
contacts. 
Id.
 at 14:8–14. Public content on Snapchat is also limited, and instead Snapchat 
is primarily used for the “private conversations and interactions” that the State purports to 
be concerned with.                                                        
 The State invites the Court to contrast Snapchat with Nextdoor, pointing out that 
Nextdoor lacks “an extensive process confirming the user actually is who they say they 
are.” (Doc. 72, p. 21). Notably, there is no evidence that Snapchat has such a process. 

“To  make  matters  worse,”  the  State  says,  “inappropriate  and/or  sexual  messages 
between users would only be flagged [on Nextdoor] if one of the users involved self-
reports the conduct.” 
Id.
 But Snapchat uses roughly the same system. Boyle Decl. ¶ 6. 
Indeed, Snapchat’s entire structure seems designed for the undetected exchange of 
sexually explicit materials because pictures and videos automatically delete after being 
opened. 
Id. ¶ 4
.                                                          
 The Act also exempts YouTube, “the most popular online activity” and “most widely 
used” platform among children. See Children and Parents: Media Use and Attitudes 

                           28                                         
Report 2022 at 2, 23, Ofcom (Mar. 30, 2022) (cited in Declaration of Tony Allen ¶ 85 (Doc. 
34-1)).22 And it exempts platforms that generate less than $100 million annually. So a 
large platform that may have a lower percentage of “harmful” content and robust tools for 
taking that content down must verify the ages of its users, while a small platform that may 

have relatively more “harmful” content and no tools for taking that content down need not. 
This “[u]nderinclusiveness raises serious doubts about whether the government is in fact 
pursuing the interest it invokes.” Brown, 
564 U.S. at 802
.                
 For the platforms regulated by Act 689, the only constraint on minors is a one-time 
parental veto. Once a child receives a parent’s blanket consent, the Act does nothing to 
protect users who have now been reliably identified as minors. The State points to 
“excessive data collection, which [social media platforms] use to deliver harmful content 
and troves of paid advertising.” See Doc. 72, p. 17. But the Act does not bar data 
collection from identified minors and instead seems to provide platforms with more 
accurate age data to feed to algorithms and advertisers because of the age-verification 

requirement. The Act also does not require regulated entities to screen the content that 
is shown to known minors by, for example, requiring platforms to hide obscene content. 
Thus, once a minor has parental permission to make an account, they can find, or even 
be recommended, harmful content.                                          
 The  State’s  briefing  also  indicates  that  time  spent  on  social  media  is  highly 
correlated with the risk of adverse mental health effects. (Doc. 72, p. 14). But the Act does 

22 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/234609/childrens-media-use-
and-attitudes-report-2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/PA87-5PAD].               

                           29                                         
not require regulated entities to offer or inform parents about time restriction settings for 
minors’ accounts. And still, the State has failed to present any evidence that a parent’s 
involvement in account creation signals an intent to be involved in the child’s online 
experiences thereafter. See Doc. 44, p. 46–47. If the legislature’s goal in passing Act 689 

was to protect minors from materials or interactions that could harm them online, there is 
no evidence that the Act will be effective in achieving that goal.        
 “The [Arkansas] Legislature is perfectly willing to leave this dangerous, mind-
altering material in the hands of children so long as one parent . . . says it's OK.” Brown, 
564 U.S. at 802
. “That is not how one addresses a serious social problem.” 
Id.
 “Because 
a ‘law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order, and thus as 
justifying a restriction on truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that 
supposedly vital interest unprohibited,’ [Act 689] fails strict scrutiny.” Reed, 576 U.S. at 
172 (citation omitted) (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 
536 U.S. 765, 780
 
(2002)).                                                                  

 The Court also concludes that Act 689 is seriously overinclusive. “A statute is 
narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it 
seeks to remedy.” Frisby v. Schultz, 
487 U.S. 474, 485
 (1988) (citing City Council v. 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 
466 U.S. 789
, 808–810 (1984)). Rather than targeting content that 
is harmful to minors, Act 689 simply impedes access to content writ large.  
 Arkansas’s imposition of an age-verification requirement for account creation is 
maximally burdensome. It erects barriers to accessing entire social media platforms 
rather than placing those barriers around the content or functions that raise concern. It 

                           30                                         
not only hinders adults’ ability to speak and receive protected speech online, it excludes 
minors whose parents do not consent (or cannot prove their consent) from “the vast 
democratic forums of the Internet.” Reno, 
521 U.S. at 868
.                
 Minors, who cannot vote for the lawmakers that represent them, can use social 

media to make their voices heard on issues that affect them, like school shootings and 
school choice. The State does not have “the power to prevent children from hearing or 
saying anything without their parents’ prior consent.” Brown, 
564 U.S. at 795
 n.3. “Such 
laws  do  not  enforce  parental  authority  over  children's  speech  .  .  .  ;  they  impose 
governmental authority, subject only to a parental veto.” 
Id.
             
 In Packingham, the Court observed that it was possible for a state to “enact 
specific, narrowly tailored laws” targeted to “conduct that often presages a sexual crime, 
like contacting a minor or using a website to gather information about a minor”; but it 
would be unconstitutional for a state to unduly burden adult access to social media. 582 
U.S. at 106–07. There, the state of North Carolina had made it a crime for a registered 

sex offender to access social media sites where minors were permitted. If a statute barring 
registered sex offenders from using social media is not narrowly tailored, the Court does 
not see how a statute barring minors from social media fares any better.   
 Age-verification requirements are also more restrictive than policies enabling or 
encouraging users (or their parents) to control their own access to information, whether 
through user-installed devices and filters or affirmative requests to third-party companies. 
“Filters  impose  selective  restrictions  on  speech  at  the  receiving  end,  not  universal 
restrictions at the source.” Ashcroft v. ACLU, 
542 U.S. 656, 657
 (2004). And “[u]nder a 

                           31                                         
filtering regime, adults . . . may gain access to speech they have a right to see without 
having to identify themselves[.]” 
Id.
 Similarly, the State could always “act to encourage 
the use of filters . . . by parents” to protect minors. Id.; see also Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 
U.S. at 809–10, 815 (finding that voluntary, “targeted blocking” of certain content by 

viewers “is less restrictive than banning” the same content).             
 Act 689 is also overinclusive as to the State’s interest in “giv[ing] parents more 
control over what social-media platforms their children are using.” (Doc. 72, p. 18). “Not 
all of the children who are forbidden to [make social media accounts] on their own have 
parents who care whether they [use social media].” Brown, 
564 U.S. at 804
. As in Brown, 
the State has presented no evidence that the Act “meet[s] a substantial need of parents 
who wish to restrict their children's access to [social media] but cannot do so.” 
Id. at 803
. 
The State attempts to distinguish Brown by pointing out that, unlike the video game 
industry’s uniform rating system, “regulated social media companies have no system writ 
large that self-polices their services.” (Doc. 72, p. 19). However, NetChoice points to 

myriad avenues for parents to control their children’s social media use. See infra section 
II.D. The fact that these tools do not operate “writ large” proves nothing. Most minors 
cannot access social media without a parent-funded device and internet connection, and 
“parents who care about the matter” have many tools at their disposal to restrict and 
monitor their children’s internet use. Brown, 
564 U.S. at 803
. “Filling the remaining modest 
gap in concerned parents’ control can hardly be a compelling state interest.” 
Id.
  
 To the extent that parents are not aware of these tools, notice to parents of their 
availability is a much less restrictive means of promoting the State’s interest, and the 

                           32                                         
State has offered no evidence to prove this alternative ineffective. Playboy Ent. Grp., 
529 U.S. at 823
. “While some of the legislation’s effect may indeed be in support of what some 
parents of the restricted children actually want, its entire effect is only in support of what 
the State thinks parents ought to want.” Brown, 
564 U.S. at 804
. “This is not the narrow 

tailoring to ‘assisting parents’ that restriction of First Amendment rights requires.” 
Id.
 
 The State describes its age-verification requirement as “simple.” (Doc. 72, p. 1). 
Well spotted. But “[t]he First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for 
efficiency.” Becerra, 585 U.S. at 775 (quoting Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N. 
Carolina, Inc., 
487 U.S. 781, 795
 (1988)). The Court finds that Act 689 is a content-based 
restriction on speech that is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest. Act 689 therefore violates the First Amendment.                 
 The State argues that NetChoice’s First Amendment claim nonetheless fails on the 
merits because “the record is far too underdeveloped for the Court” “to determine ‘which 
of the law[’s] applications violate the First Amendment.’” (Doc. 72, p. 24 (quoting Moody, 

603 U.S. at 725)). However, because the Court has found that Act 689 is a content-based 
restriction, the State bears the burden of showing the Act meets strict scrutiny. The State 
failed  to  do  so,  and  a  content-based  restriction,  insufficiently  tailored  to  target  a 
compelling government interest, is presumptively unconstitutional in all applications. The 
State has pointed to no applications of the Act that could be considered “plainly legitimate” 
and the Court is aware of none. By barring access to all content on regulated platforms, 
including  that  which  is  neither  unprotected  nor  harmful,  based  on  the  content  and 
speakers represented on those platforms, the Act is unconstitutional in all conceivable 

                           33                                         
applications.                                                             
      2.  Void for Vagueness:  NetChoice Members’ Claim               
 NetChoice also moves for summary judgment on its claim that Act 689 violates the 
due process rights of its members because pivotal terms are unconstitutionally vague. 

NetChoice argues that the Act is unconstitutionally vague because it is unclear which of 
its members are subject to the Act’s requirements. The State responds that the Act is not 
unconstitutionally vague “because some of [NetChoice’s] members’ conduct is clearly 
proscribed” and “‘primary purpose’ is not vague.” (Doc. 72, pp. 22–23 (emphasis added)). 
 As the Supreme Court explained in Grayned v. City of Rockford:       
 It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness 
 if  its  prohibitions  are  not  clearly  defined.  Vague  laws  offend  several 
 important  values.  First,  because  we assume  that  man  is  free to  steer 
 between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of 
 ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, 
 so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not 
 providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement 
 is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply 
 them.                                                                

408 U.S. 104
, 108 (1972) (footnotes omitted).                             
 A regulation “violates the first essential of due process of law” by failing to provide 
adequate notice of prohibited conduct. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 
269 U.S. 385, 391
 (1926) (citations omitted). A court should find a regulation unconstitutional if it “forbids 
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” 
Id.
   
 “The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates—as well as the relative 
importance of fair notice and fair enforcement—depends in part on the nature of the 

                           34                                         
enactment.” Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 
455 U.S. 489, 498
 
(1982).  “[E]conomic  regulation  is  subject  to  a  less  strict  vagueness  test”  as  are 
“enactments  with  civil  rather  than  criminal  penalties  because  the  consequences  of 
imprecision are qualitatively less severe.” 
Id.
 at 498–99. “Finally, perhaps the most 

important factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law is whether it 
threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. If, for example, the law 
interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test 
should apply.” 
Id. at 499
.                                                
 Here, Act 689 must meet “a more stringent vagueness test” because it both 
contains criminal penalties, Ark. Code. Ann. § 4-88-1403(b)(1), and interferes with the 
right  of  free  speech,  see  infra  section  IV.C.1.  “When  speech  is  involved,  rigorous 
adherence to th[e]se requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill 
protected speech.” F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
567 U.S. 239
, 253–54 (2012). 
Indefinite statutes “abut[ting] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms” 

may force the entities regulated “to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ than if the 
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.” Baggett v. Bullitt, 
377 U.S. 360, 372
 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 
357 U.S. 513, 526
 (1958)). “Free speech may not 
be so inhibited.” 
Id.
                                                     
 “It is essential that legislation aimed at protecting children from allegedly harmful 
expression—no less than legislation enacted with respect to adults—be clearly drawn and 
that the standards adopted be reasonably precise so that those who are governed by the 
law and those that administer it will understand its meaning and application.”  Interstate 

                           35                                         
Cir., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 
390 U.S. 676, 689
 (1968) (striking down city ordinance imposing 
misdemeanor penalty on movie theaters for showing films “unsuitable for minors” as 
impermissibly vague); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 
343 U.S. 495, 497
 (1952) 
(invalidating state law banning motion picture distributors from distributing “sacrilegious” 

movies due to vague standards); Winters v. New York, 
333 U.S. 507
, 518–19 (1948) 
(finding  unconstitutionally  vague  a  state  law  regulating  the  distribution  of  certain 
commercial publications).                                                 
 Act 689 is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to adequately define which 
entities  are  subject  to  its  requirements,  risking  chilling  effects  and  inviting  arbitrary 
enforcement. A “social media company” is defined as “an online forum that a company 
makes available for an account holder” to “[c]reate a public profile, establish an account, 
or register as a user for the primary purpose of interacting socially with other profiles and 
accounts,” “[u]pload or create posts or content,” “[v]iew posts or content of other account 
holders,” and “[i]nteract with other account holders or users, including without limitation 

establishing  mutual  connections through  request  and  acceptance.”  Ark.  Code.  Ann. 
§ 1401(7)(A) (emphasis added). Act 689 does not define “primary purpose”—a term 
critical to determining which entities fall within its scope.             
 Worse, Act 689 is ambiguous as to whose “primary purpose” is being considered—
the  user  in  creating  the  account  or  the  company  in  making  the  forum  available. 
“[A] regulation is not vague because it may at times be difficult to prove an incriminating 
fact but rather because it is unclear as to what fact must be proved.” Fox, 
567 U.S. at 253
 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Williams, 
553 U.S. 285, 306
 (2008)). Even 

                           36                                         
if the Court agreed that “primary purpose” is an acceptable “qualitative standard,” see 
Johnson v. United States, 
576 U.S. 591
, 604 (2015), the Act does not identify whose 
primary  purpose  “courts,  juries,  and  regulators”  should  look  to  in  conducting  their 
“standard factual inquiry.” (Doc. 72, p. 23). Companies must choose between risking 

unpredictable and arbitrary enforcement (backed by civil penalties, attorneys’ fees, and 
criminal sanctions) and implementing the Act’s costly age-verification requirements, at a 
minimum chilling their users’ constitutionally protected speech and at a maximum putting 
themselves out of business in the process. See Harriman Decl. ¶ 34 (attesting that 
“Arkansas may be an unviable market” if Nextdoor is forced to implement third-party age 
verification).  Such  ambiguity  renders  a  law  unconstitutional.  Left  to  deal  with  the 
uncertainty,  platforms  may  choose  to  “restrict[  ]  their  conduct  to  that  which  is 
unquestionably safe,” possibly by ending operation in the state altogether.  
 Other provisions of Act 689 are similarly vague.  The Act defines the phrase “social 
media platform” as an “internet-based service or application . . . [o]n which a substantial 

function of the service or application is to connect users in order to allow users to interact 
socially with each other within the service or application”; but the Act excludes services 
in which “the predominant or exclusive function is” “[d]irect messaging consisting of 
messages, photos, or videos” that are “[o]nly visible to the sender and the recipient or 
recipients” and “[a]re not posted publicly.”  
Ark. Code Ann. §1401
(8)(A)–(B) (emphasis 
added). Again, the statute does not define “substantial function” or “predominant . . . 
function,” leaving companies to guess whether their online services are covered.  Many 
services allow users to send direct, private messages consisting of texts, photos, or 

                           37                                         
videos, but also offer other features that allow users to create content that anyone can 
view.    Act  689  does not  explain  how  platforms  are  to  determine  which  function  is 
“predominant,” leaving those services to guess whether they are regulated. 
 The State argues that Act 689’s definitions are clear “because any person of 

ordinary intelligence can tell that [Act 689] regulates Meta, Twitter [now X], and TikTok.”  
(Doc. 72, p. 22). The Court is less concerned with the straightforward applications of the 
Act and more concerned with the NetChoice members who are not certain whether they 
are regulated, namely Snapchat, Nextdoor, and Pinterest.                  
 The State asserts that Snapchat is exempt, Nextdoor is not, and no mention of 
Pinterest is made at all. (Doc. 72, pp. 20–21). Snapchat, the State says, is exempted from 
the Act because it’s “different from a traditional social media platform.” (Doc. 72, p. 20 
(quoting Doc. 72-3, p. 10:18–21 (Boyle Depo.)). The features the State points to—no 
public commenting, connections recommended based on contacts in one’s phonebook, 
curated but user-generated public content—are not related to any particular exemption. 

Snapchat features both public “stories” and private messaging. See Boyle Decl. ¶ 4. A 
“substantial function” of Snapchat is social interaction. Snapchat believes it is unregulated 
because its “predominant purpose is as a direct messaging service” but nonetheless fears 
being dragged into litigation if it does not comply with the age-verification requirement. 
Id. at ¶ 8
.                                                                   
 NetChoice also points to uncertainty with respect to Nextdoor and Pinterest. The 
State does not explain why Nextdoor falls within the Act’s purview. Nextdoor users may 
passively “receive updates from nearby neighbors, businesses, and public services,” or 

                           38                                         
they may interact socially by connecting with other users, joining groups, or exchanging 
direct messages. See Harriman Decl. ¶ 4; Doc. 72-2, p. 14:14–15:9 (Knapp Depo.). 
Pinterest describes itself as “a visual discovery engine for finding ideas like recipes, home 
and style inspiration, and more.” All About Pinterest (Doc. 66, p. 153). But Pinterest, too, 

has some social features: users can follow other users, comment on Pins, and send 
messages. 
Id.
 pp. 153–56. It is unclear to the Court whether the “the primary ‘end to be 
attained’ of a profile” on either of these platforms is social interaction as opposed to say, 
finding a reliable plumber or planning a wedding. (Doc. 72, p. 23 (quoting Purpose, 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary23)).                                           
 Snapchat provides the prime example of the arbitrary decisionmaking the Act 
invites. As the Court noted in its preliminary injunction order, the State’s attorney asserts 
that Snapchat is exempted from the Act’s requirements, while both a co-sponsor of the 
Act as well as the State’s own expert witness contend that Snapchat is regulated. See 
Doc.  44,  pp.  33–34.  The  State  is  correct  that  courts,  not  experts,  are  tasked  with 

interpreting statutes. However, due process requires that the legislature, not the Court, 
provide  “explicit  standards  for  those  who  apply  the  law”  so  that  “arbitrary  and 
discriminatory enforcement” may be avoided. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. Here, three 
people possessing, the Court assumes, at least ordinary intelligence—and ostensibly all 
on the enforcement side—cannot agree whether the Act covers Snapchat. Snapchat is 
right to be worried about the risk of litigation.                         


23 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/purpose [https://perma.cc/K98B-A8YS]. 

                           39                                         
 Arkansas “cannot give the Judiciary uncut marble with instructions to chip away all 
that does not resemble David” while leaving Arkansans to bear constitutional deprivation 
in the meantime. Percoco v. United States, 
598 U.S. 319, 337
 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring in the judgment). That is precisely what the State has asked this Court to do; 

Act 689 is unconstitutionally vague.                                      
                   D.   Irreparable Harm                              
 Because Act 689 abridges the First Amendment rights of Arkansans who use social 
media and contains terms too vague to be reasonably understood, NetChoice members 
and their users will suffer irreparable harm if the Act goes into effect. Because it is unclear 
which NetChoice members are subject to regulation, some members would be forced to 
choose between risking enforcement penalties—civil and criminal—and implementing 
age-verification requirements that burden their users’ First Amendment rights. Other 
members, those that are clearly regulated, would be pressed into service as the private 
censors of the State. No legal remedy exists to compensate Arkansans for the loss of 

their First Amendment rights. Nat’l People’s Action v. Vill. of Wilmette, 
914 F.2d 1008, 1013
 (7th Cir. 1990).  “[T]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods 
of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson 
Chapel Sch. Dist., 
540 F.3d 752, 762
 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347, 373
 (1976).                                                          
        E.  Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest           
 When  the  government  opposes  the  issuance  of  an  injunction,  the  final  two 
factors—the balance of the equities and the public interest—merge. See Nken v. Holder, 

                           40                                         
556 U.S. 418, 435
 (2009). The balance of the equities and public interest decidedly favor 
NetChoice:  “it  is  always  in  the  public  interest to  protect  constitutional  rights.”  Phe/ps- 
Roper v. Nixon, 
545 F.3d 685, 690
 (8th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Phelps- 
Roper v.  City of Manchester,  
697 F.3d 678
 (8th  Cir. 2012). Act 689 is a content-based 
restriction on speech, and it is not targeted to address the harms the State has identified. 
Arkansas  takes  a  hatchet  to  adults’  and  minors’  protected  speech  alike  though  the 
Constitution demands it use a scalpel. 
                       V.       CONCLUSION 
  IT  IS  THEREFORE  ORDERED  that  Plaintiff's  Amended  Motion  for  Summary 
Judgment (Doc.  66)  is GRANTED. Act 689 of 2023,  the “Social  Media  Safety Act,”  is 
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED. 
  IT IS SO ORDERED on this 31st day of March, 2025. 

                                    RG A)   a 
                                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

                                 41