Opinion · Supreme Court of Alabama
Ex Parte Jackson
Ex Parte Jackson, 672 So. 2d 810 (Ala. 1995)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of Alabama
- Jurisdiction
- Alabama
- Date
- 1995-10-13
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- Houston, J, concurring in the result
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Ex Parte Jackson. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 21 opinions
EX PARTE JACKSON,672 So.2d 810(Ala. 1995)
672 So.2d 810
Ex parte Willie Simmons JACKSON.
(Re Willie Simmons Jackson, alias Willie S. Jackson, alias Billy Boy
Jackson v. State).
1920376.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 13, 1995.
Rehearing Denied December 8, 1995.
James H. Evans and Jeff Sessions, Attys. Gen., and Cecil G. Brendle, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sandra J. Stewart, Deputy Atty. Gen., for Respondent.
On Return to Remand
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences. SeeJackson v. State,640 So.2d 1025(Ala.Cr.App. 1992). This Court granted certiorari review. InExparte Jackson,640 So.2d 1050(Ala. 1993), this Court remanded this cause for the Court of Criminal Appeals to have the trial court determine whether the prosecution's reason for striking one of the jurors, Juror No. 48, was race-neutral, within the rules ofBatson v. Kentucky,476 U.S. 79,106 S.Ct. 1712,90 L.Ed.2d 69(1986), and its progeny.1Page 811Because we remanded on theBatsonissue, we did not address other issues raised on certiorari review.
On the trial court's return to the remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals again affirmed, holding that the reasons articulated by the State for striking the potential juror were race-neutral and that the trial court had properly denied the appellant'sBatsonclaim.Jackson v. State,672 So.2d 808(Ala.Crim.App. 1994).
Now that on remand the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have addressed theBatsonquestion addressed in our first opinion (640 So.2d 1050), we now consider the other issues raised in Jackson's certiorari petition.
In his petition, Jackson raised the same eight issues he had raised in the Court of Criminal Appeals. The opinions released by the Court of Criminal Appeals thoroughly treat each of those issues.Jackson v. State,640 So.2d 1025(Ala.Crim.App. 1992);Jackson v. State,672 So.2d 808(Ala.Crim.App. 1994).
Our review of a death penalty case requires us to address any plain error or defect found in the proceeding under review, even if the error was not brought to the attention of the trial court. Rule 39(k), Ala.R.App.P. ' "Plain error" only arises if the error is so obvious that the failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings.' "Ex parte Womack,435 So.2d 766,769(Ala.Cr.App. 1983),cert. denied,464 U.S. 986,104 S.Ct. 436,78 L.Ed.2d 367(1983), quotingUnited States v. Chaney,662 F.2d 1148,1152(5th Cir. 1981). This Court will take appropriate action when the error "has or probably has" substantially prejudiced the defendant. Rule 39(k), Ala.R.App.P.
Having considered the record, together with the briefs and arguments of counsel, we conclude that the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals (Jackson v. State,640 So.2d 1025(Ala.Crim.App. 1992);Jackson v. State,672 So.2d 808(Ala.Crim.App. 1994)), must be affirmed. Ala.R.App.P. 39(k).
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
HOUSTON, J., concurs in result.
"[W]hat is going to happen in future capital cases in which a jury does not unanimously sentence to death but the trial court does sentence to death (which is permissible under Alabama law, assuming that it is not unconstitutional under the state constitution, seeHarris v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___,115 S.Ct. 1031[130 L.Ed.2d 1004] (1995))[?]"
Today, I received my answer. Nothing.
At the time the Constitution of Alabama of 1901 was ratified, juries in Alabama sentenced to death or life imprisonment in capital cases and fixed the amount of compensatory and punitive damages in civil cases.
In reviewing death penalty cases, this Court must notice error that is so obvious that the failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceeding.Ex parte Bankhead,585 So.2d 112,117(Ala. 1991).
In this case, a jury did not unanimously recommend the death sentence. In fact, a majority of the jury recommended life imprisonment without parole. At the time of the ratification of the 1901 Constitution, this would not have been a valid sentence. Ala. Code 1897, § 4858.
InGilbreath v. Wallace,292 Ala. 267,269-70,292 So.2d 651,653-54(1974), this Court held: "Alabama's Constitution effected a 'freezing' of the right to jury trial as of 1901" in both "civil and criminal cases."Page 812
InEx parte Giles,632 So.2d 577(Ala. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,114 S.Ct. 2694,129 L.Ed.2d 825(1994), quotingCrowe v. State,485 So.2d 351,364(Ala.Crim.App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds,485 So.2d 373(Ala. 1985), a majority of this Court held in effect that " 'Article I, Section 11, confers the right of trial by jury as [it] existed at common law and the time of Alabama'sfirst[1819] state constitution' " (emphasis added inGiles) and that "a historical review" of the right was the "starting point in any § 11 analysis." 632 So.2d at 580-81. At common law and at the time of thefirstAlabama Constitution, juries convicted and the court alone sentenced.
InSmith v. Schulte, supra, the majority of this Court reembracedGilbreath v. Wallace, supra, to hold that § 11 prohibited the legislature from capping at $1,000,000 the amount that could be awarded in a medical malpractice wrongful death action, an action that was unknown to the common law and that was not in existence at the time of the first Alabama Constitution, but was in existence at the time of the ratification of the Constitution of 1901. Therefore, inSmithv. Schulte, the majority of this Court departed from itsGilesholding that § 11 "confers the right to trial by jury as [it] existed at common law and the time of Alabama'sfirststate constitution" and departed from its historic analysis of the claimed right, because there wasnoright to recover for wrongful death at common law or at the time of the first Alabama Constitution. This was a right that was solely a creature of the legislature created after the first Constitution, but before the 1901 Constitution.
If I had voted with the majority inSmith v. Schulte, I would have to conclude that it is plain error to affirm Jackson's sentence to death; however, I did not vote with the majority, because, in my view, the majority opinion inSmith v. Schulteis plain error.
The majority of this Court has made Art.I, §11, of the Alabama Constitution its plaything. It can restrict § 11 so as to permit the legislature, after the ratification of the 1901 Constitution, to impose a $100,000 maximum amount of damages that can be recovered by an individual in a tort action against a governmental entity, when there was no such limitation on tort damages before the ratification of the 1901 Constitution (seeGarner v. Covington County,624 So.2d 1346(Ala. 1993)); it can broaden § 11 wide enough to strike down a $250,000 cap on punitive damages (Henderson v. Alabama Power Co.,627 So.2d 878(Ala. 1993)); it can shrink § 11 small enough to be able to affirm a court's, as opposed to a jury's, sentence to death, even though sentencing to death was a jury's function when the 1901 Constitution was ratified (seeEx parte Giles,632 So.2d 577(Ala. 1993)); it can again broaden § 11 wide enough to strike down a $1,000,000 cap on a wrongful death recovery in a medical malpractice action (Smith v. Schulte, supra); and today it shrinks § 11 so small that it can ignore it ("the jury returned an advisory verdict, by a majority vote of seven to five, recommending a sentence of life imprisonment, without parole," 671 So.2d at 1367) and affirm Jackson's death sentence. I dissented inHenderson v. Alabama Power Co.and inSmith v. Schulte.I concurred in the result inEx parte Giles.I concur in the result in this case, because I believe the legislature had the power to impose caps on punitive damages and to fix the method of punishment for crime (Henderson v.Alabama Power Co., 627 So.2d at 905-08 (Houston, J., dissenting));Ex parte Giles, 632 So.2d at 587 (Houston, J., concurring in the result). I regret that the abolition of caps on punitive damages was such a felt necessity of the times that the majority of this Court played a sleight-of-hand trick to justify striking these caps, while trying not to have to declare unconstitutional much of Chapter 5 of Title 13A of the Code (Ala. Code 1975, §§13A-5-1through13A-5-59), "Punishments and Sentences."
I am convinced thatHenderson v. Alabama Power Co.andSmithv. Schultewere wrongly decided. If there is a due process or equal protection violation as a result of this waffling by the majority, it would be the civil defendants whose property was taken in excess of legislatively mandated amounts who would have a right to have that violation redressed, not the criminal defendants whosePage 813punishment has been legally prescribed by legislation.
Therefore, I concur in the result. However, if I had voted with the majority of the Court on the right-to-jury-trial issue inHenderson v. Alabama Power Co.or inSmith v. Schulte, I would have been unable to vote to affirm Jackson's sentence of death.
- Our opinion inEx parte Jackson,640 So.2d 1050(Ala. 1993), erroneously stated that Jackson had been convicted of four counts of possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, in violation of §13A-9-6, Ala. Code 1975, and that he had been sentenced for a term in prison for those charges. Although Jackson was indicted for four counts of possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, in violation of §13A-9-6, those charges were nol-prossed during the trial of the case. R.T. 1328. ↩