Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Adams v. United States

Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312 (1943)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1943-05-24
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • reasoning that "[i]n view of the general applicability of the 1940 Act it is unnecessary to consider the effect of the Weeks Forestry Act, 16 U.S.C. § 480"
  • holding that federal jurisdiction requires acceptance by the federal government
  • assessing jurisdictional status of a military camp for which the federal government held title
  • “The Act provides further: ‘Unless and until the United States has accepted jurisdiction over lands hereafter to be acquired as aforesaid, it shall be conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted.’ ”
  • “As to lands acquired by the United States 23 after 1940, it has been held that the United States does not acquire jurisdiction over lands 24 acquired by it unless it gives notice of acceptance.”
  • no federal jurisdiction absent compliance with § 255

Citator

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Cited by
75 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Criminal Law & Procedure — Federal Jurisdiction over Acquired Lands Under the Act of October 9, 1940, the United States acquires no jurisdiction to prosecute and punish crimes committed on land acquired within a State after the Act's date unless the United States has accepted jurisdiction, exclusive or partial, in the manner the Act prescribes; where no such acceptance has been made, the federal government lacks criminal jurisdiction over the area, notwithstanding that state statutes authorized the United States to take jurisdiction, since at the critical time jurisdiction had not been taken. 319 U.S. at 313-315
  2. Criminal Law & Procedure — Federal Jurisdiction over Acquired Lands The phrase "jurisdiction, exclusive or partial" in the Act of October 9, 1940, includes concurrent jurisdiction, so that concurrent jurisdiction over acquired lands can be obtained only by the formal acceptance prescribed in the Act; the administrative construction by the agencies that cooperated in developing the Act, requiring notice of acceptance if the government is to obtain concurrent jurisdiction, is entitled to great weight. 319 U.S. at 314-315
ADAMSv. UNITED STATES,319 U.S. 312(1943)
63 S.Ct. 1122
ADAMS ET AL.v. UNITED STATES ET AL.
CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.
No. 889.
Argued May 10, 1943.
Decided May 24, 1943.
1. Under the Act of October 9, 1940, the Government of the United States acquired no jurisdiction to prosecute and punish for rape committed on land acquired by the United States within a State after the date of the Act, where jurisdiction "exclusive or partial" over the area has not been accepted by the United States in the manner which the Act prescribes. P. 313. 2. The term "partial jurisdiction" as used in the Act includes concurrent jurisdiction. P. 314.
RESPONSE to questions submitted by the Circuit Court of
Appeals with respect to an appeal from a sentence imposed by the
District Court in a prosecution for rape at a military camp.
Mr. Thurgood Marshall, with whomMr. W. Robert Ming, Jr., was on the brief, for Richard P. Adams et al.Mr. Robert L. Stern, with whomSolicitor General Fahy,Assistant Attorney General Berge, andMessrs. Oscar A. ProvostandW. Marvin Smithwere on the brief, for the United States et al.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has certified to us two questions of law pursuant to § 239 of the Judicial Code. The certificate shows that the three defendants were soldiers and were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 451, 457, in the federal District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, for the rape of a civilian woman. The alleged offense occurred within the confines of Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, a government military camp, on land to which the government had acquired title at the time of the crime. The ultimate question isPage 313whether the camp was, at the time of the crime, within the federal criminal jurisdiction.

The Act of October 9, 1940, 40 U.S.C. § 255, passed prior to the acquisition of the land on which Camp Claiborne is located, provides that United States agencies and authorities may accept exclusive or partial jurisdiction over lands acquired by the United States by filing a notice with the Governor of the state in which the land is located or by taking other similar appropriate action. The Act provides further: "Unless and until the United States has accepted jurisdiction over lands hereafter to be acquired as aforesaid, it shall be conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted." The government had not given notice of acceptance of jurisdiction at the time of the alleged offense.1

The questions certified are as follows:

"1. Is the effect of the Act of Oct. 9, 1940, above quoted, to provide that, as to lands within a State thereafter acquired by the United States, no jurisdiction exists in the United States to enforce the criminal laws embraced in United States Code Title 18, Chapter 11, and especially Section 457 relating to rape, by virtue of Section 451, Third, as amended June 11, 1940, unless and until a consent to accept jurisdiction over such lands is filed in behalf of the United States as provided in said Act?

"2. Had the District Court of the Western District of Louisiana jurisdiction, on the facts above set out, to try and sentence the appellants for the offense of rape committed within the bounds of Camp Claiborne on May 10, 1942?"

Since the government had not given the notice required by the 1940 Act, it clearly did not have either "exclusive or partial" jurisdiction over the camp area. The only possiblePage 314reason suggested as to why the 1940 Act is inapplicable is that it does not require the government to give notice of acceptance of "concurrent jurisdiction." This suggestion rests on the assumption that the term "partial jurisdiction" as used in the Act does not include "concurrent jurisdiction."

The legislation followed our decisions inJamesv.DravoContracting Co.,302 U.S. 134;Mason Co. v.Tax Commission,302 U.S. 186; andCollinsv.Yosemite Park Co.,304 U.S. 518. These cases arose from controversies concerning the relation of federal and state powers over government property and had pointed the way to practical adjustments. The bill resulted from a cooperative study by government officials, and was aimed at giving broad discretion to the various agencies in order that they might obtain only the necessary jurisdiction.2The Act created a definite method of acceptance of jurisdiction so that all persons could know whether the government had obtained "no jurisdiction at all, or partial jurisdiction, or exclusive jurisdiction."3

Both the Judge Advocate General of the Army4and the Solicitor of the Department of Agriculture5have construed the 1940 Act as requiring that notice of acceptance be filed if the government is to obtain concurrent jurisdiction. The Department of Justice has abandoned the view of jurisdiction which prompted the institution of this proceeding,Page 315and now advises us of its view that concurrent jurisdiction can be acquired only by the formal acceptance prescribed in the Act. These agencies cooperated in developing the Act, and their views are entitled to great weight in its interpretation. Cf.Bowenv.Johnston,306 U.S. 19,29-30. Besides, we can think of no other rational meaning for the phrase "jurisdiction, exclusive or partial" than that which the administrative construction gives it.

Since the government had not accepted jurisdiction in the manner required by the Act, the federal court had no jurisdiction of this proceeding. In this view it is immaterial that Louisiana statutes authorized the government to take jurisdiction, since at the critical time the jurisdiction had not been taken.6

Our answer to certified question No. 1 is Yes and to question No. 2 is No.It is so ordered.
  1. Page 313 Exclusive jurisdiction over the lands on which the Camp is located was accepted for the federal government by the Secretary of War in a letter to the Governor of Louisiana, effective January 15, 1943. ↩
  2. Page 314 In the words of a sponsor of the bill, the object of the act was flexibility, so "that the head of the acquiring agency or department of the Government could at any time designate what type of jurisdiction is necessary; that is, either exclusive or partial. In other words, it definitely contemplates leaving the question of extent of jurisdiction necessary to the head of the land-acquiring agency." Hearings, House Committee on Buildings and Grounds, H.R. 7293, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5. ↩
  3. Page 314Ibid., 7. ↩
  4. Page 314 Ops. J.A.G. 680.2. ↩
  5. Page 314 Opinion No. 4311, Solicitor, Department of Agriculture. ↩
  6. Page 315 Dart's Louisiana Stat. (Supp.) 2898. In view of the general applicability of the 1940 Act, it is unnecessary to consider the effect of the Weeks Forestry Act,16 U.S.C. § 480, and the Louisiana statute dealing with jurisdiction in national forests, Dart's Louisiana Stat. 3329, even though the land involved here was originally acquired for forestry purposes. ↩