Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

In Re Demos

In Re Demos, 500 U.S. 16 (1991)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1991-04-29
Topic
bankruptcy

How later courts describe this case

  • denying petitioner IFP status whenever seeking an extraordinary writ because petitioner’s thirty-two IFP filings over three years were an abuse of the privilege
  • prohibiting him from filing any 28 extraordinary writs without the payment of the docketing fees
  • prohibiting him from 18 filing any extraordinary writs without the payment of the docketing fees
  • prohibiting him from filing any extraordinary writs without the payment of the docketing fees
  • petitioner made 32 in forma pauperis filings with the Supreme Court, most of which challenged sanctions imposed by the lower court
  • petitioner who had filed 32 in forma pauperis filings in three years precluded from all future in forma pauperis filings seeking extraordinary writs on Court's finding that three most recent filings were "calculated to disrupt the orderly consideration of cases"
  • “Petitioner inherent powers to impose sanctions.”

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed In Re Demos. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
62 opinions
IN RE DEMOS,500 U.S. 16(1991)
IN RE DEMOS
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
No. 90-7225
Decided April 29, 1991fn*
Pro sepetitioner Demos filed petitions for a writ of certiorari, a writ of habeas corpus, and a writ of mandamus, all seeking relief from a single lower court order. He has made 32in forma pauperisfilings in this Court since the October, 1988, Term began.Held:

1. Demos' petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
2. Demos is denied leave to proceedin forma pauperisin the instant, and all future, petitions for extraordinary relief. His method of seeking relief here — filing three petitions for relief from a single order below — could only be calculated to disrupt the orderly consideration of cases. The Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions from Demos for extraordinary relief unless he pays the docketing fee required by this Court's Rule38(a) and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.


No. 90-7226, certiorari denied; Nos. 90-7225 and 90-7296, motion for leave to proceedin forma pauperisdenied.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, No. 90-7226, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, No. 90-7225, and a petition for a writ of mandamus, No. 90-7296, all seeking relief from a single order of a lower court, which in turn denied petitioner leave to proceedinforma pauperisand barred petitioner from making furtherin formapauperisfilings seeking certain extraordinary writs. We deny the petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 90-7226.

Petitioner has made 32in forma pauperisfilings in this Court since the beginning of the October, 1988, Term, many of which challenge sanctions imposed by lower courts in response to petitioner's frivolousPage 17filings. Petitioner's method of seeking relief here — filing three petitions for relief from a single order of a lower court — could only be calculated to disrupt the orderly consideration of cases. Petitioner has abused the system, and we find it appropriate to deny leave to proceedin forma pauperisto petitioner in these two petitions for extraordinary relief, Nos. 90-7225 and 90-7296, and in all future petitions for extraordinary relief. SeeIn re Sindram,498 U.S. 177(1991);In re McDonald,489 U.S. 180(1989).

If petitioner wishes to have one or both of these petitions considered on its merits, he must pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court before May 20, 1991. The Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions from petitioner for extraordinary writs unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33. Petitioner remains free under the present order to filein forma pauperisrequests for relief other than an extraordinary writ, if he qualifies under this Court's Rule39and does not similarly abuse that privilege.It is so ordered.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
Today, this Court blacklists another indigentpro selitigant. The order issued today, which bars futurein forma pauperisfilings for extraordinary wits by John Demos and hints that restrictions on other filings by Demos might be forthcoming, marks the third such proscription the Court has initiated in the last two years. SeeIn reSindram,498 U.S. 177(1991);In re McDonald,489 U.S. 180(1989). Yet, as inSindramandMcDonald, the Court fails to identify any statute or rule giving it the extraordinary authority to impose a permanent ban on an indigent litigant'sin forma pauperisfilings. Nor does the Court satisfactorily explain why it has singledPage 18out an indigent litigant for having lodged frivolous filings when paying litigants often are guilty of the same sin.

I continue to oppose this Court's unseemly practice of banningin formapauperisfilings by indigent litigants. SeeIn re Sindram, supra, at 181 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting);In re McDonald, supra, at 185 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.). As I have argued, the Court's assessment of the disruption that an overly energetic litigant like Demos poses to "the orderly consideration of cases,"anteat 17, is greatly exaggerated. SeeIn re Sindram, supra, at 181 (dissenting opinion). The Court is sorely mistaken if it believes that the solution to the problem of a crowded docket is to crack down on a litigant like Demos.

Two years ago, Justice Brennan sagely warned that, in "needlessly depart[ing] from its generous tradition" of leaving its doors open to all classes of litigants, the Court "sets sail on a journey whose landing point is uncertain."In re McDonald, supra, at 188 (dissenting opinion). The journey's ominous destination is becoming apparent. The Court appears resolved to close its does to increasing numbers of indigent litigants — and for increasingly less justifiable reasons.fn*I fear that the Court's action today portends even morePage 19Draconian restrictions on the access of indigent litigants to this Court.

In closing its doors today to another indigent litigant, the Court moves ever closer to the day when it leaves an indigent litigant with a meritorious claim out in the cold. And with each barrier that it places in the way of indigent litigants, and with each instance in which it castigates such litigants for having "abused the system,"anteat 17, the Court can only reinforce in the hears and minds of our society's less fortunate members the unsettling message that their pleas are not welcome here.

I dissent.Page 20
  1. Together with No. 92-7226,Demosv.United States DistrictCourt for the Eastern District of Washington, et al.,on petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and No. 92-7296,In re Demos,on petition for writ of mandamus. ↩
  2. Indeed, the ban the Court imposes on Demos'in forma pauperisfilings for extraordinary writs seems particularly unjustifiable. The Court makes much of the fact that Demos has made 32in forma pauperisfilings since 1988. Yet, according to the records of the Clerk of the Court, onlyfourof those filings have been for extraordinary writs, the sole subject of the ban announced today. It cannot be seriously contended that these four filings in the last three years have so disrupted the orderly administration of this Court's business as to require barring any such future filings. More likely, the Court's ban on Demos'informa pauperisrequests for extraordinary writs is but a poorly disguised penalty for his more numerous petitions for certiorari. See alsoIn re Sindram,498 U.S. 177,183(1991) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting, joined by MARSHALL, J. (noting that Court's ban upon petitioner'sin forma pauperisfilings for extraordinary relief "appears to be nothing more than an alternative for punishing [petitioner] for the frequency with which he has filed petitions for certiorari and petitions for rehearing"). ↩