Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc.

United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1953)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1953-01-12
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that the government's intentional destruction of private oil terminal facilities in the Philippines during World War II to prevent their seizure by advancing Japanese forces was not a compensable taking of private property
  • holding that the government was not required to pay for oil terminals destroyed during a military invasion because doing so was necessary to prevent the enemy from gaining any strategic value from them
  • adjudicating a claim that United States military officials unlawfully destroyed private property in the Philippines
  • acknowledging that “in times of imminent peril—such as when fire threatened a whole community—the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many more could be saved”
  • noting that “in times of imminent peril—such as when fire 15 threatened a whole community—the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the property of a 16 few [so] that the property of many and the lives of many more could be saved”
  • takings claim not cognizable for oil facilities destroyed by U.S. forces in face of Japanese advance upon Manila
  • finding no takings claim where army destroyed oil facilities that were a “potential weapon of great significance to the invader”
  • holding, in the physical takings context, that “in times of imminent peril—such as when fire threatened a whole community—the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many more could be saved.”

Citator

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Cited by
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Headnotes

  1. Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment — Just Compensation — Wartime Destruction of Property The wartime destruction of private property by the Army to prevent its imminent capture and use by an advancing enemy does not entitle the owner to compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 344 U.S. 149, 150-156 (1952)
  2. Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment — Taking — Destruction of Property in Battle The destruction or injury of private property in battle, in the bombardment of cities and towns, and in other ways in war must be borne by the sufferers alone as one of its consequences; the necessities of war justify the commanding general in ordering the destruction of whatever would embarrass or impede the enemy, and the safety of the state in such cases overrides all considerations of private loss. 344 U.S. at 153-154 (quoting United States v. Pacific R. Co., 120 U.S. 227, 234 (1887))
  3. Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment — Sovereign Immunity — Necessity in Times of Peril The common law has long recognized that in times of imminent peril—such as when fire threatens a whole community—the sovereign may, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many more may be saved. 344 U.S. at 154
  4. Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment — Wartime Destruction — Requisition and Deliberation The exercise of "deliberation" by the Army in singling out property for destruction, in "requisitioning" it from its owners, and in exercising "control" over it before destroying it does not convert the wartime destruction of property to prevent its use by the enemy into a compensable taking, where the "requisition" was no more than an order to evacuate premises slated for demolition and the "deliberation" was no more than a design to prevent the enemy from realizing strategic value from an area he was soon to capture. 344 U.S. at 154-155
  5. Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment — Wartime Destruction — Timing Relative to Withdrawal It is not legally significant that the Army's destruction of property was effected prior to its withdrawal, where the property, due to the fortunes of war, had become a potential weapon of great significance to the invader and was destroyed rather than appropriated for subsequent use, in order that the United States might better and sooner destroy the enemy. 344 U.S. at 155
  6. Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment — Wartime Losses — Attribution to Fortunes of War The Fifth Amendment is not a comprehensive promise that the United States will make whole all who suffer from every ravage and burden of war; in wartime many losses must be attributed solely to the fortunes of war and not to the sovereign. 344 U.S. at 155-156
  7. Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment — Compensable Versus Noncompensable Losses — Case-by-Case Determination No rigid rules can be laid down to distinguish compensable losses from noncompensable losses; each case must be judged on its own facts. 344 U.S. at 156
UNITED STATESv. CALTEX, INC.,344 U.S. 149(1952)
73 S.Ct. 200
UNITED STATESv. CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
No. 16.
Argued October 20, 1952.
Decided December 8, 1952.
In the circumstances of this case, the wartime destruction of private property by the Army to prevent its imminent capture and use by an advancing enemy did not entitle the owner to compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 150-156.
(a) Whether or not the principle laid down inUnited Statesv.Pacific R. Co.,120 U.S. 227, was dictum when enunciated, this Court holds that it is the law today. Pp. 153-154.
(b)Mitchellv.Harmony, 13 How. 115, andUnited Statesv.Russell, 13 Wall. 623, distinguished. Pp. 152-153.
(c) A different result is not required by the fact that the Army exercised "deliberation" in singling out this property, in "requisitioning" it from its owners, and in exercising "control" over it before destroying it, nor by the fact that the destruction was effected prior to withdrawal. Pp. 154-155.


120 Ct. Cl. 518,100 F. Supp. 970, reversed.
In a suit to recover compensation under the Fifth
Amendment for property destroyed by the Army in wartime
to prevent its use by the enemy, the Court of Claims
gave judgment for the plaintiffs. 120 Ct. Cl. 518,
100 F. Supp. 970. This Court granted certiorari.343 U.S. 955.
Reversed, p. 156.
Assistant Attorney General Baldridgeargued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief wereActingSolicitor General Stern, Robert W. Ginnane, Paul A.SweeneyandBenjamin Forman.Albert R. Connellyargued the cause for the Shell Company of Philippine Islands, Ltd. et al., andLeo T. Kissamfor Caltex (Philippines), Inc., respondents. They also were on a brief for respondents.Page 150
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Each of the respondent oil companies owned terminal facilities in the Pandacan district of Manila at the time of the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor. These were used to receive, handle and store petroleum products from incoming ships and to release them for further distribution throughout the Philippine Islands. Wharves, rail and automotive equipment, pumps, pipe lines, storage tanks, and warehouses were included in the property on hand at the outbreak of the war, as well as a normal supply of petroleum products.

News of the Pearl Harbor attack reached Manila early in the morning of December 8, 1941. On the same day, enemy air attacks were mounted against our forces in the Philippines, and thereafter the enemy launched his amphibious assault.

On December 12, 1941, the United States Army, through its Chief Quartermaster, stationed a control officer at the terminals. Operations continued at respondents' plants, but distribution of the petroleum products for civilian use was severely restricted. A major share of the existing supplies was requisitioned by the Army.

The military situation in the Philippines grew worse. In the face of the Japanese advance, the Commanding General on December 23, 1941, ordered the withdrawal of all troops on Luzon to the Bataan Peninsula. On December 25, 1941, he declared Manila to be an open city. On that same day, the Chief Engineer on the staff of the Commanding General addressed to each of the oil companies letters stating that the Pandacan oil depots "are requisitioned by the U.S. Army." The letters further stated: "Any action deemed necessary for the destruction of this property will be handled by the U.S. Army." An engineer in the employ of one of the companiesPage 151was commissioned a first lieutenant in the Army Corps of Engineers to facilitate this design.

On December 26, he received orders to prepare the facilities for demolition. On December 27, 1941, while enemy planes were bombing the area, this officer met with representatives of the companies. The orders of the Chief Engineer had been transmitted to the companies. Letters from the Deputy Chief of Staff, by command of General MacArthur, also had been sent to each of the oil companies, directing the destruction of all remaining petroleum products and the vital parts of the plants. Plans were laid to carry out these instructions, to expedite the removal of products which might still be of use to the troops in the field, and to lay a demolition network about the terminals. The representatives of Caltex were given, at their insistence, a penciled receipt for all the terminal facilities and stocks of Caltex.

At 5:40 p. m., December 31, 1941, while Japanese troops were entering Manila, Army personnel completed a successful demolition. All unused petroleum products were destroyed, and the facilities were rendered useless to the enemy. The enemy was deprived of a valuable logistic weapon.

After the war, respondents demanded compensation for all of the property which had been used or destroyed by the Army. The Government paid for the petroleum stocks and transportation equipment which were either used or destroyed by the Army, but it refused to compensate respondents for the destruction of the Pandacan terminal facilities. Claiming a constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment1to just compensation for these terminal facilities, respondents sued in the Court of Claims. Recovery was allowed. 120 Ct. Cl. 518,100 F. Supp. 970Page 152. We granted certiorari to review this judgment.343 U.S. 955.

As reflected in the findings of the Court of Claims, there were two rather distinct phases of Army operations in the Pandacan district in December 1941. While the military exercised considerable control over the business operations of respondents' terminals during the period between December 12 and December 26, there was not, according to the findings below, an assumption of actual physical or proprietary dominion over them during this period.2Bound by these findings, respondents do not now question the holding of the Court of Claims that prior to December 27 there was no seizure for which just compensation must be paid.

Accordingly, it is the legal significance of the events that occurred between December 27 and December 31 which concerns us. Respondents concede that the Army had a right to destroy the installations. But they insist that the destruction created a right in themselves to exact fair compensation from the United States for what was destroyed.

The argument draws heavily from statements by this Court inMitchellv.Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1852), andUnited Statesv.Russell, 13 Wall. 623 (1871). We agree that the opinions lend some support to respondents' view.3Page 153But the language in those two cases is far broader than the holdings. Both cases involved equipment which had been impressed by the Army for subsequent use by the Army. In neither was the Army's purpose limited, as it was in this case, to the sole objective of destroying property of strategic value to prevent the enemy from using it to wage war the more successfully.

A close reading of theMitchellandRussellcases shows that they are not precedent to establish a compensable taking in this case. Nor do those cases exhaust all that has been said by this Court on the subject. InUnitedStatesv.Pacific R. Co.,120 U.S. 227(1887), Mr. Justice Field, speaking for a unanimous Court, discussed the question at length. That case involved bridges which had been destroyed during the War Between the States by a retreating Northern Army to impede the advance of the Confederate Army.4Though the point was not directly involved, the Court raised the question of whether this act constituted a compensable taking by the United States and answered it in the negative:
"The destruction or injury of private property in battle, or in the bombardment of cities and towns, and in many other ways in the war, had to be borne by the sufferers alone as one of its consequences. Whatever would embarrass or impede the advancePage 154of the enemy, as the breaking up of roads, or the burning of bridges, or would cripple and defeat him, as destroying his means of subsistence, were lawfully ordered by the commanding general. Indeed, it was his imperative duty to direct their destruction. The necessities of the war called for and justified this. The safety of the state in such cases overrides all considerations of private loss."5


It may be true that this language also went beyond the precise questions at issue. But the principles expressed were neither novel nor startling, for the common law had long recognized that in times of imminent peril — such as when fire threatened a whole community — the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many more could be saved.6And what was said in thePacific Railroadcase was later made the basis for the holding inJuragua Iron Co. v.United States,212 U.S. 297(1909), where recovery was denied to the owners of a factory which had been destroyed by American soldiers in the field in Cuba because it was thought that the structure housed the germs of a contagious disease.

Therefore, whether or not the principle laid down by Mr. Justice Field was dictum when he enunciated it, we hold that it is law today. In our view, it must govern in this case. Respondents and the majority of the Court of Claims, arguing to the contrary, have placed great emphasis on the fact that the Army exercised "deliberation" in singling out this property, in "requisitioning" it from its owners, and in exercising "control" over it before devastating it. We need not labor over these labels; it may bePage 155that they describe adequately what was done, but they do not show the legal consequences of what was done. The "requisition" involved in this case was no more than an order to evacuate the premises which were slated for demolition. The "deliberation" behind the order was no more than a design to prevent the enemy from realizing any strategic value from an area which he was soon to capture.

Had the Army hesitated, had the facilities only been destroyed after retreat, respondents would certainly have no claims to compensation. The Army did not hesitate. It is doubtful that any concern over the legal niceties of the situation entered into the decision to destroy the plants promptly while there was yet time to destroy them thoroughly.7Nor do we think it legally significant that the destruction was effected prior to withdrawal. The short of the matter is that this property, due to the fortunes of war, had become a potential weapon of great significance to the invader. It was destroyed, not appropriated for subsequent use. It was destroyed that the United States might better and sooner destroy the enemy.

The terse language of the Fifth Amendment is no comprehensive promise that the United States will make whole all who suffer from every ravage and burden of war. This Court has long recognized that in wartime many losses must be attributed solely to the fortunes of war,Page 156and not to the sovereign.8No rigid rules can be laid down to distinguish compensable losses from noncompensable losses. Each case must be judged on its own facts. But the general principles laid down in thePacific Railroadcase seem especially applicable here. Viewed realistically, then, the destruction of respondents' terminals by a trained team of engineers in the face of their impending seizure by the enemy was no different than the destruction of the bridges in thePacific Railroadcase. Adhering to the principles of that case, we conclude that the court below erred in holding that respondents have a constitutional right to compensation on the claims presented to this Court.Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs, dissenting.
I have no doubt that the military had authority to select this particular property for destruction. But whatever the weight of authority may be, I believe that the Fifth Amendment requires compensation for the taking. The property was destroyed, not because it was in the nature of a public nuisance, but because its destruction was deemed necessary to help win the war. It was as clearly appropriated to that end as animals, food, and supplies requisitioned for the defense effort. As the Court says, the destruction of this property deprived the enemy of a valuable logistic weapon.

It seems to me that the guiding principle should be this: Whenever the Government determines that one person's property — whatever it may be — is essential to the war effort and appropriates it for the common good, the public purse, rather than the individual, should bear the loss.Page 157
  1. Page 151 ". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." ↩
  2. Page 152 At one point shortly after the outbreak of the war, the Army contemplated leasing respondents' facilities. But this plan was never put into effect. Respondents continued to operate the plants themselves up to December 26, 1941. ↩
  3. Page 152 In theRussellcase,supra, the Court said, 13 Wall., at 627-628:

    "Extraordinary and unforeseen occasions arise, however, beyond all doubt, in cases of extreme necessity in time of war or of immediate and impending public danger, in which private property may be impressed into the public service, or may be seized and appropriated to the public use, or may even be destroyed without the consent of the owner. . . . Exigencies of the kind do arise in time of war orPage 153impending public danger, but it is the emergency, as was said by a great magistrate, that gives the right, and it is clear that the emergency must be shown to exist before the taking can be justified. Such a justification may be shown, and when shown the rule is well settled that the officer taking private property for such a purpose, if the emergency is fully proved, is not a trespasser, and that the government is bound to make full compensation to the owner." ↩
  4. Page 153 The narrow issue in the case was whether, after the Army rebuilt the bridges it had previously destroyed, the Army could charge for the expense of the rebuilding. On this issue the Court held for the railroad. ↩
  5. Page 154120 U.S., at 234. ↩
  6. Page 154 For earlier cases expressing such principles see,e.g., Bowditchv.Boston,101 U.S. 16,18-19(1879);Respublicav.Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357 (1788);Parhamv.The Justices,9 Ga. 341,348-349(1851). See also 2 Kent's Commentaries (14th ed.) 338. ↩
  7. Page 155 Cf.Respublicav.Sparhawk, supra, where the following appears, 1 Dall., at 363:

    "We find, indeed, a memorable instance of folly recorded in the 3Vol. of Clarendon's History, where it is mentioned, that theLordMayor of London, in 1666, when that city was on fire, would not give directions for, or consent to, the pulling down forty wooden houses, or to the removing the furniture, c. belonging to the Lawyers of the Temple, then on the Circuit, for fear he should be answerable for a trespass; and in consequence of this conduct half that great city was burnt." ↩
  8. Page 156Lichterv.United States,334 U.S. 742,787-788(1948);Bowlesv.Willingham,321 U.S. 503,517-519(1944);Omnia Commercial Co. v.United States,261 U.S. 502(1923). ↩