Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

National Labor Relations Board v. Highland Park Manufacturing Co.

341 U.S. 322

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1951-05-14
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • explaining that if Congress intended statutory terms "to have other than their ordinarily accepted meaning, it would and should have given them a special meaning by definition"
  • “The Board is a statutory agency, and, when it is forbidden to investigate or entertain complaints in certain circumstances, its final order could hardly be valid.”

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UpLaw has not yet analyzed National Labor Relations Board v. Highland Park Manufacturing Co.. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

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pending
Cited by
80 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Labor & Employment Law — Union Representation Under § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, a union affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations is a "national or international labor organization," and the National Labor Relations Board may not proceed against an employer at the instance of such an affiliated union where the officers of the parent federation have not filed the required non-Communist affidavits, even though the affiliate's own officers have filed them. 341 U.S. at 323-325
  2. Labor & Employment Law — Statutory Construction — "National or International Labor Organization" The phrase "national or international labor organization" is not limited by the internal structure of the entity; a labor union of nationwide jurisdiction, operation and influence falls within the phrase regardless of whether it is a federation rather than a union of some particular technical structure, because the use of geographic terms does not import a structural connotation and Congress would have supplied a special meaning by definition had it intended otherwise. 341 U.S. at 325
  3. Labor & Employment Law — Legislative Purpose — Communist Party Membership The congressional purpose underlying § 9(h) was wholly to eradicate and bar from leadership in the American labor movement, at each and every level, adherents to the Communist Party and believers in the unconstitutional overthrow of the Government; it would require much clearer language of exemption to conclude that the top levels of influence and actual power in the labor movement were untouched while only the lower levels were affected. 341 U.S. at 325
  4. Administrative Law — Judicial Review Where the facts regarding compliance with § 9(h) are not in dispute, an employer is entitled to judicial review of the legal question whether the requirement has been met, notwithstanding the Board's administrative determination of compliance, because an issue of law going to the heart of the validity of the proceedings on which the order is based is open to inquiry by the courts when their enforcement powers are sought. 341 U.S. at 325-326
  5. Labor & Employment Law — Board Authority — Jurisdictional Prerequisite Where the Board is forbidden by statute to investigate or entertain complaints in certain circumstances, a final order resulting from proceedings it was not permitted to conduct is invalid, and a court asked to enforce such an order is not compelled to lend its enforcement powers without inquiry. 341 U.S. at 326
LABOR BOARDv. HIGHLAND PARK CO.,341 U.S. 322(1951)
71 S.Ct. 758
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARDv. HIGHLAND PARK MANUFACTURING CO.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.
No. 425.
Argued April 23, 1951.
Decided May 14, 1951.
1. The Congress of Industrial Organizations (C. I. O.) is a "national or international labor organization" within the meaning of § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act; and the National Labor Relations Board could not proceed against an employer at the instance of a union affiliated with C. I. O. when the officers of C. I. O. had not filed the non-Communist affidavits required by that section, although the affiliated union's own officers had filed such affidavits. Pp. 323-325.

2. When a court of appeals is petitioned to decree enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations Board requiring an employer to bargain with a union and the facts regarding compliance with § 9(h) are not in dispute, the employer is entitled to a judicial review of the legal question whether there has been compliance with § 9(h). Pp. 325-326.184 F.2d 98, affirmed.
The Court of Appeals denied enforcement of an order
of the National Labor Relations Board requiring an employer
to bargain with a union affiliated with the Congress
of Industrial Organizations because the officers of the
latter had not filed the non-Communist affidavits required
by § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended by the Labor Management Relations Act,
61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 159(h),184 F.2d 98.
This Court granted certiorari.340 U.S. 927.
Affirmed, p. 326.
Mozart G. Ratnerargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief wereSolicitor General Perlman,James L. Morrisson, David P. FindlingandAlvin Gallen.Page 323Whiteford S. Blakeneyargued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

Briefs ofamici curiaeurging reversal were filed byJ. Albert Woll, Herbert S. ThatcherandJames A. Glennfor the American Federation of Labor;Arthur J. GoldbergandThomas E. Harrisfor the Congress of Industrial Organizations; andIsadore KatzandDavid Jaffefor the Textile Workers Union of America.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The National Labor Relations Board entertained a complaint by the Textile Workers Union of America against respondent, Highland Park Manufacturing Company, and ordered respondent to bargain with that Union. At all times relevant to the proceedings, the Textile Workers Union was affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations and, while the Textile Workers Union officers had filed the non-Communist affidavits pursuant to statute, the officers of the C. I. O. at that time had not. The statute provides that "No investigation shall be made by the Board . . ., no petition under subsection (e)(1) of this section shall be entertained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 160 of this title, unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed . . . by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of anynational or international labororganizationof which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party [etc.]." § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act,61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 159(h). (Italics added.) The order was challenged upon the grounds, among others, that the failure of the C. I. O. officers to file non-CommunistPage 324affidavits disabled its affiliate, the Textile Workers Union, and the Board could not entertain their complaint and enter the order.

The general counsel of the Board had ruled that the Board could not entertain a complaint under these circumstances; but the Board, with one member dissenting, overruled him, for reasons stated inMatter of NorthernVirginia Broadcasters, 75 N.L.R.B. 11. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Board inWest Texas Utilities Co. v.Labor Board, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 179,184 F.2d 233. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in this case,184 F.2d 98, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, inLabor Boardv.Postex Cotton Mills,181 F.2d 919, arrived at a contrary result, holding that the Board could not entertain the complaint. The conflicting results are each so well-considered and so thoroughly documented in opinions already appearing in the books that little could be added to either. We agree with the conclusions of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits.

The definition of "labor union" in the statute concededly includes the C. I. O. It is further conceded that the phrase "labor organization national or internationalin scope" as found in § 10(c) refers to the A. F. of L. and C. I. O. (Italics added.) But it is claimed that when the adjectives "national" or "international" are alone added, they exclude the C. I. O., because it is regarded in labor circles as a federation rather than a national or international union. We think, however, that the use of geographic terms to reach nation-wide or more than nation-wide unions does not exclude those of some particular technical structure. The C. I. O., being admittedly a labor union and one of nation-wide jurisdiction, operation and influence, is certainly in the speech of people a national union, whatever its internal composition. If Congress intended geographic adjectives to havePage 325a structural connotation or to have other than their ordinarily accepted meaning, it would and should have given them a special meaning by definition.

The language in its ordinarily accepted sense is consistent with the context and purpose of the Act, which we have defined at length inAmerican CommunicationsAssn. v.Douds,339 U.S. 382. As the Courts of Appeals for both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have said, the congressional purpose was to "wholly eradicate and bar from leadership in the American labor movement, at each and every level, adherents to the Communist party and believers in the unconstitutional overthrow of our Government."181 F.2d 919,920;184 F.2d 98,101. It would require much clearer language of exemption to justify holding that the very top levels of influence and actual power in the labor movement in this country were untouched while only the lower levels were affected.

The further contention is advanced by the Board that the administrative determination that a petitioning labor organization has complied with the Act is not subject to judicial review at the instance of an employer in an unfair labor practice proceeding. If there were dispute as to whether the C. I. O. had filed the required affidavits or whether documents filed met the statutory requirements and the Board had resolved that question in favor of the labor organizations, a different question would be presented. But here there is no question of fact. While the C. I. O. officers have since filed the affidavits, they were not on file at any time relevant to this proceeding.

It would be strange indeed if the courts were compelled to enforce without inquiry an order which could only result from proceedings that, under the admitted facts, the Board was forbidden to conduct. The Board is a statutory agency, and, when it is forbidden to investigate or entertain complaints in certain circumstances, its final order could hardly be valid. We think the contention isPage 326without merit and that an issue of law of this kind, which goes to the heart of the validity of the proceedings on which the order is based, is open to inquiry by the courts when they are asked to lend their enforcement powers to an administrative tribunal.Judgment affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.
Congress, of course, could have exacted affidavits of nonmembership in Communist organizations from the officers of all local unions, of all nationals and internationals of which locals are constituents, and of all the federated organizations —i. e., the C. I. O. and the A. F. of L. — of which national and international organizations are members. To carry out such a purpose it could have been explicit. It could also have used some colloquially all-embracing term such as the phrase "national or international in scope" which it in fact did employ in § 10(c) of the Act. Congress did not choose to express its will in either of these unequivocal forms. Instead it used the phrase "national or international labor organization."

The fact that the phrase "national or international labor organization" consists of ordinary English words, which to the ordinary ear may carry a meaning different from that which they carry in the domain of industrial relations, does not destroy our duty to determine whether they do have a technical meaning when used in regard to matters of industrial relations. See the decision, per Holmes, J., inBoston Sand Co. v.United States,278 U.S. 41,48. The Taft-Hartley Act is not an abstract document to be construed with only the aid of a standard dictionary. Its sponsors were familiar with labor organization and labor problems and it was doubtless drawn by specialists inPage 327labor relations. If they used terms having a special meaning within the field, such words of art, in the absence of contrary indications, must be given that meaning.

The best source for us in determining whether a term used in the field of industrial relations has a technical connotation is the body to which Congress has committed the administration of the statute. Certainly, if there is no reasonable ground for rejecting the determination of the National Labor Relations Board, its view should not be rejected. We are advised by the Board that "national and international organization" is a term of art referring to the autonomous national and international organizations of workers which in federation constitute the C. I. O. and the A. F. of L. "We are familiar with no use of the term `national or international labor organization' which includes parent federations such as the AFL or the CIO within its meaning. On the contrary, every definition or description of the structure of these two federations clearly indicates that the AFL and the CIO are different from `national' or `international' labor organizations."Northern Virginia Broadcasters, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 11, 13. Nothing called to our attention has put in question this authoritative finding by the National Labor Relations Board. We ought not, therefore, to reject it.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
I see no answer to the analysis of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER if objectivity is our standard and if the expertise of administrative agencies is to continue as our guide. In situations no more difficult than this we have taken the administrative construction of statutory words. Until today the test has been not whether the construction would be our own if we sat as the Board, but whether it has a reasonable basis in custom, practice, or legislativePage 328history. SeeGrayv.Powell,314 U.S. 402;Labor Boardv.Hearst Publications,322 U.S. 111.

Of course the C. I. O. is at times a "national or international labor organization" within the meaning of the Act. The Board so held inAmerican Optical Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 453. In that case the petitioning labor organization was an "organizing committee" of the C. I. O. over which the C. I. O. had control comparable to the power a "national or international" union exercise over its constituent unions. The same would be true of local unions directly chartered by the C. I. O. If one of those unions had filed the complaint against respondent, then the C. I. O. would have to file the affidavits, since it would be in the relation of a "national or international labor organization" to that dispute. A labor organization which has that relation to a dispute has the power and control at which the affidavit provision is aimed. If we took, as we customarily do, the administrative construction of the words Congress used, we would hold that the C. I. O. must file the affidavits only when in the dispute before the Board it stands, as it sometimes does, in the position of "national or international labor organization" — to use the parlance of the trade. But that is a different case from the one before us.Page 329