Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance

Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Ins., 350 U.S. 495 (1956)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1956-03-26
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that defendant’s stipulation submitting to jurisdiction waived any right to contest in personam jurisdiction
  • holding that parties who stipulated to personal jurisdiction waived any right to assert a lack of personal jurisdiction
  • holding that stipulation to personal jurisdiction in particular forum is valid waiver of individual right
  • recognizing consent when the parties “voluntarily submit[ted] to the jurisdiction” of the court
  • stating that "defects in personal jurisdiction can be waived"
  • “respondent, by its stipulation, waived any right to assert lack of personal jurisdiction over it”
  • example of a stipulation clearly waiving personal jurisdiction defense
  • jurisdiction based on defendant’s stipulation

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Authority status
pending
Cited by
54 opinions
PETROWSKIv. HAWKEYE-SECURITY CO.,350 U.S. 495(1956)
76 S.Ct. 490
PETROWSKI ET AL.v. HAWKEYE-SECURITY INSURANCE CO.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.
No. 469.
Argued March 7, 1956.
Decided March 26, 1956.
The District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter in this case; and respondent, by its stipulation, waived any right to assert a lack of personal jurisdiction over it. Pp. 495-496.226 F.2d 126, reversed and remanded.
Richard P. Tinkham, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.Victor M. Hardingargued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief wasHerbert C. Hirschboeck.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent, Hawkeye-Security Insurance Company, filed a motion to quash the return of service of summons on the grounds that the District Court acquired no personal jurisdiction over it and that the power of attorney which it had filed with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the State of Wisconsin did not authorize him to accept service of process for it in this case. After this motion was denied, respondent filed its answer to the complaint in which it again pressed its claim that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. Subsequently, however, respondent filed (1) a motion to amend its answer and to interplead; (2) a counterclaim; (3) a stipulation and order adding a party-plaintiff and amending the complaint and answer; and (4) a stipulation that judgment be entered against the alleged insured in favor of the additional party-plaintiff. The latterPage 496stipulation included the following provision, together with others consistent with it and confirmatory of its purpose:
"1. That each of the parties to this stipulation voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the above entitled Court without service of process herein, the same as if personal service had been obtained by each against the other."


Following a trial on the merits, judgment was entered against respondent, but the Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, reversed on the ground that respondent's motion to quash should have been granted.226 F.2d 126.

Upon examination of the record and the law, we conclude that the District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and that respondent, by its stipulation, waived any right to assert a lack of personal jurisdiction over it. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to it for further proceedings.Reversed and remanded.Page 497