Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Burns v. Fortson

Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1973-03-19
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • following Marston, the Court upheld Georgia’s fifty-day registration deadline
  • Court upheld residency and citizenship requirements
  • upholding Georgia's 50-day registration cutoff

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Burns v. Fortson. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
43 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Election & Voting Law — Voter Registration A state voter registration cutoff of 50 days before a general election, enacted to promote the orderly, accurate, and efficient administration of elections free from fraud, does not violate the Constitution where the State supports the cutoff with evidence of its necessity and the plaintiffs offer no contrary evidence.
  2. Election & Voting Law — Voter Registration Although a 50-day voter registration period approaches the outer constitutional limits, the Constitution is not so rigid that a recent and amply justifiable legislative judgment that 50 days rather than 30 is necessary to promote the State's important interest in accurate voter lists may not stand.
  3. Election & Voting Law — Voter Registration A state's lack of an independent durational residency requirement does not preclude upholding its voter registration cutoff, and the invalidation of a separate durational residency provision does not affect the validity of the registration deadline.
Per Curiam.

By statute, Georgia registrars are required to close their voter registration books 50 days prior to November general elections, except for those persons who seek to register to vote for President or Vice President. Ga. Code Ann. §§ 34-611 and 34-602.* The District Court upheld the registration cutoff against appellants’ constitutional attack based upon this Court’s decision in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972). This appeal followed.

The State offered extensive evidence to establish “the need for a 50-day registration cut-off point, given the vagaries and numerous requirements of the Georgia election laws.” Plaintiffs introduced no evidence. On the basis of the record before it, the District Court concluded that the State had demonstrated “that the 50-day period is necessary to promote . . . the orderly, accurate, and efficient administration of state and local elections, free *687 from, fraud.” (Footnote omitted.) Although the 50-day registration period approaches the outer constitutional limits in this area, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. What was said today in Marston v. Lewis, ante, p. 679, at 681, is applicable here:

“In the present case, we are confronted with a recent and amply justifiable legislative judgment that 50 days rather than 30 is necessary to promote the State’s important interest in accurate voter lists. The Constitution is not so rigid that that determination and others like it may not stand.”

The judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

Section 34-611 was enacted in 1964. At present, Georgia has no independent durational residency requirement. The State’s statutory requirement of one year in the State and six months in the county (see Ga. Code Ann. §34-602) was held unconstitutional in Abbott v. Carter (No. 15689, ND Ga. 1972).