Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

State Tax Commission v. Van Cott

306 U.S. 511

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1939-04-24
Topic
general

Mb. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The State of Utah’s income tax law, effective in 1935, exempts all “Amounts received as compensation, salaries or wages from the United Staies ... for services rendered in connection with the exercise of an essential governmental junction.” 1 (Italics supplied.) In his return of income taxes to the State for 1935 under this law, respondent claimed “as deduction” and “as exempt” *513 salaries paid him as attorney for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation, both federal agencies. The exemptions were denied by the Tax Commission of Utah, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed. 2 Before the Commission and in the Supreme Court of Utah, respondent asserted, first, that his salaries were exempt by the terms of the state statute itself, and, second, that they could not be taxed by the State without violating an immunity granted by the Federal Constitution. In holding respondent’s income not taxable, the Supreme Court of Utah said: “We shall have to be content to follow, as we think we must, the doctrine of the Graves Case [Rogers v.

Citator

State Tax Commission v. Van Cott has been questioned or limited by later authorities: relies on overruled authority: 57 S. Ct. 269 (overruled by Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939)). Read them before relying on it. 99 later decisions cite it.

Authority status
caution
Cited by
99 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Constitutional Law — Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Salaries of employees or officials of federal instrumentalities are not immune under the Federal Constitution from taxation by the States. 306 U.S. at 515
  2. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Review of State Court Judgments Where a state court's judgment is alternatively based on an interpretation of state law and on an immunity it believed the Federal Constitution required, and the two grounds are so interwoven that the judgment cannot be said to rest on an independent interpretation of state law, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the federal question. 306 U.S. at 514
  3. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Disposition on Appeal In exercising its appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court may not only correct error in the judgment under review but make such disposition of the case as justice requires, and in determining what justice requires it must consider any change in fact or law that has supervened since the judgment was entered; the Court may recognize such a change by setting aside the judgment and remanding the case so that the state court may be free to act, which is not to review the state court's decision upon a non-federal question but only to deal appropriately with a matter arising since its judgment bearing on the right disposition of the case. 306 U.S. at 515-516
  4. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Remand to State Court Where the Supreme Court has overruled the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity on which a state court relied in holding federal salaries exempt from state taxation, the judgment is vacated and the cause remanded so that the state court may determine whether the salaries are exempted by the state statute purely as a question of local law, apart from any question of constitutional immunity and without the necessity of attempting to divide functions of government into those which are essential and those which are non-essential. 306 U.S. at 515
STATE TAX COMM'Nv. VAN COTT,306 U.S. 511(1939)
59 S.Ct. 605
STATE TAX COMMISSION ET AL.v. VAN COTT.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH.
No. 491.
Argued March 6, 7, 1939.
Decided March 27, 1939.
1. Salaries of employees or official of federal instrumentalities are not immune under the Federal Constitution from taxation by the States.Gravesv.New Yorkex rel. O'Keefe, ante, p. 466. P. 515. 2. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah holding the salaries of an attorney for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation, both federal agencies, exempt from state taxation, does not rest squarely upon the exemption in the Utah income tax law of salaries received from the United States "for services rendered in connection with the exercise of an essential governmental function," but appears also to have been actuated by the doctrine that state taxation of such salaries is forbidden by the Federal Constitution. P. 513. 3. In view of the overruling of that doctrine byGravesv.O'Keefe, this Court vacates the judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah and remands the case to that court, in order that it may determine whether the salaries in question are exempted by the state statute, purely as a question of local law. P. 515.95 Utah 43;79 P.2d 6, vacated.
CERTIORARI,305 U.S. 592, to review a judgment sustaining a
claim of exemption from state income taxation, on appeal from a
ruling of the above-named Tax Commission.
Mr. Irwin Arnovitz, with whomMessrs. Joseph Chez, Attorney General of Utah, andJohn D. Rice, Deputy Attorney General, were on the brief, for petitioners.Page 512Mr. W.Q. Van Cott, pro se.

The decision of the court below was based squarely upon the construction of the Utah taxing statute. It did not and could not reach the federal question and should not be reviewed.

The Reconstruction and Regional corporations are engaged exclusively in exercising traditional and important functions of the United States, — "essential governmental functions," if that phrase applies to any federal activities.Brushv.Commissioner,300 U.S. 352.

UnderDobbinsv.Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435, andRogersv.Graves,299 U.S. 401, respondent's salaries are immune from state taxation, irrespective of the state statute. Also,McCullochv.Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316;Helveringv.Gerhardt,304 U.S. 405.

No question as to the constitutionality of the Reconstruction or Regional Corporation is presented.

It is the present intention of Congress that the salaries of officers and employees of the United States and its instrumentalities shall be immune from taxation by the States.

By leave of Court,Solicitor General Jacksonfiled a brief on behalf of the United States, asamicus curiae.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of Utah's income tax law, effective in 1935, exempts all "Amounts received as compensation, salaries or wages from the United States . . . for services rendered in connection with the exercise ofan essential governmental function."1(Italics supplied.) In his return of income taxes to the State for 1935 under this law, respondent claimed "as deduction" and "as exempt"Page 513salaries paid him as attorney for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation, both federal agencies. The exemptions were denied by the Tax Commission of Utah, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed.2Before the Commission and in the Supreme Court of Utah, respondent asserted, first, that his salaries were exempt by the terms of the state statute itself, and, second, that they could not be taxed by the State without violating an immunity granted by the Federal Constitution. In holding respondent's income not taxable, the Supreme Court of Utah said: "We shall have to be content to follow, as we think we must, the doctrine of the Graves Case [Rogersv.Graves,299 U.S. 401], until such time as a different rule is laid down by the courts, the Congress, or the people through amendment to the Constitution."3TheGravescase applied the doctrine that the Federal Constitution prohibits the application of state income taxes to salaries derived from federal instrumentalities. We granted certiorari, in the present case, because of the importance of the principle of Constitutional immunity from state taxation which the Utah court apparently thought controlled its judgment.4

Respondent contends that the Utah Supreme Court's decision "was based squarely upon the construction of the Utah taxing statute which was held to omit respondent's salaries as a subject of taxation, and therefore that decision did not and could not reach the federal question and should not be reviewed." But that decision cannot be said to rest squarely upon a construction of the state statute. The Utah court stated that the question before it was whether respondent's salaries from the agencies in question were "taxable income for the purpose of thePage 514state income tax law," and that the answer depended upon whether these agencies exercised "essential governmental functions." But the opinion as a whole shows that the court felt constrained to conclude as it did because of the Federal Constitution and this Court's prior adjudications of Constitutional immunity. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the court's declaration that respondent could not be taxed under the "doctrine of theGravescaseuntil such time as a different rule is laid downby the courts, the Congress or the people through amendment tothe Constitution." (Italics supplied.) If the court were only incidentally referring to decisions of this Court in determining the meaning of the state law, and had concluded therefrom that the statute was itself intended to grant exemption to respondent, this Court would have no jurisdiction to review that question.5But, if the state court did in fact intend alternatively to base its decision upon the state statute and upon an immunity it thought granted by the Constitution as interpreted by this Court, these two grounds are so interwoven that we are unable to conclude that the judgment rests upon an independent interpretation of the state law.6Whatever exemptions the Supreme Court of Utah may find in the terms of this statute, its opinion in the present case only indicates that "it thought the Federal Constitution [as construed by this Court] required" it to hold respondent not taxable.7Page 515

After careful review of this Court's decisions on the question of intergovernmental immunity, the state court concluded that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation were "instrumentalities" performing "essential governmental duties" and that state taxation of respondent's salaries violated the Federal Constitution as interpreted by theGravescase. Anticipating that this Court might reexamine that interpretation and apply a "different test," the state court said that "Until such is done the States are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court in . . . Rogers v. Graves, supra."

We have now re-examined and overruled the doctrine ofRogersv.GravesinGravesv.O'Keefe, ante, p. 466. Salaries of employees or officials of the Federal Government or its instrumentalities are no longer immune, under the Federal Constitution, from taxation by the States. Whether the Utah income tax, by its terms, exempts respondent, can now be decided by the state's highest court apart from any question of Constitutional immunity, and without the necessity, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, of attempting to divide functions of government into those which are essential and those which are non-essential.

"We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered. We may recognize such a change, which may affect the result, by setting aside the judgment and remanding the case so that the state court may be free to act. We have said that to do this is not to review, in any proper sense of thePage 516term, the decision of the state court upon a non-federal question, but only to deal appropriately with a matter arising since its judgment and having a bearing upon the right disposition of the case."8

Applying this principle, we vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings.Judgment vacated.

The CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
  1. Page 512 Revised Stat. of Utah, 1933, § 80-14-4, (2)(g). ↩
  2. Page 51395 Utah 43;79 P.2d 6. ↩
  3. Page 513 79 P.2d 14. ↩
  4. Page 513305 U.S. 592. ↩
  5. Page 514Miller's Executorsv.Swann,150 U.S. 132,136;InterstateRailway Co. v.Massachusetts,207 U.S. 79,84;LouisvilleNashville R. Co. v.Western Union Telegraph Co.,237 U.S. 300,302; cf.Carmichaelv.Southern Coal Co.,301 U.S. 495,507. ↩
  6. Page 514Abie State Bankv.Bryan,282 U.S. 765,773. ↩
  7. Page 514 Cf.Red Cross Linev.Atlantic Fruit Co.,264 U.S. 109,120;Tiptonv.Atchison, T. S.F. Ry. Co.,298 U.S. 141,152,153;Illinois Central R. Co. v.Messina,240 U.S. 395,397. ↩
  8. Page 516Pattersonv.Alabama,294 U.S. 600,607. ↩