Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Egan v. City of Aurora

Egan v. City of Aurora, 365 U.S. 514 (1961)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1961-03-06
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not include municipalities

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Egan v. City of Aurora. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Authority status
pending
Cited by
96 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Civil Rights Law — Municipal Liability A municipality is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore a damages action under that section cannot be maintained against a city. 365 U.S. 514 (citing Monroe v. Pape, ante, p. 167)
  2. Civil Rights Law — Rights Derived from State Law A claim of deprivation of a right that stems from the plaintiff's status under state law, rather than from the Fourteenth Amendment, is not cognizable as a federal civil rights claim. 365 U.S. 514–515 (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1)
  3. Civil Rights Law — Section 1983 Rights asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that derive from the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly the rights of free speech and assembly, are properly cognizable federal claims and are not governed by a construction of § 1983 inconsistent with Monroe v. Pape. 365 U.S. 515
  4. Civil Rights Law — Conspiracy Claims under § 1985 A dismissal of a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 must rest on explicit grounds, and an appellate court's affirmance on grounds not relied on below warrants vacatur and remand for reconsideration where the stated basis is unclear. 365 U.S. 515 (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1; Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651)
Per Curiam.

Petitioner, Mayor of the City of Aurora, brought this suit in the District Court against the City and certain of its officials for damages for deprivation of rights secured to him by the Constitution. He alleges unlawful action by the city and by individuals who are or who purport to be its officials (see 42 U. S. C. § 1983) and a conspiracy (see 42 U. S. C. § 1985). The District Court granted the motions to dismiss, 174 F. Supp. 794, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 275 F. 2d 377, both decisions being prior to our opinion in Monroe v. Pape, ante, p. 167.

The dismissal as to the City of Aurora was correct, for we held in Monroe v. Pape, supra, that a municipality was not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Insofar as any right claimed stems from petitioner’s status as mayor under Illinois law it is precluded *515 from assertion here by Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1. But as we read the complaint, the rights which petitioner claims he was deprived of are those that derive from the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly the right of free speech and assembly. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is not explicit as respects the grounds for dismissing the complaint under 42 U. S. C. § 1985. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1; Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the judgment of the District Court on grounds other than the ones relied on by that court, seems to have decided the case on a construction of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 that apparently is incon-. sistent with the view we took in Monroe v. Pape, supra.

. Accordingly we grant the petition for certiorari, affirm the judgment in favor of the City of Aurora, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals in favor of the individual respondents and remand the cause as respects them to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of this opinion.