Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Caldarola v. Eckert
332 U.S. 155
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1947-06-23
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- cases dealing with seamen on government owned and operated ships under war shipping Administration Agents
Citator
Caldarola v. Eckert has been questioned or limited by later authorities: relies on overruled authority: 66 S. Ct. 1218 (overruled by Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister). Read them before relying on it. 101 later decisions cite it.
- Authority status
- caution
- Cited by
- 101 opinions
CALDAROLAv. ECKERT,332 U.S. 155(1947)
67 S.Ct. 1569
CALDAROLAv. ECKERT ET AL., DOING BUSINESS AS THOR ECKERT CO.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
No. 625.
Argued March 31, April 1, 1947.
Decided June 23, 1947.
Petitioner sued respondents in a state court of New York to
recover damages for injuries sustained aboard a vessel which
respondents were managing as General Agents under a contract with
the United States. A verdict
Page 156
for the petitioner was set aside by the Appellate Division.
270 A.D. 563,61 N.Y.S.2d 164. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
295 N.Y. 463,68 N.E.2d 444. This Court granted certiorari.
329 U.S. 704.Affirmed, p. 160.
The New York Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division in setting aside a verdict for the petitioner,270 A.D. 563,61 N.Y.S.2d 164, held that under New York law the relation which the Agents bore to the vessel did not make them responsible to a third person for its condition.295 N.Y. 463,68 N.E.2d 444. Because of claimed conflict in the decisions, particularly between this ruling andHustv.Moore-McCormackLines,328 U.S. 707, we granted certiorari.329 U.S. 704.
No doubt petitioner could have sued the United States in Admiralty. Section 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act,41 Stat. 525, 46 U.S.C. § 742. He chose not to do so. Presumably to obtain the benefit of trial by jury, he asked for relief from New York. There is no question that the injury of which Caldarola complains is a maritime tort. As such it is suable in the State courts by virtue of § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which saves "to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it. . . ."1 Stat. 76-77. Whether Congress thereby recognized that there were common law rights in the States as to matters also cognizable in admiralty, or whether it was concerned only with "saving" to the States the power to use their courts to vindicate rights deriving from the maritime law to the extent that their common law remedies may be available, is a question on which the authorities do not speak with clarity. CompareWaringv.Clarke, 5 How. 441, 460-61;Taylorv.Carryl, 20 How. 583, 598-99; 3 Story on the Constitution (1st ed.) 533, n. 3, withSchoonmakerv.Gilmore,102 U.S. 118;The Hamilton,207 U.S. 398;Page 158Chelentisv.Luckenbach S.S. Co.,247 U.S. 372;C.J. HendryCo. v.Moore,318 U.S. 133;Seas Shipping Co. v.Sieracki,328 U.S. 85,88-89. In any event, whether New York is the source of the right or merely affords the means for enforcing it, her determination is decisive that there is no remedy in its courts for such a business invitee against one who has no control and possession of premises. CompareDouglasv.New York, New HavenHartford R. Co.,279 U.S. 377, andTestav.Katt,330 U.S. 386.
The New York Court of Appeals authoritatively determines who is liable, in New York, for such an occurrence as that of which Caldarola complains. Insofar as the issues in this case exclusively concern New York law, that court had the final say in holding that one in the relation of the respondents to the petitioner is not liable for the tort of which the latter complains. But to the extent that the determination of tort liability in New York is entangled with the construction of the contract between the Agents and the United States, the interpretation of that contract is a matter of federal concern and is not concluded by the meaning which the State court may find in it.
We agree that if, on a fair reading of the contract, the control which the Agents had over the vessel is the kind of control which New York requires as a basis of liability to third persons, the New York courts cannot so read the contract as to deny the right which New York recognizes. It is not claimed that an injured party has rights under the agency contract or that it created duties to third persons.Robins Drydock Repair Co. v.Flint,275 U.S. 303. And so the narrow question is whether the Agents were in possession and control of the Everagra. This is the crucial issue, because liability in tort by the Agents for Caldarola's injury would only arise in New York when there is such possession and control of premises onPage 159which injury occurs, due to negligence in their maintenance.Cullingsv.Goetz,256 N.Y. 287,176 N.E. 397. The United States, asamicus curiae, submitted what we deem to be conclusive considerations against reading the contract so as to find the Agents to be ownerspro hac vicein possession and control of the vessel. The consequences, to both the national and international interests of the United States, of such a construction would be too far-reaching to warrant such a forced reading merely in order to have a basis on which to build liability under the law of New York. Serious issues affecting the immunity of Government vessels in foreign ports as well as immunity from regulation and taxation by local governments would needlessly be raised. After all, the question is not whether petitioner may be compensated for his injury. Congress has made provision for that. Petitioner insists, in order to enable him to sue in the courts of New York, that the Agents are to be deemed, as a matter of federal law, owners of the vesselpro hac viceand, therefore, as a matter of State law, subject to the duties of such ownership under New York law toward business invitees. We reject this construction.
Our previous decisions do not require it.Hustv.Moore-McCormack Lines, supra, arose under the Jones Act. (Act of March 4, 1915,38 Stat. 1185, as amended, June 5, 1920,41 Stat. 1007). We there held that under the Agency contract the Agent was the "employer" of an injured seaman as that term is used in the Jones Act, and a seaman could therefore bring the statutory action against such an "employer." The Court did not hold that the Agency contract made the Agent for all practical purposes the owner of the vessel. It did not hold that it imposed upon him, as a matter of federal law, duties of care to third persons, more particularly to a stevedore under employment of a concern unloading the vessel pursuant to a contract with the United States.Bradyv.RooseveltPage 160Steamship Co.,317 U.S. 575, is likewise remote from the issues decisive of this case. It merely held that the Suits in Admiralty Act, by furnishing anin personamremedy against the United States, did not free the Agent from liability for his own torts. TheBradycase did not reach the "different question" whether "a cause of action" against the Agent had been established.317 U.S. at 585. That is the precise question here, and more particularly, whether the contract created a relationship from which, under New York law, liability as to business invitees followed.Judgment affirmed.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has reached the same result in a case decided sinceHustv.Moore-McCormack Lines. InMilitanov.United States,156 F.2d 599, that court held that the agent under the same form of operating agreement as we have here was ownerpro hac vice. Swan. J., speaking for the court, said in reference to theHustcase. p. 602, "If the agent remains the employer sufficiently to be liable to members of the crew under the Jones Act, we think it cannot escape the duties of an owner pro hac vice in other respects. Thus it has the duty to furnish stevedores with a safe place to work, a duty which is analogous to that owed by a landowner to a business visitor."Page 161
The Court does not essay to answer that argument; nor does it address itself to the facts which I reviewed in theHustcase and which establish that the business of managing and operating the vessel was the business of the agent. It avoids analysis of the actual arrangement by viewing with alarm the consequences to the Government of such a holding as applied in other situations. But we are here concerned with private rights which press for recognition. It is no answer to the legal argument on which those private rights rest that the Government might be inconvenienced if they were recognized. It is plain under this operating agreement that the United States is merely the underwriter of the financial risks of the venture while the private operator performs the managerial functions in the usual way. To call that government operation is to ignore the realities of the relationship. Whatever the consequences in other situations, it is shocking to find private operators getting immunity in this manner from their traditional liability for tort claims.
TheHustcase involved the rights of seamen, not of longshoremen.1Also it arose under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, whereas here liability is grounded upon maritime tort. And theHustdecision rested in partPage 162upon the effects of the so-called Clarification Act of 1943, 50 U.S.C. App. (Supp. V, 1946) § 1291, which has no bearing in this case, since seamen are not involved.
TheHustdecision flatly rejected the view that the events there in question2had been effective to strip the seaman of his various preexisting remedies, replacing them with the single remedy of suit provided by the Suits in Admiralty Act.346 U.S.C. § 742. The necessary result was to preserve not merely the seaman's rights under the Jones Act but also his other preexisting ones.4For if the conjunction of events put forward in theHustcase as having made the Suits in Admiralty Act remedy the only one available to the seaman was thus effective, the Jones Act remedy as well as others was thereby excluded. And if it was not excluded, neither were thosePage 163others long possessed by seamen.5TheHustdecision was therefore not merely a construction of the Jones Act. That Act was simply a specific fulcrum for turning the broader issue presented.
But seamen's rights are not longshoremen's rights and the events combining to present the question concerning seamen's rights in theHustcase were not conclusive upon longshoremen's rights. This is true although in some instances longshoremen, through legislation or by virtue of their succession to seamen occasioned by the industry's evolution in some phases of ship and shore duty, have been held entitled to similar protections.SeasShipping Co. v.Sieracki,328 U.S. 85;Atlantic TransportCo. v.Imbrovek,234 U.S. 52. The question in this case therefore is not one necessarily governed by the same considerations as applied in the cases of seamen covered by theHustdecision.
But, as the Court recognizes, it is one of maritime tort, although longshoremen rather than seamen are involved; and is moreover "suable in the State courts by virtue of § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which saves `to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.'" Notwithstanding the characterization as maritime tort, the Court skirts the question whether the source of the right is New York law or, on the contrary, is federal law for which New York, pursuant to § 9, merely supplies a means for enforcement. For in either event, it says, New York's "determination is decisive that there is no remedy in its courts for such a business invitee against one who has no control and possession of premises."Page 164
From this conclusion I disagree. For, if the liability here is founded in federal law, as creating the maritime tort, then New York law has nothing to do with creating or nullifying the substantive right. Its sole function is to supply the remedy commanded by § 9 of the Judiciary Act.Testav.Katt,330 U.S. 386. And in my judgment the liability here, since it arises from a maritime tort, is a creature of federal law in its entirety, not of state law.6I therefore do not agree that any substantive issues in the case "exclusively concern New York law" or that in any respect that state's Court of Appeals "had the final say in holding that one in the relation of the respondents to the petitioner is not liable for the tort of which the latter complains." I do not understand how the Court can leave open the question whether New York law has a hand in creating the right sued on or one only in supplying a forum and remedy, and at the same time can rely on New York law as having any part in creating the right or nullifying it, as it seems to do. The result does not simply entangle state law with federal law in thePage 165substantive phase of the case. It entangles hypothetically applicable state law in one phase with federal law in another.
Regarding the case, as I do, as being controlled in its substantive aspect altogether by federal law, I do not think that law requires or should permit the result the Court reaches. Regardless of whether the so-called "agency" contract makes the operating company an "agent," an "owner pro hac vice," or technically something else in relation to the United States, the federal maritime law in my opinion well might hold responsible to an injured longshoreman one who has knowledge that such persons will come aboard and who undertakes to keep the vessel and its equipment in safe condition for their use.7More especially should such a rule apply when the person so undertaking is the only one constantly on board to observe the creation of hazardous risks in the vessel's daily routines and, in addition, has such a degree of control over their creation as the "agent" did here.
But, in any event, the same result should be reached on the basis of construction of the contract. Whether this is put upon the ground stated in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, that the "agent" became ownerpro hac vice, or in the view of the contract taken in theHustcase,Page 166with reference to application of the Jones Act, is largely immaterial, perhaps only a matter of words.8
That view, incorporating the rule of theHearstcase,9we have only recently extended to apply in cases of coverage of the Social Security Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act.UnitedStatesv.Silk,331 U.S. 704;Harrisonv.Greyvan Lines,id.; Rutherford Food Corp. v.McComb,331 U.S. 722. While the liability here is not legislative in origin, nevertheless as in theHustcase, application of the common-law "control" test to defeat the longshoreman's remedy under the state procedure, as provided by § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, cannot "be justified in this temporary situation unless by inversion of that wisdom which teaches that `the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.'"328 U.S. at 725.
Finally, in my opinion, the terms of the agreement in its provisions for indemnity confirm the conclusion that liability of the "agent" in such a case as this was contemplated. Not only is there broad indemnity "for all expenditures of every kind made by it in performing, procuring or supplying the services, facilities, stores, supplies or equipment as required hereunder," with specified exceptions not covering such liabilities as are now in question. The indemnity also expressly provided:Page 167
"To the extent not recovered from insurance, the United States shall also reimburse the General Agent for all crew expenditures (accruing during the term hereof) in connection with the vessels hereunder, including, without limitation, all disbursements for or on account of wages, extra compensation, overtime, bonuses, penalties, subsistence, repatriation, travel expense, loss or personal effects, maintenance, cure, vacation allowances,damages or compensation for death or personal injuryor illness, and insurance premiums, required to be paid by law, custom, or by the terms of the ship's articles or labor agreements . . ." (Emphasis added.)
as well as for payments made to pension funds and for social security taxes. This clause specifically contemplated that the "agent" should be responsible for paying claims not only for maintenance and cure but also for "damages or compensation for death or personal injury or illness," and should be indemnified for such payment. A narrow construction, of course, would limit the provisions for payment and indemnity to payments made without resort to suit. On the other hand, even a literal interpretation would cover payments made by the "agent" upon judgments recovered against it on claims of the character specified. I know of no good reason why the narrow view should be accepted or why the Government by its contract should desire to uproot seamen and others, including longshoremen insofar as they have acquired seamen's rights aboard ship, from their normally applicable remedies, in the absence of either explicit statutory command or express contractual provision to that effect. Moreover, in view of the scope of the indemnity provided, I see no possible harm that could be inflicted on the "agent" from interpreting the contract so as to allow the normally applicable remedies to apply.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.Page 168
- Page 161 Congress and the President, in the legislative and executive action taken in connection with the Merchant Marine and pertinent in theHustcase, were concerned with the rights of seamen, not primarily or perhaps even incidentally with those of longshoremen. ↩
- Page 162 In theHustcase, after noting the disruptive consequences for seamen's long-settled rights flowing from the view that they had been reduced for assertion to the single remedy provided by the Suits in Admiralty Act, we said: "We may assume that Congress could authorize so vast a disturbance to settled rights by clear and unequivocal command. It is not permissible to find one by implication.Bradyv.Roosevelt Co., supra[317 U.S. 575], at 580. Here the disruption, if it has occurred, has done so only as an implied result of the conjunction of the Suits in Admiralty Act's provisions with the Government's emergency action in taking over the shipping industry for war purposes."328 U.S. at 722. No such intent, we said, could be found in any action of Congress, or of that body and the President, in exercising their powers to bring the industry under governmental control; or in the Suits in Admiralty Act or the Jones Act as applied to the relation created by the "agency" contract. ↩
- Page 162 See note 2. ↩
- Page 162 Confirmation of the conclusions summarized in note 2,supra, was found in the legislative history of the Clarification Act of 1943, 50 U.S.C. App. (Supp. V, 1946) § 1291, and particularly in the provision for election of remedies given by § 1, as to injuries accruing on or after October 1, 1941, and before March 24, 1943, the Act's effective date. Opinion was expressly reserved as to the effect of that Act concerning injuries occurring after its effective date.328 U.S. at 727. ↩
- Page 163 In theHustcase we said of the argument that the Suits in Admiralty Act remedy had become exclusively available for asserting seamen's rights that, with specified exceptions, "the various rights of seamen, enforceable by various proceedings in admiralty and at law, in state and federal courts, are swept into one hopper, the suit against the Government. . . ."328 U.S. at 720. ↩
- Page 16428 U.S.C. § 371, derived from § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 is a recognition by Congress that the states may exercise whatever jurisdiction the common law had concurrently with admiralty. SeeWaringv.Clarke, 5 How. 441, 460-461. However, since "It is not a remedy in the common-law courts which is saved, but a common-law remedy,"The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 431, it has been held that where suit is brought under the saving clause the right to be enforced is that "recognized by the law of the sea."Chelentisv.Luckenbach S.S. Co.,247 U.S. 372,384. "The general rules of the maritime law apply whether the proceeding be instituted in an admiralty or common-law court."CarlislePacking Co. v.Sandanger,259 U.S. 255,259. The commentators recognize this to be the rule now, 1 Benedict on Admiralty (6th ed.) 53-55; Stumberg, Maritime Cases in Common-law Courts (1925) 3 Tex. L. Rev. 246; Mole and Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence (1932) 17 Corn. L.Q. 333, 353-355, though the matter seems not to have been decided prior to theChelentiscase. Cf.The Hamilton,207 U.S. 398,404. ↩
- Page 165 "One who does an act or carries on an activity upon land on behalf of the possessor thereof, is subject to the same liability, and enjoys the same immunity from liability, for bodily harm caused thereby to others within and outside the land as though he were the possessor of the land." Restatement, Torts, § 383.
"An agent who has the custody of land or chattels and who should realize that there is an undue risk that their condition will cause harm to the person, land, or chattels of others is subject to liability for such harm caused, during the continuance of his custody, by his failure to use care to take such reasonable precautions as he is authorized to take." Restatement, Agency, § 355. ↩ - Page 166 In that case, assuming that the agreement made Hust, the injured seaman, an employee of the United States for purposes of ultimate control, in spite of the meticulous character of the differences between it and the Maritime Commission's standard contract, we said: "But it does not follow from the fact that Hust was technically the Government's employee that he lost all remedies against the operating `agent' for such injuries as he incurred. This case, likeNational Labor Relations Boardv.HearstPublications,322 U.S. 111, involves something more than mere application to the facts of the common-law test for ascertaining the vicarious responsibilities of a private employer for tortious conduct of an employee."328 U.S. at 724. ↩
- Page 166National Labor Relations Boardv.Hearst Publications,322 U.S. 111. ↩