Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.

Cal. v. Deep Sea Rsch., Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1998-04-28
Topic
bankruptcy

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that in rem admiralty proceedings don’t implicate Eleventh Amendment immunity when the property isn’t within the possession of a sovereign
  • holding that Eleventh Amendment does not apply to bar federal court jurisdiction over in rem admiralty actions where State claims an interest in, but does not actually possess, the res in dispute
  • recognizing a court’s in rem admiralty jurisdiction on the basis that the salvor presented artifacts from the shipwreck, including china and a bottle of champagne
  • stating that sovereign immunity does not prevent federal courts from hearing admiralty case brought in rem where res is not within the state’s possession
  • "According to this Court’s precedents, ... a state official is immune from suit in federal court for actions taken in an official capacity.”
  • leaving the issue of whether the Brother Jonathan was abandoned under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act for reconsideration on remand
  • applying “traditional approach” to abandonment that “allows abandonment to be inferred on the basis of circumstantial evidence”
  • recognizing an in rem exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context of admiralty law; federal court could determine title to an abandoned shipwreck, even where a State was a potential title holder, where the State did not possess the vessel at issue

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Headnotes

  1. Constitutional Law — Eleventh Amendment The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a federal court from exercising jurisdiction over an in rem admiralty action where the res is not within the State's possession; a State's sovereign immunity does not preclude federal adjudication of competing claims to a shipwreck that the State does not actually possess. 523 U.S. 491, 501-508 (1998)
  2. Constitutional Law — Eleventh Amendment While the Eleventh Amendment constrains federal jurisdiction generally, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is not wholly exempt from its operation; however, the State's immunity from an in rem admiralty proceeding turns on whether the State has actual possession of the res, not merely a constructive or asserted ownership interest in it. 523 U.S. at 502-508
  3. Admiralty & Maritime Law — Sovereign Immunity — Possession of the Res In an in rem admiralty action, the asserted ownership of a res by a sovereign — whether the State or the Federal Government — bars federal jurisdiction only where the sovereign has actual possession of the property; mere constructive possession implied from ownership does not defeat the court's in rem jurisdiction. 523 U.S. at 506-508
  4. Admiralty & Maritime Law — Abandoned Shipwreck Act — Meaning of "Abandoned" The meaning of "abandoned" under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 conforms with the meaning of abandonment under admiralty law. 523 U.S. at 508-509
CALIFORNIA v. DEEP SEA RESEARCH, INC.,523 U.S. 491(1998)
CALIFORNIA ET AL.v. DEEP SEA RESEARCH, INC., ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
No. 96-1400.
Argued December 1, 1997
Decided April 22, 1998
TheS. S. Brother Jonathanand its cargo sank off the coast of California in 1865. Shortly after the disaster, five insurance companies paid claims for the loss of certain cargo, but it is unclear whether the ship and the remaining cargo were insured. There is no evidence that either the State or the insurance companies have attempted to locate or recover the wreckage. In this action, respondent Deep Sea Research, Inc. (DSR), which has located the wreck, seeks rights to the vessel and cargo under the Federal District Court'sin remadmiralty jurisdiction. California moved to dismiss, claiming that it possesses title to the wreck either under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA) — which provides that the Federal Government asserts and transfers title to a State of any "abandoned shipwreck" embedded in the State's submerged lands or on a State's submerged lands and included, or eligible for inclusion, in the National Register — or under Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. § 6313 — which vests title in the State to all abandoned shipwrecks on or in the State's tide and submerged lands — and therefore DSR'sin remaction is an action against the State in violation of theEleventhAmendment. DSR countered that the ASA could not divest the federal courts of the exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred by Article III, § 2, of the Constitution and requested a warrant for the arrest of the vessel and its cargo. The District Court concluded that the State failed to demonstrate a "colorable claim" to the wreck under the ASA; found that the ASA pre-empts § 6313; issued a warrant for the vessel's arrest; appointed DSR the vessel's custodian and made it the exclusive salvor; and decided that it would defer adjudication of title until after DSR completed the salvage operation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the ASA pre-empts § 6313; that theEleventhAmendment does not bar the federal court's jurisdiction over thein remproceeding as to the application of the ASA; that the State did not prove that theBrother Jonathanis abandoned under the ASA; and that the wreck's uninsured portion should not be treated as abandoned.Page 492Held:
1. TheEleventhAmendment does not bar a federal court's jurisdiction over anin remadmiralty action where the res is not within the State's possession. Pp. 501-508.
(a) The federal courts have a unique role in admiralty cases as conferred by Article III, § 2, cl. 1, of the Constitution. That jurisdiction encompasses proceedingsin rem.The jurisdiction of federal courts is also constrained, however, by theEleventhAmendment. Early cases appear to have assumed the federal courts' jurisdiction over admiraltyin remactions despite theEleventhAmendment. Subsequent decisions altered the role of federal courts by explaining that admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is not wholly exempt from theEleventhAmendment.Ex parte New York,256 U.S. 490(NewYork I). Thus, this Court held that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over anin remaction against a tugboat operated by New York State,Ex parte New York,256 U.S. 503(New York II), and that Florida could not invoke theEleventhAmendment to block the arrest of maritime artifacts in the State's possession where that possession was unlawful,Florida Dept. of Statev.TreasureSalvors, Inc.,458 U.S. 670(plurality opinion). However, those opinions did not address situations comparable to this case, in which DSR asserts rights to a res not in the State's possession. The action inNew York I, although styled as anin remaction, was actually, as the Court explained in that decision, anin personamaction against a state official; and the action inNew York IIwas anin remsuit against a vessel that was property of the State, in its possession and employed for governmental use. Assertions in the opinions inTreasure Salvors, which might be read to suggest that a federal court may not undertakein remadjudication of the State's interest in property without the State's consent, regardless of the status of the res, should not be divorced from the context of that case and reflexively applied to the very different circumstances presented by this case. Also, becauseTreasure Salvorsaddressed only the District Court's authority to issue a warrant to arrest artifacts, any references to what the lower courts could have done if adjudicating the artifacts' title do not control the outcome here. Nor does the fact thatTreasure Salvorshas been cited for the general proposition that federal courts cannot adjudicate a State's claim of title to property prevent a more nuanced application of that decision in the context of the federal courts'in remadmiralty jurisdiction. Pp. 501-506.
(b) In considering whether theEleventhAmendment applies where the State asserts claim in an admiralty action to a res not in its possession,Page 493this Court's decisions involving the Federal Government's sovereign immunity inin remadmiralty actions provide guidance, for the Court has recognized a correlation between sovereign immunity principles applicable to States and the Federal Government. Based on the longstanding precedent that the federal courts'in remadmiralty jurisdiction is barred only where the Federal Government actually possesses the disputed res,e.g., The Davis, 10 Wall. 15, theEleventhAmendment does not bar federal jurisdiction over theBrother Jonathan, and the District Court may adjudicate DSR's and the State's claims to the shipwreck. Pp. 506-508.
2. Because the lower courts' conclusion that theBrotherJonathanwas not abandoned for ASA purposes was influenced by the assumption that theEleventhAmendment was relevant to the courts' inquiry, the case is remanded for reconsideration of the abandonment issue, with the clarification that the meaning of "abandoned" under the ASA conforms with its meaning under admiralty law. The District Court's full consideration of the ASA's application on remand might negate the need to address the issue whether the ASA pre-empts § 6313, and, thus, this Court declines to undertake that analysis. Pp. 508-509.
102 F.3d 379, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion,post, p. 509. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined,post, p. 510.
Joseph C. Rusconi, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs wereDanielE. Lungren, Attorney General, Roderick E. Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General,Richard M. Frank, Assistant Attorney General,Dennis M. Eagan, Deputy Attorney General,Jack Rump, andPeter Pelkofer.David C. Frederickargued the cause for the United States, respondent under this Court's Rule 121.6, in support of petitioners. With him on the briefs wereActing Solicitor General Dellinger,Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler,Deputy Assistant Attorney General Preston, andRichard A.Olderman.Page 494Fletcher C. Alfordargued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief wereStuart M. Gordon, David J. Bederman.fn*
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action, involving the adjudication of various claims to a historic shipwreck, requires us to address the interaction between theEleventhAmendment and thein remadmiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. Respondent Deep Sea Research, Inc. (DSR), located the ship, known as theS. S.Brother Jonathan, in California's territorial waters. When DSR turned to the federal courts for resolution of its claims to the vessel, California contended that theEleventhAmendment precluded a federal court from considering DSR's claims in light of the State's asserted rights to theBrother Jonathanunder federal and state law. We conclude that theEleventhAmendment does not bar the jurisdictionPage 495of a federal court over anin remadmiralty action where the res is not within the State's possession.
I
The dispute before us arises out of respondent DSR's assertion of rights to both the vessel and cargo of theBrother Jonathan, a 220-foot, wooden-hulled, double side-wheeled steamship that struck a submerged rock in July 1865 during a voyage between San Francisco and Vancouver. It took less than an hour for theBrother Jonathanto sink, and most of the ship's passengers and crew perished. The ship's cargo, also lost in the accident, included a shipment of up to $2 million in gold and a United States Army payroll that some estimates place at $250,000. See Nolte, Shipwreck: Brother Jonathan Discovered, San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 25, 1994, p. 1, reprinted in App. 127-131. One of few parts of the ship recovered was the wheel, which was later displayed in a saloon in Crescent City, California. R. Phelan, The Gold Chain 242 (1987).

Shortly after the disaster, five insurance companies paid claims totaling $48,490 for the loss of certain cargo. It is unclear whether the remaining cargo and the ship itself were insured. See Wreck of the Steamship Brother Jonathan, New York Times, Aug. 26, 1865, reprinted in App. 140-147. Prior to DSR's location of the vessel, the only recovery of cargo from the shipwreck may have occurred in the 1930's, when a fisherman found 22 pounds of gold bars minted in 1865 and believed to have come from theBrother Jonathan. The fisherman died, however, without revealing the source of his treasure. Nolte,supra, App. 130. There appears to be no evidence that either the State of California or the insurance companies that paid claims have attempted to locate or recover the wreckage.

In 1991, DSR filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking rights to the wreck of theBrother Jonathanand its cargo underPage 496that court'sin remadmiralty jurisdiction. California intervened, asserting an interest in theBrotherJonathanbased on the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA),102 Stat. 432, 43 U.S.C. § § 2101-2106, which provides that the Federal Government asserts and transfers title to a State of any "abandoned shipwreck" that either is embedded in submerged lands of a State or is on a State's submerged lands "and is included in or determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register," § 2105(a)(3). According to California, the ASA applies because theBrother Jonathanis abandoned and is both embedded on state land and eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register). California also laid claim to theBrotherJonathanunder Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. § 6313 (West Supp. 1998) (hereinafter § 6313), which vests title in the State "to all abandoned shipwrecks . . . on or in the tide and submerged lands of California."

The District Court initially dismissed DSR's action without prejudice at DSR's initiative. The case was reinstated in 1994 after DSR actually located theBrother Jonathan4 1\2 miles off the coast of Crescent City, where it apparently rests upright on the sea floor under more than 200 feet of water. Based on its possession of several artifacts from theBrother Jonathan, including china, a full bottle of champagne, and a brass spike from the ship's hull, DSR sought either an award of title to the ship and its cargo or a salvage award for its efforts in recovering the ship. DSR also claimed a right of ownership based on its purchase of subrogation interests from some of the insurance companies that had paid claims on the ship's cargo.

In response, the State of California entered an appearance for the limited purpose of filing a motion to dismiss DSR'sinremcomplaint for lack of jurisdiction. According to the State, it possesses title to theBrother Jonathanunder either the ASA or § 6313, and therefore, DSR'sinremaction against the vessel is an action against the State in violationPage 497of theEleventhAmendment. DSR disputed both of the State's statutory ownership claims, and argued that the ASA could not divest the federal courts of the exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred by ArticleIII, §2, of the United States Constitution. DSR also filed a motion requesting that the District Court issue a warrant for the arrest of theBrother Jonathanand its cargo, as well as an order appointing DSR the exclusive salvor of the shipwreck.

The District Court held two hearings on the motions. The first focused on whether the wreck is located within California's territorial waters, and the second concerned the possible abandonment, embeddedness, and historical significance of the shipwreck, issues relevant to California's claims to the res. For purposes of the pending motions, DSR stipulated that theBrother Jonathanis located upon submerged lands belonging to California.

After the hearings, the District Court concluded that the State failed to demonstrate a "colorable claim" to theBrotherJonathanunder federal law, reasoning that the State had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the ship is abandoned, embedded in the sea floor, or eligible for listing in the National Register as is required to establish title under the ASA.883 F. Supp. 1343,1357(ND Cal. 1995). As for California's state law claim, the court determined that the ASA pre-empts § 6313. Accordingly, the court issued a warrant for the arrest of theBrother Jonathan, appointed DSR custodian of the shipwreck subject to further order of the court, and ordered DSR to take possession of the shipwreck as its exclusive salvor pending the court's determination of "the manner in which the wreck and its cargo, or the proceeds therefrom, should be distributed."Id., at 1364.

The District Court stated that it was not deciding whether "any individual items of cargo or personal property have been abandoned," explaining that "[a]t this stage in the litigation, DSR is not asking the court to award it salvage fees from theresof the wreck, or to otherwise make any orderPage 498regarding title to or distribution of the wreck or its contents."Id., at 1354. The District Court thought that the most prudent course would be to adjudicate title after DSR completes the salvage operation. Following the District Court's ruling, the United States asserted a claim to any property on theBrotherJonathanbelonging to the Federal Government.

The State appealed, arguing that its immunity from suit under theEleventhAmendment does not hinge upon the demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that the ASA applies to theBrother Jonathan.102 F.3d 379,383(CA9 1996). According to the State, it had established sufficient claim to the shipwreck under state law by "assert[ing] that theBrother Jonathanis on its submerged lands and that . . . § 6313 vests title in the State to abandoned shipwrecks on its submerged lands."Id., at 385. Underlying the State's argument was a challenge to the District Court's ruling that the ASA pre-empts the California statute. The State also maintained that it had a colorable claim to theBrother Jonathanunder the ASA, arguing that it presented ample evidence of both abandonment and embeddedness, and that the District Court applied the wrong test by "requir[ing] that abandonment be shown by an affirmative act on the part of the original owner demonstrating intent to renounce ownership."Ibid.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's orders. The court first concluded that § 6313 is pre-empted by the ASA because the state statute "takes title to shipwrecks that do not meet the requirements of the ASA and which are therefore within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts."Id., at 384. With respect to the State's claim under the ASA, the court presumed that "a federal court has both the power and duty to determine whether a case falls within its subject matter jurisdiction," and concluded that "it was appropriate for the district court to require the State to present evidence thatPage 499the ASA applied to theBrother Jonathan, i.e., that it was abandoned and either embedded or eligible for listing in the National Register, before dismissing the case."Id., at 386. According to the court's reasoning, "in addressing the questions of abandonment, embeddedness, and historical significance of the wreck under the ASA, a federal court does not adjudicate the state's rights," because the ASA establishes the Federal Government's title to a qualifying shipwreck, which is then transferred to a State.Id., at 387. Consequently, in the court's view, "a federal court may adjudicate the question of whether a wreck meets the requirements of the ASA without implicating theEleventhAmendment."Ibid.

As to the specifics of the State's claim under the ASA, the court held that the District Court did not err in concluding that the State failed to prove that theBrother Jonathanis abandoned within the meaning of the statute. The court reasoned that, in the absence of a definition of abandonment in the ASA, "Congress presumably intended that courts apply the definition of abandonment that has evolved under maritime law."Ibid. In maritime law, the court explained, abandonment occurs either when title to a vessel has been affirmatively renounced or when circumstances give rise to an inference of abandonment. Here, the Court of Appeals concluded, the District Court's "failure to infer abandonment from the evidence presented by the State was not clearly erroneous," given the insurance companies' claims to the ship's insured cargo and undisputed evidence presented by DSR that the technology required to salvage theBrotherJonathanhas been developed only recently.Id., at 388. The court also rejected the State's bid to treat the uninsured portion of the wreck as abandoned, explaining that the District Court did not address the status of individual items of cargo or personal property, and that "divid[ing] the wreck of theBrother Jonathaninto abandoned and unabandoned portions for the purposes of the ASA" would lead to bothPage 500federal and state courts adjudicating the wreck's fate, which, in the court's view, would be "confusing and inefficient," and also "inconsistent with the general rule in maritime law of treating wrecks as a legally unifiedres." Id., at 389.

Summarizing its reasoning, the court stated that, "[b]ecause the law is reluctant to find abandonment, and because a finding of partial abandonment would deprive those holding title to the unabandoned portion of the wreck access to the federal forum, we hold that theBrother Jonathanis not abandoned."Ibid. (citation omitted). The court reserved the question whether there might be some point at which the insured portion of a shipwreck "becomes so negligible" that the entire wreck would be abandoned under the ASA.Ibid. The court also declined to take judicial notice of evidence that, during pendency of the appeal, theBrother Jonathanwas determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register.

By concluding that the State must prove its claim to theBrother Jonathanby a preponderance of the evidence in order to invoke the immunity afforded by theEleventhAmendment, the Ninth Circuit diverged from other Courts of Appeals that have held that a State need only make a bare assertion to ownership of a res. SeeZychv.Wrecked Vessel Believed to bethe Lady Elgin,960 F.2d 665,670(CA7), cert. denied,506 U.S. 985(1992);Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc. v.The Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,717 F.2d 6,8(CA1 1983).fn*We granted certiorari to address whether a State'sEleventhAmendment immunity in aninremadmiralty action depends upon evidence of the State's ownership of the res, and to consider the relatedPage 501questions whether theBrother Jonathanis subject to the ASA and whether the ASA pre-empts § 6313.520 U.S. 1263(1997).
II
The judicial power of federal courts extends "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The federal courts have had a unique role in admiralty cases since the birth of this Nation, because "[m]aritime commerce was . . . the jugular vein of the Thirteen States." F. Frankfurter J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 7 (1927). Accordingly, "[t]he need for a body of law applicable throughout the nation was recognized by every shade of opinion in the Constitutional Convention."Ibid. The constitutional provision was incorporated into the first Judiciary Act in 1789, and federal courts have retained "admiralty or maritime jurisdiction" since then. See28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). That jurisdiction encompasses "maritime causes of action begun and carried on as proceedingsin rem, that is, where a vessel or thing is itself treated as the offender and made the defendant by name or description in order to enforce a lien."Madrugav.Superior Court of Cal., County ofSan Diego,346 U.S. 556,560(1954).

The jurisdiction of the federal courts is constrained, however, by theEleventhAmendment, under which "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Although the Amendment, by its terms, "would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts,"Seminole Tribe ofFlav.Florida,517 U.S. 44,54(1996), the Court has interpreted the Amendment more broadly. See,e.g., Blatchfordv.Native Village ofNoatak,501 U.S. 775,779(1991). According to this Court's precedents, a State may not be sued in federal court by one of its own citizens,Page 502seeHansv.Louisiana,134 U.S. 1(1890), and a state official is immune from suit in federal court for actions taken in an official capacity, seeSmithv.Reeves,178 U.S. 436(1900).

The Court has not always charted a clear path in explaining the interaction between theEleventhAmendment and the federal courts'in remadmiralty jurisdiction. Early cases involving the disposition of "prize" vessels captured during wartime appear to have assumed that federal courts could adjudicate thein remdisposition of the bounty even when state officials raised an objection. SeeUnitedStatesv.Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 139-141 (1809). As Justice Story explained, in admiralty actionsin rem,
"the jurisdiction of the [federal] court is founded upon the possession of the thing; and if the State should interpose a claim for the property, it does not act merely in the character of a defendant, but as an actor. Besides, the language of the [Eleventh] [A]mendment is, that `the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suitin law orequity.' But a suit in the admiralty is not, correctly speaking, a suit in law or in equity; but is often spoken of in contradistinction to both." 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1689, pp. 491-492 (5th ed. 1891).


Justice Washington, riding Circuit, expressed the same view inUnited Statesv.Bright, 24 F.Cas. 1232, 1236 (No. 14,647) (CC Pa. 1809), where he reasoned:
"[I]n cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction the property in dispute is generally in the possession of the court, or of persons bound to produce it, or its equivalent, and the proceedings are in rem. The court decides in whom the right is, and distributes the proceeds accordingly. In such a case the court need not depend upon the good will of a state claiming an interest in the thing to enable it to execute its decree. All the worldPage 503are parties to such a suit, and of course are bound by the sentence. The state may interpose her claim and have it decided. But she cannot lie by, and, after the decree is passed say that she was a party, and therefore not bound, for want of jurisdiction in the court."


Although those statements might suggest that theEleventhAmendment has little application inin remadmiralty proceedings, subsequent decisions have altered that understanding of the federal courts' role. InEx parte New York,256 U.S. 490(1921)(New York I), the Court explained that admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is not wholly exempt from the operation of theEleventhAmendment, thereby rejecting the views of Justices Story and Washington.Id., at 497-498. On the same day, in its opinion inEx parte New York,256 U.S. 503(1921)(New York II), the Court likewise concluded that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over a wrongful death action broughtin remagainst a tugboat operated by the State of New York on the Erie Canal, although the Court did not specifically rely on theEleventhAmendment in its holding.

The Court's most recent case involving anin remadmiralty action,Florida Dept. of Statev.TreasureSalvors, Inc.,458 U.S. 670(1982), addressed whether theEleventhAmendment "bars an in rem admiralty action seeking to recover property owned by a state."Id., at 682 (internal quotation marks omitted). A plurality of the Court suggested thatNew York IIcould be distinguished on the ground that, inTreasure Salvors, the State's possession of maritime artifacts was unauthorized, and the State therefore could not invoke theEleventhAmendment to block their arrest.458 U.S., at 695-699(citingEx parte Young,209 U.S. 123(1908), andTindalv.Wesley,167 U.S. 204(1897)). As the plurality explained, "since the state officials do not have a colorable claim to possession of the artifacts, they may not invoke theEleventhAmendment to block execution of the warrant of arrest."458 U.S., at 697.Page 504

That reference to a "colorable claim" is at the crux of this case. Both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit interpreted the "colorable claim" requirement as imposing a burden on the State to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that theBrother Jonathanmeets the criteria set forth in the ASA. See102 F.3d, at 386;883 F. Supp., at 1349. Other Courts of Appeals have concluded that a State need only make a bare assertion to ownership of a res in order to establish its sovereign immunity in anin remadmiralty action. See,e.g., Zych,960 F.2d, at 670.

By our reasoning, however, either approach glosses over an important distinction present here. In this case, unlike inTreasure Salvors, DSR asserts rights to a res that is not in the possession of the State. TheEleventhAmendment's role in that type of dispute was not decided by the plurality opinion inTreasure Salvors, which decided "whether a federal court exercising admiraltyin remjurisdiction may seize property held by state officials under a claim that the property belongs to the State."458 U.S., at 683; see alsoid., at 697 ("In ruling that theEleventhAmendment does not bar execution of the warrant, we need not decide the extent to which a federal district court exercising admiraltyinremjurisdiction over property before the court may adjudicate the rights of claimants to that property as against sovereigns that did not appear and voluntarily assert any claim that they had to the res").

Nor did the opinions inNew York IorNew YorkIIaddress a situation comparable to this case. The holding inNew York Iexplained that, although the suit at issue was styled as anin remlibel action seeking recovery of damages against tugboats chartered by the State, the proceedings were actually "in the nature of an actionin personamagainst [the Superintendent of Public Works of the State of New York], not individually, but in his [official] capacity."256 U.S., at 501. The action inNew York IIwas aninremsuit against a vessel described as being "at all times mentioned in thePage 505libel and at present . . . the absolute property of the State of New York, in its possession and control, and employed in the public service of the State for governmental uses and purposes . . . ."256 U.S., at 508. As Justice White explained in his opinion inTreasure Salvors:
"TheIn re New Yorkcases . . . reflect the special concern in admiralty that maritime property of the sovereign is not to be seized. . . . [They] are but the most apposite examples of the line of cases concerningin remactions brought against vessels in which an official of the State, the Federal Government, or a foreign government has asserted ownership of the res. The Court's consistent interpretation of the respective but related immunity doctrines pertaining to such vessels has been, upon proper presentation that the sovereign entity claims ownershipof a res in its possession, to dismiss the suit or modify its judgment accordingly."458 U.S., at 709-710(opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).


It is true that statements in the fractured opinions inTreasure Salvorsmight be read to suggest that a federal court may not undertakein remadjudication of the State's interest in property without the State's consent, regardless of the status of the res. See,e.g.,id., at 682 (plurality opinion) ("The court did not have power . . . to adjudicate the State's interest in the property without the State's consent");id., at 711 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("It is . . . beyond reasonable dispute that theEleventhAmendment bars a federal court from deciding the rights and obligations of a State in a contract unless the State consents"). Those assertions, however, should not be divorced from the context ofTreasure Salvorsand reflexively applied to the very different circumstances presented by this case. InTreasureSalvors, the State had possession — albeit unlawfully — of the artifacts at issue. Also, thePage 506opinion addressed the District Court's authority to issue a warrant to arrest the artifacts, not the disposition of title to them. As the plurality explained, "[t]he proper resolution of [theEleventhAmendment] issue . . . does notrequire— or permit — a determination of the State's ownership of the artifacts."Id., at 699 (emphasis added); see alsoid., at 700 (noting that while adjudication of the State's right to the artifacts "would be justified if the State voluntarily advanced a claim to [them], it may not be justified as part of theEleventhAmendment analysis, the only issue before us"). Thus, any references inTreasure Salvorsto what the lower courts could have done if they had solely adjudicated title to the artifacts, rather than issued a warrant to arrest the res, do not control the outcome of this case, particularly given that it comes before us in a very different posture,i.e., in an admiralty actionin remwhere the State makes no claim of actual possession of the res.

Nor does the fact thatTreasure Salvorshas been cited for the general proposition that federal courts cannot adjudicate a State's claim of title to property, see,e.g.,Idahov.Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,521 U.S. 261,289-290 (1997) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment);id., at 305-306 (SOUTER, J., dissenting), prevent a more nuanced application ofTreasure Salvorsin the context of the federal courts'in remadmiralty jurisdiction. Although theEleventhAmendment bars federal jurisdiction over general title disputes relating to state property interests, it does not necessarily follow that it applies toin remadmiralty actions, or that in such actions, federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction over property that the State does not actually possess.

In considering whether theEleventhAmendment applies where the State asserts a claim in admiralty to a res not in its possession, this Court's decisions in cases involving the sovereign immunity of the Federal Government inin remadmiralty actions provide guidance, for this Court has recognized a correlation between sovereign immunity principlesPage 507applicable to States and the Federal Government. SeeTindalv.Wesley,167 U.S., at 213; see alsoTreasureSalvors, supra, at 710 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (discussing analogy between immunity in "in remactions brought against vessels in which an official of the State, the Federal Government, or a foreign government has asserted ownership of the res"). In one such case,The Davis, 10 Wall. 15 (1870), the Court explained that "proceedingsin remto enforce a lien against property of the United States are only forbidden in cases where, in order to sustain the proceeding, the possession of the United States must be invaded under process of the court."Id., at 20. The possession referred to was "an actual possession, and not that mere constructive possession which is very often implied by reason of ownership under circumstances favorable to such implication."Id., at 21; see alsoThe Siren, 7 Wall. 152, 159 (1869) (describing "exemption of the government from a direct proceedingin remagainst the vessel whilst in its custody"). The Court's jurisprudence respecting the sovereign immunity of foreign governments has likewise turned on the sovereign's possession of the res at issue. See,e.g., ThePesaro,255 U.S. 216,219(1921) (federal court'sinremjurisdiction not barred by mere suggestion of foreign government's ownership of vessel).

While this Court's decision inThe Daviswas issued over a century ago, its fundamental premise remains valid inin remadmiralty actions, in light of the federal courts' constitutionally established jurisdiction in that area and the fact that a requirement that a State possess the disputed res in such cases is "consistent with the principle which exempts the [State] from suit and its possession from disturbance by virtue of judicial process."The Davis,supra, at 21. Based on longstanding precedent respecting the federal courts' assumption ofin remadmiralty jurisdiction over vessels that are not in the possession of a sovereign, we conclude that theEleventhAmendment does not bar federal jurisdictionPage 508over theBrother Jonathanand, therefore, that the District Court may adjudicate DSR's and the State's claims to the shipwreck. We have no occasion in this case to consider any other circumstances under which anin remadmiralty action might proceed in federal court despite theEleventhAmendment.
III
There remains the issue whether the courts below properly concluded that theBrother Jonathanwas not abandoned for purposes of the ASA. That conclusion was necessarily influenced by the assumption that theEleventhAmendment was relevant to the courts' inquiry. The Court of Appeals' determination that the wreck and its contents are not abandoned for purposes of the ASA was affected by concerns that if "the vessel had been partially abandoned, both the federal court and the state court would be adjudicating the fate of theBrotherJonathan."102 F.3d, at 389. Moreover, the District Court's inquiry was a preliminary one, based on the concern that it was premature "for the court to find that any individual items of cargo or personal property have been abandoned."883 F. Supp., at 1354. In light of our ruling that theEleventhAmendment does not bar complete adjudication of the competing claims to theBrother Jonathanin federal court, the application of the ASA must be reevaluated. Because the record before this Court is limited to the preliminary issues before the District Court, we decline to resolve whether theBrother Jonathanis abandoned within the meaning of the ASA. We leave that issue for reconsideration on remand, with the clarification that the meaning of "abandoned" under the ASA conforms with its meaning under admiralty law.

Our grant of certiorari also encompassed the question whether the courts below properly concluded that the ASA pre-empts § 6313, which apparently operates to transfer title to abandoned shipwrecks not covered by the ASA to the State. Because the District Court's full consideration of thePage 509application of the ASA on remand might negate the need to address the pre-emption issue, we decline to undertake that analysis.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals assuming jurisdiction over this case is affirmed, its judgment in all other respects is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
InFlorida Dept. of Statev.Treasure Salvors,Inc.,458 U.S. 670(1982), both the four Members of the plurality and the four dissenters agreed that the District Court "did not have power . . . to adjudicate the State's interest in the property without the State's consent."Id., at 682; see alsoid., at 699-700;id., at 703, n. (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Our reasons for reaching that common conclusion were different, but I am now persuaded that all of us might well have reached a different conclusion if the position of Justices Story and Washington (that theEleventhAmendment is no bar to anyin remadmiralty action) had been brought to our attention. I believe that both opinions made the mistake of assuming that theEleventhAmendment has the same application to anin remadmiralty action as to any other action seeking possession of property in the control of state officers.

My error, in writing for the plurality, was the assumption that the reasoning inTindalv.Wesley,167 U.S. 204(1897), andUnited Statesv.Lee,106 U.S. 196(1882), which supported our holding that Treasure Salvors was entitled to possession of the artifacts, also precluded a binding determination of the State's interest in the property. Under the reasoning of those cases, the fact that the state officials were acting without lawful authority meant that a judgment against them would not bind the State. See458 U.S., at 687-688("In holding that the action was not barred by thePage 510EleventhAmendment, the Court inTindalemphasized that any judgment awarding possession to the plaintiff would not subsequently bind the State"). That reasoning would have been sound if we were deciding an ejectment action in which the right to possession of a parcel of real estate was in dispute; moreover, it seemed appropriate inTreasure Salvorsbecause we were focusing on the validity of the arrest warrant.

Having given further consideration to the special characteristics ofin remadmiralty actions, and more particularly to the statements by Justice Story and Justice Washington quoted in the Court's opinion,ante, at 502-503fn*I am now convinced that we should have affirmed theTreasure Salvorsjudgment in its entirety. Accordingly, I agree with the Court's holding that the State of California may be bound by a federal court'sin remadjudication of rights to theBrotherJonathanand its cargo.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. In my view, the opinion's discussion ofFlorida Dept. of Statev.TreasureSalvors, Inc.,458 U.S. 670(1982), does not embed in our law the distinction between a State's possession or nonpossession for purposes ofEleventhAmendment analysis in admiralty cases. In light of the subsisting doubts surrounding that case and JUSTICE STEVENS' concurring opinion today, it ought to be evident that the issue is open to reconsideration.Page 511
  1. Briefs ofamici curiaeurging reversal were filed for the State of Florida et al. byRobert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, andEric J. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows:Bill Pryorof Alabama,BruceM. Botelhoof Alaska,Michael J. Bowersof Georgia,Calvin E. Holloway, Sr., of Guam,Margery S. Bronsterof Hawaii,Alan G. Lance, of Idaho,James E. Ryanof Illinois,Richard P. Ieyoub, of Louisiana,J. Joseph Curran,Jr., of Maryland,Scott Harshbargerof Massachusetts,Frank J. Kelleyof Michigan,Frankie Sue Del Papaof Nevada,Dennis C. Vaccoof New York,Michael F. Easleyof North Carolina,Charles Molony Condonof South Carloina,William H. Sorrellof Vermont,Richard Cullenof Virginia, andAlva A. Swanof the Virgin Islands; for the Council of State Governments et al. byRichard RudaandJamesI. Crowley; and for the National Trust for Historic Preservation et al. byRobert A. Long, Jr., Paul W. Edmondson, Elizabeth S.Merritt, Thompson M. Mayes, Edith M. Shine, andLaura S. Nelson.

    Briefs ofamici curiaeurging affirmance were filed for the American Institute of Marine Underwriters byMarilyn L. Lytle; for the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. et al. byGuilford D. WareandMartha M. Poindexter; for the Columbus-America Discovery Group et al. byRichard T. Robol, Jane E. Rindsberg, Richard A.Cordray, andAlan G. Choate;and for Salvors, Inc., byPeter E. Hess. ↩
  2. While the petition for certiorari in this case was pending, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit. SeeFairport Int'lExploration, Inc. v.Shipwrecked Vessel Known as TheCaptain Lawrence,105 F.3d 1078(CA6 1997), cert. pending, No. 96-1936. ↩
  3. See also Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of theEleventhAmendment, 35 Stan.L.Rev. 1033, 1078-1083 (1983) (discussing the historical basis for this interpretation). ↩